September 14, 2001

Mr. Randall K. Edington
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR HANDLING IRRADIATED FUEL IN THE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (TAC NO. MB1118)

Dear Mr. Edington:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 119 to Facility Operating License (FOL) No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the FOL and Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated January 24, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 20 and August 7, 2001. The supplemental letters provided additional information that did not expand the scope of the NRC staff's initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (66 FR 20001, published April 18, 2001).

The amendment changes TSs concerning certain operational conditions required when conducting core alterations or handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment and implements administrative controls in accordance with draft NUMARC 93-01, “Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 3, Section 11.3.6.5, "Containment - Primary (PWR [pressurized-water reactor])/ Secondary (BWR [boiling-water reactor])," in lieu of License Condition 2.C.(17), which is deleted from the FOL. In addition, terms within the TSs are changed to make them consistent with the terminology in other revised TSs.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert E. Moody, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 119 to NPF-47
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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*No significant change from original SE input
Accession No.:ML 012480416 **See previous concurrence

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ENTERGY GULF STATES, INC. **

AND

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-458

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 119
License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Entergy Gulf States, Inc.* (the licensee) dated January 24, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 20 and August 7, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

---

* Entergy Operations, Inc. is authorized to act as agent for Entergy Gulf States, Inc., and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

**Entergy Gulf States, Inc., has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., was the surviving company in the merger.

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 119 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate IV
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 14, 2001

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 119

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

DOCKET NO. 50-458

Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number.

Remove	Insert
6	6
7	7

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3.3-71	3.3-71
3.6-31	3.6-31
3.7-5	3.7-5
3.7-6	3.7-6
3.7-7	3.7-7
3.7-9	3.7-9
3.7-10	3.7-10
3.7-11	3.7-11
5.0-8	5.0-8

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated January 24, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 20 and August 7, 2001, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47) for the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS). The amendment request proposes changes to the TSs concerning certain operational conditions required when conducting core alterations or handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment. In addition, the licensee proposes to implement administrative controls, in accordance with draft NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 3, Section 11.3.6.5, "Containment - Primary (PWR [pressurized-water reactor])/Secondary (BWR [boiling-water reactor]),” in lieu of License Condition 2.C.(17), and change terms to make them consistent with the terminology in other revised TSs. The supplemental letters provided additional information that did not expand the scope of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) staff's initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (66 FR 20001, published April 18, 2001).

2.0 BACKGROUND

Where applicable, the licensee uses TS Task Force Traveler 51 (TSTF-51), Revision 2, to justify the requested changes. TSTF-51, Revision 2, was approved by the NRC on October 15, 1999. TSTF-51, Revision 2, allows the removal of TS requirements for engineered safety features (ESF) to be OPERABLE after sufficient radioactive decay has occurred to ensure off-site doses remain below a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits. Fuel that is not sufficiently decayed to allow relaxation of OPERABILITY requirements is referred to as “recently” irradiated fuel. Recently irradiated fuel could still be moved, but the appropriate ESF systems need to be OPERABLE. TSTF-51, Revision 2, also allows the deletion of OPERABILITY requirements for ESF mitigation features during CORE ALTERATIONS.

The Reviewer's Note in TSTF-51, Revision 2, requires that licensees adding the term “recently” make a commitment consistent with draft NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Section 11.3.6.5. The Reviewer’s Note reads, in part:

"The following guidelines are included in the assessment of systems removed from service during movement of irradiated fuel:

- During fuel handling/core alterations, ventilation system and radiation monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91-06) should be assessed, with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the fuel. Following shutdown, radioactivity in the fuel decays away fairly rapidly. The basis of the Technical Specification operability amendment is the reduction in doses due to such decay. The goal of maintaining ventilation system and radiation monitor availability is to reduce doses even further below that provided by the natural decay.

- A single normal or contingency method to promptly close primary or secondary containment penetrations should be developed. Such prompt methods need not completely block the penetration or be capable of resisting pressure.

The purpose of the "prompt methods" mentioned above are to enable ventilation systems to draw the release from a postulated fuel handling accident in the proper direction such that it can be treated and monitored."

Since TSTF-51, Revision 2, was approved, draft NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, was issued. The requirements of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, Section 11.2.6, "Safety Assessment for Removal of Equipment from Service During Shutdown Conditions," are relocated in draft NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Section 11.3.6 "Assessment Methods for Shutdown Conditions."

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Refueling Related TS Changes

3.1.1 TS 3.6.1.10, "Primary Containment-Shutdown"

3.1.1.1 Changes to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) applicability

The LCO and Applicability is currently:

"LCO 3.6.1.10 Primary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment,
During CORE ALTERATIONS,
During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)."

