Test Plan 81 Report

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc.

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1. PURPOSE

This report describes the Type B test results for the Model 702 transport package. These tests were performed in accordance with Test Plan 81 and were conducted April 9 through 15, 1999. The Test Plan specified testing necessary to demonstrate compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR Part 71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6 **(1985** as amended 1990) for "Normal Conditions of Transport" and "Hypothetical Accident Conditions." Evaluation of the compliance of the Model 702 with these requirements is provided in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).

2. **SCOPE** OF **TESTING**

Test Plan 81 identified three orientations that could potentially cause the most significant damage to the Model 702 transport package in the 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests. Therefore, the test plan required three test specimens. However, since the Model 702 is not portable, only one unit was preconditioned (i.e., subjected to Normal Conditions of Transport Tests) prior to the Hypothetical Accident Condition tests. Also, only one shipping cask was used (in three different . cage/skid assemblies) for all tests because the number of 702 units is limited. The shipping cask was taken from the field population, and therefore represents a worse case than using a new 702 shipping cask. The tests conducted are described below.

- 1. Normal Conditions of Transport Tests per 10 CFR 71.71, including the following for specimen TP81(A):
	- a) Compression test, with the test specimen under a load greater than or equal to five times the Model 702 maximum weight for at least 24 hours.
	- b) Penetration test, in which a 13.4 lb (6.08 kg) penetration bar is dropped from at least 1 meter (40 inches) onto the test specimen in the most vulnerable location.
	- c) 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test, in which the test specimen is dropped in an orientation expected to cause maximum damage.

Water spray preconditioning of the test specimens prior to testing was not required in the test plan and is evaluated separately.

- 2. Hypothetical Accident Condition Tests per 10 CFR 71.73, including the following for each of the test specimens:
	- a) 9 meter (30 foot) drop test, in which the test specimen is dropped in an orientation expected to cause maximum damage.
	- b) Puncture test, in which the test specimen is dropped from at least 1 meter (40 inches) onto a 6 inch (152.4 mm) diameter vertical bar in an orientation expected to compound damage from the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test.

c) **,** Thermal test, in accordance with 10 CFR71.73(c)(4), in which the test specimen is exposed for 30 minutes to an environment which provides a time-averaged environmental temperature of at least 800° C (1472 $^{\circ}$ F), and an emissivity coefficient of at least 0.9. For the Model 702, the test plan specified that the decision to perform thermal testing would be based on an assessment of damage sustained by the specimen following the drop and puncture tests. This requirement was based on the evaluation of the construction of the unit, and on the potential failure modes, which are discussed in the following section.

The crush test specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(2) was not required because the radioactive contents are qualified as Special-Form radioactive material.

The water immersion test specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(6) and other tests specified in 10 CFR 71 are evaluated separately.

For all tests, sufficient margin Was included in test parameters to account for measurement uncertainty. These test parameters included test specimen weight, temperature, and drop height.

3. FAILURE MODES

For the Model 702 transport package, the key function important to safety is the positive retention of the radioactive source in its stored position within the depleted uranium shield. Removal of the cask cover or damage to the cask or DU shield could cause radiation from the package to increase above regulatory limits. Mechanisms, which could cause these modes of failure, include:

- Failure of the Cask Cover Bolts During the free drop or puncture tests, failure of the cask cover bolts could result in the source becoming partially or completely exposed.
- \bullet Failure of the Cask or Cover Assembly Shell Failure (e.g., puncture) of the cask cover assembly or failure of the inner liner to outer shell weld could expose the depleted uranium (DU) shield, which could oxidize during thermal testing.
- Separation of the Cask from the Skid $-$ If the cask to skid bolts or the tie down assembly fail during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test, the cask may strike the impact surface. In addition, the specimen could then be further damaged in the puncture bar test when the cask impacts on the puncture bar.
- Crushing or Buckling of the Protective Cage If there is significant deformation of the protective cage during the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, the distance from the source to the specimen external surface would be decreased. If there is significant deformation of the protective cage during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop, the cask may strike the impact surface.

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The drop orientations for the normal and hypothetical accident tests were selected to challenge the components that are intended to prevent these failures. For the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test, the test orientation considered most likely to cause crushing or buckling of the protective cage was top, long edge down. (See Section 6 for a figure of the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop orientation).

Three orientations were considered most likely to cause damage during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests. These orientations include the following:

- Horizontal, Short-Side Down The skid is stiffer in this orientation than in the longside down, so the maximum moment is applied to the hold down feet and the cask bolts. The impact may also cause buckling and/or brittle failure of the carbon steel protective cage structure. Detachment of the cask from the skid is possible due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the skid and brittle failure of the hold down assembly "feet" which are welded to the skid.
- Top, Long Edge Down The impact may cause significant deformation of the carbon steel protective cage. Detachment of the cask from the skid is possible due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the skid and brittle failure of the hold down assembly "feet" which are welded to the skid.
- $Vert$ Vertical, Top Down $-$ An impact in this orientation will apply the maximum tensile load to the cask cover bolts and inner liner weld. The impact may also cause buckling and/or brittle failure of the carbon steel protective cage structure. Detachment of the cask from the skid is possible due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the skid and brittle failure of the hold down assembly "feet" which are welded to the skid.

Because of the potential for brittle failure of carbon steel components, all test units were packed in dry ice and cooled to less than $-40^{\circ}C$ ($-40^{\circ}F$) (the minimum temperature required by IAEA Safety Series 6) for the penetration, 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, 9 meter (30 foot) drop, and puncture tests.

The thermal test was only expected to have a significant effect on those units for which the cask or cover assembly shell failed and exposed the DU shield. The test plan required thermal tests of the test specimens only if they sustained damage that could lead to DU oxidation during the thermal test.

4. TEST UNIT DESCRIPTION

The Model 702 test specimens, identified below, were originally constructed in accordance with drawing C70290 and were prepared for testing in accordance with drawing R-TP81, Revision B. The manufacturing route cards for the units document the compliance of these units with the AEA Technology QSA QA program (see Appendix B).

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Cask Serial No. 24 was used with the cask/skid assemblies identified above for each test specimen. The only change from production units was a replacement of the tungsten "nest" that holds sources within the source cavity, with a solid tungsten plug. The weight of the plug bounds the weight of a loaded tungsten nest.

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5. SUMMARY **AND CONCLUSIONS**

Since only one shipping cask was used for all tests, radiation profiles were only taken on the TP81(A) specimen. The test specimen met the requirements for 10CFR71 Type B(U) Transport Testing, as shown in the following table of Radiation Profile results.

Notes:

- 1. Radiation profile at the surface is not required for the Hypothetical Accident Condition test (see 10 CFR 71.51 (a)(2)). The shipping cask had been removed from cage/skid prior to final puncture test and was profiled without the cage/skid assembly.
- 2. Background level is 0.3 mR/hr.
- 3. Activity measured at surface of shipping cask.

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Results of each test are summarized in the table below, in the sequence in which the tests were completed. Detailed results are provided in the following sections of this report, test data sheets are in Appendix C, and photographs are included in Appendix D.

The skid, cage, and hold down assemblies of each test specimen were damaged. The only significant damage to the cask, however, was the loss of 1 of the 6 cask cover bolts during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test of specimen TP8 1(C). Further testing (e.g., 2 additional 9 meter drop tests and 2 puncture tests with the same cask) added no significant damage to the cask or cask cover bolts. There were no openings in the cask cover or in the cask shell, so thermal testing was not required.

6. TP81 NORMAL **TESTS**

Compression Test

Test specimen TP8 I(A) was loaded as shown in the figure below. Lead weights were placed on a steel plate, which was positioned on top of the test specimen.

