

March 16, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-424  
and 50-425

Distribution  
See next page

Mr. W. G. Hairston, III  
Senior Vice President -  
Nuclear Operations  
Georgia Power Company  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Dear Mr. Hairston:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - VOGTLE NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1  
AND 2 (TACS M82260 AND M82261)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 50 to Facility Operating License NPF-68 and Amendment No. 29 to Facility Operating License NPF-81 for the Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated November 20, 1991, as supplemented February 7, 1992.

The amendments would allow deletion of the residual heat removal system (RHRS) suction valve autoclosure interlock and revise the opening pressure interlock setpoint.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,  
*/s/*

Darl S. Hood, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 50 to NPF-68
2. Amendment No. 29 to NPF-81
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

OFC	PDII-3/DP	PDII-3/PM
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DATE	3/16/92	3/16/92

OGC	PDII-3/D
<i>Hollow</i>	DMatthews
3/13/92	3/16/92

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 16, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-424  
and 50-425

Mr. W. G. Hariston, III  
Senior Vice President -  
Nuclear Operations  
Georgia Power Company  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Dear Mr. Hairston:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT,  
UNITS 1 AND 2 (TACS M82260 AND M82261)

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Darl Hood". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Darl S. Hood, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 50 to NPF-68
2. Amendment No. 29 to NPF-81
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

Mr. W. G. Hairston, III  
Georgia Power Company

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

cc:

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 50  
License No. NPF-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated November 20, 1991, as supplemented February 7, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 50 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: **March 16, 1992**



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 29  
License No. NPF-81

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated November 20, 1991, as supplemented February 7, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 29 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance:       **March 16, 1992**

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 50

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68

DOCKET NO. 50-424

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 29

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81

DOCKET NO. 50-425

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 4-35a\*  
3/4 4-36

3/4 5-3\*  
3/4 5-4

Insert Pages

3/4 4-35a\*  
3/4 4-36

3/4 5-3\*  
3/4 5-4

\*overleaf page - no change






FIGURE 3.4-4b

UNIT 2 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE NOMINAL PORV SETPOINT FOR THE  
COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE;
- b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and
- c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.2 Each RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when the RHR suction relief valves are being used for cold overpressure protection as follows:

- a. For RHR suction relief valve PSV-8708A by verifying at least once per 72 hours that RHR RCS suction isolation valves HV-8701A and HV-8701B are open;
- b. For RHR suction relief valve PSV-8708B by verifying at least once per 72 hours that RHR RCS suction isolation valves HV-8702A and HV-8702B are open; and
- c. Testing pursuant to specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.3 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours\* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

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\*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - $T_{avg}$ GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

- a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,
- b. One OPERABLE Safety Injection pump,
- c. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,
- d. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and
- e. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and semi-automatically transferring suction to the containment emergency sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.\*

#### ACTION:

- a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.8.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

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\* The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the Safety Injection Pumps declared inoperable pursuant to Specification 3.5.3.2 provided the Safety Injection Pumps are restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs exceeding 375°F, whichever occurs first.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power lockout switches in the lockout position:

<u>Valve Number</u>	<u>Valve Function</u>	<u>Valve Position</u>
HV-8835	SI Pump Cold Leg Inj.	OPEN
HV-8840	RHR Pump Hot Leg Inj.	CLOSED
HV-8813	SI Pump Mini Flow Isol.	OPEN
HV-8806	SI Pump Suction from RWST	OPEN
HV-8802A, B	SI Pump Hot Leg Inj.	CLOSED
HV-8809A, B	RHR Pump Cold Leg Inj.	OPEN*

- b. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1) Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and
  - 2) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the Containment Emergency Sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
- 1) For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
  - 2) Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1) Verifying automatic isolation action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that with a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 355 psig the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened.
  - 2) A visual inspection of the Containment Emergency Sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

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\*Either valve may be realigned in Mode 3 for testing pursuant to Specification 4.4.6.2.2.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 29 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET. AL

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 20, 1991, as supplemented February 7, 1992, Georgia Power Company (the licensee) proposed licensing amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (Vogtle), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would delete the autoclosure interlock (ACI) for the isolation valve in the suction piping of the residual heat removal (RHR) system, revise the setpoint of the associated open permissive interlock (OPI) from 377 psig to 365 psig, and increase the surveillance interval from 12 to 72 hours for verifying operability of the RHR suction relief valves which provide cold overpressurization protection. The February 7, 1992, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The design of Vogtle's RHR suction line includes two motor-operated gate valves that are normally closed unless the RHR system is in operation. These valves isolate the low pressure RHR system (design pressure of 600 psig) from the high pressure (normally 2235 psig) of the reactor coolant system (RCS). Currently, each isolation valve is provided with two automatic interlocks, namely OPI and ACI. The OPI prevents inadvertent opening of the valves when the RCS pressure is above the design pressure of the RHR system. The ACI ensures that the isolation valves are fully closed when the RCS pressure is above the RHR system design pressure.