The licensee proposes to delete the requirement that the LCO is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS. The licensee also proposes to revise the LCO applicability by adding the word "recently" before "irradiated fuel assemblies." The revised Applicability will be:

"APPLICABILITY: During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment,

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)."

The fuel handling accident (FHA) is the only event during CORE ALTERATIONS that is postulated to result in fuel damage and radiological release. The LCO will remain applicable during activities which could result in a FHA with fuel damage and radiological release. The term "recently" when used in this context represents the decay period for the reduction of radionuclide inventory available for release in the event of a FHA. The licensee has determined that a FHA will remain less than 25% of 10 CFR Part 100 dose limitations after a decay period of 11 days. Both of these changes are consistent with the current FHA analysis and TSTF-51, Revision 2. Therefore, these proposed changes to the applicability of LCO 3.6.1.10 are acceptable.

3.1.1.2 Containment Closure Commitment

In accordance with the Reviewer's Note in TSTF-51, Revision 2, mentioned above, the licensee committed to the guidelines for the assessment of systems removed from service during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and movement of fuel assemblies over irradiated fuel assemblies. To implement their above commitment, the licensee will implement contingency plans for prompt closure of openings which will include the following:

1. Equipment and tools needed to facilitate closure will be staged.
2. Personnel responsible for closure will be knowledgeable and trained in the procedures for establishing building integrity.
3. The closure response team will be accompanied by a Radiation Protection (RP) technician for radiation protection monitoring.
4. Hoses and cables routed through openings will employ a means to allow rapid, safe disconnect and removal,
5. One door in each airlock will be capable of expeditious closure.

In their August 7, 2001, supplemental letter, the licensee clarified that the personnel responsible for closure are designated personnel available on-site. Existing procedures require that a list of designated closure respondees be maintained for each shift. The licensee states in their August 7, 2001, supplemental letter that they will implement these guidelines prior to the use of this license amendment. The staff has reviewed the RBS commitments and concluded that they are adequate for meeting the licensee's commitment to containment closure controls.

3.1.1.3 Changes to the Required Actions:

The licensee is revising the Required Actions to reflect the change in applicability. The proposed revisions are consistent with the changes in applicability discussed in Section 3.1.1.1 above. The staff concludes that the proposed revisions to the Required Actions are acceptable.

3.1.2 TS 3.7.2, "Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System," and TS 3.7.3, "Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System"

3.1.2.1 Applicability

TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.3 require that two CRFA subsystems and two Control Room AC subsystems, respectively, be operable when the TSs are Applicable. The licensee is proposing

to modify the Applicability and Actions of these TS LCOs by deleting the requirement that the LCO is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS. The current Applicability statement for both TSs is:

> "APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,
> During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment,
> During CORE ALTERATIONS,
> During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)."

Also, the licensee proposes to replace "secondary containment" with "fuel building." The fuel building is the only location outside of primary containment where irradiated fuel is moved and, per License Amendment 113, issued September 22, 2000, the fuel building is not considered part of secondary containment. After all the changes, the proposed Applicability statement will read:

> "APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3,
> During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel building,
> During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)."

These changes are acceptable (see Section 3.1.1.1, above). The licensee partially adopts the provisions of TSTF-51, Revision 2, by deleting the reference to CORE ALTERATIONS, but does not adopt the provisions for adding the word "recently" before "irradiated fuel assemblies." By not adding the word "recently" before "irradiated fuel assemblies," the licensee's wording is more restrictive than the provisions of TSTF-51, Revision 2, and is acceptable.

3.1.2.2 Required Actions

The licensee is revising the Required Actions to reflect the change in Applicability. The proposed revisions are consistent with the changes in Applicability discussed in Section 3.1.1.1, above. The staff, therefore, finds that the proposed revisions to the Required Actions are acceptable.

3.1.3 License Condition 2.C.(17)

The licensee proposes to delete License Condition 2.C.(17). The License Condition states:

> "Primary containment air lock doors may be open during CORE ALTERATIONS, except when moving recently irradiated fuel, (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 11 days), provided the following conditions exist:
>
> 1) One door in each air lock is capable of being closed.
>
> 2) Hoses and cables running through the air lock employ a means of to allow safe, quick disconnect and are tagged at both ends with specific instructions to expedite removal.

3) There is minimum of 23 feet of water over the core.

4) The air lock doors are not blocked open to allow expeditious closure.

5) A designated individual is available to expeditiously close the air lock door.

6) Systems are available to filter and monitor releases from the containment."