The vertical projected area of the unit is 19 inch (483 mm) x 21 inch (533 mm) or 399 square inches (2574 square centimeters), yielding a total load of 798 lb (362 kg) for an applied pressure of 2 psi. Since the maximum weight of the Model 702 transport package is 410 **lb** (186 kg), a load of 5 times the weight, or 2050 lb (930 kg), is more conservative. The total compressive load actually used was 2138 lb (970 kg). The test setup is shown below.

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Compression Test Setup for Specimen TP8 1(A)

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After a period of 24 hours, the weights were removed. No visible deformation or buckling occurred and no other damage was observed for any of the test specimens.

Penetration Test

Test specimen TP8 1(A) was subjected to the penetration test. Temperature readings taken just before the test are summarized below.

The penetration bar target was the top center of the protective cage in an attempt to penetrate the perforated plate and impact the cask cover. For this test, the specimen was positioned right side up, as shown below.

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Penetration Test Orientation for Specimen TP81(A)

The penetration bar was dropped from a height of at least 1 meter (40 inches) above the impact point. The bar hit as intended on the specimen, and dented and partially broke the perforated plate at the point of impact.

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Test

Test specimen TP80(A) was then subjected to the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test. Temperature readings taken just before the test are summarized below.

The drop orientation for the unit is shown below.

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 I(A)

The test specimen impacted as intended. The hold down ring fractured and a 30 degree section of the ring (along with one of the top brackets) broke off. The perforated plate buckled on the sides and the cage was displaced about 1/2 inch towards the shipping cask. There was some tearing of the perforated plate. The cask and cage remained secured to the skid.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

Results of the first intermediate inspection and assessment are summarized below. The radiation profile of the specimen was measured, and data sheets are provided in Appendices B and C.

7. TP81 ACCIDENT DROP **TESTS- TP81(C)**

Due to the damage sustained during the Normal Conditions of Transport tests, Specimen TP8 I(C) was dropped in the orientation defined in Test Plan 81 for **TP8I** (A) (horizontal, short side down).

Specimen TP8 I(C) was subjected to both a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and a puncture test in accordance with Test Plan 81. The results are described below.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test

Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP8 I(C) were as follows:

The orientation for Specimen **TP8** 1(C) was horizontal, short-side down as shown below. The intention was to apply the maximum moment to the hold down feet and the cask-to-skid bolts, thereby breaking the cask free from the skid.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(C)

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The specimen impacted as intended. Both legs of the skid fractured. All four cask to skid bolts sheared off and all four lower brackets of the hold down assembly fractured, which freed the cask and allowed the hold down ring to strike the impact surface. The hold down ring transferred the side impact load into the top edge of the cask cover, which locally buckled and pried off one of the 6 cask cover bolts.

Puncture Test

For the puncture test, TP8 I(C) was dropped in the cage horizontal, short-side down as in the 9 meter (30 foot) drop with the puncture bar directly under the tear in the perforated plate, where the hold down ring had struck the impact surface. The puncture billet was intended to strike the cask cover through the side of the perforated plate.

Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(C)

The unit impacted on its side and the puncture billet impacted at the tear in the perforated plate as intended. The impact caused further degradation of the skid and cage. One of the skid legs broke off, the puncture bar tore through the perforated plate at the point of impact, and the bottom tube of the cage frame broke. One of the cask cooling fins was slightly bent, but there was no additional damage to the cask or cask cover bolts.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment <u>Post Post mspection and Assessment</u>

Following the test, the protective cage was removed and the unit was inspected. The cask and cask cover retained their structural integrity.

8. TP81 ACCIDENT DROP **TESTS-** TP81(B)

During re-assembly of Specimen TP81(B), the 5 remaining cover bolts for the cask were replaced and torqued in accordance with drawing R-TP81, Revision B. Specimen TP81(B) was then subjected to a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test in accordance with Test Plan 8 1. A puncture test was not performed because the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test did not result in significant damage to the shipping cask, and, therefore, the puncture test performed for $TP81(C)$ (and later for TP81(A)) bounds any puncture tests that could have been done for TP81(B). The results of the 9 meter (30 foot) test are described below.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test

Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP81(B) were as follows:

The orientation for Specimen TP81(B), shown below, was the same as for the 1.2 meter (4-foot) drop. The intention was to cause significant deformation of the carbon steel protective cage.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP81(B)

The specimen impacted as intended. The impact deflected the cage frame about 4 inches towards the shipping cask. The perforated plates on both sides of the cage detached. The skid buckled slightly. Two of the four base brackets (those opposite the impact edge) broke. Two of the four top brackets (those next to impact edge) also failed. Frame welds on the top edge failed and the tube steel dented due to the impact from the two top brackets. The cask remained secured to the skid via the four cask to skid bolts.

Puncture Test

Not performed.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

Since the 9 meter (30 foot) drop resulted in essentially no damage to the cask, and since only one cask was used for all tests, the final 9 meter (30 foot) drop test for Specimen TP8 I(A) was performed before selecting a firial puncture test orientation.

9. TP81 ACCIDENT DROP TESTS - TP81(A)²

Specimen TP8 1(A) was subjected to the third orientation for the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and puncture test described in Test Plan 81. The results are described below.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test

Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP8 1(A) were as follows:

The orientation for Specimen TP8 I(A), shown below, was vertical, top down. The intention was to apply the maximum tensile load to the cask cover bolts and inner liner weld.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP81 (A)

The specimen impacted as intended. The skid fractured and the cask and square plate welded to the skid tore away from the rest of the skid. Three hold down ring brackets broke off (the fourth bracket was broken in the 1.2 meter drop test of specimen $TP81(\overline{A})$). The cask struck the impact surface, as evidenced by the dented-in head of one of the 5 remaining cask cover bolts, and by the dented ends of the cask cooling fins.

Puncture Test

For the Specimen TP81(A) puncture test, the cask bolted to the portion of the skid that remained after the 9 meter (30 foot) drop was dropped without the cage at a 15 to 20 degree angle off vertical onto the puncture bar. The targeted impact point was the bolt that had been dented during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test.

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Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen TP81 (A)

The cask struck the puncture bar on the intended bolt. The bolt was dented further, but remained secure. There was no additional damage to the cask or the other cask cover bolts.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

The cask and cask cover retained their structural integrity. The post-test radiation profile was performed on the cask without the cage/skid assembly, and showed only a slight change in radiation levels from the pre-test profile (see Appendices B and C). Because no damage occurred that could result in oxidation of the DU shield, the thermal test was not required (see Section 3).

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QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, as specified in the MPR Quality Assurance Manual.

Prepared by *O-i') 12A* Reviewed by \mathcal{H} Approved by $\mathcal A$

September 8, 1999

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Mr. Michael L. Tremblay AEA Technology QSA, Inc. 40 North Avenue Burlington, MA 01803

Subject: Final Test Plan 81 Report, Model 702, Type B(U) Transport Package

Dear Mr. Tremblay:

Three copies of the final Test Plan 81 Report, Model 702, Type B(U) Transport Package are enclosed. This version of the report incorporates the documentation missing from our May 14 draft report.

Please call me if you have comments or questions about this letter or enclosure.

Sincerely,

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Carchi Softe

Caroline S. Schlaseman

Enclosure

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TEST PLAN 81 REPORT

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MODEL 702

September 8, 1999

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1. PURPOSE

This report describes the Type B test results for the Model 702 transport package. These tests were performed in accordance with Test Plan 81 and were conducted April 9 through 15, 1999. The Test Plan specified testing necessary to demonstrate compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR Part 71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6 (1985 as amended 1990) for "Normal Conditions of Transport" and "Hypothetical Accident Conditions." Evaluation of the compliance of the Model 702 with these requirements is provided in the Safety Analysis Report (SAP.).

