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Oyster Creek
US Route 9 South
P.O. Box 388
Forked River, NJ 08731-0388

10 CFR 50.90

August 6, 2001
2130-01-20169

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Oyster Creek Generating Station
Facility Operating License No. DPR-16
Docket No. 50-219
Emergency Technical Specification Change Request No. 302
Emergency Service Water System Allowed Outage Time
One-time Change to Technical Specification 3.4.C.3

AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) is requesting an emergency change to the Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.C.3. This emergency TS change is being pursued in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) in that failure to act in a timely way will result in a shutdown of a nuclear power plant.

During an investigation of the cause of a soil surface depression that had developed at a corner of the foundation of the Chlorination System pump house, Emergency Service Water (ESW) loop II pump 52C was started to confirm appropriate flow rate. This operability test was performed in the event an underground ESW System piping leak was the cause of the soil surface depression. Within minutes of starting the ESW pump, water was detected at the soil depression. The pump was stopped immediately and, although sufficient flow was measured, ESW loop II was declared inoperable at 1439 hours on August 2, 2001 due to the potential impact of the leak-induced soil erosion on adjacent structures and the inability to verify that the leak did not jeopardize long-term pipe integrity. The ESW System test confirmed the leakage was associated with ESW loop II.

Oyster Creek TS 3.4.C.3 provides an allowed outage time (AOT) duration of 7-days for one emergency service water system loop. If TS 3.4.C.3 cannot be met, then TS 3.4.C.7 requires the reactor to be placed in the cold shutdown condition. The attached TS change will provide a one-time extension of this AOT for an additional 7-days to allow completion of repairs and restoration of Oyster Creek Emergency Service Water loop II operability. Without issuance of an emergency TS amendment, at 1439 hours on August 9, 2001, Oyster Creek will be required to commence a plant shutdown in accordance with TS 3.4.C.3 and 3.4.C.7. Attached is the requested revision to TS 3.4.C.3 and the detailed justification for this emergency TS change request.

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Using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92, AmerGen has concluded that this proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration, as described in the enclosed analysis performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1). Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1), a copy of this Emergency Technical Specification Change Request is provided to the designated official of the State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, as well as the Chief Executive of the township in which the facility is located.

This requested change to the Technical Specifications has undergone a safety review in accordance with Section 6.5 of the Oyster Creek Technical Specifications.

NRC approval of this change is requested prior to expiration of the action statement clock on August 9, 2001. If any additional information is needed, please contact Paul Czaya at (609) 971-4139.

Very truly yours,



RJ DeGregorio 8/4/01

Ron J. DeGregorio
Vice President – Oyster Creek

- Enclosures: (1) Oyster Creek Emergency Technical Specification Change Request
No. 302 Safety Evaluation and No Significant Hazards
Consideration
(2) Affected Oyster Creek Technical Specification Page
(3) Replacement Technical Specification Page

cc: H. J. Miller, Administrator, USNRC Region I
T. G. Colburn, USNRC Senior Project Manager, Oyster Creek (Acting)
L. A. Dudes, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
File No. 01074

United States of America
Nuclear Regulatory Commission


In the Matter of)
AmerGen Energy Company, LLC) Docket No. 50-219

Certificate of Service

This is to certify that a copy of Emergency Technical Specification Change Request No. 302 for the Oyster Creek Generating Station Facility Operating License, filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on August 6, 2001, has this 6th day of August 2001 been served on the State of New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering as well as the Chief Executive of the township in which the facility is located, by deposit in the United States mail, addressed as follows:

The Honorable Ronald Sterling
Mayor of Lacey Township
818 West Lacey Road
Forked River, NJ 08731

Mr. Kent Tosch, Director
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
Department of Environmental Protection
CN 415
Trenton, NJ 08628

By: 
Ron J. DeGregorio
Vice President – Oyster Creek

Oyster Creek Generating Station

Facility Operating License
No. DPR-16

Emergency Technical Specification Change
Request No. 302
Docket No. 50-219

Applicant submits by this Emergency Technical Specification Change Request No. 302 to the Oyster Creek Generating Station Operating License a proposed change to Specification 3.4.C.3. All statements contained in this submittal have been reviewed, and all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

By: *Ron J. DeGregorio* R.J.D. 8/6/01
Ron J. DeGregorio
Vice President – Oyster Creek

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 6th day of August 2001.