In the Description of Proposed Changes in their July 20, 2001, supplemental letter, the licensee stated that this License Condition was no longer needed because 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires licensees to assess and manage the risk associated with systems, structures, and components being removed from service during normal shutdown operations. This was in conflict with the supplemental letter dated July 20, 2001, where the licensee stated they were making "...commitments to compensatory actions as delineated in TSTF-51, Revision 2, in lieu of relying on the maintenance rule, 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), as a basis for managing the impact of an open containment configuration...." In the August 7, 2001, supplemental letter, the licensee stated it was not their intent to leave the statement concerning 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) as a sole basis for deleting the License Condition. The licensee reiterated the administrative controls stipulated in TSTF-51, Revision 2, in conjunction with the current FHA analysis, are the bases for deleting License Condition 2.C.(17).

The NRC staff reviewed the administrative controls proposed by the licensee and discussed in Section 3.1.1.2, above, and determined they provide equivalent protection to the License Condition. In addition, the reactor vessel and fuel pool levels are controlled by other TSs to ensure the assumptions of the FHA analysis are maintained. Since equivalent requirements to those imposed by this License Condition exist elsewhere, the deletion of License Condition 2.C.(17) is acceptable.

3.1.4 TS Table 3.3.7.1-1, "Control Room Fresh Air System Instrumentation"

3.1.4.1 Changes to footnote (b) for TS Table 3.3.7.1-1

Footnote (b) for TS Table 3.3.7.1-1 currently reads:

> “During CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment."

The licensee proposes to delete the requirement that footnote (b) for TS Table 3.3.7.1-1 is applicable to Control Room Local Intake Ventilation Radiation Monitors during CORE ALTERATIONS. Also, the licensee proposes to replace “or secondary containment" with “containment or fuel building.” The fuel building is the only location outside of primary containment where irradiated fuel is moved and, per License Amendment 113, the fuel building is not considered part of secondary containment.

The revised footnote (b) to TS Table 3.3.7.1-1 will read:

> “During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel building."

The FHA is the only event during CORE ALTERATIONS that is postulated to result in fuel damage and radiological release. Footnote (b) for TS Table 3.3.7.1-1 will remain applicable

during activities which could result in a FHA with fuel damage and radiological release. The licensee partially adopts the provisions of TSTF-51, Revision 2, by deleting the reference to CORE ALTERATIONS, but does not adopt the provisions for adding the word "recently" before "irradiated fuel assemblies." By not adding the word "recently" before "irradiated fuel assemblies," the licensee's wording is more restrictive than the provisions of TSTF-51, Revision 2. These changes are consistent with the current FHA analysis and TSTF-51, Revision 2. Therefore, these proposed changes to footnote (b) to TS Table 3.3.7.1-1 are acceptable.

3.2 Non-refueling Related TS Changes

3.2.1 Deletion of the Standby Gas Treatment System from TS 5.5.2, “Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment”

The Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment leakage control program was established in response to requirements in NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI [Three Mile Island Nuclear Station] Action Plan Requirements." The program is to provide controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside of containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a severe transient or accident to as low a practicable. The program typically includes ESF systems that circulate contaminated fluids outside primary containment. Currently, the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system is included in the RBS Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment leakage control program. The licensee proposes to delete the inclusion of the SGT systems from TS 5.5.2 because they believe it is unnecessary. The current TS 5.5.2 reads:

> “This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. The systems include the Low Pressure Core Spray, High Pressure Core Spray, Residual Heat Removal, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, process sampling, and Standby Gas Treatment Systems. The program shall include the following:
>
> a. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements; and
>
> b. Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.”

The revised TS 5.5.2 will read:

> “This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. The systems include the Low Pressure Core Spray, High Pressure Core Spray, Residual Heat Removal, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, and process sampling. The program shall include the following:
>
> a. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements; and
>
> b. Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.”

The SGT system ensures that airborne radioactive materials that leak from the primary containment or from ESF systems following a design basis accident (DBA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment. The SGT system also maintains the annulus and the auxiliary building at slight negative pressures during DBAs. The SGT system filters, fans, and part of the discharge ductwork are located in secondary containment. The system filters are located upstream of the fans and have at least a 99% efficiency in removing iodine and contaminants. The discharge portion of the system penetrates secondary containment and exhausts filtered air out the exhaust stack. The leakage testing required by this program for the SGT system consists of bubble tests on the discharge ductwork joints between the fans and the exhaust stack. This portion of the system is downstream of the filters and contains filtered air during system operation. The high-efficiency particulate air and charcoal filters are tested for penetration and bypass leakage in accordance with TS 5.5.7, "Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)."

