



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 30, 1999

Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.  
Vice President  
Southern Nuclear Operating  
Company, Inc.  
Post Office Box 1295  
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE  
OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MA5400 AND MA5401)

Dear Mr. Beasley:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 108 to Facility Operating License NPF-68 and Amendment No. 86 to Facility Operating License NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated April 13, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 26, 1999.

The amendments update Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.0.4 in the existing VEGP TS to be consistent with the versions of the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 as they appear in Revision 1 to NUREG-1431. The proposed change adds the words "or that are part of a shutdown of the unit," to LCO 3.0.4 to allow reactor shutdowns that are not necessarily required by other TS Required Actions.

The amendments also allow entry into the Applicability of LCO 3.4.12 (entry into Mode 4 from Mode 3) with one required power operated relief valve inoperable provided the licensee adheres to certain restrictions outlined in the TS. To support this change, in its letter dated August 26, 1999, the licensee committed to revise the cold overpressure protection system enable temperature as part of the next update to the pressure and temperature limits for Vogtle. This update is projected to be submitted in the first quarter of the year 2000.

The amendments also revise the associated bases to include these changes.

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J. B. Beasley, Jr.

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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ramin Assa', written in a cursive style.

Ramin Assa, Project Manager, Section 1  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 108 to NPF-68
2. Amendment No. 86 to NPF-81
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

cc:

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UNITED STATES  
**NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 108  
License No. NPF-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated April 13, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 26, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 108 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: September 30, 1999



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 86  
License No. NPF-81

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), acting for itself, Georgia Power Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated April 13, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 26, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 86 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: September 30, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 108

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68

DOCKET NO. 50-424

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 86

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81

DOCKET NO. 50-425

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. Overleaf pages are provided.\*

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
3.0-1	3.0-1*
3.0-2	3.0-2
3.0-5	3.0-5
3.1.1-1	3.1.1-1
3.3.1-1	3.3.1-1
3.3.1-2	3.3.1-2*
3.3.8-1	3.3.8-1
3.3.8-2	3.3.8-2*
3.4.8-1	3.4.8-1
3.4.8-2	3.4.8-2
3.4.12-1	3.4.12-1*
3.4.12-2	3.4.12-2
3.9.1-1	3.9.1-1
3.9.6-1	3.9.6-1
3.9.6-2	3.9.6-2*
B 3.0-5	B 3.0-5
B 3.0-6	B 3.0-6
B 3.0-7	B 3.0-7
B 3.0-8	B 3.0-8*
B 3.0-13	B 3.0-13*
B 3.0-14	B 3.0-14
B 3.0-15	B 3.0-15
B 3.1.1-3	B 3.1.1-3*
B 3.1.1-4	B 3.1.1-4
B 3.3.1-41	B 3.3.1-41*
B 3.3.1-42	B 3.3.1-42
B 3.3.8-1	B 3.3.8-1*
B 3.3.8-2	B 3.3.8-2

Remove

B 3.3.8-3  
B 3.4.8-3  
B 3.4.8-4  
B 3.4.12-9  
B 3.4.12-10  
B 3.4.12-11  
B 3.4.12-12  
B 3.4.12-13  
B 3.4.12-14  
B 3.9.1-3  
B 3.9.1-4  
B 3.9.6-1  
B 3.9.6-2

Insert

B 3.3.8-3  
B 3.4.8-3  
B 3.4.8-4\*  
B 3.4.12-9  
B 3.4.12-10  
B 3.4.12-11  
B 3.4.12-12  
B 3.4.12-13  
B 3.4.12-14  
B 3.9.1-3  
B 3.9.1-4\*  
B 3.9.6-1\*  
B 3.9.6-2

3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

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LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2.

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LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated.

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LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour to place the unit, as applicable, in:

- a. MODE 3 within 7 hours;
- b. MODE 4 within 13 hours; and
- c. MODE 5 within 37 hours.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall not be made except when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued

(continued)

### 3.0 LCO APPLICABILITY

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LCO 3.0.4  
(continued)

operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered allow unit operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability only for a limited period of time.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified Condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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LCO 3.0.5

Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

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LCO 3.0.6

When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.5.15, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)." If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

When a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

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(continued)

3.0 SR APPLICABILITY

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SR 3.0.3  
(continued)                      When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.

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SR 3.0.4                              Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall not be made unless the LCO's Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

LCO 3.1.1 SDM shall be  $\geq$  the limit specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5.

ACTIONS

NOTE

While this LCO is not met, transition to a lower MODE within the Applicability, and entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6 is not permitted.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. SDM not within limit.	A.1 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit.	15 minutes

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.1.1.1 Verify SDM is $\geq$ the limit specified in the COLR.	24 hours

3.3. INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation

LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----  
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.  
-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable.	A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 for the channel(s).	Immediately
B. One Manual Reactor Trip channel inoperable.	B.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.	48 hours
	<u>OR</u> B.2 Be in MODE 3.	54 hours
C. -----NOTE----- While this LCO is not met for Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 in MODE 5, closing the reactor trip breakers is not permitted. -----  One channel or train inoperable.	C.1 Restore channel or train to OPERABLE status.  <u>OR</u> C.2 Open RTBs.	48 hours  49 hours

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>D. One Power Range Neutron Flux — High channel inoperable.</p>	<p>-----NOTE----- A channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment. -----</p>	
	<p>D.1.1 Place channel in trip.</p>	6 hours
	<p><u>AND</u></p>	
	<p>D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to <math>\leq 75\%</math> RTP.</p>	12 hours
	<p><u>OR</u></p>	
	<p>D.2.1 Place channel in trip.</p>	6 hours
	<p><u>AND</u></p>	
	<p>-----NOTE----- Only required to be performed when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable and THERMAL POWER <math>\geq 75\%</math> RTP. -----</p>	
	<p>D.2.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.2.</p>	Once per 12 hours
	<p><u>OR</u></p>	
	<p>D.3 Be in MODE 3.</p>	12 hours