2. **SCOPE'OF TESTING**

Test Plan 81 identified three orientations that could potentially cause the most significant damage to the Model 702 transport package in the 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests. Therefore, the test plan required three test specimens. However, since the Model 702 is not portable, only one unit was preconditioned (i.e., subjected to Normal Conditions of Transport Tests) prior to the Hypothetical Accident Condition tests. Also, only one shipping cask was used (in three different cage/skid assemblies) for all tests because the number of 702 units is limited. The shipping cask was taken from the field population, and therefore represents a worse case than using a new 702 shipping cask. The tests conducted are described below. V.

- 1. Normal Conditions of Transport Tests per 10 CFR 71.71, including the following for specimen TP81(A):
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	- c) 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test, in which the test specimen is dropped in an orientation expected to cause maximum damage.

Water spray preconditioning of the test specimens prior to testing was not required in the test plan and is evaluated separately.

- 2. Hypothetical Accident Condition Tests per 10 CFR 71.73, including the following for each of the test specimens:
	- a) 9 meter (30 foot) drop test, in which the test specimen is dropped in an orientation expected to cause maximum damage.
	- b) Puncture test, in which the test specimen is dropped from at least 1 meter (40 inches) onto a 6 inch (152.4 mm) diameter vertical bar in an orientation expected to compound damage from the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test.

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c) Thermal test, in accordance with 10 CFR71.73(c)(4), in which the test specimen is exposed for 30 minutes to an environment which provides a time-averaged environmental temperature of at least 800° C (1472 $^{\circ}$ F), and an emissivity coefficient of at least 0.9. For the Model 702, the test plan specified that the decision to perform thermal testing would be based on an assessment of damage sustained by the specimen following the drop and puncture tests. This requirement was based on the evaluation of the construction of the unit, and on the potential failure modes, which are discussed" in the following section.

The crush test specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(2) was not required because the radioactive contents are qualified as Special-Form radioactive material.

The water immersion test specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(6) and other tests specified in 10 CFR 71 are evaluated separately. .

For all tests, sufficient margin was included in test parameters to account for measurement uncertainty. These test parameters included test specimen weight, temperature, and drop height.

3. FAILURE MODES

For the Model 702 transport package, the key function important to safety is the positive retention of the radioactive source in its stored position within the depleted uranium shield. Removal of the cask cover or damage to the cask or DU shield could cause radiation from the package to increase above regulatory limits. Mechanisms, which could cause these modes of failure, include:

- Failure of the Cask Cover Bolts During the free drop or puncture tests, failure of the cask cover bolts could result in the source becoming partially or completely exposed.
- Failure of the Cask or Cover Assembly Shell Failure (e.g., puncture) of the cask cover assembly or failure of the inner liner to outer shell weld could expose the depleted uranium (DU) shield, which could oxidize during thermal testing.
- Separation of the Cask from the Skid If the cask to skid bolts or the tie down assembly fail during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test, the cask may strike the impact surface. In addition, the specimen could then be further damaged in the puncture bar test when the cask impacts on the puncture bar.
- Crushing or Buckling of the Protective Cage If there is significant deformation of the protective cage during the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, the distance from the source to the specimen external surface would be decreased. If there is significant deformation of the protective cage during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop, the cask may strike the impact surface.

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The drop orientations for the normal and hypothetical accident tests were selected to challenge the components that are intended to prevent these failures. For the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test, the test orientation considered most likely to cause crushing or buckling of the protective cage was top, long edge down. (See Section 6 for a figure of the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop orientation).

Three orientations were considered most likely to cause damage during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests. These orientations include the following:

- Horizontal, Short-Side Down The skid is stiffer in this orientation than in the longside down, so the maximum moment is applied to the hold down feet and the cask bolts. The impact may also cause buckling and/or brittle failure of the carbon steel protective cage structure. Detachment of the cask from the skid is possible due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the skid and brittle failure of the hold down assembly "feet" which are welded to the skid.
- Top, Long Edge Down The impact may cause significant deformation of the carbon steel protective cage. Detachment of the cask from the skid is possible due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the skid and brittle failure of the hold down assembly "feet" which are welded to the skid.
- Vertical, Top Down An impact in this orientation will apply the maximum tensile load to the cask cover bolts and inner liner weld. The impact may also cause buckling and/or brittle failure of the carbon steel protective cage structure. Detachment of the cask from the skid is possible due to thread failure of the tapped holes in the skid and brittle failure of the hold down assembly "feet" which are welded to the skid.

Because of the potential for brittle failure of carbon steel components, all test units were packed in dry ice and cooled to less than -40°C (-40°F) (the minimum temperature required by IAEA Safety Series 6) for the penetration, 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, 9 meter (30 foot) drop, and puncture tests.

The thermal test was only expected to have a significant effect on those units for which the cask or cover assembly shell failed and exposed the DU shield. The test plan required thermal tests of the test specimens only if they sustained damage that could lead to DU oxidation during the thermal test.

4. **TEST UNIT DESCRIPTION**

The Model 702 test specimens, identified below, were originally constructed in accordance with drawing C70290 and were prepared for testing in accordance with drawing R-TP81, Revision B. The manufacturing route cards for the units document the compliance of these units with the **AEA** Technology QSA QA program (see Appendix B).

Cask Serial No. 24 was used with the cask/skid assemblies identified above for each test specimen. The only change from production units was a replacement of the tungsten "nest" that holds sources within the source cavity, with a solid tungsten plug. The weight of the plug bounds the weight of a loaded tungsten nest.

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5. SUMMARY **AND CONCLUSIONS**

Since only one shipping cask was used for all tests, radiation profiles were only taken on the TP81(A) specimen. The test specimen met the requirements for 10CFR71 Type B(U) Transport Testing, as shown in the following table of Radiation Profile results.

Notes:

- **1.** Radiation profile at the surface is not required for the Hypothetical Accident Condition test (see 10 CFR 71.51 (a)(2)). The shipping cask had been removed from cage/skid prior to final puncture test and was profiled without the cage/skid assembly.
- 2. Background level is 0.3 mR/hr.
- 3. Activity measured at surface of shipping cask.

Results of each test are summarized in the table below, in the sequence in which the tests were completed. Detailed results are provided in the following sections of this report, test data sheets are in Appendix C, and photographs are included in Appendix D.

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The skid, cage, and hold down assemblies of each test specimen were damaged. The only significant damage to the cask, however, was the loss of 1 of the 6 cask cover bolts during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test of specimen TP81(C). Further testing (e.g., 2 additional 9 meter drop tests and 2 puncture tests with the same cask) added no significant damage to the cask or cask cover bolts. There were no openings in the cask cover or in the cask shell, so thermal testing was not required.

6. TP81 NORMAL TESTS

Compression Test

Test specimen TP8 1(A) was loaded as shown in the figure below. Lead weights were placed on a steel plate, which was positioned on top of the test specimen.

The vertical projected area of the unit is 19 inch (483 mm) x 21 inch (533 mm) or 399 square inches (2574 square centimeters), yielding a total load of 798 lb (362 kg) for an applied pressure of 2 psi. Since the maximum weight of the Model 702 transport package is 410 lb (186 kg), a load of 5 times the weight, or 2050 lb (930 kg), is more conservative. The total compressive load actually used was 2138 lb (970 kg). The test setup is shown below.

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Compression Test Setup for Specimen TP8 1(A)

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After a period of 24 hours, the weights were removed. No visible deformation or buckling occurred and no other damage was observed for any of the test specimens.

Penetration Test

Test specimen TP8 1(A) was subjected to the penetration test. Temperature readings taken just before the test are summarized below.

The penetration bar target was the top center of the protective cage in an attempt to penetrate the perforated plate and impact the cask cover. For this test, the specimen was positioned right side up, as shown below.

Penetration Test Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(A)

The penetration bar was dropped from a height of at least 1 meter (40 inches) above the impact point. The bar hit as intended on the specimen, and dented and partially broke the perforated plate at the point of impact.

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1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Test

Test specimen TP80(A) was then subjected to the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test. Temperature readings taken just before the test are summarized below.

The drop orientation for the unit is shown below.

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1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(A)

The test specimen impacted as intended. The hold down ring fractured and a 30 degree section of the ring (along with one of the top brackets) broke off. The perforated plate buckled on the sides and the cage was displaced about 1/2 inch towards the shipping cask. There was some tearing of the perforated plate. The cask and cage remained secured to the skid.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

Results of the first intermediate inspection and assessment are summarized below. The radiation profile of the specimen was measured, and data sheets are provided in Appendices B and C.

7. TP81 ACCIDENT DROP **TESTS- TP81(C)**

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Due to the damage sustained during the Normal Conditions of Transport tests, Specimen TP81(C) was dropped in the orientation defined in Test Plan 81 for TP81(A) (horizontal, shortside down).

Specimen TP8 1(C) was subjected to both a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and a puncture test in accordance with Test Plan 81. The results are described below.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test

Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP81(C) were as follows:

The orientation for Specimen TP8 1(C) was horizontal, short-side down as shown below. The intention was to apply the maximum moment to the hold down feet and the cask-to-skid bolts, thereby breaking the cask free from the skid.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(C)

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The specimen impacted as intended. Both legs of the skid fractured. All four cask to skid bolts sheared off and all four lower brackets of the hold down assembly fractured, which freed the cask and allowed the hold down ring to strike the impact surface. The hold down ring transferred the side impact load into the top edge of the cask cover, which locally buckled and pried off one of the 6 cask cover bolts.

Puncture Test

For the puncture test, TP81(C) was dropped in the cage horizontal, short-side down as in the 9 meter (30 foot) drop with the puncture bar directly under the tear in the perforated plate, where the hold down ringhad struck the impact surface. The puncture billet was intended to strike the cask cover through the side of the perforated plate.

Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(C)

The unit impacted on its side and the puncture billet impacted at the tear in the perforated plate as intended. The impact caused further degradation of the skid and cage. One of the skid legs broke off, the puncture bar tore through the perforated plate at the point of impact, and the bottom tube of the cage frame broke. One of the cask cooling fins was slightly bent, but there was no additional damage to the cask or cask cover bolts.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

Following the test, the protective cage was removed and the unit was inspected. The cask and cask cover retained their structural integrity.

8. ' TP81 ACCIDENT DROP **TESTS** - TP81(B)

During re-assembly of Specimen TP81(B), the 5 remaining cover bolts for the cask were replaced and torqued in accordance with drawing R-TP81, Revision B. Specimen TP81(B) was then subjected to a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test in accordance with Test Plan 81. A puncture test was not performed because the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test did not result in significant damage to the shipping cask, and, therefore, the puncture test performed for $TP81(C)$ (and later for **TP8** 1 (A)) bounds any puncture tests that could have been done for TP8 1 (B). The results of the 9 meter (30 foot) test are described below.

9 Meter (30 Foot)'Drop Test

Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP81(B) were as follows:

The orientation for Specimen TP81(B), shown below, was the same as for the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop. The intention was to cause significant deformation of the carbon steel protective cage.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1 (B)

The specimen impacted as intended. The impact deflected the cage frame about 4 inches towards the shipping-cask. The perforated plates on both sides of the cage detached. The skid buckled slightly. Two of the four base brackets (those opposite the impact edge) broke. Two of the four top brackets (those next to impact edge) also failed. Frame welds on the top edge failed and the tube steel dented due to the impact from the two top brackets. The cask remained secured to the skid via the four cask to skid bolts.

Puncture Test

Not performed.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

Since the 9 meter (30 foot) drop resulted in essentially no damage to the cask, and since only one cask was used for all tests, the final 9 meter (30 foot) drop test for Specimen TP81 (A) was performed before selecting a final puncture test orientation.

9. TP81 ACCIDENT DROP **TESTS- TP81 (A')**

Specimen TP81(A) was subjected to the third orientation for the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and puncture test described in Test Plan 81. The results are described below.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test

Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP8 I(A) were as follows:

The orientation for Specimen TP8 1(A), shown below, was vertical, top down. The intention was to apply the maximum tensile load to the cask cover bolts and inner liner weld.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP8 1(A)

The specimen impacted as intended. The skid fractured and the cask and square plate welded to the skid tore away from the rest of the skid. Three hold down ring brackets broke off (the fourth bracket was broken in the 1.2 meter drop test of specimen TP81(A)). The cask struck the impact surface, as evidenced by the dented-in head of one of the 5 remaining cask cover bolts, and by the dented ends of the cask cooling fins.

Puncture Test

For the Specimen TP8 1(A) puncture test, the cask bolted to the portion of the skid that remained after the 9 meter (30 foot) drop was dropped without the cage at a 15 to 20 degree angle off vertical onto the puncture bar. The targeted impact point was the bolt that had been dented during the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test.

AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 81 Report

Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen **TP8** I(A)

The cask struck the puncture bar on the intended bolt. The bolt was dented further, but remained secure. There was no additional damage to the cask or the other cask cover bolts.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment

The cask and cask cover retained their structural integrity. The post-test radiation profile was performed on the cask without the cage/skid assembly, and showed only a slight change in radiation levels from the pre-test profile (see Appendices B and C). Because no damage occurred that could result in oxidation of the DU shield, the thermal test was not required (see Section 3).

APPENDIX A

CALIBRATION RECORDS

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TEST WEIGHT ID NUMBERS: 01 thru <u>යද</u> COMMENTS/ACTIONS: \overline{a} CUSTOMERS SIGNATURE (FOR OFF TOLERANCE): + B. Clarke TECHNICIANS SIGNATURE: 1) raper

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TEST WEIGHT ID NUMBERS: 01 Thru 2

COMMENTS/ACTIONS:

CUSTOMERS SIGNATURE (FOR OFF TOLERANCE):

TECHNICIANS SIGNATURE: $\frac{1}{2}$.

Berology Service, Inc. Data Sheet MMSCC-10012 Page 11 $\mathbb{P}.\mathsf{O}$. No.: 3753 7 (1998)

2 ID. No.: 140 Manufacturer: DELTRONIC Department:

Department: Model No.: 140 Technician: PR.

Department: Model No.: 140 Technician: PR.

