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Dockets Nos. 50-269/270 & 287

February 4, 1977

Duke Power Company
ATTN: Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.
Vice President
Steam Production
Post Office Box 2178
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 37, 37 and 34 to Facility Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your request dated June 11, 1976.

These amendments will increase the flux/flow trip setpoint of the Reactor Protective System for Unit 1 from 1.055 to 1.07. This increase results from the elimination of the reactor internals vent valve flow penalty.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original
Signed by

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 37 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 37 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 34 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation
5. Federal Register Notice

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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x27433:tsh SURNAME➤	DNeighbors		ASchwencer	RBaer	KRGoller	
DATE➤	1/26/77	1/ /77	2/4/77	1/ /77	1/ /77	

cc: Mr. William L. Porter
Duke Power Company
P. O. Box 2178
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Suite 1050
Washington, D. C. 20006

Oconee Public Library
201 South Spring Street
Walhalla, South Carolina 29691

Honorable James M. Phinney
County Supervisor of Oconee County
Walhalla, South Carolina 29621

Office of Intergovernmental Relations
116 West Jones Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27603

Chief, Energy Systems
Analyses Branch (AW-459)
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Room 645, East Tower
401 M Street, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IV Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
345 Coutland Street, N. E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-269

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 37
License No. DPR-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated June 11, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of the Facility License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 37, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Karl R. Goller

Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 4, 1977

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO DPR-47

AMENDMENT NO. 34 TO DPR-55

DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
2.1-2	2.1-2
2.1-7	2.1-7
2.3-2	2.3-2
2.3-3	2.3-3
2.3-4	2.3-4
2.3-8	2.3-8
2.3-11	2.3-11

can be related to DNB through the use of the BAW-2 correlation (1). The BAW-2 correlation has been developed to predict DNB and the location of DNB for axially uniform and non-uniform heat flux distributions. The local DNB ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the actual heat flux, is indicative of the margin to DNB. The minimum value of the DNBR, during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to 1.30. A DNBR of 1.30 corresponds to a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that DNB will not occur; this is considered a conservative margin to DNB for all operating conditions. The difference between the actual core outlet pressure and the indicated reactor coolant system pressure has been considered in determining the core protection safety limits. The difference in these two pressures is nominally 45 psi; however, only a 30 psi drop was assumed in reducing the pressure trip setponts to correspond to the elevated location where the pressure is actually measured.

The curve presented in Figure 2.1-1A represents the conditions at which a minimum DNBR of 1.30 is predicted for the maximum possible thermal power (112 percent) when four reactor coolant pumps are operating (minimum reactor coolant flow is 107.6 percent of 131.3×10^6 lbs/hr.). This curve is based on the combination of nuclear power peaking factors, with potential effects of fuel densification and rod bowing, which result in a more conservative DNBR than any other shape that exists during normal operation.

The curves of Figure 2.1-2A are based on the more restrictive of two thermal limits and include the effects of potential fuel densification and rod bowing:

1. The 1.30 DNBR limit produced by the combination of the radial peak, axial peak and position of the axial peak that yields no less than a 1.30 DNBR.

2. The combination of radial and axial peak that causes central fuel melting at the hot spot. The limit is 20.15 kw/ft for Unit 1.

Power peaking is not a directly observable quantity and therefore limits have been established on the bases of the reactor power imbalance produced by the power peaking.

The specified flow rates for Curves 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Figure 2.1-2A correspond to the expected minimum flow rates with four pumps, three pumps, one pump in each loop and two pumps in one loop, respectively.

The curve of Figure 2.1-1A is the most restrictive of all possible reactor coolant pump-maximum thermal power combinations shown in Figure 2.1-3A.

The maximum thermal power for three-pump operation is 86.4 percent due to a power level trip produced by the flux-flow ratio 74.7 percent flow x 1.07 = 79.9 percent power plus the maximum calibration and instrument error. The maximum thermal power for other coolant pump conditions are produced in a similar manner.



CURVE	REACTOR COOLANT FLOW (lb/hr)
1	141.3×10^6
2	105.6×10^6
3	69.3×10^6
4	64.7×10^6

UNIT 1
CORE PROTECTION SAFETY LIMIT
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
FIGURE 2.1-2A

During normal plant operation with all reactor coolant pumps operating, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 105.5% of rated power. Adding to this the possible variation in trip setpoints due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 112%, which is more conservative than the value used in the safety analysis. (4)

Overpower Trip Based on Flow and Imbalance

The power level trip set point produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a power-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate the most severe thermal transient considered in the design, the loss-of-coolant flow accident from high power. Analysis has demonstrated that the specified power-to-flow ratio is adequate to prevent a DNBR of less than 1.3 should a low flow condition exist due to any electrical malfunction.

