

Februray 20, 1990

Dockets Nos. 50-424
and 50-425

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Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President -
Nuclear Operations
Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Dear Mr. Hairston:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 28 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68
AND AMENDMENT NO. 9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81 - VOGTLE
ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TACs 75320/75321)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 28 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 and Amendment No. 9 to Facility Operating License NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated November 21, 1989.

The amendments enable non-borated chemical additions to be made to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) under administrative control during Mode 5b (cold shutdown, loops not filled) and Mode 6 (refueling) using a flow path via the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST).

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of issuance of the amendments will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Timothy A. Reed, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 28 to NPF-68
- 2. Amendment No. 9 to NPF-81
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Georgia Power Company

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 28
License No. NPF-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated November 21, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 28 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: February 20, 1990



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 9
License No. NPF-81

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated November 21, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 9 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: February 20, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 28

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68

AND LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 9

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81

DOCKETS NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>Amended Page</u>	<u>Overleaf Page</u>
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3/4 9-1	
B3/4 4-1	B3/4 4-2
B3/4 9-1	B3/4 9-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS FILLED

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) train shall be OPERABLE and in operation*, and either:

- a. One additional RHR train shall be OPERABLE**, or
- b. The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators shall be greater than 17% of wide range (LI-0501, LI-0502, LI-0503, LI-0504).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled***.

ACTION:

- a. With one of the RHR trains inoperable or with less than the required steam generator water level, immediately initiate corrective action to return the inoperable RHR train to OPERABLE status or restore the required steam generator water level as soon as possible.
- b. With no RHR train in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR train to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.1.1 The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators when required shall be determined to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.4.1.2 At least one RHR train shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

**One RHR train may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR train is OPERABLE and in operation.

***A reactor coolant pump shall not be started unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLED

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.2 Two residual heat removal (RHR) trains shall be OPERABLE* and at least one RHR train shall be in operation.** Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves (1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-176#, 1208-U4-177# and 1208-U4-183) shall be closed and secured in position.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled.

ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required RHR trains OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR trains to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
- b. With no RHR train in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR train to operation.
- c. With the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves (1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-176#, 1208-U4-177#, and 1208-U4-183) not closed and secured in position, immediately close and secure in position the RMWST discharge valves.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.2.1 At least one RHR train shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.4.2.2 Valves 1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-176#, 1208-U4-177#, and 1208-U4-183 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops at least once per 31 days.

*One RHR train may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR train is OPERABLE and in operation.

**The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

#RMWST discharge valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 may be open under administrative control provided the Reactor Coolant System is in compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.2 and the high flux at shutdown alarm is OPERABLE with a setpoint of 2.30 times background in accordance with Note 9 of Table 4.3-1.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions are met:

- a. A K_{eff} of 0.95 or less, or
- b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2000 ppm.

Additionally, valves 1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-177#, 1208-U4-183, and 1208-U4-176# shall be closed and secured in position.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

- a. With the requirements of a. and b. above not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K_{eff} is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2000 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.
- b. With valves 1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-177#, 1208-U4-183, and 1208-U4-176# not closed and secured in position, immediately close and secure in position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours.

4.9.1.2 Valves 1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-177#, 1208-U4-183, and 1208-U4-176# shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops at least once per 31 days.

RMWST discharge valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 may be open under administrative control provided the Reactor Coolant System is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.9.1 and the high flux at shutdown alarm is OPERABLE with a setpoint of 2.30 times background. For the purpose of this Specification, the high flux at shutdown alarm will be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 4.9.2.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR train provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two trains/loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR train provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR trains be OPERABLE. The locking closed of the required valves, except valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 for short periods of time to maintain chemistry control, in Mode 5 (with the loops not filled) precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the Reactor Coolant System. These actions prevent flow to the RCS of unborated water in excess of that analyzed. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution accident in the safety analysis.

