November 25, 1996

Mr. J. W. Hampton
Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke Power Company
P. O. Box 1439
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ACRS T-2 E26

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TAC NOS. M96580, M96581, M96582)

Dear Mr. Hampton:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 219 , 219 , and 216 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, respectively, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated September 17, 1996, and supplement dated October 23, 1996.

The amendments lower the maximum allowable reactor building pressure, lower the actuation setpoint for actuation of the reactor building spray system, and modify the associated TS Bases requirements.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 219 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 219 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 216 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 25, 1996

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Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke Power Company
P. O. Box 1439
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cc w/encl: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-269

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 219
License No. DPR-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1996, as supplemented October 23, 1996, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. <u>Technical Specifications</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 219 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Herbert N. Berkow

Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 25, 1996

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 219
License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1996, as supplemented October 23, 1996, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 219 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 25, 1996

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 216
License No. DPR-55

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1996, as supplemented October 23, 1996, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 216, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 25, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 219

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

DOCKET NO. 50-269

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 219

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

DOCKET NO. 50-270

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 216

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DOCKET NO. 50-287

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3.3-6	3.3-6
3.3-7	3.3-7
3.5-31	3.5-31
3.5-32	3.5-32
3.6-2	3.6-2

Bases

Specification 3.3 assures that, for whatever condition the reactor coolant system is in, adequate engineered safety feature equipment is operable.

For operation up to 60% FP, two high pressure injection pumps are specified. Also, two low pressure injection pumps and both core flood tanks are required. In the event that the need for emergency core cooling should occur, functioning of one high pressure injection pump, one low pressure injection pump, and both core flood tanks will protect the core, and in the event of a main coolant loop severance, limit the peak clad temperature to less than 2,200°F and the metal-water reaction to that representing less than 1 percent of the clad.(1) Both core flooding tanks are required as a single core flood tank has insufficient inventory to reflood the core.

The requirement to have three HPI pumps and two HPI flowpaths operable during power operation above 60% FP is based on considerations of potential small breaks at the reactor coolant pump discharge piping for which two HPI trains (two pumps and two flow paths) are required to assure adequate core cooling.(2) The analysis of these breaks indicates that for operation at or below 60% FP only a single train of the HPI system is needed to provide the necessary core cooling.

The requirement for a flowpath from LPI discharge to HPI pump suction is provided to assure availability of long term core cooling following a small break LOCA in which the BWST is depleted and RCS pressure remains above the shutoff head of the LPI pumps.

The borated water storage tanks are used for two purposes:

(a) As a supply of borated water for accident conditions.

(b) As a supply of borated water for flooding the fuel transfer canal during refueling operation.(3)

Three-hundred and fifty thousand (350,000) gallons of borated water (a level of 46 feet in the BWST) are required to supply emergency core cooling and reactor building spray in the event of a loss-of-core cooling accident. This amount fulfills requirements for emergency core cooling. The borated water storage tank capacity of 388,000 gallons is based on refueling volume requirements. Heaters maintain the borated water supply at a temperature above 50°F to lessen the potential for thermal shock of the reactor vessel during high pressure injection system operation. The boron concentration is set at the amount of boron required to maintain the core 1 percent $\Delta k/k$ subcritical at 70°F without any control rods in the core. The minimum boron concentration is specified in the Core Operating Limits Report.

It has been shown that the containment temperature response following a LOCA or main steam line break accident will be within the equipment qualification analysis conditions with one train of Reactor Building spray and two Reactor Building coolers operable.(4) Therefore, a maintenance period of seven days is acceptable for one Reactor Building cooling fan and its associated cooling unit provided two Reactor Building spray systems are operable or one Reactor Building spray system provided all three Reactor Building cooling units are operable.

Valve LPSW-108 is the LPSW isolation valve on the discharge side of each Unit's RBCUs. This valve is required to be locked open in order to assure the LPSW flowpath for the RBCUs is available.

Three low pressure service water pumps serve Oconee Units 1 and 2 and two low pressure service water pumps serve Oconee Unit 3. There is a manual cross-connection on the supply headers for Unit 1, 2, and 3. One low pressure service water pump per unit is required for normal operation.