(continued)

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.8 High Flux at Shutdown Alarm (HFASA)

LCO 3.3.8 Two channels of HFASA shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5

-----NOTE-----  
The HFASA may be blocked in MODE 3 during reactor startup.  
-----

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>A. One channel of HFASA inoperable.</p>	<p>A.1 -----NOTE----- Exception to LCO 3.0.4: MODE changes are only permitted when Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are met. -----  Restore channel to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>48 hours</p>
<p>B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Two channels of HFASA inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1 Perform SR 3.1.1.1 (verify SDM).</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2 Perform SR 3.9.2.1 (verify unborated water source isolated).</p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Once per 12 hours thereafter</p> <p>4 hours</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Once per 14 days thereafter</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
<p>-----NOTE-----                      Not required to be performed prior to entering                      MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entry                      into MODE 3.                      -----</p>		
SR 3.3.8.1	Perform COT.	92 days
SR 3.3.8.2	Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.	18 months

### 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

#### 3.4.8 RCS Loops—MODE 5, Loops Not Filled

LCO 3.4.8 Two residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE and one RHR loop shall be in operation. Each valve used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position.

-----NOTES-----

1. All RHR pumps may be de-energized for  $\leq 15$  minutes when switching from one loop to another provided:
  - a. The core outlet temperature is maintained  $> 10^{\circ}\text{F}$  below saturation temperature.
  - b. No operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and
  - c. No draining operations to further reduce the RCS water volume are permitted.
2. One RHR loop may be inoperable for  $\leq 2$  hours for surveillance testing provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.
3. Valves in the flowpath from the RMWST, through the chemical mixing tank, to the suction of the charging pumps may be open under administrative control provided the RCS is in compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of LCO 3.1.1 and the high flux at shutdown alarm is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled.

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

-----NOTE-----

While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled is not permitted.

-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One RHR loop inoperable.	A.1 Initiate action to restore RHR loop to OPERABLE status.	Immediately
B. Required RHR loops inoperable.  <u>OR</u>  No RHR loop in operation.	B.1 Suspend all operations involving reduction in RCS boron concentration.  <u>AND</u>  B.2 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status and to operation.	Immediately    Immediately
C. One or more valves used to isolate unborated water sources not secured in closed position.	C.1 Initiate action to secure valve(s) in closed position.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.8.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation.	12 hours
SR 3.4.8.2 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to the required RHR pump that is not in operation.	7 days
SR 3.4.8.3 Verify each valve that isolates unborated water sources is secured in the closed position.	31 days

### 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

#### 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Protection Systems (COPS)

LCO 3.4.12 A COPS shall be OPERABLE with all safety injection pumps incapable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and either a or b below.

- a. Two RCS relief valves, as follows:
  1. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings within the limits specified in the PTLR, or
  2. Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves with setpoints  $\geq 440$  psig and  $\leq 460$  psig, or
  3. One PORV with a lift setting within the limits specified in the PTLR and one RHR suction relief valve with a setpoint within specified limits.
- b. The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of  $\geq 2.14$  square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4,  
MODE 5,  
MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is on.

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NOTE

1. Accumulator isolation is only required when accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in the PTLR.
  2. The safety injection pumps are not required to be incapable of injecting into the RCS until 4 hours after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 provided the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs has not decreased below 325°F.
-

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

1. While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on from MODE 6, and entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on is not permitted.
  2. With one required PORV inoperable for the purpose of cold overpressure protection, entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 is permitted provided that RCS temperature is maintained above 275°F, and, within 36 hours, either: the PORV is restored to OPERABLE status; or, an RHR suction relief valve is placed in service so that the requirements of LCO 3.4.12 are met. Otherwise, the reactor vessel must be depressurized and vented in accordance with Required Action F.1.
- 

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more safety injection pumps capable of injecting into the RCS.	A.1 Render all safety injection pumps incapable of injecting into the RCS.	4 hours
B. An accumulator not isolated when the accumulator pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.	B.1 Isolate affected accumulator.	1 hour
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met.	C.1 Increase RCS cold leg temperature to > 350°F.	12 hours
	<u>OR</u> C.2 Depressurize affected accumulator to less than the maximum RCS pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.	12 hours
D. One required RCS relief valve inoperable in MODE 4.	D.1 Restore required RCS relief valve to OPERABLE status.	7 days

(continued)

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.1 Boron Concentration

LCO 3.9.1 Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

With the RCS boron concentration specified in the COLR for MODE 6 not met, entry into MODE 6 is not permitted.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Boron concentration not within limit.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.2 Suspend positive reactivity additions.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.3 Initiate action to restore boron concentration to within limit.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified in the COLR.	72 hours

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation – Low Water Level

LCO 3.9.6 Two RHR loops shall be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----  
While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 6 with water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange is not permitted.  
-----

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>A. Less than the required number of RHR loops OPERABLE.</p>	<p>A.1 Initiate action to restore required RHR loops to OPERABLE status.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>A.2 Initiate action to establish <math>\geq 23</math> ft of water above the top of reactor vessel flange.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>
<p>B. No RHR loop in operation.</p>	<p>B.1 Suspend operations involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>(continued)</p>

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. (continued)	B.2 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to operation.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> B.3 Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere.	4 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.6.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of $\geq 3000$ gpm.	12 hours

BASES

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LCO 3.0.3  
(continued)

an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool." Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.15 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.15 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool" is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.

