

Docket Nos. 50-~~280~~
and 50-281

DEC 08 1975

Virginia Electric & Power Company
ATTN: Mr. Stanley Ragone
Senior Vice President
Post Office Box 26666
Richmond, Virginia 23261

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments No. 13 to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 for the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The amendments include Change No. 28 to your Technical Specifications for each license and are in response to your request dated September 17, 1975.

The amendments revise the provisions in the Technical Specifications relating to 3 miscellaneous items. These changes include: (1) a revised surveillance requirement in the Inservice Inspection Program, (2) an error correction, and (3) a revised limiting condition for operation in the fuel oil system for the emergency diesel-generators.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

RS

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 13 to DPR-32
2. Amendment No. 13 to DPR-37
3. Safety Evaluation
4. Federal Register Notice

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson
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cc w/enclosures & incoming:

Ms. Susan T. Wilburn
Commonwealth of Virginia
Council on the Environment
P. O. Box 790
Richmond, Virginia 23206

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-280

SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 13
License No. DPR-32

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Virginia Electric & Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1975, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-32 is hereby amended to read as follows:




" B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 28 ."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 28 to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 8, 1975

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 13
CHANGE NO. 28 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32
DOCKET NO. 50-280

Revise Appendix A as follows:

<u>Remove Pages:</u>	<u>Insert Pages:</u>
3.16-2 - 3.16-6	3.16-2 - 3.16-7
4.1-9	4.1-9
4.2-27	4.2-27

4. Two physically independent circuits from the offsite transmission network to energize the 4,160 and 480 v emergency buses. One of these sources must be immediately available, i.e. primary source; and the other must be capable of being made available within 8 hours; i.e. dependable alternate source.
5. Two operable flow paths for providing fuel to each diesel generator.
6. Two batteries, two chargers, and the d.c. distribution systems operable.

B. During power operation or the return to power from hot shutdown conditions, the requirements of specification 3.16-A may be modified by one of the following:

1. One diesel generator may be unavailable or inoperable provided the operability of the other diesel generator is demonstrated daily. If this diesel generator is not returned to an operable status within 7 days, the reactor shall be brought to a cold shutdown condition. One diesel fuel oil flow path may be "inoperable" for 24 hours provided the other flow path is proven operable. If after 24 hours, the inoperable flow path cannot be returned to service, the diesel shall be considered "inoperable."

2. If a primary source is not available, the unit may be operated for seven (7) days provided the dependable alternate source can be operable within 8 hours. If specification A-4 is not satisfied within seven (7) days, the unit shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition.
 3. One battery may be inoperable for 24 hours provided the other battery and battery chargers remain operable with one battery charger carrying the d.c. load of the failed battery's supply system. If the battery is not returned to operable status within the 24 hour period the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the battery is not restored to operable status within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.
- C. The continuous running electrical load supplied by an emergency diesel generator shall be limited to 2750 kw.

Basis

The Emergency Power System is an on-site, independent, automatically starting power source. It supplies power to vital unit auxiliaries if a normal power source is not available. The Emergency Power System consists of three diesel generators for two units. One generator is used exclusively for Unit 1, the second for Unit 2, and the third generator functions as a backup for either Unit 1 or 2. The diesel generators have a continuous 2,000 hour rating of 2750 kw and a two hour rating of 2850 kw. The actual loads using conservative

ratings for accident conditions, require approximately 2,320 kw. Each unit has two emergency buses, one bus in each unit is connected to its exclusive diesel generator. The second bus in each unit will be connected to the backup diesel generator as required. Each diesel generator has 100 percent capacity and is connected to independent 4,160 v emergency buses. These emergency buses are normally fed from the reserve station service transformers. The normal station service transformers are fed from the unit isolated phase bus at a point between the generator terminals and the low voltage terminal of the main step-up transformer. The reserve station service transformers are fed from the autotransformers in the high voltage switchyard. The circuit which supplies power through either autotransformer is called a "primary source." In the event an autotransformer is inoperable, the remaining one may be cross-tied by a 34.5 bus to all three reserve station service transformers. Thus, a primary source is available to both units even if one of the two autotransformers is out of service.

In addition to the "primary sources," each unit has an additional offsite power source which is called the "dependable alternate source." This source can be made available in eight (8) hours by removing a unit from service, disconnecting its generator from the isolated phase bus, and feeding offsite power through the main step-up transformer and normal station service transformers to the emergency buses.