The power level trip set point produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level trip set point produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situtations of Table 2.3-1A are as follows:

1. Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 107% and reactor flow rate is 100%, or flow rate is 93.5% and power level is 100%.

2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 79.9% and reactor flow rate is 74.7% or flow rate is 70.1% and power level is 75%.

3. Trip would occur when two reactor coolant pumps are operating in a single loop if power is 52.4% and the operating loop flow rate is 54.5% or flow rate is 47.9% and power level is 46%.

4. Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pumps operating) if the power is 52.4% and reactor flow rate is 49.0% or flow rate is 45.8% and the power level is 49%.

The flux-to-flow ratios account for the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors and the maximum variation from the average value of the RC flow signal in such a manner that the reactor protective system receives a conservative indication of the RC flow.

For safety calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level trip were used.

The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kw/ft limits or DNBR limits. The reactor power imbalance (power in the top half of core minus power in the bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio such that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2A - Unit 1 are produced. The power-to-flow ratio reduces the power
2.3-2B - Unit 2
2.3-2C - Unit 3

level trip and associated reactor power/reactor power-imbalance boundaries by 1.07% ..for a 1% flow reduction.

The power-to-flow reduction ratio is 0.961 during single loop operation.

Pump Monitors

The pump monitors prevent the minimum core DNBR from decreasing below 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant pump(s). The circuitry monitoring pump operational status provides redundant trip protection for DNB by tripping the reactor on a signal diverse from that of the power-to-flow ratio. The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation.

Reactor Coolant System Pressure

During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure set point is reached before the nuclear overpower trip set point. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1A - Unit 1
2.3-1B - Unit 2
2.3-1C - Unit 3
for high reactor coolant system pressure (2355 psig) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any design transient. (1)

The low pressure (1800) psig and variable low pressure $(11.14\ T_{out}-4706)$ trip
(1800) psig $(10.79\ T_{out}-4539)$
(1800) psig $(10.79\ T_{out}-4539)$
setpoints shown in Figure 2.3-1A have been established to maintain the DNB
2.3-1B
2.3-1C
ratio greater than or equal to 1.3 for those design accidents that result in a pressure reduction. (2,3)

Due to the calibration and instrumentation errors the safety analysis used a variable low reactor coolant system pressure trip value of $(11.14\ T_{out}\ -4746)$
$(10.79\ T_{out}\ -4579)$
$(10.79\ T_{out}\ -4579)$

Coolant Outlet Temperature

The high reactor coolant outlet temperature trip setting limit (619 F) shown in Figure 2.3-1A has been established to prevent excessive core coolant
2.3-1B
2.3-1C
temperatures in the operating range. Due to calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a trip set point of 620^{o}F.

Reactor Building Pressure

The high reactor building pressure trip setting limit (4 psig) provides positive assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident, even in the absence of a low reactor coolant system pressure trip.

Shutdown Bypass

In order to provide for control rod drive tests, zero power physics testing, and startup procedures, there is provision for bypassing certain segments of the reactor protection system. The reactor protection system segments which can be bypassed are shown in Table 2.3-1A. Two conditions are imposed when
2.3-1B
2.3-1C

the bypass is used:

1. By administrative control the nuclear overpower trip set point must be reduced to a value ≤ 5.0% of rated power during reactor shutdown.
2. A high reactor coolant system pressure trip setpoint of 1720 psig is automatically imposed.

The purpose of the 1720 psig high pressure trip set point is to prevent normal operation with part of the reactor protection system bypassed. This high pressure trip set point is lower than the normal low pressure trip set point so that the reactor must be tripped before the bypass is initiated. The over power trip set point of ≤ 5.0% prevents any significant reactor power from being produced when performing the physics tests. Sufficient natural circulation (5) would be available to remove 5.0% of rated power if none of the reactor coolant pumps were operating.

Two Pump Operation

A. Two Loop Operation

Operation with one pump in each loop will be allowed only following reactor shutdown. After shutdown has occurred, reset the pump contact monitor power level trip setpoint to 55.0%.

B. Single Loop Operation

Single loop operation is permitted only after the reactor has been tripped. After the pump contact monitor trip has occurred, the following actions will permit single loop operation:

1. Reset the pump contact monitor power level trip setpoint to 55.0%.
2. Trip one of the two protective channels receiving outlet temperature information from sensors in the Idle Loop.
3. Reset flux-flow setpoint to 0.961.