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LCO 3.0.4

LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It precludes placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., Applicability desired to be entered) when the following exist:

- a. Unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to be entered; and
- b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements, if the Applicability were entered, would result in the unit being required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the Required Actions.

Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

(continued)

BASES

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LCO 3.0.4  
(continued)

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual Specifications. Exceptions may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for MODE changes when entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, LCO 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. The requirements of LCO 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6, or in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken. In some cases (e.g., LCO 3.1.1) these ACTIONS provide a Note that states "While this LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability is not permitted, unless required to comply with ACTIONS." This Note is a requirement explicitly precluding entry into a MODE or other specified condition of the Applicability.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, changing MODES or other specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, in compliance with LCO 3.0.4 or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is stated, is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surveillances that do not have to be performed due to the associated inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

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LCO 3.0.5

LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of SRs to demonstrate:

- a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service;  
or

(continued)

BASES

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LCO 3.0.5  
(continued)

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the allowed SRs. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the SRs.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of an SR on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of an SR on another channel in the same trip system.

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LCO 3.0.6

LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for support systems that have an LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions.

When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the unit is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.

(continued)

BASES

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LCO 3.0.6  
(continued)

However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Specification 5.5.15, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)," ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.

Cross train checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support multiple and redundant safety systems are required. The cross train check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

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LCO 3.0.7

There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Test Exception LCO 3.1.8 allows specified Technical Specification requirements to be changed to permit performance of these special tests and operations,

(continued)

**BASES**

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**SR 3.0.3**  
(continued)

personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements. When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions or operational situations, is discovered not to have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows the full delay period of 24 hours to perform the Surveillance.

SR 3.0.3 also provides a time limit for completion of Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals.

If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

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**SR 3.0.4**

SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the

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BASES

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SR 3.0.4  
(continued)

Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit.

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change. When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) is not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s), since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown.

The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCO Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.

(continued)

BASES

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SR 3.0.4  
(continued)

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable for MODE changes when entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, SR 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. The requirements of SR 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6, or in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.

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**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES**  
(continued)

terminating RCS heat removal and cooldown. Following the MSLB, a post trip return to power may occur; however, the MSLB analysis bounds the post trip return to power, and therefore, there is adequate protection to ensure that the specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for this transient.

The most limiting event in MODES 3, 4, and 5 is a boron dilution at BOL, when critical boron concentration is highest. In the boron dilution analysis, the required SDM defines the reactivity difference between an initial subcritical boron concentration and the corresponding critical boron concentration. These values, in conjunction with the configuration of the RCS and the assumed dilution flow rate, directly affect the results of the analysis. In the analysis of this accident, the minimum SDM specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) is required to allow the operator 15 minutes from the initiation of the Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm to total loss of SDM.

In addition to the limiting MSLB and boron dilution transients, the SDM requirement must also protect against:

- a. An uncontrolled rod withdrawal from subcritical or low power condition; and
- b. Rod ejection.

Each of these events is discussed below.

Depending on the system initial conditions and reactivity insertion rate, the uncontrolled rod withdrawal transient is terminated by either a high power level trip or a high pressurizer pressure trip. In all cases, power level, RCS pressure, linear heat rate, and the DNBR do not exceed allowable limits.

The ejection of a control rod rapidly adds reactivity to the reactor core, causing both the core power level and heat flux to increase with corresponding increases in reactor coolant temperatures and pressure. The ejection of a rod also produces a time dependent redistribution of core power.

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(continued)

## BASES

APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

SDM satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. Even though it is not directly observed from the control room, SDM is considered an initial condition process variable because it is periodically monitored to ensure that the unit is operating within the bounds of accident analysis assumptions.

## LCO

SDM is a core design condition that can be ensured during operation through control rod positioning (control and shutdown banks) and through the soluble boron concentration.

The MSLB (Ref. 2) and the boron dilution (Ref. 3) accidents are the most limiting analyses that establish the SDM value of the LCO. For MSLB accidents, if the LCO is violated, there is a potential to exceed the DNBR limit and to exceed 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 4). For the boron dilution accident, if the LCO is violated, the minimum required time assumed for operator action to terminate dilution may no longer be applicable. The required SDM is specified in the COLR.

## APPLICABILITY

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the SDM requirements are applicable to provide sufficient negative reactivity to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses discussed above. In MODE 6, the shutdown reactivity requirements are given in LCO 3.9.1, "Boron Concentration." In MODES 1 and 2, SDM is ensured by complying with LCO 3.1.5, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," and LCO 3.1.6, "Control Bank Insertion Limits."

## ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note prohibiting transition to a lower MODE within the Applicability and entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6. LCO 3.0.4 already prohibits entry into MODE 4 from MODE 5 and into MODE 3 from MODE 4 when SDM requirements are not met.

A.1

If the SDM requirements are not met, boration must be initiated promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. It is assumed that

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

A.1

Condition A applies to all RTS protection functions. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required channels for one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

B.1 and B.2

Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for this Function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function.

The Completion Time of 48 hours is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation channels and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which Condition B is no longer applicable. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours (54 hours total time). The 6 additional hours to reach MODE 3 is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the unit in MODE 3, Condition C applies to this trip function.

C.1 and C.2

Condition C applies to the following reactor trip Functions in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the CRD System capable of rod withdrawal:

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

- Manual Reactor Trip;
- RTBs;
- RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms; and
- Automatic Trip Logic.

