



**Nuclear Management Company, LLC**  
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant  
1717 Wakonade Dr. East • Welch MN 55089

September 4, 2001

10 CFR Part 73  
Section 73.71

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

**PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT**  
Docket No. 50-282 License No. DPR-42  
50-306 DPR-60

**LER 1-01-06: Security Responders out of Position due to Plant Fire**

The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached. In the report, we made no new NRC commitments. This event was reported via the Emergency Notification System in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73, Section 73.71, on August 4, 2001. Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

Mano Nazar  
Site Vice President  
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

c: Regional Administrator - Region III, NRC  
NRR Project Manager, NRC  
Senior Resident Inspector, NRC  
James Bernstein, State of Minnesota

Attachment

JE74

<b>NRC FORM 366</b> (1-2001)	<b>U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION</b>	<b>APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001</b> Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to <a href="mailto:bj1@nrc.gov">bj1@nrc.gov</a> , and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
<b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b> (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)		

<b>FACILITY NAME (1)</b> Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1	<b>DOCKET NUMBER (2)</b> 05000 282	<b>PAGE (3)</b> 1 OF 3
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**TITLE (4)**  
 Security Responders out of Position due to Plant Fire

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
08	03	01	01	06	00	09	04	01	Prairie Island Unit 2	50-306
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

<b>OPERATING MODE (9)</b>	1	<b>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)</b>								
<b>POWER LEVEL (10)</b>	20	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
		20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				

**LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)**

<b>NAME</b> Mike Sleigh	<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)</b> 651-388-1121
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**COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)</b>										
<b>YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).</b>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<b>NO</b>				
					<b>EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)</b>		<b>MONTH</b>	<b>DAY</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	

**ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)**

During the evening of August 3, 2001 an electrical fault in non-safeguards Bus 12 started a fire. An offsite response from the Red Wing Fire Department was required to assist the plant staff in the control of that fire.

During the event, two responders were outside of their timelines for periods of approximately 2 hours/15 minutes and 16 minutes, respectively. While they were outside of their timelines, they were still within the plant's protected area, able to respond, and were supported by the fact that staffing levels that night were above the Security Plan minimum requirements. Additionally, during the course of the event 3 fully qualified supervisors arrived on site and would have been able to provide some assistance in a contingency event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1	05000 282	01	06	00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

During the evening of August 3, 2001 an electrical fault in non-safeguards Bus 12 started a fire. An offsite response from the Red Wing Fire Department was required to assist the plant staff in the control of that fire.

The Security Team on duty that evening responded to the fire and an initial report was made to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System to report that a Suspension of Safeguards had been made due to a security responder being outside of his response timeline for a short period of time. After a careful review of the event and following discussions with Region III, it is our opinion that this event did not constitute a Suspension of Safeguards and should not have been reported as such. The event does still require notification of the NRC as responders outside of their timelines is in itself a reportable event.

A more detailed review of the locations of all Security personnel during the event was completed. During that review it was determined that an additional responder, who was originally thought to be within his timelines, was outside of his timelines for a period of approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes.

The following is a short timeline of activities associated with the response by Security personnel.

August 3, 2001 (Note that times are approximate)

- 2040 Fire starts
- 2053 Security shift Captain reports to Control Room to assume Shift Emergency Communicator duties
- 2105 First fire truck and first ambulance arrived – escorted into the Protected Area by Security personnel, including Security responder A
- 2112 Notification of Unusual Event declared by the plant
- 2128 Security responder B sent out of position to assess an alarm on a perimeter zone
- 2136 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site to assist (Note that Security supervisors are fully qualified to perform all the duties of a Security responder)
- 2144 Security responder B returns to his response sector (alarm was reset and tested – Responder B was out of position for approximately 16 minutes)
- 2146 Security Manager arrives on site
- 2203 Security Consultant arrives on site
- 2234 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site
- 2237 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site
- 2242 Second fire truck, second ambulance and fire department support vehicle arrive on site
- 2320 Security responder A returns to sector as fire department vehicles depart the site (Out of sector for approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes)
- 2322 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site
- 0012 (August 4) NUE terminated

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		01	- 06 -	00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The fire in Bus 12, with the activation of the Emergency Response Organization and the presence of offsite response vehicles, required use of responders in areas outside of their timelines.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event is reportable per 10CFR 73.71 since Security response personnel were outside of their timelines as set forth in the site's protective strategy.

A review of the events showed that the two responders, identified in the timeline above as A and B, were outside of their timelines for periods of approximately 2 hours/15 minutes and 16 minutes, respectively. While they were outside of their timelines, they were still within the plant's protected area, able to respond, and were supported by the fact that staffing levels that night were above the Security Plan minimum requirements. Additionally, during the course of the event 3 fully qualified supervisors arrived on site and would have been able to provide some assistance in a contingency event.

It should also be noted that a fire of this nature is a random and unpredictable event that would not have been exploitable by an adversary.

Effect on Safety System Functional Failure and Other Performance Indicators

Effect of the fire in Bus 12 will be discussed in LER 1-01-05.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate Actions Taken

The responders were all within their timelines when the offsite response vehicles left the Protected Area.

Actions to be Taken

The overall Security response to this event is being evaluated through the Prairie Island corrective action process.

FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

None.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None.