The Units 1 and 2 LPSW system requires two pumps to meet the single failure criterion provided that one of the Units has been defueled and the following LPSW system loads on the defueled Unit are isolated: RBCUs, Component Cooling, main turbine oil tank, RC pumps, and LPI coolers. In this configuration, if two of the three LPSW pumps are inoperable, 72 hours are permitted by TS 3.3.7.b to restore two of the three LPSW pumps to operable status. At all other times when the RCS of Unit 1 or 2 is ≥ 350 psig or ≥ 250°F, all three LPSW pumps are required to meet the single failure criterion. When all three LPSW pumps are required to be operable and one of the three pumps is inoperable, 72 hours are permitted by TS 3.3.7.b to restore the pump to operable status.

The operability of redundant equipment(s) is determined based on the results of inservice inspection and testing as required by Technical Specification 4.5 and ASME Section XI.

<u>REFERENCES</u>

(1) ECCS Analysis of B&W's 177-FA Lowered-Loop NSS, BAW-10103, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia, June 1975.

(2) Duke Power Company to NRC letter, July 14, 1978, "Proposed Modifications of High Pressure Injection System".

(3) FSAR, Section 9.3.3.2

(4) FSAR, Section 15.14.5

3.5.3 Engineered Safety Features Protective System Actuation Setpoints

Applicability

This specification applies to the engineered safety features protective system actuation setpoints.

Objective

To provide for automatic initiation of the engineered safety features protective system in the event of a breach of RCS integrity.

Specification

The engineered safety features protective actuation setpoints and permissible bypasses shall be as follows:

Functional Unit	Action	Setpoint
High Reactor Building Pressure	Reactor Building Spray	≤15 psig
	High-Pressure Injection	≤4 psig
	Low-Pressure Injection	≤4 psig
	Start Reactor Building Cooling & Reactor Building Isolation (Essential and Non-essential Systems)	≤4 psig
	Penetration Room Ventilation	≤4 psig
Lower Reactor Coolant System Pressure	High Pressure Injection (1) & Reactor Building Isolation (Non-essential systems)	≥1500 psig
	Low Pressure Injection (2)	≥500 psig

(1) May be bypassed below 1750 psig and is automatically reinstated above 1750 psig.

(2) May be bypassed below 900 psig and is automatically reinstated above 900 psig.

Bases

High Reactor Building Pressure

The basis for the 15 psig and 4 psig setpoints for the high pressure signal is to establish a setting which would be reached immediately in the event of a DBA, cover the entire spectrum of break sizes and yet be far enough above normal operation maximum internal pressure to prevent spurious initiation.

Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure

The basis for the 1500 psig low reactor coolant pressure setpoint for high pressure injection initiation and 500 psig for low pressure injection is to establish a value which is high enough such that protection is provided for the entire spectrum of break sizes and is far enough below normal operating pressure to prevent spurious initiation.(1)

REFERENCE

(1) FSAR, Section 15.14.

2. For plant conditions when the Reactor Coolant System temperature is above 250°F and pressure is above 350 psig but the reactor is at or below hot shutdown, one Reactor Building Purge isolation valve on each penetration may be open for testing and/or maintenance per Specification 4.4.4.1 and 3.6.6.

3. For plant conditions other than contained in Specification 3.6.3.b.1, .2 above, with one or more Reactor Building purge valves open, the open valves shall be closed within one hour, or the plant shall be in hot shutdown within 12 hours and within an additional 24 hours, Reactor Coolant System temperature below 250°F and pressure below 350 psig.

c. A containment isolation valve, other than a Reactor Building Purge isolation valve, may be inoperable provided either:

1. The inoperable valve is restored to operable status within four hours.

2. The affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a deactivated automatic valve secured and locked in the isolated position.[1]

3. The affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a closed manual valve or blind flange.[1]

4. The reactor is in the hot shutdown condition within 12 hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours.

3.6.4 The reactor building internal pressure shall not exceed 1.2 psig or a vacuum of -2.45 psig if the reactor is critical.

3.6.5 Prior to criticality following refueling shutdown, a check shall be made to confirm that all manual containment isolation valves which should be closed are closed and tagged.

[1]Penetration flow paths (except for the Reactor Building Purge flow path) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 219 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47

AND AMENDMENT NO. 216 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-55

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 17, 1996, as supplemented by letter dated October 23, 1996, Duke Power Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would modify the requirements associated with limiting the peak reactor building pressure by lowering the maximum allowable reactor building pressure, lower the actuation setpoint for actuation of the reactor building spray system, and modify the associated TS Bases requirements. Specifically, the licensee has proposed changes to TS 3.5.3, 3.6.4, and Bases 3.3.