This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel or train inoperable, the inoperable channel or train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. If the affected Function(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the RTBs must be opened within the next hour. The additional hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. With the RTBs open, these Functions are no longer required. This Condition is modified by a Note that prohibits closing the RTBs in MODE 5 if any of the above Functions (Function 1, 17, 18, or 19 of Table 3.3.1-1) are not met. Closing the RTBs in MODES 3 or 4 with any of these Functions not met is prohibited by LCO 3.0.4.

The Completion Time is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

D.1.1, D.1.2, D.2.1, D.2.2, and D.3

Condition D applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux — High Function.

The NIS power range detectors provide input to the CRD System and the SG Water Level Control System and, therefore, have a two-out-of-four trip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition. This results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 6 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 7).

In addition to placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to  $\leq 75\%$  RTP within 12 hours. Reducing the power level prevents operation of

(continued)

## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.8 High Flux at Shutdown Alarm (HFASA)

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

The primary purpose of the HFASA is to warn the operator of an unplanned boron dilution event in sufficient time (15 minutes prior to loss of shutdown margin) to allow manual action to terminate the event. The HFASA is used for this purpose in MODES 3 and 4, and MODE 5 with the loops filled.

The HFASA consists of two channels of alarms, with each channel receiving input from one source range channel. An alarm setpoint of  $\leq 2.3$  times background provides at least 15 minutes from the time the HFASA occurs to the total loss of shutdown margin due to an unplanned dilution event. This meets the Standard Review Plan criteria for mitigating the consequences of an unplanned dilution event by relying on operator action.

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##### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analysis presented in Reference 1 identifies credible boron dilution initiators. Time intervals from the HFASA until loss of shutdown margin were calculated. The results demonstrate that sufficient time for operator response is available to terminate an inadvertent dilution event taking credit for one HFASA with a setpoint of  $\leq 2.3$  times background.

The HFASA satisfied Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

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##### LCO

The LCO requires two channels of HFASA to be OPERABLE with input from two source range channels to provide protection against single failure.

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##### APPLICABILITY

The HFASA must be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

The Applicability is modified by a Note which allows the HFASA to be blocked in MODE 3 during reactor startup so that spurious alarms are not generated.

(continued)

BASES

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APPLICABILITY  
(continued)

In MODES 1 and 2, operators are alerted to an unplanned dilution event by a reactor trip on overtemperature delta-T or power range neutron flux high, low setpoint, respectively. As a protective measure in addition to HFASA, in MODE 5 with the loops not filled, unplanned dilution events are precluded by requiring the unborated water source (reactor makeup water storage tank (RMWST)) to be isolated.

---

ACTIONS

A.1

With one channel of HFASA inoperable, Required Action A.1 requires the inoperable channel to be restored within 48 hours. In this condition, one channel of HFASA remains available to provide protection. The 48 hour Completion Time is consistent with that required for an inoperable source range channel. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note providing an exception to LCO 3.0.4. When Condition A (and Required Action A.1) are applicable, the Note permits MODE changes provided that Required Action B.1 and B.2 are met. LCO 3.0.4 allows MODE changes when the associated ACTIONS to be entered provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time, or to comply with ACTIONS, or to facilitate a shutdown of the unit. The associated ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.8 provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Therefore, with one channel of HFASA inoperable, LCO 3.0.4 would permit entry into the Applicability of LCO 3.3.8 and MODE changes within the 48 hour Completion Time allowed by Required Action A.1, before Condition B and Required Actions B.1 and B.2 would become applicable. In particular, when transitioning down through MODES 3, 4, and 5, the shutdown margin requirements become more restrictive to compensate for a postulated boron dilution event. Required Action B.1 is a periodic verification of shutdown margin, and Required Action B.2 ensures that the unborated water source isolation valves are shut, precluding a boron dilution event. With one channel of HFASA inoperable, it is prudent to take the compensatory actions of Required Actions B.1 and B.2 if MODE changes are desired or required.

B.1 and B.2

With the Required Action A.1 and associated Completion Time not met, or with both channels of HFASA inoperable, the appropriate ACTIONS are to verify that the required SDM is present and isolate the unborated water source by performing

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**BASES**

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**ACTIONS**

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

SR 3.9.2.1. This places the unit in a condition that precludes an unplanned dilution event. The Completion Times of 1 hour and once per 12 hours thereafter for verifying SDM provide timely assurance that no unintended dilution occurred while the HFASA was inoperable and that SDM is maintained. The Completion Times of 4 hours and once per 14 days thereafter for verifying that the unborated source is isolated provide timely assurance that an unplanned dilution event cannot occur while the HFASA is inoperable and that this protection is maintained until the HFASA is restored.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

The HFASA channels are subject to a COT and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

SR 3.3.8.1

SR 3.3.8.1 requires the performance of a COT every 92 days to ensure that each channel of the HFASA and its setpoint are OPERABLE. This test shall include verification that the HFASA setpoint is less than or equal to 2.3 times background. The frequency of 92 days is consistent with the requirements for the source range channels. This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note that provides a 4-hour delay in the requirement to perform this surveillance for the HFASA instrumentation upon entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without delay for the performance of the surveillance to meet the applicability requirements in MODE 3.

SR 3.3.8.2

SR 3.3.8.2 requires the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. This test verifies that each channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. It encompasses the HFASA portion of the instrument loop. The frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.

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**REFERENCES**

1. FSAR, Subsection 15.4.6.
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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

Note 3 allows valves in the flowpath from the RMWST, through the chemical mixing tank, to the suction of the charging pumps to be open under administrative control provided the SDM requirements of LCO 3.1.1 are met and the high flux at shutdown alarm is OPERABLE. (OPERABILITY of the high flux at shutdown alarm is defined by LCO 3.3.8.) This permits the addition of chemicals to the RCS as necessary in this MODE of operation while minimizing the risk of an uncontrolled boron dilution transient.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required.