The generator can be disconnected from the isolated phase bus within eight (8) hours. A unit can be maintained in a safe condition for eight (8) hours with no offsite power without damaging reactor fuel or the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

The diesel generators function as an onsite back-up system to supply the emergency buses. Each emergency bus provides power to the following operating Engineered Safeguards equipment:

- A. One containment spray pump
- B. One charging pump
- C. One low head safety injection pump
- D. One recirculation spray pump inside containment
- E. One recirculation spray pump outside containment
- F. One containment vacuum pump
- G. One motor control center for valves, instruments, control air compressor, fuel oil pumps, etc.
- H. Control area air conditioning equipment - four air recirculating units, one water chilling unit, one service water pump and one chilled water circulating pump
- I. One charging pump service water pump for charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube oil coolers

- J. One charging pump cooling water pump for charging pump seal coolers.

The day tanks are filled by transferring fuel from any one of two buried tornado missile protected fuel oil storage tanks, each of 20,000 gal capacity. Two of 100 percent capacity fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel generator are powered from the emergency buses to assure that an operating diesel generator has a continuous supply of fuel. The buried fuel oil storage tanks contain a seven day supply of fuel, 35,000 gal minimum, for the full load operation of one diesel generator; in addition, there is an above ground fuel oil storage tank on-site with a capacity of 210,000 gal which is used for transferring fuel to the buried tanks.

If a loss of normal power is not accompanied by a loss-of-coolant accident, the safeguards equipment will not be required. Under this condition the following additional auxiliary equipment may be operated from each emergency bus:

- A. One component cooling pump
- B. One residual heat removal pump
- C. One motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pump

The emergency buses in each unit are capable of being interconnected under strict administrative procedures so that the equipment which would normally be operated by one of the diesels could be operated by the other diesel, if required.

References

FSAR Section 8.5 Emergency Power System
FSAR Section 9.3 Residual Heat Removal System
FSAR Section 9.4 Component Cooling System
FSAR Section 10.3.2 Auxiliary Steam System
FSAR Section 10.3.5 Condensate and Feedwater System

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TABLE 4.1-2A

MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR EQUIPMENT TESTS

<u>Description</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>FSAR Section Reference</u>
1. Control Rod Assemblies	Rod drop times of all full length rods at hot and cold conditions.	Each refueling shutdown or after disassembly or maintenance requiring the breach of the Reactor Coolant System integrity	7
2. Control Rod Assemblies	Partial movement of all rods	Every 2 weeks	7
3. Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank	Functional	Each refueling shutdown	6
4. Pressurizer Safety Valves	Setpoint	Each refueling shutdown	4
5. Main Steam Safety Valves	Setpoint	Each refueling shutdown	10
6. Containment Isolation Trip	*Functional	Each refueling shutdown	5
7. Refueling System Interlocks	*Functional	Prior to refueling	9.12
8. Service Water System	*Functional	Each refueling shutdown	9.9
9. Fire Protection Pump and Power Supply	Functional	Monthly	9.10
10. Primary System Leakage	*Evaluate	Daily	4
11. Diesel Fuel Supply	*Fuel Inventory	5 days/week	8.5
12. Boric Acid Piping Heat Tracing Circuits	*Operational	Monthly	9.1
13. Main Steam Line Trip	Functional (1) Full closure (2) Partial closure	(1) Each cold shutdown (2) Before each startup but at least quarterly	10
14. Service Water System Values in Line Supplying Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers	Functional	Each refueling	9.9
15. Control Room Ventilation System	*Ability to maintain positive pressure for 1 hour using a volume of air equivalent to or less than that stored in the bottled air supply	Each refueling interval (approx. every 12-18 months)	9.13

*See Specification 4.1.D

TABLE 4.2-1

SECTION D. PIPING PRESSURE BOUNDARY

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Required Examination Areas</u>	<u>Required Examination Methods</u>	<u>Extent of Examination Planned During First 5-Year Interval</u>	<u>Tentative Inspection During 10-Year Interval</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4.3	G-1	Pressure retaining bolting	Visual and volumetric	Not applicable	Not applicable	There is no bolting 2 inches and larger in the piping system.
4.4	G-2	Pressure retaining bolting	Visual	33% of the bolting would be examined	By the end of the interval, 100% of the bolting would be examined	All bolting is below 2 inches in diameter and would be visually examined, either in place if the bolted connection is not disassembled during the inspection interval, or whenever the bolted connection is disassembled. The bolting to be examined would include studs and nuts.
4.5	K-1	Integrally welded supports	Visual and surface	10% of supports would be examined	By the end of the interval, a cumulative 25% of the supports would be examined	Areas subject to examination would include any integrally welded external support attachment which includes the welds to the pressure containing boundary, the base metal beneath the weld zone, and along the support attachment for distance of two base metal thicknesses.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-281

SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 13
License No. DPR-37

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Virginia Electric & Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1975, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-37 is hereby amended to read as follows:




" B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 28 ."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 28 to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 8, 1975

