February 20, 1990

Dockets Nos. 50-424
and 50-425

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Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice President -
Nuclear Operations
Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Dear Mr. Hairston:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 29 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 AND AMENDMENT NO. 10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81 - VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TACs 74127/74128)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 29 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 and Amendment No. 10 to Facility Operating License NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 25, 1989.

The amendments will revise the rod insertion limits to allow a withdrawn range of 222 steps to 231 steps. The change minimizes control rod wear caused by fretting against upper internal control rod guide surfaces. Additionally, the amendments revise the TSs to allow the use of an absorber material of either hafnium or silver-indium-cadmium.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation supporting the amendments is also enclosed. Notice of issuance of the amendments will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Timothy A. Reed, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 29 to NPF-68
2. Amendment No. 10 to NPF-81
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

CP-1

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DATED: February 20, 1990

AMENDMENT NO. 29 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1
AMENDMENT NO. 10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81 - Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 29
License No. NPF-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated August 25, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 29 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DBMatthews

David B. Matthews, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: February 20, 1990

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 10
License No. NPF-81

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated August 25, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.10 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. GPC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DBMatthews

David B. Matthews, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: February 20, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 29

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68

AND LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 10

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81

DOCKETS NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Amended Page	Overleaf Page
3/4 1-19	
3/4 1-20	3/4 1-21
3/4 1-22	
3/4 10-1	3/4 10-2
B 3/4 2-2	B 3/4 2-1
5-4	

ROD DROP TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The individual shutdown and control rod drop time from the physical fully withdrawn position shall be less than or equal to 2.2 seconds from beginning of decay of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry with:

a. T_{avg} (TI-0412, TI-0422, TI-0432, TI-0442) greater than or equal to 551°F, and

b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With the drop time of any rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 The rod drop time shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,

b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the Control Rod Drive System which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and

c. At least once per 18 months.

SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be withdrawn to a position greater than or equal to 222 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* #.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod inserted to a position less than 222 steps, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

a. Withdraw the rod to a position greater than or equal to 222 steps, or

b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be withdrawn to a position greater than or equal to 222 steps:

a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control Bank A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

#With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figure 3.1-3.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* #.

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figure, or

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod insertion limit monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

#With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.



FIGURE 3.1-3

ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a. With any control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.1.1 The position of each control rod not fully inserted shall be determined at least once per 2 hours.

4.10.1.2 Each control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.2 The group height, insertion, and power distribution limits of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER is maintained less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. The limits of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are maintained and determined at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.10.2.2 below.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.2 or 3.2.3 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 are suspended, either:

a. Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficient to satisfy the ACTION requirements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, or

b. Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.2.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.2.2 The requirements of the below listed specifications shall be performed at least once per 12 hours during PHYSICS TESTS:

a. Specifications 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3, and

b. Specification 4.2.3.2.

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal operation and in short-term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200°F is not exceeded.

The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows:

$F_Q(Z)$ Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods;

$F_{\Delta H}^N$ Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power; and

$F_{xy}(Z)$ Radial Peaking Factor, is defined as the ratio of peak power density to average power density in the horizontal plane at core elevation Z.

3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) assure that the $F_Q(Z)$ upper bound envelope of 2.30 times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes.

Target flux difference is determined at equilibrium xenon conditions. The rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with their respective insertion limits and should be inserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at high power levels. The value of the target flux difference obtained under these conditions divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER is the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL POWER for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER levels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup considerations.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Continued)

Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the AFD within the target band required by Specification 3.2.1 about the target flux difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the time duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1-hour penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits of Figure 3.2-1 while at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance.

Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer determines the 1-minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for two or more OPERABLE excore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively.

Figure B 3/4 2-1 shows a typical monthly target band.

3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F^N_{\Delta H}$

The limits on heat flux hot channel factor and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that: (1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200°F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the limits are maintained provided:

a. Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than ± 12 steps, indicated, from the group demand position;

b. Control rod banks are sequenced with a constant tip-to-tip distance between banks as defined by Figure 3.1-3.

5.3 REACTOR CORE

FUEL ASSEMBLIES

5.3.1 The core shall contain 193 fuel assemblies with each fuel assembly containing 264 fuel rods clad with Zircaloy-4. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 144 inches. The initial core loading shall have a maximum enrichment not to exceed 3.2 weight percent U-235. Reload fuel shall be similar in physical design to the initial core loading and shall have a maximum enrichment not to exceed 4.55 weight percent U-235.

CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES

5.3.2 The core shall contain 53 full-length control rod assemblies. The control rod assemblies shall contain a nominal 142 inches of absorber material. The nominal absorber composition shall be 95.5% natural halfnium and 4.5% natural zirconium and/or 80% silver, 15% indium, and 5% cadmium. All control rods shall be clad with stainless steel.

5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.4.1 The Reactor Coolant System is designed and shall be maintained:

a. In accordance with the Code requirements specified in Section 5.2 of the FSAR, with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements,

b. For a pressure of 2485 psig, and

c. For a temperature of 650°F, except for the pressurizer which is 680°F.

VOLUME

5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the Reactor Coolant System is 12,240 $\pm$ 100 cubic feet at a nominal T_{avg} of 588.5°F.

5.5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION

5.5.1 The meteorological tower shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1-1 and 5.1-2.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 29 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68

AND AMENDMENT NO. 10 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-81

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKETS NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 25, 1989, Georgia Power Company, et al. (GPC or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes to the TSs would revise the rod insertion limits of Figure 3.1-3 to show the fully withdrawn position as 222 steps instead of 228 steps. The purpose of the change in the insertion limit is to allow a periodic change, within the range of 222 to 231 steps withdrawn, of the parked full out position of the control rods which will minimize the effects of control rod wear caused by fretting against upper internal control rod guide surfaces. Specification 3.1.3.4 would also be revised to assure that control rod drop time measurements are made from the physical fully withdrawn position (231 steps withdrawn). In addition, a revision to TS 5.3.2 is being proposed that would indicate that control rods may utilize an absorber material of either hafnium or silver-indium-cadmium. The use of either type of absorber material was described in the VEGP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of VEGP. However, Section 5.3.2 of the TSs only described hafnium since that was the only absorber material in use at the time that the VEGP Units 1 and 2 licenses were issued. Current plans are to replace control rods with absorber material of hafnium with control rods that use silver-indium-cadmium, beginning at the next refueling outage which is scheduled for VEGP Unit 1 in the Spring of 1990.

2.0 EVALUATION

Rod Insertion Limits

The control rods operate in the withdrawn position for extended periods of time and as a result, control rod cladding wears against the control rod guide card due to coolant flow vibration. The point of wear is local and is determined by the withdrawn parked position. Westinghouse has recommended to its licensees a periodic repositioning of control rods to reduce this wear.

For Vogtle, the current control rod parked withdrawn position is 228 steps, while the physical limit to rod withdrawal is 231 steps. The proposed change will revise the TSs to allow withdrawn parked positions between 222 and 231 steps to further minimize the wear problem and to lengthen the control rod lifetime.

The licensee evaluated the non-LOCAs (loss of coolant accidents) and LOCAs that could be affected by the proposed change in rod insertion limit. The results show that the change in rod insertion limit (between 222 and 231 steps) will not: (1) increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (2) increase the consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, (3) create the possibility of a new kind of accident, or (4) decrease the safety margin. Both the licensee's evaluation and the proposed TS changes to allow for withdrawn parked positions between 222 and 231 steps are acceptable for Vogtle Units 1 and 2.

Control Rod Material

The hafnium control rods have been used recently in many Westinghouse plants. In late 1988, the NRC staff discovered hafnium control rod swelling and cracking problems in Wolf Creek. Subsequent reexaminations by Westinghouse confirmed that the swelling and cracking were caused by hydriding of the hafnium material. In March 1989, the staff issued an NRC Information Notice No. 89-31, entitled "Swelling and Cracking of Hafnium Control Rods." The staff also reviewed Westinghouse proposed hafnium control rod examination guidelines and recommended that these guidelines be observed by all the affected licensees using hafnium control rods. However, a better resolution to this problem is the replacement of hafnium control rods with silver-indium-cadmium (Ag-In-Cd) control rods, which are less prone to the swelling problem. The Ag-In-Cd absorber material was approved previously for use in control rods.

The licensee has opted to replace all hafnium control rods with Ag-In-Cd control rods for Vogtle Units 1 and 2. The licensee evaluated the effect of changing the control rod material from hafnium to Ag-In-Cd. The results demonstrate that no appreciable changes were observed for rod cluster control assembly worth, shutdown margin, and rod drop time since the two absorber materials are neutronically equivalent. Based on the NRC staff's previous approval of the use of Ag-In-Cd absorber material, we conclude that the licensee's proposed TS change to allow the use of Ag-In-Cd control rod material is acceptable for Vogtle Units 1 and 2.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments involve changes in requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register on November 15, 1989 (54 FR 47602), and consulted with the State of Georgia. No public comments were received, and the State of Georgia did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. L. Wu

Dated: February 20, 1990