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APPLICABILITY

In MODE 5 with loops not filled, this LCO requires core heat removal and coolant circulation by the RHR System.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops—MODES 1 and 2";  
LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops—MODE 3";  
LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops—MODE 4";  
LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops—MODE 5, Loops Filled";  
LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation—High Water Level" (MODE 6); and  
LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation—Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note prohibiting entry into MODE 5 with the loops not filled while the LCO is not met.

A.1

If only one RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for RHR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE or in operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.

C.1

If the valve(s) required to be closed are discovered to be open (except as provided by Note 3 to the LCO), action must be initiated immediately to secure the open valve(s) in the closed position in order to preclude an uncontrolled boron dilution transient.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1

This SR requires verification every 12 hours that one loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.

SR 3.4.8.2

Verification that the required number of pumps are OPERABLE ensures that additional pumps can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pumps. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

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**BASES**

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**APPLICABILITY**  
(continued)

**OPERABILITY** of the pressurizer safety valves that provide overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event.

The Applicability is modified by a Note stating that accumulator isolation is only required when the accumulator pressure is more than or at the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature, as allowed by the P/T limit curves. This Note permits the accumulator discharge isolation valve Surveillance to be performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions.

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**ACTIONS**

Two Notes modify the ACTIONS table. Note 1 prohibits entry into MODE 6 with the vessel head on from MODE 6 and MODE 5 from MODE 6 with the vessel head on. Entry into MODE 4 from MODE 5 is already prohibited by LCO 3.0.4. Note 2 permits entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 with a PORV that is inoperable for the purpose of cold overpressure protection provided that RCS temperature is maintained above 275°F, and, within 36 hours, either: the PORV is restored to OPERABLE status; or, an RHR suction relief valve is placed in service so that the requirements of LCO 3.4.12 are met. Otherwise, the reactor vessel must be depressurized and vented in accordance with Required Action F.1. With only one PORV OPERABLE, the COPS remains capable of mitigating a design basis cold overpressurization event. However, the system cannot withstand a single failure of the remaining PORV. The current COPS enable temperature is established very conservatively at 350°F. However, the application of ASME Code Case N-514 would allow the enable temperature to be lowered to less than 275°F. Therefore, when entering this LCO from MODE 3 with one required PORV inoperable, maintaining RCS temperature above 275°F minimizes actual exposure to a cold overpressure event. Furthermore, requiring action within 36 hours minimizes the exposure to a single failure while allowing sufficient time to either restore the inoperable PORV or to place RHR in service. Note 2 is only applicable to the condition of entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 with one required PORV inoperable for the purpose of cold overpressure protection. If operating in MODE 4 and a failure of a required RCS relief valve occurs, Condition D applies.

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(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

A.1

With one or more safety injection pumps capable of injecting into the RCS, RCS overpressurization is possible.

Rendering the safety injection pumps incapable of injecting into the RCS within 4 hours to restore restricted coolant input capability to the RCS reflects the urgency of removing the RCS from this condition.

B.1, C.1, and C.2

An unisolated accumulator requires isolation within 1 hour. This is only required when the accumulator pressure is at or more than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed by the P/T limit curves.

If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour, Required Action C.1 and Required Action C.2 provide two options, either of which must be performed in the next 12 hours. By increasing the RCS temperature to > 350°F, an accumulator pressure of 678 psig cannot exceed the COPS limits if the accumulators are fully injected. Depressurizing the accumulators below the COPS limit from the PTLR also gives this protection.

The Completion Times are based on operating experience that these activities can be accomplished in these time periods and that the likelihood that an event requiring COPS during this time is small.

D.1

In MODE 4, with one required RCS relief valve inoperable, the RCS relief valve must be restored to OPERABLE status within a Completion Time of 7 days. Two RCS relief valves in any combination of the PORVS and the RHR suction relief valves are required to provide low temperature overpressure mitigation while withstanding a single failure of an active component.

The Completion Time considers the facts that only one of the RCS relief valves is required to mitigate an overpressure transient and that the likelihood of an active failure of the remaining valve path during this time period is very low.

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(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

E.1

The consequences of operational events that will overpressurize the RCS are more severe at lower temperature (Ref. 7). Thus, with one of the two RCS relief valves inoperable in MODE 5 or in MODE 6 with the head on, the Completion Time to restore two valves to OPERABLE status is 24 hours.

The Completion Time represents a reasonable time to investigate and repair several types of relief valve failures without exposure to a lengthy period with only one OPERABLE RCS relief valve to protect against overpressure events.

F.1

The RCS must be depressurized and a vent must be established within 12 hours when:

- a. Both required RCS relief valves are inoperable; or
- b. A Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, or E is not met; or
- c. The COPS is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, B, C, D, or E.

The vent must be sized  $\geq 2.14$  square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe) to ensure that the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action is needed to protect the RCPB from a low temperature overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.

The Completion Time considers the time required to place the plant in this Condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements.

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(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2

To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the mass input capability, both safety injection pumps are verified incapable of injecting into the RCS, and the accumulator discharge isolation valves are verified closed and locked out.

The safety injection pumps are rendered incapable of injecting into the RCS through at least two independent means such that a single failure or single action will not result in an injection into the RCS.

The Frequency of within 4 hours after initial entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 and prior to RCS cold leg temperature decreasing below 325°F (for the safety injection pumps) and 12 hours thereafter (for the safety injection pumps and accumulators) is sufficient, considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room, to verify the required status of the equipment.