George W. Busch
Notary Public

GEORGE W. BUSCH
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEW JERSEY
My Comm. Expires 8, 2009

Enclosure 1

Oyster Creek Generating Station
Technical Specification Change Request No. 302

Safety Evaluation
and
No Significant Hazards Determination

I. Technical Specification Change Request No. 302

The proposed change is to Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.C.3. The change is as follows:

The allowed outage time of 7 days in TS 3.4.C.3 for emergency service water (ESW) loop II and its associated containment spray loop would be extended from 1439 hours on August 9, 2001 to 1439 hours on August 16, 2001.

The proposed change is contained on TS page 3.4-4. A mark-up of TS page 3.4-4 is contained in Enclosure 2. The replacement TS page 3.4-4 is contained in Enclosure 3.

II. Discussion of Proposed Changes

On August 2, 2001, personnel noticed a small soil surface depression and evidence of standing water between a startup transformer and the chlorination building. Operations personnel noted that Containment Spray/ESW loop II had been run for approximately 6-7 hours on July 31, 2001 to reduce suppression pool water temperature. While the matter of a possible leak was being investigated, there was no further evidence of water rising to ground level. It was decided to perform ESW pump operability testing of ESW loop II to confirm operability and, possibly, see if it was the source of a leak. After a few minutes of ESW loop II pump 52C operation, water surfaced and enlarged the surface depression. The pump was secured and ESW loop II was declared inoperable at 1439 hours on August 2, 2001. With ESW loop II inoperable, TS 3.4.C.3 requires the return of the system to operable status within 7 days.

Mobilization to effect the repair of ESW loop II piping commenced immediately upon discovery of the ESW loop II leak and repairs have been continuing 24 hours a day in an effort to reach completion within the allowed outage time. However, the nature of the repair (underground installation of approximately 220 feet of 14-inch pipe to bypass the affected area) has taken longer than originally anticipated due to the complexity of excavating in the area. The yard where the ESW piping is buried contains other underground services, which necessitated extreme caution preparing the excavations. In addition, a period of inclement weather complicated work in certain portions of the excavations. This further contributed to delay in the pipe repair.

The requested change is necessary in order to avoid the shutdown and restart of the Oyster Creek Generating Station. TS 3.4.C.3 requires an inoperable ESW System train to be returned to service within 7 days. TS 3.4.C.7 requires the reactor to be placed in the cold shutdown condition if TS 3.4.C.3 cannot be met. The requested additional 7 days to TS 3.4.C.3 that would be effective for only one time is needed in order to ensure completion of the ESW loop II piping repair. The current schedule considers

contingencies and shows a possible completion 3 days and 8 hours beyond the 7-day allowed outage time. While the repair may take less time, it may also take some additional time beyond that projected by the current schedule. In any case, the difference in the actual repair time is not expected to vary by more than a few days, therefore, AmerGen requests an additional 7 days as prudent to ensure work will be complete within the extended allowed outage time.

III. Safety Assessment

During the subsequent investigation into the cause of ESW loop II leakage, a leak was observed in the ESW loop II piping at an abandoned 1½ inch supply tap to the chlorination system eductor, through the use of video camera inspection. The apparent root cause is localized corrosion due to coating failure. This conclusion is based on past experience. Underground pipe coating failure has occurred in the past at Oyster Creek in carbon steel underground piping. In all cases, the degradation mechanism has been attributed to corrosion initiated by coating failure. In one specific case for similar service and material the failure was at a weld. The coating had likely been damaged due to the heat of the welding process, and corrosion of the unprotected metal was then initiated. The size of the failures has been small, and for the most part, on the order of the size of a one-inch hole. The current leak in ESW loop II piping was measured to be about 300 gpm. This flow loss is equivalent to a hole approximately 1 inch in diameter based on system pressures.

The location of the leak in ESW loop II is in an area that would require undermining the foundations of several components and buildings to repair the existing pipe that is buried about 20 feet below grade. To ensure continued plant safety, AmerGen is aggressively working on a repair which will abandon a section of pipe and run new piping through an area of the plant that has fewer known obstructions below grade. The pipe replacement satisfies all applicable Code requirements. The new pipe is not coated either internally or externally. Corrosion rates for this pipe in this service indicate that the minimum wall thickness will not be exceeded between now and the end of the next 1R19 refueling outage. Further evaluation will be performed to determine the replacement schedule of this new section of piping.

The scope of work required to ensure reliable performance of the ESW System II may not be completed in the 7-day outage period allowed by TS 3.4.C.3. Therefore, the requested change is necessary to avoid cycling the unit through an unnecessary transient by placing Oyster Creek in a cold shutdown condition as would be required by TS 3.4.C.7. Compensatory measures during the extended allowed outage period will include the following:

- The continuation of daily operability verification of all components in the redundant CS/ESW loop.
- CS/ESW loop I components and controls, Standby Diesel Generators, and normal power supplies have been provided additional protection from inadvertent or accidental manipulation in accordance with station Procedure 106.13, Operational Barriers.
- During the period when ESW loop II is out-of-service, and maintenance on the plant is necessary, the risk will be carefully evaluated in accordance with plant procedures before proceeding.

The Containment Heat Removal Systems are designed to reduce containment pressure and temperature following a Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), by removing thermal energy from the containment atmosphere. These systems also serve to limit offsite doses by reducing the pressure differential between the containment atmosphere and the external environment. The Containment Spray (CS) and Emergency Service Water Systems comprise the Containment Heat Removal Systems for the OCGS.

The design bases of the Containment Heat Removal Systems are as follows:

- a. To remove heat from the Primary Containment and, in conjunction with the Core Spray System, to assure continuity of core cooling.
- b. To provide redundancy in the event of a single active component failure.
- c. To provide for manual initiation of the system.
- d. To be able to test active components during normal operations.

The Containment Spray System consists of two redundant loops, which deliver water from the suppression pool to the spray headers in the drywell and torus. Each loop consists of two 100% capacity pumps in parallel, two 50% capacity heat exchangers in parallel, and two 50% capacity drywell spray headers and a torus spray header (the torus spray header can use up to 5% of Containment Spray System flow). Both loops share a common suction header from the suppression pool and a common spray header in the torus air space. The containment spray heat exchangers are cooled by the Emergency Service Water System. There are two 100% capacity ESW pumps per containment spray loop. Containment spray and ESW pumps are powered by the Standby Diesel Generators on loss of offsite power.

Containment spray water is pumped from the suppression pool through the suction strainers to the heat exchangers, sprayed into containment and returned by gravity to the suppression pool via the drywell to suppression pool vent headers. The water spray removes latent and sensible heat from the drywell. The heat is rejected to the Emergency Service Water System via the containment spray heat exchangers. Emergency service water is pumped from the intake canal from Barnegat Bay (ultimate heat sink) to the

containment spray heat exchangers and returned to the discharge canal to Barnegat Bay. ESW loop II supports Containment Spray loop II. Therefore, with ESW loop II inoperable, Containment Spray loop II is also inoperable.

During the period when ESW loop II is out-of-service, only loop I will be available to perform the system function. Although ESW loop I has redundant pumps, these are dependent on the divisional AC power from 4160V Bus C. This system could fail on a loss of AC or DC power, plugging of the heat exchangers, a pipe break in the common flow path from the pumps or by failure of both redundant pumps. These possibilities are not considered to be risk significant for the period in question since the sequence of events leading to a failure would require a LOCA inside containment, followed by the loss of ESW loop I. The probabilities of these events are evaluated using the OCPRA as discussed below and show that operation of the plant with only one loop of ESW for an additional one week period is not risk significant.

The ESW System is tested quarterly for operability and compliance with Inservice Testing (IST) requirements. The test was last performed for ESW loop I on June 28, 2001, with satisfactory results. IST results from the past year were also reviewed. There are no abnormal trends noted. Both ESW loops are Maintenance Rule level (a)(2) at the present time, and pump reliability has been improved with material changes to the pumps.

However, given the leakage that has occurred from ESW loop II, it is possible that the flow of water has created a void under the loop I piping, leaving a portion of the pipe unsupported. According to the ANSI B31.1 piping code, a maximum span of 17 feet or less would be acceptable. Although there has been some slight surface displacement in the vicinity of the leak, if a void more than 17 feet in length existed below the emergency service water line, evidence of significant ground subsidence would be observed. The Oyster Creek site is back-filled with a soil that is very similar to beach sand. When the material is saturated, it readily sloughs into and fills any voided area. No surface subsidence was observed in the area after a heavy rainfall that occurred after the loop II pump was secured. In addition, the start-up transformer is located on the ground above the pipe. If there were a void in the soil, settlement of this transformer would be expected. Review and evaluation of the transformer show no movement. The transformer continues to be monitored.

Quantitative Best-Estimate Evaluation of Change in Risk

The risk of remaining in operation for an additional 7-day period with Containment Spray/ESW loop II out of service was evaluated using the Oyster Creek Level 1 PRA. The base risk was determined by the normal maintenance model. The risk during the

extended period was evaluated using the no maintenance model with CS/ESW loop II unavailable.

The base case represents the average core damage frequency (CDF) with no additional penalties imposed. This represents the average PRA with average rates of system unavailabilities.

$$CDF_0 = 3.8E-06 \text{ per year}$$

Similarly, the average large early release frequency (LERF) results are:

$$LERF_0 = 7.56E-07 \text{ per year}$$

The configuration-specific results below represent the PRA results for CDF with ESW loop II out-of-service. These results were developed using the no maintenance model with the ESW loop II disabled.

$$\begin{aligned} CDF_1 &= 4.37E-06 \text{ per year} \\ ICCDP^1 &= (\Delta CDF) \times T, \text{ where } T \text{ is } 7 \text{ days} \\ ICCDP &= (4.37E-06 - 3.8E-06) * 7/365 \\ ICCDP &= 5.7E-07 * .0192 = 1.09E-08 \end{aligned}$$

¹ ICCDP: incremental conditional core damage probability

Calculation of the change in LERF found that there were no significant changes in the LERF. Comparison of the plant damage states in the model found that almost all of the increase in CDF resulted in late releases. This is consistent with the model since the Containment Spray/ESW system is most significant in mitigation of late containment failures.

The acceptance criteria for temporary changes (such as the change requested herein) is delineated in EPRI TR-105396, "PSA Applications Guide." The value for the calculated ICCDP is below the acceptance criterion of 1E-06. Although the LERF showed no change, if all of the ICCDP resulted in a large early release, it would remain below the incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) acceptance criterion of 1E-07. As a result, the risk associated with the 7-day extension is considered non-risk significant.

Determining Risk of Complete Loss of the Containment Spray Function

In order to determine an upper bound on the risk increase, a failure of the remaining ESW loop I was also evaluated using the no maintenance model. The configuration-specific results below represent the PRA results for CDF with both ESW System loops out of service.

$$CDF_2 = 9.62E-06 \text{ per year}$$

$$ICCDP = (\Delta CDF) \times T, \text{ where } T \text{ is } 7 \text{ days}$$

$$ICCDP = (9.62E-06 - 3.8E-06) * 7/365$$

$$ICCDP = 5.82E-06 * .0192 = 1.12E-07$$

Conclusion

The incremental increase in risk associated with continued operation with Containment Spray/ESW loop II out of service is calculated and is shown to be below the EPRI PSA Applications Guide criteria for temporary plant changes.

IV. Information Supporting a Finding of No Significant Hazards

AmerGen has concluded that the proposed changes to the TS do not involve significant hazards. In support of this determination, an evaluation of each of the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 is provided below.

1. The proposed TS changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The Containment Spray/Emergency Service Water System is an accident mitigation feature designed to function in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Loss-of-coolant accidents have been previously evaluated as shown in Chapter 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The ESW System provides cooling water from the ultimate heat sink (Barnegat Bay) to the Containment Spray System (CSS) heat exchangers. The water in the suppression pool is cooled via the CSS. Thus, heat from primary containment is removed by the CSS in conjunction with the ESW System in response to a LOCA. The ESW System is started manually as required by emergency operating procedures. ESW consists of two loops each containing two pumps. Since ESW is an accident mitigation system and no changes to accident initiating events are associated with the extension of the allowed outage time contained in this request for a one-time change to an additional 7-day allowed outage time for ESW loop II in TS 3.4.C.3, there is no impact on accident probability.

Operation of one pump in one ESW loop provides adequate heat removal capability. Since two 100% capacity pumps in one loop of the total ESW System will be available to accomplish the safety function of heat removal from the primary containment while the other train is inoperable, accident (LOCA) consequences are not impacted. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed TS changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed 7-day additional allowed outage time beyond the 7 days provided by TS 3.4.C.3 for Containment Spray/ESW loop II in this proposed change concerns the availability of an accident mitigation system. The proposed change does not directly impact the integrity of any fission product barrier (cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, and containment) since the function of containment heat removal is available through CS/ESW loop I.

The extension of time an additional 7 days of the plant configuration allowed by TS 3.4.C.3 will not initiate any accidents or result in any accidents that have not been previously evaluated. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed TS changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Technical Specification 3.4.C.3 allows continued operation of the reactor with one Containment Spray/ESW loop II inoperable for up to 7 days. Since the accident mitigation function of the Containment Spray/ESW System can be achieved with only one loop operable, increasing the allowed outage time by 7 days has no impact on margin of safety defined by system function. The margin of safety associated with the unavailability of CS/ESW loop II for an additional 7 days is not significantly reduced by the increased allowed outage time as determined through risk analysis. Therefore, the proposed change to TS 3.4.C.3 does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

V. Information Supporting an Environmental Assessment Determination

AmerGen has evaluated this requested change to TS 3.4.C.3 against the criteria for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has determined that this requested action meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and, as such, has

determined that no irreversible consequences exist in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(b). This determination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed to a license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 50 that reflects a requirement with respect to the use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, and the action meets the following specific criteria:

- (i) The proposed action involves no significant hazard consideration. As demonstrated in Section IV above, this proposed action does not involve a significant hazard consideration.
- (ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite. The proposed action does not affect the generation of any radioactive effluent. It is expected that plant equipment would operate as expected in the event of an accident to minimize the potential for any leakage of radioactive effluents.
- (iii) There is no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The proposed action will not change the level of controls or methodology used for processing of radioactive effluents or handling of solid radioactive waste, nor will the proposed action result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant. Therefore, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure resulting from this change.

VI. Statement of Emergency Circumstances

10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) states that whenever an emergency situation exists, a licensee requesting an amendment must explain why this emergency situation occurred and why it could not be avoided.

Background

On August 2, 2001, personnel noticed a small soil surface depression and evidence of standing water between a startup transformer and the chlorination building. Operations personnel noted that Containment Spray/ESW loop II had been run for approximately 6-7 hours on July 31, 2001 to reduce suppression pool water temperature. While the matter of a possible leak was being investigated, there was no further evidence of water rising to ground level. It was decided to perform ESW pump operability testing of ESW loop II to confirm operability and, possibly, see if it was the source of a leak. After a few minutes of ESW loop II pump 52C operation, water surfaced and enlarged the surface depression. The pump was secured and ESW loop II was declared inoperable. With ESW loop II inoperable, TS 3.4.C.3 requires the return of the system to operable status within 7 days.

The location of the leak in ESW loop II is in an area that would require undermining the foundations of several components and buildings to repair the existing pipe that is buried about 20 feet below grade. To ensure continued plant safety, AmerGen is aggressively working on a repair which will abandon a section of pipe and run new piping through an area of the plant that has fewer known obstructions below grade. The pipe replacement satisfies all applicable Code requirements.

Emergency Circumstances

The scope of work required to ensure reliable performance of the system cannot be completed in the 7 day outage period allowed by TS 3.4.C.3. Therefore, a shutdown is required by TS 3.4.C.7. This emergency Technical Specification change provides a one-time extension of the allowed outage time of Technical Specification 3.4.C.3 while repair of the leaking underground Emergency Service Water loop II pipe is being performed. Mobilization to effect the repair commenced immediately upon discovery of the ESW loop II leak and repairs have been continuing 24 hours a day in an effort to reach completion within the allowed outage time. However, the nature of the repair (installation of approximately 220 feet of 14-inch pipe to bypass the affected area) has taken longer than originally anticipated due to the complexity of excavating in the area. The yard where the ESW piping is buried contains other underground services which necessitates extreme caution performing the excavations. In addition, a period of inclement weather complicated the work in certain portions of the excavations. This further contributed to delay in the pipe repair.

The requested change is necessary in order to avoid an undesirable transient resulting from the shutdown and restart of the Oyster Creek Generating Station. TS 3.4.C.3 requires an inoperable ESW loop to be returned to service within 7 days. TS 3.4.C.7 requires the reactor to be placed in the cold shutdown condition if TS 3.4.C.3 cannot be met.

An emergency one-time Technical Specification change to the requirements of TS 3.4.C.3 is requested to provide an additional 7-days to complete the repair to ESW loop II piping. This change will avoid placing Oyster Creek in a cold shutdown condition, thereby cycling the unit through a transient. As discussed previously, there is no significant increase in nuclear safety risk by extending the allowed outage time for one loop of ESW to allow repair of the damaged piping to be completed.

AmerGen could not have foreseen the need for change prior to the indication of the leakage and this submittal was made as soon as practical after determination that the repair may not be completed within the existing 7-day allowed outage time.

VII. Implementation

AmerGen requests that the license amendment be effective no later than expiration of the current action statement clock (1439 hours on August 9, 2001).

Enclosure 2

Oyster Creek Technical Specification Change Request No. 302

Mark-up Revision to Technical Specification Page 3.4-4

2. If at any time there are only four operable electromatic relief valves, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 3 days provided the motor operated isolation and condensate makeup valves in both isolation condensers are verified daily to be operable.
3. If Specifications 3.4.B.1 and 3.4.B.2 are not met; reactor pressure shall be reduced to 110 psig or less, within 24 hours.
4. The time delay set point for initiation after coincidence of low-low-low reactor water level and high drywell pressure shall be set not to exceed two minutes.

C. Containment Spray System and Emergency Service Water System

1. The containment spray system and the emergency service water system shall be operable at all times with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, except as specified in Specifications 3.4.C.3, 3.4.C.4, 3.4.C.6 and 3.4.C.8.
2. The absorption chamber water volume shall not be less than 82,000 ft³ in order for the containment spray and emergency service water system to be considered operable.
3. If one emergency service water system loop becomes inoperable, its associated containment spray system loop shall be considered inoperable. If one containment spray system loop and/or its associated emergency service water system loop becomes inoperable during the run mode, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days provided the remaining containment spray system loop and its associated emergency service water system loop each have no inoperable components and are verified daily to be operable.
- * —————
4. If a pump in the containment spray system or emergency service water system becomes inoperable, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 15 days provided the other similar pump is verified daily to be operable. A maximum of two pumps may be inoperable provided the two pumps are not in the same loop. If more than two pumps become inoperable, the limits of Specification 3.4.C.3 shall apply.
5. During the period when one diesel is inoperable, the containment spray loop and emergency service water system loop connected to the operable diesel shall have no inoperable components.
6. If primary containment integrity is not required (see Specification 3.5.A), the containment spray system may be made inoperable.

* In accordance with AmerGen Emergency Technical Specification Change Request dated August 6, 2001 and any requirements in the associated NRC safety evaluation the allowed outage time for emergency service water loop II and its associated containment spray loop is extended from 1439 hours on August 9, 2001 until 1439 hours on August 16, 2001.

Enclosure 3

Oyster Creek Technical Specification Change Request No. 302

Replacement Technical Specification Page 3.4-4

2. If at any time there are only four operable electromatic relief valves, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 3 days provided the motor operated isolation and condensate makeup valves in both isolation condensers are verified daily to be operable.
3. If Specifications 3.4.B.1 and 3.4.B.2 are not met, reactor pressure shall be reduced to 110 psig or less, within 24 hours.
4. The time delay set point for initiation after coincidence of low-low-low reactor water level and high drywell pressure shall be set not to exceed two minutes.

C. Containment Spray System and Emergency Service Water System

1. The containment spray system and the emergency service water system shall be operable at all times with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, except as specified in Specifications 3.4.C.3, 3.4.C.4, 3.4.C.6 and 3.4.C.8.
2. The absorption chamber water volume shall not be less than 82,000 ft³ in order for the containment spray and emergency service water system to be considered operable.
3. If one emergency service water system loop becomes inoperable, its associated containment spray system loop shall be considered inoperable. If one containment spray system loop and/or its associated emergency service water system loop becomes inoperable during the run mode, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7* days provided the remaining containment spray system loop and its associated emergency service water system loop each have no inoperable components and are verified daily to be operable.
4. If a pump in the containment spray system or emergency service water system becomes inoperable, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 15 days provided the other similar pump is verified daily to be operable. A maximum of two pumps may be inoperable provided the two pumps are not in the same loop. If more than two pumps become inoperable, the limits of Specification 3.4.C.3 shall apply.
5. During the period when one diesel is inoperable, the containment spray loop and emergency service water system loop connected to the operable diesel shall have no inoperable components.
6. If primary containment integrity is not required (see Specification 3.5.A), the containment spray system may be made inoperable.

* In accordance with AmerGen Emergency Technical Specification Change Request dated August 6, 2001 and any requirements in the associated NRC safety evaluation the allowed outage time for emergency service water loop II and its associated containment spray loop is extended from 1439 hours on August 9, 2001 until 1439 hours on August 16, 2001.