July 20, 2001

Mr. J. William Lessig
Plant Manager
Honeywell Specialty Chemicals
P.O. Box 430
Metropolis, IL 62690

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 04003392/2001-003(DNMS) (HONEYWELL)
AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Dear Mr. Lessig:

On June 29, 2001, the NRC concluded a routine inspection at your Metropolis, Illinois facility. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the preliminary findings identified in the enclosed report were discussed with you and members of your staff.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations of activities in progress. Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred.

The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding the violation are described in the enclosed report. The violation was cited for the failure to submit Nuclear Material Transaction Reports to the NRC by close of business the next working day after fuel shipments left the licensee's facility. The violation is of concern because it had been an ongoing problem over an extended period of time.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room **or** from the *Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS)*. *ADAMS is accessible from* the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

***/RA/***

Patrick L. Hiland, Chief
Fuel Cycle Branch

Docket No. 04003392
License No. SUB-526

Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation
2. Inspection Report 04003392/2001-003(DNMS)

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Honeywell Specialty Chemicals
Metropolis, Illinois

Docket No. 04003392
License No. SUB-526

During an NRC inspection conducted June 26 through 29, 2001, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) NUREG-1600, December 18, 2000, the violation is listed below:

> 40 CFR 64(a) requires, in part, that except as specified in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, each specific licensee who exports 1 kilogram of uranium source material of any origin shall complete and submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report in accordance with instructions no later than the close of business the next working day.
>
> Contrary to the above, as of June 29, 2001, the licensee was not submitting completed Nuclear Material Transaction Reports in accordance with instructions for shipments of greater than 9,000 kilograms by close of business the next working day for shipments leaving the licensee's facility, and the licensee was not otherwise excepted.
>
> **This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VI). (VIO 04003392/2001-003-01)**

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Honeywell Specialty Chemicals, is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for the violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your Notice of Violation response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001.

Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (for example, explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or

financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days.

Dated this 20th day of July 2001.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

| | |
|---|---|
| Docket No: | 04003392 |
| License No: | SUB-526 |
| Report No: | 04003392/2001-003(DNMS) |
| Licensee: | Honeywell Specialty Chemicals |
| Facility: | Metropolis Works |
| Location: | P. O. Box 430<br>Metropolis, IL 62960 |
| Dates: | June 26 through 29, 2001 |
| Inspectors: | M. P. Phillips, Senior Fuel Cycle Inspector<br>A. Morrell, Inspector in Training |
| Approved By: | Patrick Hiland, Chief<br>Fuel Cycle Branch<br>Division of Nuclear Materials Safety |

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Honeywell Specialty Chemicals
### NRC Inspection Report 040-03392/2001-003(DNMS)

Operations

- Operations were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures for the specific tasks being performed. Operators were knowledgeable of safe operating parameters for cognizant equipment. (Section 2)

Transportation

- Uranium hexafluoride cylinder shipments were properly secured, radiation and contamination surveys were properly performed, and radiological conditions of shipments were within Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC regulatory limits. Shipping papers were properly maintained in the vehicles carrying the shipments and the vehicles were properly placarded. The inspectors identified a violation associated with the submittal of Nuclear Material Transaction Reports in that the reports were not being submitted by the close of business of the next working day after the shipment left the site. (Section 3)

Waste Management and Control

- The licensee was shipping waste offsite approximately three times per year. While licensee contamination surveys of the packages shipped to Envirocare showed no detectable surface contamination, Envirocare receipt surveys showed contamination on six of the last nine shipments. The licensee was attempting to resolve this discrepancy. Liquid and airborne effluents were within regulatory limits. Waste was being characterized by a computer spreadsheet program based on surveys done several years ago, and this methodology probably overestimated the amount of uranium being shipped as waste. (Section 4)

## Report Details

## I. Operations

### O1 Conduct of Operations

O1.1 Process Background

The Honeywell Specialty Chemicals facility is the only civilian facility in the United States that converts uranium ore concentrates ($U_3O_8$ yellowcake) into uranium hexafluoride ($UF_6$) for shipment to enrichment facilities. The complete process involves five separate components as follows: ore preparation, reduction, green salt, fluorination, and distillation.