REFERENCES

(1) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.2
(2) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.7
(3) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.8
(4) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.3
(5) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.6



2.3-8

UNIT 1
PROTECTION SYSTEM MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE SETPOINTS
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

FIGURE 2.3-2A

Table 2.3-1A
Unit 1

Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits

RPS Segment	Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -100% Rated)	Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -75% Rated)	Two Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating in A Single Loop (Operating Power -46% Rated)	One Reactor Coolant Pump Operating in Each Loop (Operating Power -49% Rated)	Shutdown Bypass
1. Nuclear Power Max. (% Rated)	105.5	105.5	105.5	105.5	5.0(3)
2. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Flow (2) and Imbalance, (% Rated)	1.07 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.07 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	0.961 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.07 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	Bypassed
3. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Pump Monitors, (%, Rated)	NA	NA	55% (5)(6)	55% (5)	Bypassed
4. High Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Max.	2355	2355	2355	2355	1720(4)
5. Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	1800	1800	1800	1800	Bypassed
6. Variable Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure psig, Min.	$(11.14\ T_{out} - 4706)$(1)	$(11.14\ T_{out} - 4706)$(1)	$(11.14\ T_{out} - 4706)$(1)	$(11.14\ T_{out} - 4706)$(1)	Bypassed
7. Reactor Coolant Temp. F., Max.	619	619	619 (6)	619	619
8. High Reactor Building Pressure, psig, Max.	4	4	4	4	4

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(1) T_{out} is in degrees Fahrenheit (°F).

(2) Reactor Coolant System Flow, %.

(3) Administratively controlled reduction set only during reactor shutdown.

(4) Automatically set when other segments of the RPS are bypassed.

(5) Reactor power level trip set point produced by pump contact monitor reset to 55.0%.

(6) Specification 3.1.8 applies. Trip one of the two protection channels receiving outlet temperature information from sensors in the idle loop.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 37
License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated June 11, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of the Facility License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 37 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 4, 1977

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 34
License No. DPR-55

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated June 11, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of the Facility License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 34, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 4, 1977

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

AMENDMENT NO. 34 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Introduction

By letter dated June 11, 1976, Duke Power Company (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station. These changes will increase the flux/flow trip setpoint for Unit 1 from 1.055 to 1.07.

Discussion

In our letters dated June 30, 1976, and October 22, 1976, we issued amendments to the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications which provided for the elimination of a 4.6% vent valve flow penalty for Oconee Units 2 and 3. The June 30, 1976, amendment also provided surveillance requirements for all three units which would demonstrate, at each refueling outage, that the vent valves are not stuck open. This evaluation covers a proposed amendment to eliminate the vent valve flow penalty for Unit 1.

Evaluation

In the past, a 4.6% reactor coolant flow penalty had been assumed in the thermal-hydraulic design analysis for the Oconee units. This penalty was assessed to allow for the potential of a core vent valve being stuck open during normal operation. The core vent valves are incorporated into the design of the reactor internals to preclude the possibility of a vapor lock developing in the core following a postulated cold-leg break. By letter dated January 30, 1976, we advised the licensee that we had concluded that sufficient evidence had been provided by B&W to assure that the core vent valves would remain closed during normal operation and that it could, therefore, submit an application for a license amendment to eliminate the vent valve flow penalty. In addition, the submittal should include appropriate surveillance requirements to demonstrate, at each refueling outage, that the vent valves are not stuck open and that they operate freely.

Our evaluation of the elimination of the vent valve flow penalty, discussed in our Safety Evaluation Report dated June 30, 1976 for Unit 2, is applicable to Unit 1 also. In that SER we found that the elimination of this penalty is acceptable. We therefore conclude that the elimination of the vent valve flow penalty for Unit 1 is acceptable.

The Technical Specifications proposed by the licensee reflect the elimination of the vent valve flow penalty by raising the flux/flow trip setpoint to 1.07 from 1.055.

We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: February 4, 1977

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

DUKE POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments Nos. 37, 37 and 34 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55, respectively, issued to Duke Power Company which revised the licenses for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3, located in Oconee County, South Carolina. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments will increase the flux/flow trip setpoint of the Reactor Protective System for Unit 1 from 1.055 to 1.07. This increase results from the elimination of the reactor internals vent valve flow penalty.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on July 15, 1976 (41 FR 29229). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following notice of the proposed action.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated June 11, 1976, (2) Amendments Nos. 37, 37 and 34 to Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55, respectively, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. and at the Oconee County Library, 201 South Spring Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 4th day of February 1977.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A. Schwencer

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors