

April 28, 1999

Mr. William R. McCollum, Jr.
Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke Energy Corporation
P. O. Box 1439
Seneca, SC 29679

DISTRIBUTION: OGC WBlumberg
~~Docket File~~ ACRS T-6 E26
PUBLIC GHill(6)
PDII-2 R/F COgle,RII
JZwolinski/SBlack WBeckner,TSB
CNorsworthy (e-mail SE only)

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TAC NOS. MA4879, MA4880, AND MA4881)

Dear Mr. McCollum:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 303 , 303 , and 303 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, respectively, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated March 1, 1999.

The amendments revise the Improved Technical Specification (ITS) 3.9, "Refueling Operations," Subsection 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.3.b by adding a Note to state that the emergency air lock door is not required to be closed when it is sealed with a temporary cover plate.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 303 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 303 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 303 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

cc w/encls: See next page *AMD4879, WPD*
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\0A4879AM.WP

DFOI 11

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure

"E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

*See Previous Concurrence

OFFICE	PDII-2/FM	PDII-2/LA	SCSB*	SPSB/WMB*	OGC*	PDII/SC	PD/D
NAME	DLaBarge:cn	CHawes <i>MH</i>	CBerlinger	MReinhart	RBachmann	REmch <i>BE</i>	HBerkow
DATE	<i>4/26/99</i>	<i>4/26/99</i>	03/26/99	04/14/99	04/02/99	<i>4/26/99</i>	<i>4/27/99</i>

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

9905040255 990428
PDR ADOCK 05000269
P PDR



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 28, 1999

Mr. William R. McCollum, Jr.
Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke Energy Corporation
P. O. Box 1439
Seneca, SC 29679

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2,
AND 3 (TAC NOS. MA4879, MA4880, AND MA4881)

Dear Mr. McCollum:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 303 ,
303 , and 303 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55,
respectively, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The amendments consist of
changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated March 1,
1999.

The amendments revise the Improved Technical Specification (ITS) 3.9, "Refueling
Operations," Subsection 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," Limiting Condition for Operation
3.9.3.b by adding a Note to state that the emergency air lock door is not required to be closed
when it is sealed with a temporary cover plate.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included
in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David E. LaBarge".

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 303 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 303 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 303 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Oconee Nuclear Station

cc:

Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn
Legal Department (PBO5E)
Duke Energy Corporation
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006

Anne Cottingham, Esquire
Winston and Strawn
1400 L Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20005

Mr. Rick N. Edwards
Framatome Technologies
Suite 525
1700 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-1631

Manager, LIS
NUS Corporation
2650 McCormick Drive, 3rd Floor
Clearwater, Florida 34619-1035

Senior Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
7812B Rochester Highway
Seneca, South Carolina 29672

Virgil R. Autry, Director
Division of Radioactive Waste Management
Bureau of Land and Waste Management
Department of Health and Environmental
Control
2600 Bull Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201-1708

County Supervisor of Oconee County
Walhalla, South Carolina 29621

Mr. J. E. Burchfield
Compliance Manager
Duke Energy Corporation
Oconee Nuclear Site
P. O. Box 1439
Seneca, South Carolina 29679

Ms. Karen E. Long
Assistant Attorney General
North Carolina Department of
Justice
P. O. Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

L. A. Keller
Manager - Nuclear Regulatory
Licensing
Duke Energy Corporation
526 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006

Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
North Carolina Department of
Environment, Health, and
Natural Resources
3825 Barrett Drive
Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721

Mr. Steven P. Shaver
Senior Sales Engineer
Westinghouse Electric Company
5929 Carnegie Blvd.
Suite 500
Charlotte, North Carolina 28209

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 303 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Section Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1999



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 303
License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated March 1, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

9905040260 990428
PDR ADOCK 05000269
P PDR

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 303, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Section Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1999



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 303
License No. DPR-55

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated March 1, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 303 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Section Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 303

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

DOCKET NO. 50-269

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 303

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

DOCKET NO. 50-270

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 303

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DOCKET NO. 50-287

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3.9.3-1
B3.9.3-2
B3.9.3-3
B3.9.3-4
B3.9.3-5

Insert

3.9.3-1
B3.9.3-2
B3.9.3-3
B3.9.3-4
B3.9.3-5

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Containment Penetrations

- LC0 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:
- a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts;
 - b. One door in each air lock closed; and
 -----NOTE-----
 An emergency air lock door is not required to be closed when a temporary cover plate is installed.