The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting an RCP with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 350°F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR train, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Cold Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip until the first Reactor Trip System Trip Setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

During shutdown conditions in Mode 5 only one pressurizer code safety is required for overpressure protection. In lieu of an actual operable code safety valve an unisolated and unsealed vent pathway (i.e. a direct unimpaired opening) of equivalent size can be taken as synonymous with an OPERABLE code safety.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The locking closed of the required valves, except valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 for short periods of time to maintain chemistry control, during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System. These actions prevent flow to the RCS of unborated water in excess of that analyzed. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the Boron Dilution Accident in the safety analysis. The Boron concentration value of 2000 ppm or greater ensures a K_{eff} of 0.95 or less and includes a conservative allowance for calculational uncertainties of 100 ppm of boron.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements of the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that:

(1) The refueling machine will be used for the movement of fuel assemblies and/or rod control cluster assemblies (RCCA) or thimble plug assemblies, and the auxiliary hoist will be used for the movement of control rod drive shafts,

(2) the refueling machine will have sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly and/or a rod control cluster assembly or thimble plug assembly, and the auxiliary hoist will have sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod drive shaft and attached RCCA, and

(3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) train be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR trains OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR train will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR train, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 28 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68
AND AMENDMENT NO. 9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.
DOCKETS NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 21, 1989, Georgia Power Company (the licensee) requested changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) 3/4.4.1.4.2 and 3/4.9.1 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. These changes enable non-borated chemical additions to be made to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) during Mode 5b (cold shutdown, loops not filled) and Mode 6 (refueling) using a flow path via the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST). Use of this flow path requires that valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 be opened periodically under administrative control. The existing TSs require that these valves be closed and secured.

2.0 EVALUATION

Of the accidents and transients addressed in the Vogtle Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the boron dilution event is the only transient that could be affected by the proposed TS revisions. The prolonged and unmonitored addition of an unborated chemical solution into the RCS for purpose of controlling RCS chemistry could lead to a complete loss of shutdown margin.

FSAR Section 15.4.6 presents boron dilution analyses for Modes 3, 4, and 5a (loops filled) in accordance with Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 15.4.6. The analyses verify that adequate operator time (at least 15 minutes) is available to terminate the dilution flow between the time a "high flux at shutdown" alarm is received and when criticality occurs. However, boron dilution analyses for Modes 5b and 6 do not exist because TS 3/4.4.1.4.2 and 3/4.9.1 assure that possible dilution flow paths are isolated by closing and securing the appropriate valves, thereby administratively precluding a boron dilution event.

To permit chemical additions to be made to the RCS during Modes 5b and 6 using a flow path via the RMWST through the chemical mixing tank, valves 1208-U4-176 and 1208-U4-177 must be opened. In this regard, the licensee has proposed revisions to the above referenced TSs and has performed boron dilution analyses for these modes and this particular dilution path in accordance with SRP Section 15.4.6. The SRP acceptance criteria for Modes 5b and 6 are minimum operator action times of 15 minutes and 30 minutes, respectively.

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The licensee's analyses to determine minimum operator action times make use of conservative assumptions regarding boron dilution rate and active reactor coolant volume, as suggested in the SRP. A dilution flow rate of 3.5 gpm, representing the maximum rate possible via the proposed flow path under any operating condition, has been assumed. Additionally, the minimum cold drained reactor vessel volume has been utilized in the analyses, and the active RCS volume further minimized by assuming only one residual heat removal train in operation, considering miniflow and bypass lines to be empty, and neglecting reactor coolant loop volumes. Also, the source range "high flux at shutdown" alarm is assumed to be operable with a setpoint of 2.3 times background, as required by TS Table 4.3-1, Note 9. Shutdown margin requirements, as specified by TS 3.1.1.2 for Mode 5 and TS 3.9.1 for Mode 6, are also unchanged. The results of the licensee's analyses indicate that the minimum acceptable operator action times of 15 minutes for Mode 5b and 30 minutes for Mode 6, as specified in the SRP, are met.

We have reviewed the licensee's analyses as provided in the November 21, 1989, submittal and find that conservative assumptions have been used, the SRP acceptance criteria have been met or exceeded, and that the proposed TS changes will not have any adverse affect on safety. Any other boron dilution paths will continue to be precluded by the TSs.

On the basis of the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed TSs changes are acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments involve changes in requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register on December 27, 1989 (54 FR 53205), and consulted with the State of Georgia. No public comments were received, and the State of Georgia did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: H. I. Abelson, SRXB/DST

Dated: February 20, 1990

DATED: February 20, 1990

AMENDMENT NO.28 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 - Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Unit 1

AMENDMENT NO.9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81 - Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Unit 2

DISTRIBUTION:

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