4. Two physically independent circuits from the offsite transmission network to energize the 4,160 and 480 v emergency buses. One of these sources must be immediately available, i.e. primary source; and the other must be capable of being made available within 8 hours; i.e. dependable alternate source.
 5. Two operable flow paths for providing fuel to each diesel generator.
 6. Two batteries, two chargers, and the d.c. distribution systems operable.
- B. During power operation or the return to power from hot shutdown conditions, the requirements of specification 3.16-A may be modified by one of the following:
1. One diesel generator may be unavailable or inoperable provided the operability of the other diesel generator is demonstrated daily. If this diesel generator is not returned to an operable status within 7 days, the reactor shall be brought to a cold shutdown condition. One diesel fuel oil flow path may be "inoperable" for 24 hours provided the other flow path is proven operable. If after 24 hours, the inoperable flow path cannot be returned to service, the diesel shall be considered "inoperable."

2. If a primary source is not available, the unit may be operated for seven (7) days provided the dependable alternate source can be operable within 8 hours. If specification A-4 is not satisfied within seven (7) days, the unit shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition.
 3. One battery may be inoperable for 24 hours provided the other battery and battery chargers remain operable with one battery charger carrying the d.c. load of the failed battery's supply system. If the battery is not returned to operable status within the 24 hour period the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the battery is not restored to operable status within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.
- C. The continuous running electrical load supplied by an emergency diesel generator shall be limited to 2750 kw.

Basis

The Emergency Power System is an on-site, independent, automatically starting power source. It supplies power to vital unit auxiliaries if a normal power source is not available. The Emergency Power System consists of three diesel generators for two units. One generator is used exclusively for Unit 1, the second for Unit 2, and the third generator functions as a backup for either Unit 1 or 2. The diesel generators have a continuous 2,000 hour rating of 2750 kw and a two hour rating of 2850 kw. The actual loads using conservative

ratings for accident conditions, require approximately 2,320 kw. Each unit has two emergency buses, one bus in each unit is connected to its exclusive diesel generator. The second bus in each unit will be connected to the backup diesel generator as required. Each diesel generator has 100 percent capacity and is connected to independent 4,160 v emergency buses. These emergency buses are normally fed from the reserve station service transformers. The normal station service transformers are fed from the unit isolated phase bus at a point between the generator terminals and the low voltage terminal of the main step-up transformer. The reserve station service transformers are fed from the autotransformers in the high voltage switchyard. The circuit which supplies power through either autotransformer is called a "primary source." In the event an autotransformer is inoperable, the remaining one may be cross-tied by a 34.5 bus to all three reserve station service transformers. Thus, a primary source is available to both units even if one of the two autotransformers is out of service.

In addition to the "primary sources," each unit has an additional offsite power source which is called the "dependable alternate source." This source can be made available in eight (8) hours by removing a unit from service, disconnecting its generator from the isolated phase bus, and feeding offsite power through the main step-up transformer and normal station service transformers to the emergency buses.

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- I. One charging pump service water pump for charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube oil coolers

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- J. One charging pump cooling water pump for charging pump seal coolers.

The day tanks are filled by transferring fuel from any one of two buried tornado missile protected fuel oil storage tanks, each of 20,000 gal capacity. Two of 100 percent capacity fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel generator are powered from the emergency buses to assure that an operating diesel generator has a continuous supply of fuel. The buried fuel oil storage tanks contain a seven day supply of fuel, 35,000 gal minimum, for the full load operation of one diesel generator; in addition, there is an above ground fuel oil storage tank on-site with a capacity of 210,000 gal which is used for transferring fuel to the buried tanks.

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- A. One component cooling pump
- B. One residual heat removal pump
- C. One motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pump

The emergency buses in each unit are capable of being interconnected under strict administrative procedures so that the equipment which would normally be operated by one of the diesels could be operated by the other diesel, if required.

References

- FSAR Section 8.5 Emergency Power System
- FSAR Section 9.3 Residual Heat Removal System
- FSAR Section 9.4 Component Cooling System
- FSAR Section 10.3.2 Auxiliary Steam System
- FSAR Section 10.3.5 Condensate and Feedwater System

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TABLE 4.1-2A

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2. Control Rod Assemblies	Partial movement of all rods	Every 2 weeks	7
3. Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank	Functional	Each refueling shutdown	6
4. Pressurizer Safety Valves	Setpoint	Each refueling shutdown	4
5. Main Steam Safety Valves	Setpoint	Each refueling shutdown	10
6. Containment Isolation Trip	*Functional	Each refueling shutdown	5
7. Refueling System Interlocks	*Functional	Prior to refueling	9.12
8. Service Water System	*Functional	Each refueling shutdown	9.9
9. Fire Protection Pump and Power Supply	Functional	Monthly	9.10
10. Primary System Leakage	*Evaluate	Daily	4
11. Diesel Fuel Supply	*Fuel Inventory	5 days/week	8.5
12. Boric Acid Piping Heat Tracing Circuits	*Operational	Monthly	9.1
13. Main Steam Line Trip	Functional (1) Full closure (2) Partial closure	(1) Each cold shutdown (2) Before each startup but at least quarterly	10
14. Service Water System Valves in Line Supplying Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers	Functional	Each refueling	9.9
15. Control Room Ventilation System	*Ability to maintain positive pressure for 1 hour using a volume of air equivalent to or less than that stored in the bottled air supply	Each refueling interval (approx. every 12-18 months)	9.13

*See Specification 4.1.D

TABLE 4.2-1

SECTION D. PIPING PRESSURE BOUNDARY

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Required Examination Areas</u>	<u>Required Examination Methods</u>	<u>Extent of Examination Planned During First 5-Year Interval</u>	<u>Tentative Inspection During 10-Year Interval</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4.3	G-1	Pressure retaining bolting	Visual and volumetric	Not applicable	Not applicable	There is no bolting 2 inches and larger in the piping system.
4.4	G-2	Pressure retaining bolting	Visual	33% of the bolting would be examined	By the end of the interval, 100% of the bolting would be examined	All bolting is below 2 inches in diameter and would be visually examined, either in place if the bolted connection is not disassembled during the inspection interval, or whenever the bolted connection is disassembled. The bolting to be examined would include studs and nuts.
4.5	K-1	Integrally welded supports	Visual and surface	10% of supports would be examined	By the end of the interval, a cumulative 25% of the supports would be examined	Areas subject to examination would include any integrally welded external support attachment which includes the welds to the pressure containing boundary, the base metal beneath the weld zone, and along the support attachment for distance of two base metal thicknesses.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 13
CHANGE NO. 28 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DFR-37
DOCKET NO. 50-281

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages:

3.16-2 - 3.16-6
4.1-9
4.2-27

Insert Pages:

3.16-2 - 3.16-7
4.1-9
4.2-27

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NO. 13 TO LICENSES NOS. DPR-32 AND DPR-37

CHANGE NO. 28 TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY

SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 & 2

DOCKETS NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

Introduction

By letter dated September 17, 1975, Virginia Electric & Power Company (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 for the Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2. The purpose of the request is to revise the Surry 1 and 2 Technical Specifications in order to implement 3 miscellaneous changes.

Discussion

The licensee requested the three following miscellaneous changes in the Surry Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications:

1. Proposed revision of the inservice inspection technique of primary system pipe support welds from volumetric to surface.
2. Correction of an error in Table 4.1-2A.
3. Proposed revision of the limiting condition for operation to permit one of the two fuel oil flow paths to the emergency diesel generators to be inoperable for 24 hours.

Evaluation

Item 1

The licensee desires to revise item number 4.5 of Table 4.2-1 of the inservice inspection program to indicate that a surface examination will be performed on integrally welded pipe supports of the primary system instead of the currently specified volumetric examination. The change from volumetric to surface inspection for the welds on these pipe supports is merely a change in inspection techniques and will not significantly affect the reliability of the support. The licensee requires this change as a meaningful volumetric examination of these

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welds cannot be performed with present techniques. We conclude that the change is acceptable as it serves only to introduce a minor needed change in inspection methods and as the surface examination represents a more reliable indication of weld integrity for these supports the reliability of the supports is better insured.

Item 2

This proposed change serves to correct an error in the Technical Specifications as originally issued wherein a test requirement of TS 4.7 was omitted from Table 4.1-2A. This error correction is acceptable.

Item 3

The licensee desires to revise TS 3.16.B.1 to allow a fuel oil flow path to one diesel generator to be inoperable for 24 hours without declaring the diesel generator inoperable. The change is acceptable in that there are two flow paths for fuel oil to each diesel generator. If one of the two flow paths is inoperable, the system can still sustain any single failure and fulfill its function. Allowing a fuel oil flow path to be inoperable for 24 hours is consistent with the practice for other redundant components of this system and does not represent a reduction in safety.

None of the three above changes involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident or significantly increase the probability of an accident. No revision of safety limits is involved.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: December 8, 1975

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETS NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSES

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments No. 13 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 issued to Virginia Electric & Power Company which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Surry County, Virginia. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendments revise the provisions in the Technical Specifications relating to 3 miscellaneous items. These changes include: (1) a revised surveillance requirement in the Inservice Inspection Program, (2) an error correction, and (3) a revised limiting condition for operation in the fuel oil system for the emergency diesel-generators.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments is not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.


For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated September 17, 1975, (2) Amendments No. 13

to Licenses Nos. D-32 and DPR-37, with Change No. 28 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. and at the Swem Library, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 8th day of December, 1975.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4
Division of Reactor Licensing