 - c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:
 - 1. closed by a manual, non-automatic power operated or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or
 - 2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Reactor Building Purge supply and exhaust isolation signal.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS,
 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more containment penetrations not in required status.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> A.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.	Immediately

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

OPERABILITY is required. During periods of unit shutdown when containment OPERABILITY is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment ingress and egress is necessary. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed. Placement of a temporary cover plate in the emergency air lock is an acceptable means for providing containment closure.

The temporary cover plate is installed and sealed against the inner emergency air lock door flange gasket. The temporary cover plate is visually inspected to ensure that no gaps exist. All cables, hoses and service air piping run through the sleeves on the temporary cover plate will also be installed and sealed. The sleeves will also be inspected to ensure that no gaps exist. Leak testing is not required prior to beginning fuel handling operations. Therefore, visual inspection of the temporary cover plate over the emergency air lock satisfies the requirement that the air lock be closed, which constitutes operability for this requirement.

The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refueling.

The Reactor Building Purge System includes a supply penetration and exhaust penetration. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, two valves in each of the supply and exhaust penetrations are secured in the closed position. The system is not subject to a Specification in MODE 5.

In MODE 6, large air exchanges are necessary to support refueling operations. The purge system is used for this purpose, and two valves in each penetration flow path may be closed on a unit vent high radiation signal.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by a closed automatic isolation valve, non-automatic power operated valve, manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the containment penetration(s) during fuel movements.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). A minimum fuel transfer canal water level and the minimum decay time of 72 hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity subsequent to a fuel handling accident results in doses that are within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. The design basis for fuel handling accidents has historically separated the radiological consequences from the containment capability. The NRC staff has treated the containment capability for fuel handling conditions as a logical part of the "primary success path" to mitigate fuel handling accidents, irrespective of the assumptions used to calculate the radiological consequences of such accidents (Ref. 2).

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36.

LCO

This LCO reduces the consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity from containment. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the RB purge isolation signal.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO (continued) This LCO is modified by a note indicating that an emergency air lock door is not required to be closed when a temporary cover plate is installed.

APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2

With the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the isolation function is not needed. This is accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Performance of these actions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.3.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. Also the Surveillance will demonstrate that each open penetration's valve operator has motive power, which will ensure each valve is capable of being closed.

The Surveillance is performed every 7 days during the CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

the containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete fuel handling operations.

As such, this Surveillance ensures that a postulated fuel handling accident that releases fission product radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of fission product radioactivity to the environment.

SR 3.9.3.2

This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the isolation position actuates to its isolation position on an actual or simulated high radiation signal. The frequency requires the isolation capability of the reactor building purge valves to be verified functional once each refueling outage prior to CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. This ensures that this function is verified prior to CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. This Surveillance will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel handling accident to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the containment.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.11.
2. NRC letter to RG & E dated December 7, 1995, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Conversion to Improved Standard Technical Specifications - Resolutions of Ginna Design Basis for Refueling Accidents.

(continued)



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 303 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-38
AMENDMENT NO. 303 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47
AND AMENDMENT NO. 303 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-55

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 1, 1999, Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Improved Technical Specifications (ITS). The requested changes would add a Note to ITS 3.9, "Refueling Operations," Subsection 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations," Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.3.b that would state: "An emergency air lock door is not required to be closed when a temporary cover plate is installed."

In addition, the licensee proposed expanding the corresponding Bases Background section by stating the following: "Placement of a temporary cover plate in the emergency air lock is an acceptable means for providing containment closure."