The ore preparation process begins with the ore concentrates, which are contained in 55 gallon drums. The drums are emptied into a digester where the ore concentrates are mixed with sulfuric acid to remove sodium. The dissolved solution then goes to a neutralizer tank where it is neutralized with ammonia. The precipitated uranium compound is then filtered and sent to a calciner, which removes carbonates, water, and other volatile materials. The calcined material is then blended and agglomerated in equipment specially designed to obtain the optimum particle size for fluid bed operations.

The next phase of the operation is reduction. In this phase, the particles from the ore preparation process are fed into a fluid bed reductor where it is contacted at elevated temperature with hydrogen, forming uranium dioxide ($UO_2$). Impurities from this process are reacted and evolved out of the system in the waste gas, which is filtered, incinerated, and discharged without further treatment.

The green salt phase of the operation consists of converting the $UO_2$ into uranium tetrafluoride ($UF_4$). The $UO_2$ is sent directly to the hydro-fluorination bed reactors where the $UO_2$ is reacted with anhydrous hydrofluoric acid to produce $UF_4$, which is sent to the green salt hopper or placed in storage drums if the fluorinators are not in operation. Impurities are removed at this stage as well, and these impurities are filtered and scrubbed prior to venting to the atmosphere. Final treatment of scrubber liquors is performed at the Environmental Protection Facility.

In the fluorination phase, the green salt hoppers or storage drums are fed into a blender, which then feeds the fluid bed fluorinators, where $UF_4$ is contacted with elemental fluorine. Most of the metallic impurities remain as the $UF_6$ is volatized. As the $UF_6$ leaves the fluorination step, it is filtered to separate particulate material and is then de-sublimed in cold traps.

In the final distillation phase, the cold traps are periodically cycled by heating the $UF_6$ under pressure to its melting point whereupon it is sent to the still-feed tanks. These tanks drain to the vaporizer, which processes the $UF_6$ through a series of low boilers, low boiler condensers, high boilers, high boiling condensers, and finally through the product condenser. The $UF_6$ is then drained into 14 ton product cylinders.

The cylinders are sampled, weighed, and placed on a transfer buggy to be removed to a storage area where they are allowed to sit for five days to solidify prior to further handling. Once cooled, the cylinders can be transported to enrichment facilities.

O1.2 Conduct of Operations

a. Inspection Scope (TI2600/003)

The inspectors observed general operations in the Feed Materials Building (FMB) and other areas onsite to verify that the activities were performed safely and in accordance with applicable license conditions and regulatory requirements. In particular, the inspectors observed the following activities:

- Cylinder disconnect, weighing, and storage;
- FMB and control room operations; and
- Liquid uranium hexafluoride ($UF_6$) transfer from cold traps to still-feed tanks.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors noted that the activities observed were conducted in accordance with applicable procedures [although the procedures were not in-hand or available at the job site] and postings, and that operators used appropriate protective clothing and equipment. The FMB units (ore preparation, reduction, green salt, fluorination, and distillation) were all in operation during the inspection. Control room operations were conducted with attention focused on equipment important to safety. Operation log books were current and conclusive for activities conducted during the shifts observed.

During the calibration of the PIC-410 controller, the operator identified several discrepancies between the Appendix 1 list of set variables in the procedure and the actual variables on the controller. The operator noted the actual values on the controller setting, and subsequently determined that the variable values were appropriate.

The inspectors observed cylinder filling operations in the FMB and the change-out of product cylinders. Cylinders were placed in fill positions. Each cylinder fill position had two independent load cells monitoring the weight of the cylinder during the product filling process. The inspectors observed that the load cell weights were continuously monitored and recorded by the distillation operators in the FMB control room. In addition, the distillation operators manually calculated the fill times for each cylinder. An alarm was set to go off at the time calculated when a cylinder should be approaching its fill value. Also, this time was placed on a white board in the Control Room supervisor's office. Throughout the filling process, the distillation operators monitored the product flow totalizer to ensure that a product cylinder was not overfilled. The inspectors observed the distillation operators proceed to the cylinder fill location. Cylinders were properly isolated from the flow at the precalculated weight displayed by the load cells. The fill procedure was properly followed to provide for drawing a vacuum on cylinders, and the cylinders were then lifted by the main overhead crane after the pigtail was removed connecting the cylinders to the fill line. The operators followed proper precautionary practices in having the gulper hose available and operable, and in wearing respirators during this evolution. A load cell on the crane was used to record

the weight of the cylinders. The cylinders were then transferred to the weighing cart, and the official weight of the cylinders determined. All of the weights made on each cylinder were compared to verify that they were within 100 pounds of each other. In all cases, the weights were below the administrative weight limit for 48Y cylinders going to Russia.