SR 3.4.12.3

Each required RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying its RHR suction isolation valves are open and by testing it in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This Surveillance is only required to be performed if the RHR suction relief valve is being used to meet this LCO. For Train A, the RHR suction relief valve is PSV-8708A and the suction isolation valves are HV-8701A and B. For Train B, the RHR suction relief valve is PSV-8708B and the suction isolation valves are HV-8702A and B.

The RHR suction valves are verified to be opened every 12 hours. The Frequency is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as valve status indications available to the operator in the control room that verify the RHR suction isolation valves remain open.

The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 8), test per Inservice Testing Program verifies OPERABILITY by proving proper relief valve mechanical motion and by measuring and, if required, adjusting the lift setpoint.

SR 3.4.12.4

The RCS vent of  $\geq 2.14$  square inches (based on an equivalent length of 10 feet of pipe) is proven OPERABLE by verifying its open condition either:

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.12.4 (continued)

- a. Once every 12 hours for a valve that cannot be locked.
- b. Once every 31 days for a valve that is locked, sealed, or secured in position. A removed pressurizer safety valve fits this category.

The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE. This Surveillance is required to be performed if the vent is being used to satisfy the pressure relief requirements of the LCO 3.4.12b.

SR 3.4.12.5

The PORV block valve must be verified open every 72 hours to provide the flow path for each required PORV to perform its function when actuated. The valve must be remotely verified open in the main control room. This Surveillance is performed if the PORV satisfies the LCO.

The block valve is a remotely controlled, motor operated valve. The power to the valve operator is not required removed, and the manual operator is not required locked in the inactive position. Thus, the block valve can be closed in the event the PORV develops excessive leakage or does not close (sticks open) after relieving an overpressure situation.

The 72 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls available to the operator in the control room, such as valve position indication, that verify that the PORV block valve remains open.

SR 3.4.12.6

Performance of a COT is required within 12 hours after decreasing RCS temperature to  $\leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$  and every 31 days on each required PORV to verify and, as necessary, adjust its lift setpoint. The COT will verify the setpoint is within the PTLR allowed maximum limits in the PTLR. PORV actuation could depressurize the RCS and is not required.

A Note has been added indicating that this SR is required to be performed 12 hours after decreasing RCS cold leg temperature to  $\leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ . The 12 hours considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressure event during this time.

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.4.12.7

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required every 18 months to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required range and accuracy to known input.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.
  2. Generic Letter 88-11.
  3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III.
  4. FSAR, Chapter 15
  5. 10 CFR 50, Section 50.46.
  6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
  7. Generic Letter 90-06.
  8. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
  9. Westinghouse Letter GP-13419, RHR Open Permissive Setpoint.
- 
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BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

The RCS boron concentration satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

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LCO

The LCO requires that a minimum boron concentration be maintained in all filled portions of the RCS, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity while in MODE 6. The boron concentration limit specified in the COLR ensures that a core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  of  $\leq 0.95$  is maintained during fuel handling operations. Violation of the LCO could lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6.

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APPLICABILITY

This LCO is applicable in MODE 6 to ensure that the fuel in the reactor vessel will remain subcritical. The required boron concentration ensures a  $k_{\text{eff}} \leq 0.95$ . In MODES 1 and 2, LCO 3.1.4, "Rod Group Alignment Limits," LCO 3.1.5, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," and LCO 3.1.6, "Control Bank Insertion Limits," ensure an adequate amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN" ensures an adequate amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor.

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note prohibiting entry into MODE 6 if the RCS boron concentration specified in the COLR is not met.

A.1 and A.2

Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If the boron concentration of any coolant volume in the filled portions of the RCS, the refueling canal, or the refueling cavity is less than its limit, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position or normal cooldown of the coolant volume for the purpose of system temperature control.

(continued)

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

A.3

In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately.

There are no safety analysis assumptions of boration flow rate and concentration that must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as soon as possible. In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration with the best source available for unit conditions.

Once actions have been initiated, they must be continued until the boron concentration is restored. The restoration time depends on the amount of boron that must be injected to reach the required concentration.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1

This SR ensures that the coolant boron concentration in all filled portions of the RCS, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity is within the COLR limits. The boron concentration of the coolant in each volume is determined periodically by chemical analysis.

A Frequency of once every 72 hours is a reasonable amount of time to verify the boron concentration of representative samples. The Frequency is based on operating experience, which has shown 72 hours to be adequate.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Subsection 15.4.6.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation — Low Water Level

#### BASES

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#### **BACKGROUND**

The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant, and to prevent boron stratification. Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchangers where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR System.

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#### **APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES**

While there is no explicit analysis assumption for the decay heat removal function of the RHR system in MODE 6, if the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of refueling cavity water level. In addition, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to the boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity. The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant will eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier. Two trains of the RHR System are required to be OPERABLE, and one train in operation, in order to prevent this challenge.

RHR and coolant circulation - Low Water Level satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement.

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#### **LCO**

In MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, both RHR loops must be OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

Additionally, one loop of RHR must be in operation in order to provide:

- a. Removal of decay heat;
- b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and
- c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path and to determine the low end temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs.

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APPLICABILITY

Two RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal and mixing of the borated coolant. Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level  $\geq 23$  ft are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation — High Water Level."

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note that prohibits entry into the Applicability while this LCO is not met.

A.1 and A.2

If less than the required number of RHR loops are OPERABLE, action shall be immediately initiated and continued until the RHR loop is restored to OPERABLE status and to operation or until  $\geq 23$  ft of water level is established above the reactor vessel flange. When the water level is  $\geq 23$  ft above the reactor vessel flange, the Applicability changes to that of LCO 3.9.5, and only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE and in operation. An immediate Completion Time is necessary for an operator to initiate corrective actions.