"The temporary cover plate is installed and sealed against the inner emergency air lock door flange gasket. The temporary cover plate is visually inspected to ensure that no gaps exist. All cables, hoses and service air piping run through the sleeves on the temporary cover plate will also be installed and sealed. The sleeves will also be inspected to ensure that no gaps exist. Leak testing is not required prior to beginning fuel handling operations. Therefore, visual inspection of the temporary cover plate over the emergency air lock satisfies the requirement that the air lock be closed, which constitutes operability for this requirement."

A change to the LCO Bases, 3.9.3 would state: "This LCO is modified by a note indicating that an emergency air lock door is not required to be closed when a temporary cover plate is installed."

2.0 BACKGROUND

Containment air locks are part of the containment boundary to prevent the uncontrolled release of airborne contamination and provide a means for personnel access during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Each air lock has a door at both ends; these doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment closure is required. When a unit is shutdown and containment closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism can be disabled and both

9905040263 990428
PDR ADOCK 05000269
P PDR

doors opened for extended periods when frequent containment ingress and egress is necessary.

However, during refueling outages containment closure is required by the Oconee TS during core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel in the containment; this would require that at least one door be closed at all times. To satisfy these closure requirements, as well as to accommodate frequent personnel movement through the air lock and the use of temporary services inside the containment, Oconee has proposed amendments that will allow use of a temporary cover plate installed over the emergency personnel hatch inner door opening so that both doors can be swung to the full-open position.

The cover plate is a 36-inch diameter, 1-inch thick, aluminum plate that is bolted against the inner door opening and sealed against the hatch with a sealant. The cover plate contains penetrations of various diameters with sleeves that are welded to the plate and a 20-inch personnel escape hatch. The sleeves provide conduits for routing cables, hoses, and other services across the boundary. They are sealed using hard-setting epoxy or by foaming with fire barrier material, as appropriate. The plate is visually inspected to ensure that no gaps exist at the hatch flange and sleeves. Leak testing is not required prior to beginning fuel handling operations. A surveillance program monitors the condition of the seals. The escape hatch is normally shut and opened only for a means of emergency exit, if necessary. A personnel hatch is used for normal containment entry and exit, with one door shut when containment closure is needed, and is unrelated to the proposed amendment.

3.0 EVALUATION

Oconee ITS LCO 3.9.3.b requires that during refueling operations, one door in each air lock containment penetration to be closed. The corresponding Bases states that containment closure is required during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment. Therefore, while the door air lock mechanism may remain disabled, the present TS requires that one air lock door remain closed.

A temporary cover plate would provide equivalent closure of the containment during refueling mode activities, comparable to that provided by an emergency airlock door, with the exception of the temporary cover plate not being a pressure-retaining device. However, pressurization events are unlikely during refueling mode activities. Therefore, without differential pressure providing a driving force to force radioactive material past the temporary cover plate, leakage rate testing of the cover plate seals is not necessary as long as inspections show that the seals are in place and intact.

Furthermore, the analysis provided in the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 15.11, "Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment," takes no credit for containment or filtration of gases released. The analysis concluded that the potential dose release from the containment would not exceed the 10 CFR Part 100 dose guidelines, and this amendment does not affect that analysis. The air locks when closed, as well as the cover plate when installed in lieu of air lock door closure, serve to prevent release from the containment in the event of a fuel handling accident, thus providing defense in depth beyond that assumed in the dose calculations.

4.0 SUMMARY

The staff has determined that the proposed ITS change to use the cover plate described by the licensee in lieu of the requirement to maintain at least one air lock door closed during refueling is acceptable, since it provides an appropriate level of protection against release of radioactive material during a fuel handling accident. In addition, this protection is beyond that assumed in the dose calculations for a fuel handling accident at Oconee. Therefore, the addition of the Note to LCO 3.9.3.b and the Bases changes are acceptable. The changes allow use of an equivalent device to satisfy the closure requirements of the containment equipment hatch during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel in containment; the staff finds this approach to be acceptable.

The licensee has informed the staff that provisions have been made to add a description of the equipment hatch, its use, and design basis, as appropriate, to the next available update to the Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 14282 dated March 24, 1999). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: David E. LaBarge

Date: April 28, 1999