

#23 MD AFW
1/2 PORV Nonfunctioning Cause
Block Valve BT.

- 1 CH
- 1 SWS
- 1 CCW
- 1 SE
- 1/4 AFW Pump Control
- 1 TD

RISK SIGNIFICANCE

- The CCDP for this condition was $\sim 2E-4$
- Dominant sequence - loss of the #21MDAFW pump + loss of #22 TDAFW pump + failure to recover FW

Based on NRC/ComEd Analysis

- Loss of GA Loss of #23
- AFW water + Loss of FW
Loss of FCB -

Key Assumptions

- No credit for 480 V. bus recovery
- Bleed & feed success 2/2 PORVs
- ~~Condition existed for 1 year~~

Alternate A/C Power
- Recovery of GA Bus By 1522rue
Losing & closing BKR - No fault
on Bus
- Recovery of offsite Power was
not proceduralized on A
Simple isolation.
* Current P&A Assumption.

C/45

→ Gen/SPAN

RISK SIGNIFICANCE

- *Parbed Estimate for Risk Core Based*
- The CCDP for this event was ~ 2.2E-6

7.7E-5 For SGT
 Preliminary Finding
 Significant Performance Issue
 Regarding 1997 inspection
 which ~~showed~~ ~~change~~ ~~these~~
 conditions & Risk Assessment

- Potential deficiencies with the 1997 SGT inspection program are risk significant ΔCDF
 DUE TO CONDITION OF STEAM GENERATOR

Dominant sequence - Failure to depressurize RCS & failure to terminate FW flow to ruptured generator

Damage SG

Key Assumptions

- ~~SGTL~~ ^{FAUCOLE} ~ 100 gpm - HRA revised accordingly
- Charging pumps available for HP makeup

Risk Lower
 Time to Core
 Passage