UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

August 3, 2001

Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice
President, Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 3
Avila Beach, CA 93424

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON INSPECTION REPORT 50-275/01-05; 50-323/01-05

Dear Mr. Rueger:

On July 7, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, facility, for the period May 20, 2001 through July 7, 2001. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 7, 2001, with Mr. James R. Becker and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company operated under voluntary bankruptcy proceedings during this inspection period. The NRC has exercised communications channels to better understand your planned and implemented actions, especially as they relate to your responsibility to safely operate the Diablo Canyon reactors. NRC inspections, to date, have confirmed that you are operating these reactors safely and that public health and safety is, thus far, assured.
In response to these conditions, there will continue to be two differences in how the Region communicates its inspection findings. First, we will continue the 6-week periodicity of our integrated inspection reports (the other reactors in Region IV implemented a quarterly report frequency, with the exception of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station). Second, the description of the scope of the individual inspection activities will be significantly more detailed. This is being done to keep the public more fully informed of the breadth and depth of the NRC's inspection and oversight activities.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos: 50-275
50-323
License Nos: DPR-80
DPR-82

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No.
50-275/01-05; 50-323/01-05

cc w/enclosure:
David H. Oatley, Vice President
Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, California 93424

Lawrence F. Womack, Vice President, Power
Generation & Nuclear Services
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424

Dr. Richard Ferguson
Energy Chair
Sierra Club California
1100 llth Street, Suite 311
Sacramento, California 95814

Nancy Culver
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
P.O. Box 164
Pismo Beach, California 93448

Chairman
San Luis Obispo County Board of
Supervisors
Room 370
County Government Center
San Luis Obispo, California 93408

Truman Burns\Mr. Robert Kinosian
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102
San Francisco, California 94102

Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
857 Cass Street, Suite D
Monterey, California 93940

Ed Bailey, Radiation Program Director
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732 (MS 178)
Sacramento, CA 94327-7320

Steve Hsu
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732
Sacramento, California 94327-7320

Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 7442
San Francisco, California 94120

City Editor
The Tribune
3825 South Higuera Street
P.O. Box 112
San Luis Obispo, California 93406-0112

Robert A. Laurie, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 31)
Sacramento, CA 95814

Electronic distribution from ADAMS by RIV:
Regional Administrator **(EWM)**
DRP Director **(KEB)**
DRS Director **(ATH)**
Senior Resident Inspector **(DLP)**
Branch Chief, DRP/E **(WBJ)**
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E **(GAP)**
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS **(PHH)**
RITS Coordinator **(NBH)**
Scott Morris **(SAM1)**
NRR Event Tracking System **(IPAS)**
DC Site Secretary **(AAJ)**
Dale Thatcher **(DFT)**

R:_DC\2001\DC2001-05RP-DLP.wpd

RIV:SRI:DRP/E	C:DRS/OB	C:DRS/PSB	C:DRP/E	
DLProulx	ATGody	GMGood	WBJones	
T - WBJones	***PCGage for***	***E - WBJones***	***/RA/***	
8/3/01	8/2/01	8/2/01	8/3/01	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos:	50-275 50-323
License Nos:	DPR-80 DPR-82
Report No:	50-275/01-05 50-323/01-05
Licensee:	Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility:	Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 and 2
Location:	7 ½ miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, California
Dates:	May 20 through July 7, 2001
Inspectors:	D. L. Proulx, Senior Resident Inspector T. W. Jackson, Resident Inspector G. W. Johnston, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch T. O. McKernon, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch J. B. Nicholas, Ph.D., Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch L. P. Ricketson, P.E., Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch
Approved By:	W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects

ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1 Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000-275-01-05, IR 05000-323-01-05, on 5/19/01 to 7/7/01, Pacific Gas and Electric. Co., Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. Resident Inspector Report. Access to Rad. Sig. Areas

This report covers a 7-week routine resident inspection, an operator requalification inspection, and two radiation safety inspections conducted from May 19 through July 7, 2001. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Violations of very low significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On June 21, 2001, operators decreased Unit 1 to 48 percent power to investigate a potential seawater leak in the main condenser. Chemists identified that the source of the contamination was the condensate storage tank. Unit 1 remained at 48 percent power until the condensate storage tank was cleaned up. Operators returned Unit 1 to 100 percent power on June 23, and Unit 1 continued to operate at essentially 100 percent power until the end of this inspection period.

Diablo Canyon Unit 2 began this inspection period in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) during Refueling Outage 2R10. Operators commenced heatup on Unit 2 and entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) on May 22, 2001, and then Mode 3 (Hot Standby) on May 23. Following completion of scheduled outage work, operators took Unit 1 to Mode 2 (Startup) on May 25. Unit 2 entered Mode 1 on May 28, and the main generator was synchronized to the grid on May 28, ending Refueling Outage 2R10. Power escalation continued until Unit 2 achieved 100 percent power on June 2. Unit 2 continued to operate at essentially 100 percent power until the end of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

.1 Complete System Walkdown

Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump

a. Inspection Scope

From June 6-19, 2001, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of AFW Train 1-1 to assess if the system could perform its intended safety function and if deficiencies were being documented and corrected. The inspectors: (1) reviewed the action request backlog for the residual heat removal system, (2) reviewed applicable procedures, (3) examined the in-plant materiel condition of the system, and (4) verified valve and electrical lineups. The inspectors used Drawing 106718, "Auxiliary Feedwater," Revision 81, and Procedure "OP D-1:II, "Auxiliary Feedwater System - Alignment Verification for Plant Startup," Revision 16, as guidance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Partial System Walkdowns

Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-1 System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On June 21, 2001, while Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-2 was inoperable, the inspectors performed a partial system walkdown of portions of the chemical and volume control system associated with Centrifugal Charging Pump 2-1. The inspection included procedure review, an in-plant walkdown of the system, verification of the valve and electrical lineups, and review of the Final Safety Analysis Report. The inspectors used Procedures OP B-1A:IX, "CVCS - Alignment Verification for Plant Startup," Revision 33, and OP AP-17, "Loss of Charging," Revision 22, as guidance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Residual Heat Removal Pump 1-1 System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On July 6, 2001, while Residual Heat Removal Pump 1-2 was inoperable, the inspectors performed a partial system walkdown of portions of the Emergency Core Cooling System associated with Residual Heat Removal Pump 1-1. The inspection included procedure review, an in-plant walkdown of the system, verification of the valve and electrical lineups, and review of the Final Safety Analysis Report. The inspectors referenced Procedure OP B-2:IV, "RHR - Remove from Service during Plant Heatup," Revision 13, as guidance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Monthly Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed fire protection walkdowns to assess the material condition of plant fire detection and suppression, fire seal operability, and proper control of transient combustibles. The inspectors used Section 9.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Report Update as guidance. Specific risk-significant areas inspected included the intake structure, the radiological controlled area of the auxiliary building, the diesel generator rooms of the turbine building, and the safety-related switchgear rooms in the auxiliary building.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

.1 Quarterly Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed operator performance in the simulator during routine training and requalification examinations. The inspectors evaluated the trainees use of self- and peer-checking, three-way communications, Technical Specifications, and abnormal procedures. The inspectors also attended the crew and individual debriefs to determine if the evaluators critically assessed operator performance. On June 12, 2001, the inspectors observed simulator scenarios associated with loss of pressure Transmitter PT-403, and loss of Invertor IY-11, IY-12, and IY-13.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors: (1) evaluated examination security measures and procedures for compliance with 10 CFR 55.49; (2) evaluated the licensee's sample plan for the written examinations for compliance with 10 CFR 55.59 and NUREG-1021, as referenced in the facility requalification program procedures; and (3) evaluated maintenance of license conditions for compliance with 10 CFR 55.53 by review of facility records, procedures, and tracking systems for licensed operator training, qualification, and watchstanding. In addition, the inspectors reviewed remedial training and examinations for examination failures for compliance with facility procedures and responsiveness to address areas failed.