The licensee's basis for removing the SGT system from TS 5.5.2 is that the portion of the system outside of containment does not contain "highly radioactive fluid." The discharge section of the SGT system ductwork is downstream of the filters where any iodine and contaminants have been removed to at least a 99% efficiency. The efficacy of the filters is maintained by requirements outside of the leakage control program. As the inclusion of the SGT system in this leakage control program does not impact the SGT system's ability to perform its function, the licensee proposal to remove it from the program is acceptable.

The NRC staff finds the licensee's proposed changes to the TSs and the RBS Operating License specified in a January 24, 2001, letter to the NRC, as supplemented by letters dated July 20 and August 7, 2001, to be acceptable when considered together with the radiological consequence evaluation in Section 3.3, below.

3.3 Radiological Consequence Evaluation

The NRC staff evaluated the proposed changes with respect to the radiological consequences, both offsite and to the control room operators, of DBAs. RBS previously had received approval for the containment air locks to be open during refueling in Amendment 85, issued January 11, 1996. At the time this amendment was approved, License Condition 2.C.(17) was added to ensure re-establishment of containment integrity should an accident occur while the air locks are open, and provide for defense-in-depth mitigation and monitoring of a potential radioactivity release from the primary containment during refueling.

The licensee did not perform any new analyses in support of the proposed TS changes. The licensee's current design basis includes FHA radiological consequences analyses that credit 11 days of radiological decay time and do not credit either containment integrity or the compensatory measures, as committed to previously by the License Condition. The NRC staff has reviewed the current FHA dose analyses and determined that they are still applicable to the newly proposed TS changes. The NRC staff also reviewed information on the expected release points for an FHA with the proposed TS change, which was provided by the licensee's supplemental letter dated July 20, 2001. The NRC staff has reasonable assurance, based on careful review of this information, that the current FHA dose analyses used atmospheric dispersion factors that are conservative for this submittal. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the current FHA analyses remain bounding because the proposed TS changes would not invalidate the assumptions used either in the previously approved analysis in support of allowing the containment personnel air locks to be open during movement of fuel in

containment (see Amendment 85) or in the analysis approved for Amendment 110, issued March 2, 2000, which updated the FHA in containment.

The proposed TS changes, along with previously approved TS changes for Amendment 83, issued September 11, 1995, Amendment 110, and Amendment 113 to the RBS operating license, are consistent with generic changes in TSTF-51, Revision 2. Use of the term "recently irradiated fuel" to mean fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 11 days is acceptable, based on staff finding the licensee's FHA analysis and compensatory actions acceptable in accordance with the reviewers note for TSTF-51, Revision 2. After 11 days, the fuel has undergone radioactive decay to a point that, for an unmitigated design basis FHA without building integrity, the calculated radiological consequences are well within the dose limits given in 10 CFR Part 100 for persons offsite and are also within the dose limits given in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19 for control room personnel.

The NRC staff has determined that the current RBS design basis radiological consequences analyses remain bounding for the proposed TS changes concerning certain operational conditions required when conducting core alterations or handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment. The NRC staff has reasonable assurance that, with the proposed TS changes, RBS continues to meet the dose acceptance criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.25 for persons offsite and the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19 for the control room. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed TS changes are acceptable with regard to the radiological consequences of DBAs.

3.4 Commitments

In reviewing the licensee's application dated January 24, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 20 and August 7, 2001, the NRC staff noted that the licensee made commitments regarding activities associated with the proposed TS changes. The commitments that the NRC staff considers to be safety significant are as follows:

1. During fuel handling/core alterations, ventilation system and radiation monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91-06) will be assessed, with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the fuel. The goal of maintaining ventilation system and radiation monitor availability is to reduce doses even further below that provided by the natural decay.

2. A single normal or contingency method to promptly close primary or secondary containment penetrations will be established. Such prompt methods need not completely block the penetration or be capable of resisting pressure.

3. Contingency plans for prompt closure of openings will include the following:

   - Equipment and tools needed to facilitate closure will be staged,
   - Personnel responsible for closure will be knowledgeable and trained in the procedures for establishing building integrity,
   - The closure response team will be accompanied by a Radiation Protection (RP) technician for radiation protection monitoring,
   - Hoses and cables routed through openings will employ a means to allow rapid, safe disconnect and removal, and
   - One door in each airlock will be capable of expeditious closure.

The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above commitments are best provided by the licensee's administrative processes, including its commitment management program. The above commitments do not warrant the creation of a regulatory requirement. The NRC staff notes that pending industry and regulatory guidance pertaining to 10 CFR 50.71(e) may call for some information relative to the above commitment to be included in a future update of the RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (66 FR 20001, published April 18, 2001). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: D. Cullison
M. Hart

Date: September 14, 2001

cc:

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