In October 1988, by Generic Letter (GL) 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," the NRC addressed the increasing generic concern regarding loss of RHR during nonpower operation, requested certain actions, and provided several recommendations to reduce such potential losses. One of the recommendations was that licensees should identify TS that restrict or limit the safety benefit of the action identified in GL 88-17 and submit appropriate changes. Among the TS identified in GL 88-17 were TS that control the autoclosure interlock. The licensee's proposal to delete the ACI is in response to the generic concern as addressed in GL 88-17.

## 2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee proposes to change TS 4.5.2.d to reflect deletion of the ACI for the isolation valves in the suction piping of the RHR system and to revise the setpoint of the associated OPI from 377 psig to 365 psig. Additionally, the surveillance interval in TS 4.4.9.3.2 would be revised from 12 to 72 hours for verifying operability of the RHR system suction relief valves which provide cold overpressurization protection.

The NRC staff has previously reviewed a Westinghouse Owners Group study, WCAP-11736, "Residual Heat Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal Report for the Westinghouse Owners Group," dated February 1988. The NRC staff approved WCAP-11736 for generic use by its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of August 8, 1989. In its SER, the NRC staff concluded that the removal of the ACI for Westinghouse plants can produce a net safety benefit provided five specific improvements accompany such removal:

- (1) Add an alarm to each RHR suction valve which will actuate if the valve is open and the pressure is greater than the OPI setpoint and less than the RHR system design pressure minus the RHR pump head pressure,
- (2) Provide valve position indication to the alarm from the stem mounted limit switches in a manner such that power would not be affected by power lockout of the valve,
- (3) Implement plant-specific procedures in accordance with the improvements described in WCAP-11736,
- (4) Where feasible, remove power from the RHR suction valves prior to their being leak-checked, and
- (5) Size the valve operators such that the valves cannot be opened against the full system pressure.

In support of its request, the licensee has submitted Vogtle-specific safety analyses, WCAP-12927, "Residual Heat Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal Report for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2." These analyses are based on WCAP-11736, and use Callaway Unit 1 as the reference plant.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and our previous evaluation of WCAP-11736. We find that the licensee has adequately identified and accounted for differences in RHR system configuration, design and operating characteristics that exist between Vogtle Units 1 and 2 and the reference plant. Those differences that impact the reference probabilistic risk analyses were remodelled to ensure that the Vogtle analyses do not show results that would invalidate the conclusions of WCAP-11736.

In its evaluations, the licensee has adequately addressed each of the accompanying improvements stated in the NRC's SER and has identified proposed

actions that provide at least an equivalent level of safety. Specifically, the licensee states that:

- (1) An alarm, both audible and visual, to alert the operators that an RHR suction isolation valve is open coincident with high RCS pressure, is being added as part of the modification to remove the RHR ACI. The setpoint is consistent with WCAP-11736 guidance. Also, in accordance with WCAP-11736, the OPI for each of the RHR system suction valves will remain intact and unchanged.
- (2) The contacts on the existing limit switches utilized for position indication to the new alarms are different from the limit switch contacts which presently provide valve position to the main control board. Thus, diversity in valve position indication is achieved. In addition, the alarm circuit is powered by a supply which is separate from the power supply for the valve control and position indication circuits.
- (3) The licensee has reviewed the Vogtle operating procedures to determine the effect of ACI removal and has committed to make appropriate revisions. Under these procedures, if an alarm is received, the operators will be directed to terminate the overpressure condition or close the open RHR suction valves. If the open valves cannot be closed, RCS pressurization will be stopped and the plant returned to the shutdown cooling mode. To further ensure alarm operability, instrument loop calibration procedures will be revised.
- (4) There is no plan to remove power from the RHR system suction/isolation valves prior to leak testing. All RHR isolation valve leak testing is conducted in Modes 3 or 4 with the RCS pressure less than 500 psig. Assurance of proper valve position indication prior to startup is accomplished by the use of valve position indication and administrative controls.
- (5) While the suction valve operators were not sized so that the valves cannot be opened against the full system pressure, it is unlikely that they could be opened because the valve motor size is inadequate to open the valve against the high differential pressure. The licensee's analyses did not take credit for this inability to open the valve against full pressure. Additionally, the licensee states that power is normally removed from these valves in Modes 1, 2, and 3, and the OPI will continue to function to prevent opening of these valves when RCS pressure is greater than 365 psig.

The proposed change to TS 4.4.9.3.2 modifies the surveillance requirement to verify that the RHR suction relief valves are in the correct (open) position from once every 12 hours to once every 72 hours. This change is consistent with the surveillance interval specified for the reference plant in the previously approved WCAP-11736 and is, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed change to TS 4.5.2d (to delete the requirement for verifying ACI operability) is consistent with the licensee's plan to remove the ACI feature from the RHR system suction valves. This change is, therefore, acceptable.

On the basis of these conclusions, we find the proposed TS changes, and the proposed plan for RHR system ACI removal, to be acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 2595). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: M. Chatterton, SRXB/DST  
L. Raghavan, PDII-3/DPR-I/II

Date: **March 16, 1992**



DATED: MARCH 16, 1992

AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1  
AMENDMENT NO. 29 TO VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2

DISTRIBUTION:

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