June 8, 1995

Mr. C. K. McCoy
Vice President - Nuclear
Vogtle Project
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

SUBJECT: CORRECTION PAGES TO AMENDMENTS 86 AND 64 FOR VOGTLE NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES

Dear Mr. McCoy:

The Commission issued Amendments 86 and 64 to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-68 and NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications on May 31, 1995. Enclosed are revised Bases pages to replace pages B 3/4 3-1 and B 3/4 3-4.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Louis L. Wheeler, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/encl:
See next page

DISTRIBUTION

Docket File
PDII-2 Reading
PUBLIC
SVarga
JZwolinski
OGC, O-15 B18
OPA,O-17 F2
OC/LFDCB,T-9 E10
GHill(4), T-5 C3
ACRS(4), T-2 E26
EMerschoff,RII
RCrlenjak,RII
BMarcus,O-8 H3
SMitra,O-7 E4
CGrimes,O-11 F23

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\VOGTLE\CORR8664.LTR

OFFICE	DRPE/PD22/LA	DRPE/PD22/PM	DRPE/PD22/D	
NAME	L.BERRY	D.WHEELER	H.BERKOW	
DATE	6/8/95	6/8/95	6/8/95	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

140031

9506230210 950608
PDR ADOCK 05000424
P PDR

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

DF01

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 8, 1995

Mr. C. K. McCoy
Vice President - Nuclear
Vogtle Project
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

SUBJECT: CORRECTION PAGES TO AMENDMENTS 86 AND 64 FOR VOGTLE NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES

Dear Mr. McCoy:

The Commission issued Amendments 86 and 64 to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-68 and NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications on May 31, 1995. Enclosed are revised Bases pages to replace pages B 3/4 3-1 and B 3/4 3-4.

Sincerely,

Louis L. Wheeler, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/encl:
See next page

cc:
Mr. J. A. Bailey
Manager - Licensing
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Mr. J. B. Beasley
General Manager, Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant
P. O. Box 1600
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, NW., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Office of Planning and Budget
Room 615B
270 Washington Street, SW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Office of the County Commissioner
Burke County Commission
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

Mr. J. D. Woodard
Senior Vice President -
Nuclear Operations
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Harold Reheis, Director
Department of Natural Resources
205 Butler Street, SE. Suite 1252
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Attorney General
Law Department
132 Judicial Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Mr. Ernie Toupin
Manager of Nuclear Operations
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
2100 East Exchange Place
Tucker, Georgia 30085-1349

Charles A. Patrizia, Esquire
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker
12th Floor
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW.
Washington, DC 20036

Arthur H. Domby, Esquire
Troutman Sanders
NationsBank Plaza
600 Peachtree Street, NE.
Suite 5200
Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216

Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 572
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance consistent with maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation, and (3) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report. Surveillance intervals and out of service times were determined based upon maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features instrumentation. The NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10271 and its supplements were provided in letters dated February 21, 1985, from C. O. Thomas (NRC) to J. J. Sheppard (WOG-GP); February 22, 1989, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. A. Newton (WOG); and on April 30, 1990, from C. E. Rossi to G. T. Goering.

The engineered safety features actuation system does not include an explicit functional unit for the automatic load sequencer. An inoperable load sequencer would affect the ability to detect and respond to a loss of power or undervoltage and thus is included with the instrumentation that must be available to meet the requirements of functional units 6.d.i. and i.i., as well as 8.a and b. Since the hardware is the same for each of these functional units, a common action statement is used. The mode of applicability for functional unit 6.d does not include mode 4 since the AFW is not required to be operable in mode 4; therefore, a footnote has been added that refers to functional unit 8.a and b. which requires the instrumentation to be operable in mode 4.

An inoperable automatic load sequencer does not impact the operability of the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays (functional unit 1.b). The hardware referred to by this functional unit is not contained within the automatic load sequencer, but in the solid-state protection system. The effects of an inoperable automatic load sequencer is that the associated on site or offsite 4.16 kV emergency power sources may not correctly respond to an ESF or loss of power signal. The appropriate action for an inoperable automatic load sequencer is closely related to the action for an inoperable diesel generator and an associated offsite source with an energized 4.16 kV

9506280766 950608
PDR ADOCK 05000424
P PDR

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

P-11 With pressurizer pressure below the P-11 setpoint, allows manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure signal. Allows manual block of safety injection actuation and steam line isolation on low compensated steam line pressure signal and allows steam line isolation on high steam line negative pressure rate. With pressurizer pressure above the P-11 setpoint, defeats manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and safety injection and steam line isolation on low steam line pressure and defeats steam line isolation on high steam line negative pressure rate.

P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves, initiates a turbine trip, and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

The Source Range High Flux at Shutdown Alarm Setpoint is an analysis assumption for mitigation of a Boron Dilution Event in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems.

3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.

For the purpose of measuring $F_Q(Z)$ or $F^N_{\Delta H}$ a full incore flux map is used. Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable.