March 31, 1987

Docket No. 50-395

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Mr. D. A. Nauman
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
P.O. Box 764 (Mail Code 167)
Columbia, South Carolina 29218

Dear Mr. Nauman:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-12 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated December 11, 1986.

The amendment increases the required boron concentration for the accumulators and the refueling water storage tank. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/S/

Jon B. Hopkins, Project Manager
PWR Project Directorate #2
Division of PWR Licensing-A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 61 to NPF-12
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PAD#2	PM:PAD#2	OGC	PD:PAD#2
DMiller	JHopkins:hc	M Young	LRubenstein
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PDR ADOCK 05000395
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cc:

Mr. William A. Williams, Jr.
Technical Assistant - Nuclear Operations
Santee Cooper
P.O. Box 764 (Mail Code 167)
Columbia, South Carolina 29218

J. B. Knotts, Jr., Esq.
Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell
and Reynolds
1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Resident Inspector/Summer NPS
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 1, Box 64
Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065

Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Chairman, Fairfield County Council
P.O. Box 293
Winnsboro, South Carolina 29180

Attorney General
Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Chief
Bureau of Radiological Health
South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control
2600 Bull Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-395

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 61
License No. NPF-12

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company and South Carolina Public Service Authority (the licensees) dated December 11, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-12 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 61 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Lester S. Rubenstein, Director
PWR Project Directorate #2
Division of PWR Licensing-A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 31, 1987

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 61 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12

DOCKET NO. 50-395

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. Corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 1-11	3/4 1-11
3/4 1-12	3/4 1-12
3/4 5-1	3/4 5-1
3/4 5-9	3/4 5-9
B3/4 1-2	B3/4 1-2
B3/4 1-3	B3/4 1-3
B3/4 5-2	B3/4 5-2
- -	B3/4 5-3
B3/4 6-4	B3/4 6-4

BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A boric acid storage system with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 2700 gallons,
2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and
3. A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 37,900 gallons,
2. A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppm, and
3. A minimum solution temperature of 40°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,
2. Verifying the contained borated water volume, and
3. Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than 40°F.

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a. A boric acid storage system with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 13,200 gallons,

2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 453,800 gallons,

2. A minimum boron concentration of 2300 ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of 40°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid storage system inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2 percent delta k/k at 200°F; restore the boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. A contained borated water volume of between 7368 and 7594 gallons,

c. A boron concentration of between 2200 and 2500 ppm, and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 656 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within one hour and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and

2. Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution.

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that the isolation valve operator breaker opened at the motor control center and locked in the open position.

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

   1. When an actual or a simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint,

   2. Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of 453,800 gallons,

b. A boron concentration of between 2300 and 2500 ppm of boron, and

c. A minimum water temperature of 40°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and

2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40°F.

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions. This value of the MDC was then transformed into the limiting MTC value -4.2×10^{-4} delta k/k/°F. The MTC value of 3.3×10^{-4} delta k/k/°F represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting MTC value of -4.2×10^{-4} k/k/°F.

The surveillance requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551°F. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps, and 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200°F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide the required SHUTDOWN

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k or as required by Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and is satisfied by 12475 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 64,040 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 275°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1 percent delta k/k or as required by Figure 3.1-3 after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition is satisfied by either 2000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 9690 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be inoperable below 300°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of either a LOCA, a steamline break or inadvertent RCS depressurization. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure 1) that sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, 2) that the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition (68 to 212 degrees-F) following a small break LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, Spray Additive Tank (SAT), containment spray system piping and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except the most reactive control rod assembly (ARI-1), 3) that the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow area ≥ 3.0 sq. ft.) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, ECCS water and other sources of water that may eventually reside in the sump post-LOCA with all control rods assumed to be out (ARO), 4) long term subcriticality following a steamline break assuming ARI-1 and preclude fuel failure.

The maximum allowable value for the RWST boron concentration forms the basis for determining the time (Post-LOCA) at which operator action is required to switch over the ECCS to hot leg recirculation in order to avoid precipitation of the soluble boron.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.8 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

3/4.6.1.7 REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 36-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system. To provide assurance that the 36-inch valves cannot be inadvertently opened, they are sealed closed in accordance with the Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevent power from being spplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 6 inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since unlike the 36 inch valves the 6 inch valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.

Periodic leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals will provide early indication of seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures develop. The 0.60 L_a leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the reactor building spray system ensures that reactor building depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a steam line break. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The reactor building spray system and the reactor building cooling system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the reactor building atmosphere. However, the reactor building spray system also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the reactor building atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the reactor building spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.8 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the reactor building cooling system ensures that 1) the reactor building air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the reactor building spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

The reactor building cooling system and the reactor building spray system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the reactor building atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out of service time requirements for the reactor building cooling system have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out of service time requirements for the reactor building spray system have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the reactor building spray system also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the reactor building atmosphere.

3/4.6.3 PARTICULATE IODINE CLEANUP SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the containment filter trains ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 61 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-395

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 11, 1986, South Carolina Electric and Gas (the licensee) made application to amend the Technical Specifications of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. The proposed amendment would increase the required boron concentration in the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the accumulators. The changes are necessary to assure that the reactor will remain sub-critical in cold shutdown following a LOCA when higher enrichment fuel is used for anticipated longer fuel cycles.

EVALUATION

The proposed amendment increases the minimum allowable value of boron concentrations in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) accumulators to 2200 ppm and in the RWST to 2300 ppm. The maximum allowable value is 2500 ppm for both systems. This increase has implications for the analysis of several non-LOCA events and for the system chemistry (through the mechanism of pH change in the post accident containment). The licensee has addressed these concerns in the submittal.

1. Non-LOCA Safety Analyses

The only non-LOCA events which are affected by the increased boron concentration are those for which the safety injection system (SIS) is actuated. Each of these events has been examined to determine the effect of increased boron concentration. The results show that the increased boron concentration has a generally helpful effect on the event and in no case does it have a harmful effect.

2. LOCA Analysis

The small break LOCA analysis makes no assumption about the boron concentration in the ECCS water (shutdown is achieved and maintained by control rods). Thus, the increased boron concentration has no effect on the small break LOCA analysis.

During the initial portion of the large break LOCA analysis subcriticality is maintained by voids in the core and the increased boron concentration has no effect on this portion of the analysis. Since the peak clad temperature occurs during this portion of the event there is no effect on the results of the LOCA analysis.

For post LOCA shutdown no credit is taken for control rods in the Summer analysis. Thus, the boron in the ECCS water is relied upon to maintain shutdown. The ECCS water, when mixed with other sources (reactor coolant water, etc.) must produce a boron concentration sufficient to maintain the reactor in a shutdown state. The adequacy of the increased concentration to achieve this goal will be addressed for each reload.

A potential problem of boron precipitation due to concentration of boron in the liquid occurs as a result of steaming produced by decay heat in the core. Conservative analysis of this effect by the licensee produced the conclusion that the initial switch to hot leg injection should occur at 11 hours (instead of the present 24 hours) and that alternation between hot and cold leg injection should subsequently occur every 18 hours (instead of the present 24 hours). The emergency procedures for the Summer Plant will be altered to reflect the new times.

3. Other Considerations

Increasing the ECCS boron concentration reduces the pH of the containment spray and recirculating core coolant solutions. The reduction in pH can lead to reduction of the iodine spray removal coefficient and decontamination factor (DF), increase the rate of hydrogen production due to zinc corrosion and increase the potential for chloride induced stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel. These effects have been examined by the licensee with the following results.

The minimum calculated pH resulting from the increased boron concentration does not reduce the iodine spray removal coefficient or DF below that assumed in the FSAR. This is acceptable.

Examination of zinc corrosion rate data shows that the corrosion rate for the minimum pH resulting from the increased boron concentration (7.8) is less than that assumed in the FSAR. This is acceptable. Corrosion of other materials (e.g., aluminum) decreases montonically with decreasing pH.

The pH value of 7.8 is greater than the minimum value recommended by the vendor in order to minimize chloride stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel and is acceptable. Other equipment has been qualified at high pH values to maximize effects. The reduced pH will have a positive effect for other equipment qualification.

4. Finding

Based on the review described above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed Technical Specification changes, which implement an increase in the boron concentration of the ECCS water, are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 31, 1987

Principal Contributors:

J.B. Hopkins, Project Directorate #2, DPLA
W.L. Brooks, Reactor Systems Branch, DPLA