Deviation u.: Standard No.: 006 Cal.: 02/10/99 Due: 08/31/99

Accuracy: ID.No.: 140 Date Cal: 04/01/99 Cage Type: FLAIN PLUG - X CLASS

: END A END B

Required... 0.2801" 0.2901"

Deviation:: +0.000 01" 0.000 00"

Measured:: 0.28011" 0.28000" $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{z}}$, and $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{z}}$ $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{A}}$ Customer: AEA TECHNOLOGY

ID.No.: 142

2 Serial No.: 4R

2 Cal.: 02/10/99 Due: 08/31/99

2 Cal.: 02/10/99 Due: 08/31/ Gage Type: 24.0" RULER

: STRAIGHT WITHIN .0001"

Required: 6.0" 12.0" 18.0" 22.0"

Deviation: : 0 0 0 0 SQUARE HEAD WITHIN 0.0001"

: Measured: : 6.000" 12.000" 18.000" 22.000" INCREMENTS CORRECT

: P.O. No.: 3753
Date Cal: 04/01/99
Date Due: 04/01/00 Customer: AEA TECHNOLOGY 1D. No.: 143 Manufacturer: DELTRONIC Date Cal: 04/01/99

2 ID. No.: 143 Manufacturer: DELTRONIC Date Due: 04/01/00

2 ID. No.: Serial No.: 143 Technician: PR

Department: Model No.: 006 Cal.: 02/10/99 Due: 08/31/99

Accura Gage Type: PLAIN PLUG - X CLASS Required: : 0.4527"
Deviation: : -0.000 04" -0.000 03"
Measured: : 0.45266" 0.45267" Customer: AEA TECHNOLOGY P.O. No.: 3753 Customer: AEA TECHNOLOGY

ID.No.: 144

2 ID.No.: 144

P.O. No.: 3753

Deviation 1:

Deviation 1:

Deviation 1:

Accuracy: +/-0.000 04"

Standard No.: 021

Cal.: 02/10/99 Due: 08/31/99

Accuracy: Standard No.: 021

Cal.: 02 Gage Type: PLAIN PLUG - X CLASS Required: : 0.4534"

Required: : 0.4534" 0.4534"

Deviation: : 0.000 00" 0.000 00"

Measured: : 0.45340" 0.45340"

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TEST PROCEDURE REFERENCE. METTER TOLEDO MANUAL FOR CALIBRATIONS SERVICES, HANDEQO

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junt Metrology Service, Inc. Data Sheet HMSCC: 01843 PAGE 1 P.O.No.: P3236 lustomer: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA Date Cal: 11/10/98 Date Due: 11/10/99 Manufacturer: CRAFTSMAN $ID.NO.: 279(1)$ Serial No.: 5970355413 Technician: DD 2 ID.No.: $\frac{1}{2}$ model No.:

Standard No.: 158

Standard No.: 158

Standard No.: 151

Cal.: 07/06/98 Due: 07/06/99

Cal.: 07/06/98 Due: 07/06/99

Cal.: Due: Cal. Proc. No.: 23 Department: Q.C. Deviation u.: Accuracy: $+/-4$ ⁸ Accuracy: Gage Type: 20-150 ft/1b TORQUEWRENCH (PART 1 of 2) $\overline{C}W$
80 120 60 140 Lb Required: $: 40$ Deviation: : $+0.77$ $+1.70$ $+2.40$ $+4.00$ $+2.07$ Measured: : 40.77 61.70 82.40 124.60 142.07 lb $P.0.No.: P3236$ Customer: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA Date Cal: 11/10/98 Date Due: 11/10/99 Manufacturer: CRAFTSMAN ID.No.: 279 (2) Technician: DD Serial No.: 5970355413 2 ID. No.: Cal. Proc. No.: 23 Model No.:
Standard No.: 158 Model No.: Department: Q.C. cal.: 07/06/98 Due: 07/06/99
Cal.: 07/06/98 Due: 07/06/99 Deviation u.: Standard No.: 161 Accuracy: $+/-4$ Due: $Cal.$: **Standard No.:** Accuracy: Gage Type: 20-150 ft/lb TORQUEWRENCH (PART 2 of 2) للمعادل š. **CCW** Required: : 40 60 60 120 140 1
Deviation: : +1.60 +0.19 +1.34 +3.60 +2.37 140 lb Measured: : 41.60 60.19 21.34 123.60 142.37 lb ------------

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Simpson Gumpertz **&** Heger Inc.

9 June 1997 Consulting Engineers 297 Broadway'4 Telephone: San Francisco. CA 02174-5310 Fax:

617 643 2000 617 643 2009

Sentinel Amersham Corporation 40 North Avenue Burlington, Massathusetts 01803

Attention: Steven J. Grenier

Tel: 617-272-2000 Fax: 617-273-2216

Comm. 97276 - Test Foundation Study, Sentinel Amersham Test Site, Groveland, MA

Gentlemen:

At your request we studied a test foundation located on the property of Valley Tree Service, Inc. at 1210 Salem Street, Groveland, Massachusetts. The purpose of our study was to determine if the test foundation provides an eisentially unyielding horizontal surface Tor purposes of a drop test.

Scope

The scope of our study included: visiting the site to examine the foundation; reviewing documents provided by you that describe the construction of the foundation; reviewing drawings describing the housing of your Model 676 Projector; and computing the performance characteristics of the foundation in a drop test of the Model 676 Projector.

Background and Information From Others

We understand from our discussions with Sentinel Amersham representatives that the test foundation is used as a reaction support in a drop test for the Model 676 Projector. The projector is dropped from a height of 30 ft onto the center portion of the foundation. The drawings for the Model 676 Projector show that the weight is 625 ibs, and the end plates are fabricated from 1 in. thick steel plate.

We understand from discussions with Sentinel Amersham representatives and from construction records that the test foundation was built in 1982. The delivery tickets show that 2-1/2 cubic yards of 3,000 psi concrete were utilized. We were also told that a **1** in. thick steel plate is embedded in the top surface of the foundation and welded to reinforcing steel in the foundation.

Observations

On 5 June 1997, Joseph J. Zona of Simpson Gumpertz & Heger Inc. visited the test facility and observed the following:

- The test foundation is 7 ft 4 in. \times 7 ft 5 in.
- A steel plate is embedded in the top of the foundation so that the top of the plate is approximately flush with the top of the concrete. The plate is 47 in. x 48 in. At one

side of the plate, the concrete is chipped away exposing part of the plate edge. The bottom of the plate is not visible, but 7/8 in. of plate is exposed to view.

- The top surface of the steel plate is approximately horizontal. The plate slopes a maximum of **1/8** in. per 2 ft.
- The top surface of the concrete is weathered, but sound.
- **⁰**Four cracks are visible in the foundation, each emanating from a corner of the steel plate. The cracks appear stable and show no signs of recent movement.
- The concrète is flush with the adjoining bituminous pavement. There is no evidence of settlement or heaving of the foundation. $\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$

The exposed soil in the vicinity of the foundation is firm and sandy.

Results of Analysis

We estimated the depth of the foundation as 15 in. based, on the measured plan dimensions and the reported volume of concrete delivered. We characterized the supporting soil as medium dense coarse grained material.

We used simple analytical models to estimate the response of the foundation in a drop test. A conservation of momentum approach that models the test as a plastic impact provides an upper bound estimate of the kinetic energy taken by the foundation. This approach predicts that 6 percent of the kinetic energy of the Model 676 Projector is taken by the foundation upon impact.

Arya et al present a relevant method of analysis in "Design of Structures & Foundations For Vibrating Machines.' The approach accounts for the participation of an effective soil mass in resisting a dynamic loading. This method predicts less than 1 percent of the kinetic energy is taken by the foundation. Arya el al also present a method of estimating the foundation deflection. We computed a deflection upon impact of 0.014 in.

We estimated the flexibility of the concrete foundation as a plate on an elastic foundation using a method presented in "Theory of Plates and Shells" by Timoshenko & Woinowsky-Krieger. This approach shows that the foundation is rigid relative to the soil, and virtually all of the foundation deflection is the result of soil response.

Discussion

The plastic impact approach provides an upper bound estimate of the energy transmitted to the foundation. In an actual test, energy is absorbed in the device being tested in both plastic deformation and rebound energy that is not accounted for in this analysis.

