



BRIEFY DISCUSS!
OUR
APPROACH TO THE SDP
REF TO WIP. - ZOLINSKI
funding.



3260 TUBES
6 Support Plates
92 - Tubes/row
Row 1 Punched
Prior to Service
7% Punched

IP2 SGTL Risk Analysis

Region I

US NRC

- NRR/OST Risk Assessment (STAKE LONG)
- Key Assumptions Validated by RES (DAN MANICKSBERRY)

C/36

Application of Revised Reactor Oversight Program

- Delta-CDF is used to determine finding risk significance
- IAW IMC 0609 delta-CDF ~ delta-LERF for SGTR issues
- IAW IMC 0609 delta-LERF $> 1E-5$ is a Red risk significance finding
- The NRC risk evaluation determined a delta-CDF/LERF of $> 1E-5$ (Red)

or delta-CDF $> 1E-4$

Actual value was $\sim 1E-4$

NRC Risk Assessment Assumptions

- The 1997 SGT inspection performance deficiencies resulted in a IE frequency for SGT failures of 1/year
- The probability that the degraded tube would rupture rather than leak is 0.5
- Includes induced SGTRs - RCS overpressurization events (ATWS); Faulted SGs; and spontaneous failures

ConEdison Risk Assessment

- Assessed of the actual event risk consequences Not Delta-CDF
- Determined a CCDP $\sim 2.2E-6$ and CLERP ~ 0 for the actual SGTL event

Summary/Conclusion

- Poor SGT inspection in 1997 resulted in a highly risk significance condition
- Applying the guidance of IMC 0609 the risk associated with the SGT inspection findings are Red based on delta-LERF and Red/Yellow based on delta-CDF