In addition, the inspectors: (1) interviewed eight personnel (four operators, three instructors/evaluators, and a training supervisor) regarding the policies and practices for administering examinations; (2) observed the administration of two dynamic simulator scenarios to two requalification crews by facility evaluators, including an operations department manager, who participated in the crew and individual evaluations; and (3) observed three facility evaluators administer five job performance measures, including two in the control room simulator in a dynamic mode, and three in the plant under simulated conditions. Each job performance measure was observed being performed by an average of four requalification candidates. The inspectors also reviewed the remediation process for three individuals, one of which involved a written examination failure, one a simulator examination failure, and one periodic weekly quiz failure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

.1 Routine Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance rule implementation for equipment performance problems. The inspectors determined if the equipment was properly placed into the scope of the rule, if the failures were properly characterized, and if goal setting was recommended, if required. Procedure MA1.ID17, "Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program," Revision 8, was used as guidance. The inspectors reviewed A0536239, Valve 1-FCV-437 Leaks by Resulting in Condensate Storage Tank Contamination.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

Risk Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed daily and weekly work schedules to determine when the licensee had scheduled risk-significant activities. The inspectors reviewed selected activities regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control and that the licensee established the applicable contingencies, as discussed in the risk assessments. The inspectors used Procedure AD7.DC6, "On-Line Maintenance Risk Management," Revision 5, as guidance and reviewed the activities associated with the following:

- Diesel Engine Generator 1-3 Outage Window on June 19-20, 2001
- Residual Heat Removal Pump 1-2 Emergent Work on July 6, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions (71111.14, 71153)

Licensee Event Report (LER) Review

.1 (Closed) LER 275/00-01-00: Technical Specification 3.3.1 not met because of inadequate postmaintenance test.

This issue was reviewed as part of NRC Inspection Report 50-275;323/00-08. The inspectors identified a minor violation not subject to formal NRC Enforcement actions. The LER provided no new information that would change this previous disposition.

.2 (Closed) LER 275/00-02-00: Technical Specification 3.4.4 not met because of personnel error.

This issue was reviewed as part of NRC Inspection Report 50-275;323/00-05. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV violation that was treated as a noncited violation. The LER provided no new information that would change this previous disposition.

.3 (Closed) LER 275/00-11-00: Manual reactor trip because of rod control failure.

This issue was reviewed as part of NRC Inspection Report 50-275;323/00-15. The inspectors performed an onsite followup to this event and identified no enforcement issues. The LER provided no new information that would change this previous disposition.

.4 (Closed) LER 275/00-12-00: Automatic reactor trip because of test equipment failure.

This issue was reviewed as part of NRC Inspection Report 50-275;323/00-15. The inspectors performed an onsite followup to this event and identified no enforcement issues. The LER provided no new information that would change this previous disposition.

.5 (Closed) LER 323/00-04-00: Engineered Safety Features actuation, diesel generators started when startup power was lost because of personnel error.

This issue was reviewed as part of NRC Inspection Report 50-275;323/00-14. The inspectors identified a violation of very low safety significance that was treated as a noncited violation. The LER provided no new information that would change this previous disposition.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and supporting documents to determine if the associated systems could meet their intended safety functions despite the degraded status. The inspectors reviewed the applicable Technical Specification Bases

and Final Safety Analysis Report Update sections in support of this inspection. The inspectors reviewed A0535257, Neutron Detector N-43 Failing High.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the cumulative effect of operator workarounds to assess if the licensee adequately managed these items. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator workaround and operator burden logs to determine if plant operators would reasonably be able to perform their postaccident duties, given the existing equipment deficiencies, and were not overly distracted during the normal operation of the plant.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated portions of postmaintenance testing to determine if the test adequately demonstrated that the maintenance activity was performed properly. The inspectors reviewed the work orders, the completed data reduction, and witnessed portions of the postmaintenance tests performed in accordance with the following:

- STP V-3P4, Exercising AFW Valves for Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater Supplies, Revision 13A, on June 16, 2001
- STP V-3L10A, Exercising Valve SI-8923A, Safety Injection Pump 1-1 Suction Valve, Revision 1, on June 17, 2001
- STP M-9A, Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test, Revision 57A, on June 20, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated several outage activities during Unit 2 Outage 2R10 to verify Technical Specification compliance, and to ensure that the licensee appropriately

considered risk in developing schedules, plant configurations, mitigation strategies, and protection of key safety functions.