The cylinders were then lifted onto the transfer buggy and parked at the "cylinder cooling pad." This was an area of the facility that the Honeywell staff had determined was level, thus allowing for level cooling of the cylinders. The inspectors noted that cylinder filling and transfer to storage operations were conducted in accordance with the governing procedures.

The inspectors discussed ongoing operation activities, the risk associated with cognizant operations, and the status of equipment with control room operators in the FMB at each of the control stations (ore prep/reduction, green salt, fluorination, and distillation). The inspectors observed that operational alarms were promptly addressed, and only a few standing alarms existed. In each case where a standing alarm was noted, the operators initiated appropriate compensatory actions to assure safe operations. The inspectors observed that fluorination operators were cognizant of the critical operating parameters of the cold traps. Specifically, the fluorination operators correctly explained the cold trap's current fill status, the maximum fill limit, and the calibration frequency of load cells and instrumentation.

The inspectors discussed the conduct of operations with the hydrofluorination, fluorination, and distillation operators. In discussions with the inspectors, each operator stated they were responsible for the safe operation of their respective equipment, and at no time would they start another functional area's equipment. The fluorination operator demonstrated the dumping of a cold trap to the "still-feed" tank. The inspectors determined that this evolution was performed in accordance with facility procedures. In discussions with the inspectors, operators were knowledgeable of current maintenance activities being performed; who was working on the equipment; the status of the maintenance activity; and what hazardous systems were isolated to perform the activity.

During facility tours, the inspectors observed housekeeping practices. The inspectors noted that the third floor staff of the FMB were on respirators, required for most of the time that the inspectors were at the facility. However, at the time of the inspectors' tour, a respirator was not required for any floor in the FMB. The floors of the FMB were clear of obstructions and were clean.

c. Conclusion

Operations were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures for the specific tasks being performed. Operators were knowledgeable of safe operating parameters for cognizant equipment.

## III. Transportation Activities

T1.1 Conduct of Transportation

a. Inspection Scope (86740)

The inspectors observed preparations and shipment of several 14-ton $UF_6$ cylinders bound for Russia to verify that the shipments were made in accordance with 10 CFR and 49 CFR requirements. The inspectors also reviewed all required paperwork associated with the shipments to ensure that the documentation complied with 10 CFR and 49 CFR requirements.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors observed the licensee prepare truck shipments of 14-ton $UF_6$ cylinders that were ultimately being sent to Russia. The shipments were properly secured, and appropriate surveys were performed to ensure that removable contamination and radiation levels were below the limits specified in 49 CFR. The shipments were appropriately labeled and marked in accordance with 49 CFR. A review of shipping papers also verified that the information required by both 49 CFR and 10 CFR was available in the shipping documentation and that the documents were readily available to the driver of the vehicle. However, there were two sets of bills-of-lading for each shipment. The first bill-of-lading documented the shipper as Honeywell, and the shipment was consigned to Techsnabexport for UEIP via IZOTOP, St. Petersburg, Russia, c/o Paducah-McCracken County Riverport Authority. This was the bill-of-lading prepared for the truck shipment, which contained one 14-ton $UF_6$ cylinder destined for the Port Authority in Paducah, Kentucky. The truck was then offloaded, and the cylinder remained there until it was loaded onto a barge for completion of the shipment. The trucking company hauling the shipments was Transport Logistics International (TLI). A second bill of lading was then completed for the international portion of the shipment, and this bill of lading listed the shipper as “Transport Logistics International for Fuel Logistics GMBH from Honeywell, Metropolis, Illinois, on behalf of USEC, Paducah, Kentucky.”

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s Nuclear Material Transaction Reports for the above shipments. In discussions with a member of the licensee’s staff, the inspectors determined that these reports were collected throughout the week, and then sent to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System every two weeks. In reviewing past practices, the inspectors also found an instance earlier in the year where approximately 52 Nuclear Material Transaction Reports were submitted in late March regarding shipments that had left the plant site as far back as December 2000. These shipments had followed the same route as the cylinders discussed above; specifically, they were shipped by truck to the Port Authority in Paducah, Kentucky. Subsequently, the shipments were shipped by barge/boat to their final destination overseas. In discussing the process with the licensee’s staff, the inspectors determined that the licensee had been under the mistaken impression that the shipment did not occur until it was prepared for leaving the country from the Port Authority in Paducah. However, for this to be the case, the Port Authority would have to be a licensee capable of receiving licensed material. This was not the case. The inspectors determined that the cylinders were shipped from Honeywell via the carrier TLI by truck one at a time. The carrier then consolidated the shipment onto a barge and continued the shipment on a barge

containing 150 cylinders. The barge was then loaded onto the ship, Baltic Mercur, and taken to the Port of St. Petersburg, Russia for unloading.