The Arya approach is fully applicable to foundations that support vibrating equipment. This approach may somewhat overstate the participation of the soil in a single impact loading. However, we expect the influence of the participating soil mass will be significant and, therefore, we expect the percent of kinetic energy taken by the foundation is closer to **^I** percent than 6 percent.

-3- Steven **J.** Grenier, Comm. **97276 ⁹**June **¹⁹⁹⁷**

The four cracks near the corners of the foundation intersect corners of the embedded steel plate. This suggests that the plate restrained the free shrinkage of the foundation and caused these cracks. The cracks are obviously old, yet they remain tight and there is no sign of recent movement at the cracks. This strongly indicates that the cracks have not compromised the monolithic behavior of the foundation. Any loss of stiffness in the foundation related to these cracks is insignificant within the limits of our simple analytical models.

Conclusion

Based on the study described above, we conclude that the existing test foundation absorbs between 1 and 6 percent of the kinetic energy at impact during a 30 ft drop test of a Model 676 Projector. In our opinion the foundation provides an essentially unyielding horizontal surface for the purpose of this test. For items of lesser mass, the foundation also provides an essentially. unyielding horiozntal surface.

Sincerely yours, **0s** onP.E. **UA. P.E.** Princi $11732 - 97$

Senior Associate

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 81 Report

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APPENDIX B

MANUFACTURING ROUTE CARDS **AND** PRE **TEST** RADIATION PROFILE **DATA SHEET**

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Arnersham Corporation 40 North Avenue Burlington, MA 01803

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SHIELDING PROFILE AND INSPECTION FORM

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SHIELDING PROFILE AND INSPECTION FORM

ZImersham QSA

PROFILE ORIENTATION $\sqrt{9}P$ FOR TYPE B TOST NE $\mathcal{L}^{\mathcal{L}}$ REAR^x 60 <u>/ል</u> -1864.(047) PERFORA⁻ STEEL (4 DU-3 CENTER TACK WELDED ALONS ED RADIONON $(1/8)$ LG WELD EVERY $3/4$ 70 -PROTECTIVE CAGE **WARNING-**LABEL (2 AT 180^{*}) I Z XJ20 WALL SQ TUBI (i) B FILLET ξ BUTT WE I/IG ST STL 公公 S. STILANTE PERFORATED TIEL (2 AT OPPOSITE STOES) FR. **LEEF d'A SOURTH** ₁9 囚 **SEAL WIRE -** $\frac{1}{2}$ - 13 DRILLED HEX 1 \overline{a} BOIS, LOCKWAS **A TORQUED TO 517 LB R** MODEL 702 PACKAGE GENERAL ARRANGEMENT * PLEASE CLEARLY TOENTIFY ON CAGE AND CASK

AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 81 Report

APPENDIX **C**

TEST CHECKLISTS AND DATA SHEETS

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. **Burlington, Massachusetts**

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Specimen Preparation List

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NOTE 1: CASK WAS DAMAGED DURING PRIOR 30' DROP TEST

COVER BOLTS ARE SECURED PER DWG. R-TP81, REV. B. N
NOTE 2: HOLD. DOWN RING FRACTURED (PIECE MISSING AT ONE TIE DOWN BRACKET)
DURING, L. ZM (4 FOOT) DROP. ALSO, SKID WAS CRALKED DURING 1. ZM (4 FOOT) DROP. I

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Equipment List 1: Compression Test

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Burlington, Massachusetts

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Checklist 1: Compression Test

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Equipment List 2: Penetration Test

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Checklist 2: Penetration Test

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1999, March
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- Equipment List 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop

AEA Technology **QSA,** Inc. Burlington, Massachusetts

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Test Plan March 81. Revision **^I**31. **¹⁹⁹⁹** larch 31, 1999
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Checklist 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop

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AEA Technology **QSA**, Inc. Burjington. Massachusetts Test Plan **March 81.** Revision **31. 1999 1** Page 43 **of** 54

Data Sheet **3:** 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Unit Model and Serial Number: Test Specimen: TP81 (A) 702 SU $3\frac{4}{9}$
Test Date: 13 A PR 9 9 **Test Time:** $10 \cdot 15$ **Test Plan 81 Step No.: 8.7** Describe drop orientation and drop height:
See fylmes 5. Seekine 8.7.7 Describe impact (location, rotation, etc.):
Hit is pour composed - field to side Describe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.):
he faming ring hroken as 70° see ction by okan out $m \cdot n$ mel dange to cage - purt plate bulled an sides On-site assessment: **6 example 2000 compared by the contract of the contract o** *k* of *Geove* 10 St. Cl. 6. The company factuates on part plats
detacted 90° to edge timped */7YV"-tA* <- 4 *¢* Z11 .~ **/~O** QA: D. N. Kurtz .
Regulatory: Engineeriny **QAs** V Describe any post-test disassembly and inspection: $\frac{1}{S}$ KID CRACKED AS SHOWN ON TEST PLAN FIG. 5 MARK-UP (ATTACHED). Describe any change in source position: NOT APPLICABLE Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography: N/A Date: Completed by: 13 AMR 99

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1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen 8.7.2 **TP81(A)**

The impact surface of Specimen TP81(A) is the top, long edge of the protective cage as shown below.

Figure 5. 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TP81(A) .

SENTINEL TPOI(A) - AFTER 1.2 M (4 FOOT) DROP TEST DROP TEST WAIT

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Burlington, Massachusetts \mathbf{R}

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Q Mater (30 Foot) Free Drop $\overline{1}$ \overline{a}

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Checklist 4: **9** Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop

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NOTE 1: TC LOST TURING IMPACT : NO READING $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{r}}$

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March 31, 1999
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Data Sheet 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop

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AEA Technology **QSA,** Inc. Burlington. Massachusetts **k**

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8.9.3 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TP81(B)

The impact surface of Specimen TP81(B) is the top long edge of the protective cage as shown below.

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Data Sheet 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop

TP81(A) Test Specimen: Test Unit Model and Serial Number: SN 24 70Z Test Plan 81 Step No.: 8.9 Test Date: 14 APR 99 Test Time: $5:20 \text{ nm}$ Describe drop orientation and drop height: DROPPED AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 8. Describe impact (location, rotation, etc.): IMPACTED TOP OF CAGE, AS PRESCRIBED Describe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.): BRITTLE FRACTURE OF SKID: CASK "Y SQUARE WELDED SKID PLATE TORE AWAY FROM REST OF SKID. 2 BRACKETS AT TOP RING BROKE OFF, AS DID 3RD TIE DOWN (4th UAS BROKEN IN FRIOR 4A (1.2M) DEOP) THE 5 CASK COVER BOLTS (6th EOLT HAB BROKEN IN FRIOR 30 FT (9 M) DROP), AND BY DENTED ENDS OF FINS AT 2 CIRCUMFERENTAL LOCATIONS. On-site assessment: REMOVE CASK, AND PORTION OF SKID STILL BOLTED TO CASK, FROM THE CAGE AND DROP W/O CAGE ON PUNCTURE BAR. DROP AT AN ANGLE SUGHTLY OFF VERTICAL, ONTO THE DENTED CASK COVER BOLT, TO TRY TO BREAK OFF THIS BOLT. QA: D.H. Kurt Engineering: Regulatory: Describe any post-test disasserably and inspection: NO FURTHER INSPECTION PRIOR TO PUNCTURE TEST. NOT APPLICABLE Describe any change in source position: Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography: $\sqrt{\mathcal{A}}$ Date: Completed by: 14 APR 99 Carolin Shehler