(continued)



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 108 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 86 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81  
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.  
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 13, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 26, 1999, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., et al. (SNC/the licensee) proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would update Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4 in the existing VEGP TS to be consistent with the versions of the LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 as they appear in Revision 1 to NUREG-1431.

The existing VEGP version of LCO 3.0.4, which was based on Revision 0 to NUREG-1431, has a potential conflict with its Bases. The existing Bases of LCO 3.0.4 state that "the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from a normal shutdown." However, this language does not appear in the existing TS LCO 3.0.4.

The proposed changes to the existing VEGP TS LCO 3.0.4 will eliminate the conflict with its Bases and as stated above will be consistent with Revision 1 to NUREG-1431. SNC requests approval of the proposed changes to support their use during the Fall 1999 refueling outage.

The supplemental letter dated August 26, 1999, provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the April 13, 1999, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The supplemental letter specifically proposed revisions to Notes to modify Condition C of LCO 3.3.1 and Condition A of LCO 3.3.8. The supplemental letter further committed to revise cold overpressure protection system enable temperature as part of the next update to the pressure and temperature limits for VEGP. Finally, the supplemental letter proposed revising TS to allow entry into the Applicability of LCO 3.4.12 (entry into Mode 4 from Mode 3) with one required power operated relief valve inoperable provided the licensee adheres to certain restrictions outlined in the TS.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

The existing VEGP TS LCO 3.0.4, based on Revision 0 to NUREG-1431, states, in part,

“This specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS.”

The proposed change would add the words “or that are part of a shutdown of the unit,” to make it clear that LCO 3.0.4 would not prevent shutdowns that are not necessarily required by TS Required Actions. These added words eliminate the above stated conflict between existing LCO 3.0.4 and its Bases. In addition, the proposed change to LCO 3.0.4 would also add the following:

“LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.”

Similarly, the existing VEGP TS SR 3.0.4 states, in part,

“This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS.”

The proposed change would add the words “or that are part of a shutdown of the unit,” to make it clear that SR 3.0.4 would not prevent shutdowns that are not necessarily required by TS required actions. In addition, the proposed change would also add the following:

“LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.”

The staff's review finds that the proposed changes for LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are consistent with Revision 1 to NUREG-1431 and are, therefore, acceptable. The Bases language that corresponds to the proposed changes is also taken from Revision 1 to NUREG-1431. The staff's review finds these revised Bases acceptable.

However, the Mode restrictions of the existing VEGP versions of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 are applicable in all Modes. The above proposed change has the effect of removing those Mode restrictions from MODES 5 and 6. In other words, the proposed changes provide additional Mode change flexibility that is not allowed by the existing VEGP TS. As a result, Revision 1 to NUREG-1431 version of LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4 includes a reviewer's note that requires an evaluation of the entire existing TS to determine where specific restrictions on Mode changes or Required Actions should be included in individual LCO to justify the change.

The licensee has performed this evaluation, which is summarized in a matrix that is included in Enclosure 1 of the submittal dated April 13, 1999. Based on the licensee's evaluation, in some cases this additional flexibility has been determined to be inappropriate. In those cases, Notes restricting this flexibility have been proposed for specific affected LCOs. These affected LCOs are as follows:

LCO 3.1.1; LCO 3.3.1, Condition C; LCO 3.3.8, Condition A; LCO 3.4.8;  
LCO 3.4.12; LCO 3.9.1; and LCO 3.9.6.

The NRC technical staff has reviewed the proposed restrictive Notes for the above identified LCOs and their Bases. The staff's review results are as follows:

- (1) LCO 3.1.1 Shutdown Margin - The licensee proposes to add a note in LCO 3.1.1 which states:

"While this LCO is not met, transition to a lower Mode within the Applicability, and entry into Mode 5 from Mode 6 is not permitted."

This note is needed since the required shutdown margin (SDM) is increased at lower modes. Thus, transitions from a high mode to a lower mode should not be made when the required SDM margin for this lower mode is not yet met. Also, entering Mode 5 without SDM met implies that the more restrictive SDM for Mode 6 has not been met. Under this condition, a transition to Mode 5 should not be made until the required SDM for Mode 5 is met. The licensee also proposes a note in the bases section of this LCO to describe the note proposed in LCO. The staff finds that the proposed notes are acceptable.

- (2) LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation - The April 13, 1999, submittal proposed to add a note to modify Condition C of LCO 3.3.1. The proposed note was as follows:

"With Function 1, 17, 18, or 19 in Table 3.3.1-1 not met, do not close the reactor trip breakers."

However, the staff's review determined that the note as expressed above was not consistent with a Note already approved by the NRC staff in the same application for several other plants that were also using the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as represented by NUREG-1431. Therefore, in a resubmittal dated August 26, 1999, SNC has enclosed marked-up pages from the VEGP TS and Bases reflecting the following Note as applied to LCO 3.3.1, Condition C.

"While this LCO is not met for Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 in MODE 5, closing the reactor trip breakers is not permitted."

The above revised Note only applies in MODE 5. The reason for adding a Note is that Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 are required to be operable in MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the reactor trip breakers closed and the rod control system capable of rod withdrawal. Closing the reactor trip breakers in these modes would constitute entry into the LCO applicability for these functions. However, the proposed change to LCO 3.0.4 would make LCO 3.0.4 only applicable in MODES 1 thru 4. Therefore, a restriction is necessary for MODE 5, since LCO 3.0.4 would no longer apply to MODE 5. It is not necessary to add a restriction for MODES 3 and 4 since LCO 3.0.4 would continue to apply in these modes. The staff finds the revised notes to be acceptable.