The inspectors reviewed the regulatory basis for the shipments and determined the following:

- Honeywell was licensed to make the shipments to Russia (export license No. XSOU-8767), but TLI was not licensed.

- TLI was a general licensee (pursuant to 10 CFR 40.23) as a "person who possesses transient shipment of natural uranium other than in the form of ore or ore residue in amounts exceeding 500 kilograms." Under this license, they could consolidate packages into larger shipments for further transport overseas.

- 10 CFR 40.64(a) required that each specific licensee who exports 1 kilogram of uranium source material of any origin shall complete and submit a Nuclear Material Transaction Report in accordance with instructions no later than the close of business the next working day.

Based on the above regulatory requirements, the inspectors concluded that Honeywell was responsible for completing and submitting the Nuclear Material Transaction Report. However, the Honeywell staff was not submitting the forms by close of business the next working day after a shipment left the site, but the staff was holding the forms and submitting them at some future date, usually the end of the week. The inspectors concluded that this was a violation of 10 CFR 40.64(a) requirements.
**(VIO 40-03392/2001-003-01)**

The licensee's staff agreed to forward the Nuclear Material Transaction Report by close of business the next working day after a shipment left the site until the licensee could obtain relief from this requirement from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

c. Conclusions

Uranium hexafluoride cylinder shipments were properly secured, radiation and contamination surveys were properly performed, and radiological conditions of shipments were within DOT and NRC regulatory limits. Shipping papers were properly maintained in the vehicles carrying the shipments, and the vehicles were properly placarded. The inspectors identified a violation associated with the submittal of Nuclear Material Transaction Reports in that the reports were not being submitted by the close of business of the next working day after the shipment left the site.

## IV. Waste Management and Control

W1.1 Conduct of Waste Management

a. Inspection Scope (84850, 84900, & 88035)

The inspectors reviewed radioactive disposal records for the release of liquid, airborne and solid wastes to ensure that releases complied with regulations and license requirements. The inspectors reviewed waste control procedures, records, and the

results of a quality assurance audit to verify that activities were completed in accordance with the license and applicable regulatory requirements. The inspectors also toured the scrap iron waste storage facility, the ore drum crusher area, and the legacy waste storage area to ensure that material was stored safely and in accordance with regulatory requirements.

b. Observation and Findings

The inspectors observed the shipment of a truckload of metal contaminated with uranium that was shipped as 11(e)2 (byproduct material as defined in 10 CFR 40) material. The inspectors reviewed prior shipment records and determined that the licensee had shipped approximately 166,500 cubic feet of 11(e)2 material, including contaminated uranium drums to Envirocare of Utah, and crushed wooden pallets to Quivera in New Mexico. The licensee maintained appropriate documentation and shipping papers for these transfers. Currently a shipment of 11(e)2 material would leave the facility every four months. The inspectors reviewed records of waste shipment from the previous year and, except for some minor contingencies, the documentation and shipping papers were adequate. Of note, however, was the fact that even though the licensee had determined that the shipments to Envirocare were not contaminated upon departure from the Honeywell facility, Envirocare surveys performed upon receipt of six of the last nine shipments showed external contamination upon receipt, with the highest being 4,476 disintegrations per minute (dpm) per 100 square centimeters ($cm^2$) beta, and 860 dpm/$cm^2$ alpha. Although these values were less than the regulatory limits specified in 49 CFR 173.443(b), the discrepancy was being evaluated by the licensee to determine if current survey techniques result in the best likelihood for identifying any loose contamination on the packages sent to Envirocare for disposal.