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Test Plan **81.** Revision **I** March **31. 1999** Page **4• of** 54

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Equipment List **5:** Puncture Test

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Test Plan 81, Revision 1 March 31, 1999 Page 51 of 54

Data Sheet 5: Puncture Test

 $TPS1\times_{A} 24A$ 14 AR 99 Test Unit Model and Serial Number: Test Specimen: 702 SN24 Test Plan 81 Step No.: 8.10 Test Time: 5:45 Pm Test Date: 14 APR 99 Describe drop orientation and drop height: CASK, BOLTED TO PORTION OF SKID THAT REMAINED AFTER 9M(30 ft) DROP WAS DROPPED YO CAGE AT AN ANGLE ~10°-15° OFF VERTICAL ONTO ONE OF THE CASK COVER BOLTS. THE BOLT CHOSEN FOR IMPACT HAD CASK STRUCK PUNCTURE BAR (BEEN DENTED (IMPACTED) DURING THE 30 H(9M) DECK Describe impact (location, rotation, etc.): DROP HT. \geq 40' AN BOLT (WHICH LEFT A MARK AN THE PUNC. BAR). Describe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.): BET THAT WAS STRUCK WAS FURTHER DENTED, BUT REMAINED SECURE. On-site assessment: SPECIMEN SUCCESSFULY PASSED HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT TEST (SUBSECT TO FINAL RAD. PROFILE) BECAUSE CASK AND COVER DID NOT LOBE THETR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY (DESPITE BEING DAMAGED PRIOR TO START OF THIS 30 ft DROP-PUNCTURE TEST SEQUENCE). QA: D.W. Kent Engineering: $\frac{1}{2}$ Regulatory: Describe any post-test disassembly and inspection: NO FURTHER INSPECTION, OTHER THAN FINAL PROFILE OF CASK. NOT APPLICABLE Describe any change in source position: Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography: \mathcal{N}/\mathcal{A} Completed by: Caroli Alehle Date: 14 APR 99

SENTINEL $\frac{TP81(A) - ATPR PUNCTURE TEST}{D+OP}$

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APPENDIX D

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TEST PHOTOGRAPHS

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TPSI(A) Compression Test Setup

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TP81(A) Penetratlon Test Setup TPS1(A) Penetration Test Results

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TP81(A) 1.2 Meter Drop Setup

TP81(A) 1.2 Meter Drop Results-Detail of Hold Down Ring

TP81(A) 1.2 Meter Drop Results-Detail of Cage Deformation

TP81(A) 1.2 Meter Drop Results-Detail of Buckled Cage

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TP81(C) 9 Meter Drop Setup

TP81(C) 9 Meter Drop Results-Detail of

TP81(C) 9 Meter Drop Results-Detail of Skid

TP81(C) 9 Meter Drop Results-Detail of Missing Cask Cover Bolt

TP81(C) Puncture Test Setup

TPS1(C) Puncture Test Results

TPS1(B) 9 Meter Drop Setup TP81(B) 9 Meter Drop Results. Detail of Cage Deformation

Detail of Cask and Skid

TP81(B) 9 Meter Drop Results-

Detail of Cask and Skid

Detail of Cask and Skid

Detail of Cask and Skid

TPSI(A) 9 Meter Drop Setup

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TP81(A) 9 Meter Drop Results

TP81(A) Puncture Test Setup

TPS1(A) Puncture Test Results-Detail of Dented Bolt

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Appendix D: Finite Element Analysis (Model 702)

D-1 Finite Element Analysis for the Model **702**

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1.0 Purpose

The purpose of this calculation is to document a finite element analysis of the AEA Technology Model 702 transport package for the thermal requirements of 1OCFR71.73.4. The Model 702 transport package is designed for use as a shipping container for radio-isotopes. The transport package is shown on Figures 1 and 2.

10CFR71.73 specifies hypothetical accident conditions for which the transport package must be designed. The thermal accident conditions include immersion in a 1475 'F fire for 30 minutes. The acceptance criteria for the test is that there is not a significant increase in radiation levels external to the package following a hypothetical accident. For this calculation, the acceptance criteria is considered to be met if the calculated strains in the stainless steel components which contain the depleted uranium and the stainless steel cover bolts are less than the strain corresponding to the material ultimate strength at the test temperature.

2.0 Summary of Results

Figure 3 shows contours of the stress intensity profile in the transport package at 2 minutes, the time of maximum stress during the transient. The maximum stress intensity is 26 ksi. Figure 4 shows contours of total strain at 2 minutes. The maximum strain is less than 5%. This strain is considerably less than the strain at failure (40 to 50%) for stainless steel at a temperature of 1475 °F.

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An additional elastic-plastic stress pass was made at a time of 30 minutes to confirm that there is sufficient material strength at the highest temperatures to react the primary pressure loads. The maximum calculated total strain at 30 minutes is also less than 5%.

3.0 Approach

A three-dimensional finite element model of the transport package was developed with the ANSYS computer program (Reference 1). The shipping cask is mounted on a carbon steel skid with a protective cage. The skid and cage are conservatively assumed to have failed as a result of hypothetical accident drop loads and are not included in the model. The transport package components included in the model are:

- Shipping Cask
- Depleted Uranium Shield
- Cask Cover Assembly (Stainless Steel Liner and Depleted Uranium Shielding)
- Cask Cover Bolts
- Copper Wafers

Half (180 degrees) of the transport package was modeled based on geometric and loading symmetry.

A three part sequential analysis technique was used. In the first part of the analysis, a thermal transient analysis was performed to calculate temperature profiles within the package as a result of immersion in a fire. Radiation and convective heat transfer modes were considered. In the second part of the analysis, stresses in the transport package components due to the calculated temperature profiles were determined on an elastic basis at several times during the transient. In the third part of the analysis, at the time of maximum elastic stress due to temperature, a final analysis was performed with elastic-plastic material properties. The effects of bounding internal pressure and cover bolt pre-load were included in the final analysis.

4.0 Finite Element Model

4.1 Geometry

One half of the transport package is modeled. Figures 5 through 8 show the finite element model components. Dimensions for the model are from References 2 through 16. Figures 9, 10 and 11 show key-point numbers for a cross section of model. Keypoint coordinates for the cross sections are listed in Attachment 1.

The model is meshed with hexahedral (brick) and tetrahedral elements. The bolts are represented by spar (line) elements. A surface effect element is used on the outside of the model to facilitate the application of the thermal boundary conditions.

The transport package includes thin (0.010 inch) copper wafers that separate the depleted uranium from the stainless steel. These wafers are modeled explicitly and are assumed to completely fill the gap and to be in perfect thermal contact with the stainless steel on one side and the depleted uranium on the other. Structurally, these wafers provide little mechanical resistance due to the low strength of copper at high temperature.

4.2 Material Properties

The transport package outer shell, cover, liners and bolts are constructed from 304 stainless steel. Depleted uranium is used for shielding in the cask and cover assemblies. Thin copper wafers are used between the stainless steel and uranium. A neoprene gasket was included between the cover and cask assemblies. Material properties for these four materials from References 17 through 20 are used in the model and listed in Attachment 2. The properties are temperature dependent for all but the neoprene.

The mechanical strength of the copper at elevated temperature was assumed to be negligible. Accordingly, the elastic modulus for this materials was set to 1,000 psi.

Elastic-plastic material properties for the stainless steel components were used for the final analysis runs. Bi-linear stress strain curves as a function of temperature were input. The yield stress values used are shown in Table 4.1. A tangent modulus (slope of the stress strain curve in the plastic region) of 500,000 psi was used for each curve.

Table 4.1: Yield Stress Values for 304 Stainless Steel (Reference 17)

4.3 Thermal Boundary Conditions

Thermal boundary conditions representing immersion in a fire at 1475 °F were applied to the finite element model on all exterior surfaces. These surfaces include the finned outer surface of the cask, the cover top plate and the cask lower plate. The bottom of the cask lower plate was also heated (i.e. the cask is assumed to be suspended in the fire). The symmetry plane of the model was represented by a no heat flow condition (insulated).

Radiation and convection heat transfer modes were included to account for heat flow from the fire to the cask. For radiation, the shipping cask was conservatively assumed to be a black body; absorbing all radiation. An absorptivity **/** emissivity of 1.0 was assumed for the exterior; a form factor of 1.0 was assumed indicating the cask is fully engulfed by the fire. Based on a review of typical fossil-fired furnace design coefficients, a heat transfer coefficient of 20 BTU/hr-ft²- \rm{P} was assumed on the exterior surfaces for convection.

Heat flow across the air gaps inside the shipping cask was also considered. Radiation links were used to represent the heat transfer between the cask inner liner and the cover liner. Convective heat transfer in the confined space within the shipping cask was assumed to be negligible.

4.4 Structural Boundary Conditions

Structural boundary conditions were applied to the shipping cask finite element model to determine thermal expansion stresses and stresses due to internal pressure. Thermal expansion stresses result from differential thermal expansion of the shipping cask components. Pressure stresses result from the air inside the shipping cask heating up and expanding (according to the ideal gas law).

Internal pressures were applied in the final elastic-plastic analyses. The limiting condition for internal pressure stress occurs when the neoprene gasket has burned off, relieving the pressure within the source cavity while the air surrounding the depleted uranium contained within the welded portion on the cask and cover assemblies expands (i.e. the inner surfaces of the cask and cover assemblies shown on Figures 6 and 7 are pressurized). The bounding value of the applied pressure is determined as follows:

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P_2 = \frac{T_2}{T_1} P_1 = \frac{(1475 + 460)}{(70 + 460)} 15 = 55 \text{ psi}
$$

Displacements are constrained at the plane of symmetry in the direction normal to the plane of symmetry (y direction), along a vertical line through the origin in the x direction, and at a single node on the bottom of the cask lower plate in the z direction.

5.0 Cover Bolt Calculations

An initial strain of 0.004 inches was applied to the bolts in the final elastic-plastic analyses. This strain was determined to result in a bolt pre-load of 1,467 lb for ambient conditions. This pre-load corresponds to a torque of 165 in-lbs from the following relationship:

 $T = K^*D^*F$

Where $T =$ the applied torque

 $K =$ the nut factor (0.3, Reference 21)

 $D =$ the nominal bolt diameter = $3/8$ inch

 $F =$ the bolt tension force

The 1,467 lb load in the bolts corresponds to a stress of 19 ksi for a stress area of 0.0773 in² (Reference 23 for 3/8 inch bolts)

$$
S_{\rm pl} = \frac{1467}{0.0773} = 19 \text{ ksi}
$$

Other potential loads on the bolts are dead weight and pressure. These loads were not applied in the finite element model but are evaluated below. The weight of the cover assembly is 30 lbs (Reference 13). This weight results in load of 5 lbs and a stress of 0.065 ksi in each of the 6 bolts.

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S_{\text{dw}} = \frac{30}{6(0.0773)} = 0.065 \text{ ksi}
$$

If the neoprene gasket does not fail, the 55 psi internal pressure is applied on a area conservatively corresponding to the bolt circle diameter of 5.5 inches. This results in a load of 218 lbs and a stress of 2.8 ksi for each bolt.

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L_{\rm P} = \frac{55 \frac{\pi}{4} (5.5)^2}{6} = 218 \text{ lbs} \qquad S_{\rm P} = \frac{55 \frac{\pi}{4} (5.5)^2}{6 (0.0773)} = 2.8 \text{ ksi}
$$

6.0 Results

6.1 Thermal

Figures 12 through 16 show temperature profiles in the shipping cask at selected times during the temperature transient. At two minutes into the transient (Figure 13) the fins on the outside of the shipping cask have heated up to nearly 1300 \textdegree F while the inside of the shipping cask is still relatively cool. By 30 minutes, the shipping cask has nearly reached an equilibrium temperature of 1475 'F. The depleted uranium shielding in the cover is the last component to heat up.

6.2 Stress

Figures 17 through 23 show contours of stress intensity in the shipping cask at selected times during the temperature transient. These stresses were calculated with elastic material properties and do not include pressure loads or bolt pre-load. This phase of the analysis was used to identify the time of maximum thermal stress. The maximum thermal stress intensity occurs at 2 minutes and is located in the outer tip of the fin at its attachment to the lower plate on the plane of symmetry.

The stress in the fin and lower plate results from the expansion of the hot fin which is restrained by the cooler cask and lower plate. The maximum calculated elastic stress of 135 ksi occurs where the bending reinforcement provided by the lower plate is a minimum at the plane of symmetry. This maximum stress would not occur in an actual cask subjected to the specified thermal conditions because the stainless steel shell material would yield and relieve the stress. These

thermal expansion stresses are secondary and do not occur in the material that forms the pressure boundary around the depleted uranium.

High stresses also occur in the cover periphery. The depleted uranium shielding in the cover causes the center of the cover to heat up more slowly than the periphery. This temperature difference results in a hoop stress in the cover.

To obtain a more realistic picture of the stress and strain condition in the cask, the stress pass was repeated at the time of maximum elastic thermal stress, 2 minutes, with elastic-plastic material properties. Pressure and bolt pre-load were included in this pass. Figures 3 and 4 show contours of stress intensity and total (elastic + plastic) strain. The maximum stress is reduced from 135 ksi to 26 ksi due to yielding in the material. The maximum calculated strain is less than 5%. Material testing shows that 304 stainless steel at 1475 \textdegree F will not rupture until the strain reaches 40 to 50% (Reference 22). Consequently, a strain of less than 5% is judged to be acceptable.

An additional elastic-plastic stress pass was made at a time of 30 minutes to confirm that there is sufficient material strength at the highest temperatures to react the primary pressure loads. Figure 24 shows that the stress results are bounded by the stresses at 2 minutes. The maximum calculated total strain at 30 minutes is also less than 5%.

As discussed in Attachment 2, the analyses reported in this calculation were performed using a curve fit for the uranium and copper material properties which slightly under-predicted the heat capacity of the material at low temperatures. Scoping analyses performed using linear interpolation of the available material properties indicate that the time of maximum stress remains at about 2 minutes into the transient. The curve fit material properties result in a maximum elastic stress about 8% lower than that predicted using linear interpolation of the data. The maximum strain calculated in an elastic-plastic analysis is similarly expected to be no more than 8% greater than that shown in Figure 4, i.e. less than 5%.

6.3 Cover Bolts

The stress and load in the cover bolts were evaluated for the elastic-plastic stress passes. These evaluations show that the stress and load in the bolts was lower at high temperature than under cold pre-load conditions. The load decreases at high temperature because the stainless steel bolt expands more than the joint formed by the cover plate, gasket and shell.

The decrease in load more than offsets any potential load due to internal pressure if the gasket does not rupture or deadweight of the cover. At 2 minutes, the load in each bolt decreases from 1,467 lb to 114 - 176 lbs (the three bolts have different loads). This decrease in load of more than 1,000 lbs more than offsets the 5 lb load due to dead weight or the 218 lb potential pressure load.

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Figure 2: Model 702 Transport Package Schematic

Figure 11: Geometric Keypoints - Depleted Uranium

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