The inspectors provided continuous control room coverage from May 18-19, 2001, when the reactor coolant system was in a condition of reduced inventory (i.e. midloop) to remove steam generator nozzle dams, which was a risk-significant evolution. The inspectors used Procedure OP A-2:III, "Reactor Vessel - Draining to Half Loop with Fuel in the Vessel," Revision 18, as guidance. The inspectors evaluated the calibration of the Reactor Vessel Refueling Level Indicating System and the cross-calibration of the incore thermocouples and resistance temperature detectors. The inspectors verified adequate inventory control and contingency plans and verified containment closure and containment closure capability were in accordance with Technical Specifications and outage risk plans.

From May 24 through June 1, 2001, the inspectors witnessed portions of the Unit 2 heatup, startup and power escalation to 100 percent power.

The inspectors reviewed operator overtime usage to determine if the Technical Specifications limitations on working hours were followed or management approval was obtained. The inspectors reviewed overtime sheets, management approvals, and outage scheduling to determine if the licensee judiciously employed risk-informed methods of when to authorize individuals to exceed NRC limits for overtime usage.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

Routine Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated several routine surveillance tests to determine if the licensee complied with the applicable Technical Specifications requirements. The inspectors performed a technical review of the procedure, observed the test, and reviewed the completed test data. The inspectors evaluated the following:

- STP M-39A3, Routine Surveillance Test of Diesel Generator 1-3 Room Carbon Dioxide Fire System Operation, Revision 7, on June 29. 2001

- STP P-RHR-12, Routine Surveillance Test of RHR Pump 1-2, Revision 12, on July 6, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following Temporary Modifications/Plant Jumpers. The inspectors reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and that the applicable drawings were annotated, observed that the necessary tags were in place, and that the transient combustible administrative controls were properly implemented. The temporary alterations were performed in accordance with Procedure CF4.ID7, "Temporary Modifications - Plant Jumpers and Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision 7B.

- Unit 2 Digital Rod Position Indication Cabinet B Control Rod F08 Coil Jumper
- Unit 2 Safety Injection Suction Line Sonic Transducer

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety [OS]

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed radiation workers and radiation protection personnel involved in high dose rate and high exposure jobs during routine operations. The inspector also conducted plant walkdowns within the radiological controlled area and conducted independent radiation surveys of selected work areas. The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements:

- Area posting and other controls for airborne radioactivity areas, radiation areas, and high radiation areas
- High radiation area key controls
- Radiation work permits and radiological surveys involving airborne radioactivity areas and high radiation areas
- Prejob briefing prior to emergent valve work in a Unit 2 mixed bed demineralize cubicle
- Conduct of work with the potential for high radiation dose (replacement of insulation on the pressurize and valve work in the 2-2 demineralize cubicle)
- Dosimetry placement when work involved a significant dose gradient

- Controls involved with the storage of highly radioactive items in the spent fuel pool
- Problem identification reports involving high radiation area incidents and potential problems since October 2000 (including detailed reviews of A0525568, A0527032, A0530296, A0530581, and A0530808)
- Nuclear Quality Services Assessment Number 010240003

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed radiation workers and radiation protection personnel throughout the radiologically controlled area and conducted independent radiation surveys of selected work areas. One high exposure job of emergent valve work in a very high radiation area located in the mixed bed 2-2 demineralize cubicle was observed during the inspection. The following items were reviewed to determine whether the licensee had an adequate program to maintain occupational exposures ALARA:

- ALARA program procedures
- Nuclear Quality Services Radiation Protection Assessment Report 010240003
- Processes used to estimate and track exposures
- Plant collective exposure history for the past 3 years, current exposure trends, and 3-year rolling average dose information
- Three radiation work permit (RAP) packages for refueling outage work activities which resulted in some of the highest personnel collective exposures during the Unit 1 Cycle 10 refueling outage (RAP 00-1020-0, “1R10 Reactor Disassembly and Other Miscellaneous Reactor Head Work”; RAP 00-1025-0, “1R10 Reactor Head Maintenance”; and RAP 00-1027-1, “1R10 Reactor Reassembly”)
- Four RAP packages for refueling outage work activities which could result in the highest personnel collective exposures during the Unit 2 Cycle 10 refueling outage (RAP 01-2002-0, “2R10 Scaffolding in Containment”; RAP-01-2004-0, “2R10 Radiation Protection in Containment”; RAP 01-2042-0, “2R10 Primary Stream Generator Nozzle Dam Installation and Removal”; and RAP 01-2044-0, “2R10 Primary Steam Generator Eddy Current Inspections and Tube Work”)
- Hot spot tracking and reduction program

- Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions, including six temporary shielding requests (TSR 01-0204, TSR 01-0215, TSR 01-0226, TSR 01-0231, TSR 01-0248, and TSR 01-0255)
- Individual exposures of selected work groups (health physics, operations, and maintenance)
- Plant related source term data, including source term control strategy
- Radiological work planning
- ALARA Committee meeting minutes (2/14/01, 3/14/01, and 5/9/01)
- Declared pregnant worker dose monitoring controls
- A summary of radiological worker performance and ALARA related action requests written since January 1, 2000, was reviewed. Five of these action requests were reviewed in detail (A0506518, A0513301, A0515749, A0514938, and A0532219)
- Job site inspection and ALARA controls. Prejob briefing and work activities for emergent value work in the mixed bed 2-2 demineralize cubicle which was controlled by RAP 01-0045-0

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Safety Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following performance indicators for the period from the second quarter of 2000 through the first quarter of 2001 to assess the accuracy and completeness of the indicator. The inspectors reviewed plant operating logs and licensee monthly operating reports to support this inspection. The inspectors used NEI 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Verification,” Revision 0, as guidance for this inspection.

- Reactor Scrams (Trips)
- Reactor Scrams with a Loss of Normal Heat Removal

.2 Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed corrective action program records for Technical Specification required locked high radiation areas, very high radiation areas, and unplanned exposure occurrences for the past 12 months to confirm that these occurrences were properly recorded as performance indicators. Radiological controlled area entries with exposures greater than 100 millirems within the past 12 months were reviewed and selected examples were examined to determine whether they were within the dose projections of the governing radiation work permits. Whole body counts or dose estimates were reviewed if the radiation worker received a committed effective dose equivalent of more than 100 millirems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed radiological effluent release program corrective action records, licensee event reports, and annual effluent release reports documented during the past four quarters to determine if any doses resulting from effluent releases exceeded the performance indicator thresholds.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

Evaluation of Diablo Canyon Safety Condition in Light of Power and Financial Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

Because of the tight energy situation in California, Region IV initiated special review processes for Diablo Canyon. The residents evaluated the following factors each week to determine whether the financial condition and power needs of the licensee impact plant safety. The resident inspectors brief the responsible managers in Region IV on these factors. The factors reviewed include: (1) impact on staffing, (2) corrective maintenance backlog, (3) changes to the planned maintenance schedule, (4) reduction in outage scope, including risk-significant modifications, (5) availability of emergency facilities and operability of emergency sirens, and (6) grid stability (i.e., availability of offsite power to the switchyard, status of the operating reserves especially onset of rolling blackouts, and main generator reactive loading).

Additionally, the resident inspectors provided status daily on the energy supply situation, operating reserves, available in the California market. Managers have increased their presence by performing monthly visits to assess site conditions, including employee morale, licensee initiatives, and specific technical issues.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results of the licensed operator requalification inspection to Mr. T. King, Manager of Learning Services, and other members of the licensee's management staff at an exit interview on April 5, 2001.

The inspector presented the inspection results of the ALARA planning and controls to Mr. J. Tomkins, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Licensing, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 24, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspector presented the inspection results of access control to radiologically significant areas to Mr. J. Tomkins, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Licensing and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 25, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Becker, Station Director, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of each regional inspection during the inspection period. The resident inspection results were presented on July 6, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations. The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as Noncited Violations (NCV).