- (3) LCO 3.3.8 High Flux at Shutdown Alarm (HFASA) - The April 13, 1999, submittal proposed a Note that modified Condition A of LCO 3.3.8 as follows:

"With one channel of HFASA inoperable, entry into the Applicability and MODE transition within the Applicability is permitted provided that

required Action B.1 and B.2 and their associated Completions Times are met within the time of entry into the Applicability or the MODE transition, as applicable.”

The staff’s review concurred with the intent of the Note, but commented that the Note more properly modified Required Action A.1 rather than Condition A itself. In addition, the staff felt that the Note could be expressed in simpler terms, and requested that the Bases provide a more detailed discussion of the reason for the Note. In the August 26, 1999, resubmittal, the pages from LCO 3.3.8 and Bases have been marked-up to apply a Note to Required Action A.1, and the Note has been simplified to read as follows:

“Exception to LCO 3.0.4: MODE changes are only permitted when Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are met.”

The basis for adding the Note is as follows. LCO 3.0.4 allows Mode changes when the associated Actions to be entered provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time, or to comply with Actions, or to facilitate a shutdown of the unit. The associated Actions of LCO 3.3.8 provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Therefore, with one channel of HFASA inoperable, LCO 3.0.4 would permit entry into the Applicability of 3.3.8 and Mode changes within the 48 hours Completion Time allowed by Required Action A.1, before Condition B and Required Actions B.1 and B.2 would become applicable. In particular, when transitioning down through MODES 3, 4, and 5, the shutdown margin requirements become more restrictive to compensate for a postulated boron dilution event. Required Action B.1 is a periodic verification of shutdown margin, and Required Action B.2 ensures that the unborated water source isolation valves are shut, precluding a boron dilution event. With one channel of HFASA inoperable, it is prudent to take the compensatory actions of Required Actions B.1 and B.2 if Mode changes are desired or required. The Bases have been marked-up to include the above explanation. The staff’s review finds these changes to be acceptable.

- (4) LCO 3.4.8 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loops - (Mode 5 Loops Not Filled) - The licensee proposes to add a Note which states:

“While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled is not permitted.”

This Note is needed since during Mode 5 with loops not filled, the residual heat removal (RHR) system is essential for providing decay heat removal capability. Also, without an RHR train in operation, the boron dilution safety analysis will not bound these plant conditions. Therefore, when this LCO is not met, it is unsafe to enter MODE 5 with loops not filled. The licensee also proposes a Note in the bases section of this LCO to describe the Note proposed in the LCO. The staff finds that these proposed Notes are acceptable.

- (5) LCO 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Protection System - In its letter dated April 13, 1999, supplemented by a letter dated August 26, 1999, the licensee proposes to add the following two Notes:

1) “While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on from Mode 6, and entry into Mode 5 from Mode 6 with the reactor vessel head on is not permitted.”

2) "With one required PORV inoperable for the purpose of cold overpressure protection: entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 is permitted provided that RCS temperature is maintained above 275 °F, and, within 36 hours, either the PORV is restored to OPERABLE status, or an RHR suction relief valve is placed in service so that the requirements of LCO 3.4.12 are met. Otherwise, the reactor vessel must be depressurized and vented in accordance with Required Action F.1."

- (6) The licensee also proposes a revised BASES 3.4.12 which provides the technical bases of its proposed Notes.

In its letter dated August 26, 1999, the licensee stated that it will revise the Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS) enable temperature as part of the next update to the pressure and temperature limits for Vogtle units early next year. The licensee intends to use the methodology allowed by ASME Code Case N-514 for determining the COPS enable temperature. Using this methodology, the estimated COPS enable temperature at Vogtle units will be well below 275 °F. Since the current COPS enable temperature is conservatively set at 350 °F, as a compensatory measure, the proposed Note 2 also requires action within 36 hours to restore the redundant COPS after entering MODE 4 (as contrasted to the previous LCO 3.4.12 Condition D 7-day provision). This requirement will further minimize the risk associated with a postulated cold overpressure event at the RCS temperature of above 275 °F and inadequate COPS. Therefore, the staff considers that to enter MODE 4 above 275 °F from MODE 3 with one inoperable PORV does not present a safety concern. Therefore, the staff finds that the licensee proposed Notes are acceptable.

- (7) LCO 3.9.1 Boron Concentration - The licensee proposes to add a note which states:

"With the RCS boron concentration specified in the COLR for Mode 6 not met, entry into Mode 6 is not permitted."

This note is needed to prevent a transition from MODE 5 to MODE 6 without adequate boron concentration to satisfy MODE 6. The note does not need to cover the potential transition from a defueled condition to MODE 6 since the required actions in this TS would prevent this transition by suspending core alteration and positive reactivity additions. The licensee also proposed a note in the bases section of the LCO to describe the note proposed in LCO. The staff finds that the proposed notes are acceptable.

- (8) LCO 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level - The licensee proposes to add a note which states:

"While this LCO is not met, entry into Mode 6 with water level less than 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange is not permitted."

This note is needed to assure adequate decay heat removal capability by RHR systems in the low water level conditions. Also, when RHR is not operable during MODE 5 or MODE 6 with high water level, immediate action is required to restore RHR to operable status. While this

required action is not completed, a transition from these Modes should be deferred. The licensee also proposes a note to the bases section of the LCO to describe the note proposed in the LCO. The staff finds that the proposed notes are acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 43779). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: Chu-Yu Liang  
Carl S. Schulten  
Angela T. Chu

Date: September 30, 1999

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Ramin Assa, Project Manager, Section 1  
Project Directorate II  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 108 to NPF-68
- 2. Amendment No. 86 to NPF-81
- 3. Safety Evaluation

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