The October 23, 1996, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Following a high energy line break (and in conjunction with a worst case single failure), the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) coolers, Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs), and the Reactor Building Spray System, must be capable of performing two functions. These two functions are (a) to maintain the Reactor Building temperature less than the environmental qualification (EQ) envelope, and (b) to maintain the Reactor Building internal pressure less than 59 psig. The heat removal capabilities of the LPI coolers and RBCUs are tested at least once per quarter to ensure that these systems are operable. The acceptance criteria for these tests are based, in part, on the containment pressure/temperature response to a mass and energy release following a high energy line break inside the containment.

The methodology for simulating the mass and energy release from high energy line breaks, and the resulting containment response for the Oconee Nuclear Station, is contained in the Duke Power Company Topical Report, DPC-NE-3003-P, "Mass and Energy Release and Containment Response Methodology," dated August 11, 1993. This methodology was approved by the NRC staff in a Safety Evaluation

Report dated March 15, 1995. This analysis demonstrates that the EQ requirements and containment pressure acceptance criteria are met for a range of LPI cooler and RBCU performance requirements, and result in less frequent cleaning and testing of these systems. In addition, the analysis indicated that TS changes to the setpoint are necessary based on the input assumptions used in the analysis. These changes are in the more conservative direction and have already been applied administratively.

3.0 EVALUATION

The first change would affect TS 3.5.3, "Engineered Safety Features Protective System Actuation Setpoints." It would reduce the reactor building spray system actuation setpoint on high reactor building pressure from ≤ 30 psig to ≤ 15 psig.

Justification: The small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) containment pressure response analysis that is described in Topical Report DPC-NE-3003-P requires that the reactor building spray system actuate when reactor building pressure reaches 20 psig. This setpoint, rather than 30 psig, improves the long-term reactor building temperature response following a small break LOCA, since it would result in actuation of the reactor building spray system more quickly on increasing pressure. An allowance of 5 psig is applied to the analysis assumption to provide an additional safety margin, resulting in a proposed setpoint of 15 psig. An additional administrative margin has been applied since 1971 by procedure, so that the setpoint is controlled at ≤ 10 psig. The additional margin has not caused operational concerns.

Since the proposed setpoint is below the maximum setpoint that has been analyzed in the topical report, will enhance the response of the reactor building spray system to a small break LOCA, is consistent with the analysis that covers the entire spectrum of break sizes, is high enough to prevent spurious initiation during normal operation, and is in the more conservative direction, the proposed change is acceptable.

The second proposed change would affect TS 3.6.4, "Reactor Building Pressure." It would reduce the maximum allowable reactor building internal pressure from 1.5 psig to 1.2 psig when the reactor is critical. In addition, the lower reactor building pressure limit would be changed from 5 inches of mercury (inches of Hg) to -2.45 psig.

Justification: The post-LOCA reactor building response analysis that is described in Topical Report DPC-NE-3003-P assumes an initial reactor building pressure of 1.2 psig and shows that the peak reactor building pressure remains below the design internal pressure of 59 psig for all reactor building temperatures. Current operating procedures require depressurizing the reactor building if the reactor building pressure indication exceeds 0.6 psig, which represents an additional safety margin that has been administratively applied.

Since the proposed setpoint is consistent with the setpoint assumed in the analysis, and is in the more conservative (safe) direction, it is acceptable.

The proposed change to the lower reactor building pressure limit from a vacuum of 5 inches of Hg to -2.45 psig is merely a straight-forward conversion between units used to specify the pressure. There is no actual change in the allowable negative pressure. Also the units will be consistent with the units and instrument scale used in the control room. Therefore, this change is acceptable.

The third proposed change would affect TS 3.3.5, "Reactor Building Cooling," and TS 3.3.6, "Reactor Building Spray," Bases. It would indicate that the containment temperature response following a LOCA or main steam line break accident will be within the equipment qualification analysis conditions with one spray and two coolers operable. This proposed change clarifies the design accident requirements of the reactor building sprays and coolers to make the description consistent with the topical report description. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 55031, October 23, 1996). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: David E. LaBarge

Date: November 25, 1996