If you deny these noncited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Diablo Canyon facility.

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
323/0105-01	Technical Specification 5.7.2 states that for high radiation areas with dose rates greater than 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source, each entryway to

such an area shall be conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and shall be provided with a locked or continuously guarded door or gate that prevents unauthorized entry. On March 8, 2001, the keycard reader door to containment was not locked, allowing potential unauthorized entrance to high-high radiation areas within the containment building. See Action Request A0527032. This is being treated as a noncited violation.

Through the use of the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.

323/0105-02

10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires that each licensee shall make or cause to be made, surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 and are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the radiation levels and the potential radiological hazards. On April 30, 2001, the licensee identified a high radiation area above the 2-1 Deborating Demineralize resin fill connection access port which had dose rates as high as 170 millirems/hour at 30 centimeters. The licensee's investigation determined that the conditions existed for as long as 24 hours. See Action Request A0530296. This is being treated as a noncited violation.

Through the use of the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low because there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.

ATTACHMENT 1

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. R. Becker, Station Director
D. D. Christensen, Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Licensing
R. E. Hite, Director, Radiation Protection
S. C. Ketelsen, Supervisor, Regulatory Services
D. B. Miklush, Director, Engineering Services
P. T. Nugent, Director, Regulatory Services
D. H. Oatley, Vice President
J. W. Tompkins, Director, Nuclear Quality Analysis and Licensing
R. A. Waltos, Director, Maintenance Services

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed During this Inspection

323/2001005-01	NCV	Unlocked High-High Radiation Area (Section 4OA7)
323/2001005-02	NCV	Unposted High Radiation Area (Section 4OA7)

Previous Items Closed

275/00-01-00	LER	Technical Specification 3.3.1 not met because of inadequate postmaintenance test (Section 1R14.1)
275/00-02-00	LER	Technical Specification 3.4.4 not met because of personnel error (Section 1R14.2)
275/00-11-00:	LER	Manual reactor trip because of rod control failure (Section 1R14.3)
275/00-12-00	LER	Automatic reactor trip because of test equipment failure (Section 1R14.4)
323/00-04-00	LER	Engineered Safety Features actuation, diesel generators started when startup power was lost because of personnel error (Section 1R14.5)

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AFW	auxiliary feedwater
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
AR	action request
CFR	Code of Federal Regulation
JPM	Job Performance Measure
LER	Licensee Event Report
NCV	noncited violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
VAR	volt-amperes reactive

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

TQ2.ID1 “Training Program Analysis,” Revision 3A

TQ2.ID2 “Training Program Design,” Revision 3B

TQ2.ID3 “Training Program Development,” Revision 3B

TQ2.ID4 “Training Program Implementation,” Revision 4B

TQ2.ID5 “Training Program Evaluation,” Revision 3

TQ2.ID6 “Training Records Management,” Revision 2A

TQ1.DC15 “Instructor Training Program,” Revision 5

TQ2.DC1 “Non-Licensed Operator Initial training Program,” Revision 3

TQ2.DC2 “Licensed Operator and Shift Technical Advisor Initial Training Program,” Revision 5A

TQ2.DC3 “Licensed Operator, Non-Licensed Operator, and Shift Technical Advisor Continuing Training Programs,” Revision 9

SPG “Systematic Approach to Training Guide,” Revision 1

Other Documents Reviewed

Simulator Trouble Reports
2000/2001 Requalification Sample Plan
JPM Annual Examination, Revision Date 4/6/01

Simulator Annual Examination, Revision Date 4/3/01
Annual SRO Written Exam Week 4

Annual RO Written Exam Week 4
Annual Written Examination Results Week 1 - 3 2000/2001
Dynamic Simulator Scenario Index
Licensed Operator Requalification Dynamic Exam Scenarios:
Job Performance Measures (JPMs):
“Audit of Operations Accredited Training Programs” September 7, 2000
Action Request AR0509211 “Self Assessment of INPO findings”
Action Request A0513211 “Reactvity Management Self Assessment”