The inspectors reviewed radioactive disposal records for the release of liquid and airborne effluents. Liquid releases were reviewed for the period April 2000 through May 2001. During this period, liquid effluents ranged from 0.94E-7 microcuries per milliliter (uCi/ml) to 2.8E-7 uCi/ml. All of these releases were below the 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B effluent limit of 3E-7 uCi/ml. The total quantity of uranium released during this period [April 1, 2000 through May 31, 2001] was 0.984 curies (36.4 GigaBequerels) in a volume of 1.41 billion gallons of water. Regarding airborne releases, the effluent calculations were based on concentrations of material present on various floors of the FMB and calculated air flows through each floor based on fan flow volumes. The calculation was then input into the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) "Comply" software to compute a dose to the maximum exposed individual of the public. The dose computed for 1998 was 2.2 millirem (22 microsieverts), and the dose computed for 1999 was 1.2 millirem (12 microsieverts). However, in many cases, the windows to various floors were open, and a breeze could be felt as a result of outside winds. These flows were not included in this calculated dose. The inspectors concluded that even if the outside air flow through a floor were included in the calculation, the result would not be significantly greater than what the licensee had calculated using EPA's "Comply" software.

The inspectors interviewed the waste control manager and reviewed the licensee's procedures and records of radioactive waste generation and storage. Waste materials were stored in various onsite areas, which were all observed by the inspector. These areas were the scrap iron waste storage facility, ore drum crusher area, and the legacy waste storage area. Per the waste control manager, the goal was to have all of the iron

waste and legacy waste that was packaged to be transferred to Envirocare by the end of next year. The ore drum crusher area had a truck parked onto which the crushed ore drums [referred to as "hockey pucks" by site personnel] were placed. When a truck was fully loaded, it was closed up and sent as an exclusive use shipment of 11(e)2 material to Envirocare.

The inspectors determined that the characterization of waste shipments was not based on measurements of the shipment, but based on a calculation. Several years ago the licensee performed a detailed survey of various shipments of waste to determine the percentage of uranium, thorium, and radium contained as contamination of the material being shipped. That survey was used by the licensee to characterize current shipments via a spreadsheet calculation. The calculation took the total weight of material being shipped, and multiplied that by the factors determined from the old survey to obtain the radioactive materials shipped values for the shipping papers. The inspectors concluded that this methodology would most likely overestimate the amount of radioactive material being shipped offsite.

c. Conclusions

The licensee was shipping waste offsite approximately three times per year. While licensee contamination surveys of the packages shipped to Envirocare showed no detectable surface contamination, Envirocare receipt surveys showed contamination on six of the last nine shipments. The licensee was attempting to resolve this discrepancy. Liquid and airborne effluents were within regulatory limits. Waste was being characterized by a computer spreadsheet program based on surveys done several years ago, and this methodology probably overestimated the amount of uranium being shipped as waste.

## V. Management Meeting

### X1. Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff and management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 29, 2001. The plant staff acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Honeywell Specialty Chemicals

* M. Davis, Health Physics Supervisor
* W. Lessig, Plant Manager
  H. Roberts, Health Physics Manager

Other members of the licensees' staff were also contacted during the inspection.

* Denotes those attending the exit meeting on June 29, 2001.

## INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

| | |
|---|---|
| IP 84850: | Radioactive Waste Management - Inspection of Waste Generator Requirements |
| IP 84900: | Low-level Radioactive Waste Storage |
| IP 86740: | Transportation Activities |
| IP 88035: | Radioactive Waste Management |
| TI 2600/003: | Operational Safety Review |

## ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 04003392/2001003-01 | VIO | Failure to submit Nuclear Material Transaction Reports by close of business the next business day for shipments leaving the site. |

Closed:

None

Discussed:

None

## LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

| | |
|---|---|
| ADAMS | Agencywide Document Access and Management System |
| ALARA | As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable |
| CFR | Code of Federal Regulations |
| DNMS | Division of Nuclear Material Safety |
| DOT | Department of Transportation |
| EPA | Environmental Protection Agency |
| FMB | Feed Materials Building |
| HP | Heath Physics |
| IP | Inspection Procedure |
| NRC | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| PARS | Publicly Available Records |
| PDR | Public Document Room |
| PERR | Public Electronic Reading Room |
| SNM | Special Nuclear Material |
| SWU | Separative Work Unit |
| TLI | Transport Logistics International |
| $UF_4$ | Uranium Tetrafluoride |
| $UF_6$ | Uranium Hexafluoride |
| $U_3O_8$ | Yellowcake (uranium ore concentrates) |
| uCi/ml | microcuries per milliliter |
| USEC | United States Enrichment Corporation |