50-269/270/287

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 15, 1997

Mr. William R. McCollum
Vice President, Oconee Site
Duke Energy Corporation
P. O. Box 1439
Seneca, SC 29679

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TAC NOS. M97125, M97126, AND M97127)

Dear Mr. McCollum:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos225 , 225 , and 222 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, respectively, for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated October 30, 1996, and supplements dated April 22, July 2, September 3, and September 4, 1997.

The amendments revise the Reactor Building Structural Integrity TS regarding the tendon surveillance program.

As stated in the change to Appendix C of the TS for this amendment, approval is based on the condition that you provide in the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) the prescribed lower limit (PLL) and the minimum required value (MRV) of tendon forces for each group of tendons prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1. This condition is based on the commitment contained in your letter dated July 2, 1997, to place the PLL and MRV in the SLC Manual, which is Chapter 16 of the Oconee UFSAR, and your letter dated September 4, 1997, recognizing that this would be added as a License Condition to the TS. We request that you submit the portion of the SLC Manual related to the establishment of these limits as soon as it is available.

DF01

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 225 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 225 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 222 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No.225 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No.225 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No.222 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-269

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 225
License No. DPR-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 30, 1996, and supplements dated April 22, July 2, September 3, and September 4, 1997, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B as revised through Amendment No. 225 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

In addition, paragraph 3.K of the Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3.K Additional Conditions

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No. 225, are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Energy CorporationCompany shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and the change to the facility shall be implemented prior to performance of the surveillance tests during the Unit 1 end-of-cycle 17 outage. Implementation of this amendment shall include the provisions that the licensee provide in the facility Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) the prescribed lower limit and the minimum required value of Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tendon forces for each group of tendons prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1. In addition, the portion of the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual related to the establishment of these limits will be submitted as soon as available.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachments:
1. Page 9a to the License and Page 1 to Appendix C of the License
2. Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 15, 1997

3.I. Iodine Monitoring

The licensee shall implement a program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,

2. Procedures for monitoring, and

3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

3.J. Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin

The licensee shall implement a program which will ensure the capability to accurately monitor the Reactor Coolant System subcooling margin. This program shall include the following:

I. Training of personnel, and

2. Procedures for monitoring.

3.K. Additional Conditions

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No.225 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Energy Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

4. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight, February 6, 2013.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Voss A. Moore, Assistant Director
for Light Water Reactors, Group 2
Directorate of Licensing

Attachments:
1. Change No. 13 to Appendices A and B
Technical Specifications License No. DPR-38
2. Appendix C - Additional Conditions

Date of Issuance: July 19, 1974

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

Duke Power Company shall comply with the following conditions on the schedules noted below:

Amendment Number	Additional Conditions	Implementation Date
224	This amendment authorizes the licensee to incorporate in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report certain changes to the main turbine-generated missile protection criteria. Implementation of this amendment is the incorporation of these changes as described in the licensee's application dated April 29, 1997, and evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 1997.	May 16, 1997
225	Prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1, the licensee will modify the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) to incorporate the prescribed lower limit and the minimum required value of tendon forces for each group of Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tendons. In addition, the portion of the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual related to the establishment of these limits will be submitted as soon as available. Implementation of this amendment includes the incorporation of these commitments as described in the licensee's application dated October 30, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated April 22 and July 2, 1997, evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation attached to this amendment, and acknowledged by letter dated September 4, 1997.	September 15, 1997

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 225
License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 30, 1996, and supplements dated April 22, July 2, September 3, and September 4, 1997, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B as revised through Amendment No. 225, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

In addition, paragraph 3.K of the Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3.K Additional Conditions

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No. 225 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Energy Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and the change to the facility shall be implemented prior to performance of the surveillance tests during the Unit 1 end-of-cycle 17 outage. Implementation of this amendment shall include the provisions that the licensee provide in the facility Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) the prescribed lower limit and the minimum required value of Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tendon forces for each group of tendons prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1. In addition, the portion of the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual related to the establishment of these limits will be submitted as soon as available.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachments:
1. Page 9a to the License and Page 1 to Appendix C of the License
2. Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 15, 1997

3.I. Iodine Monitoring

The licensee shall implement a program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,

2. Procedures for monitoring, and

3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

3.J. Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin

The licensee shall implement a program which will ensure the capability to accurately monitor the Reactor Coolant System subcooling margin. This program shall include the following:

I. Training of personnel, and

2. Procedures for monitoring.

3.K. Additional Conditions

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No. 225 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Energy Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

4. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight, October 6, 2013.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Voss A. Moore, Assistant Director
for Light Water Reactors, Group 2
Directorate of Licensing

Attachments:
1. Change No. 13 to Appendices A and B
   Technical Specifications License No. DPR-38
2. Appendix C - Additional Conditions

Date of Issuance: July 19, 1974

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

Duke Energy Corporation shall comply with the following conditions on the schedules noted below:

Amendment Number	Additional Conditions	Implementation Date
224	This amendment authorizes the licensee to incorporate in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report certain changes to the main turbine-generated missile protection criteria. Implementation of this amendment is the incorporation of these changes as described in the licensee's application dated April 29, 1997, and evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 1997.	May 16, 1997
225	Prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1, the licensee will modify the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) to incorporate the prescribed lower limit and the minimum required value of tendon forces for each group of Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tendons. In addition, the portion of the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual related to the establishment of these limits will be submitted as soon as available. Implementation of this amendment includes the incorporation of these commitments as described in the licensee's application dated October 30, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated April 22 and July 2, 1997, evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation attached to this amendment, and acknowledged by letter dated September 4, 1997.	September 15, 1997

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 222
License No. DPR-55

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 filed by the Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) dated October 30, 1996, and supplements dated April 22, July 2, September 3, and September 4, 1997, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B. Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B as revised through Amendment No. 222 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

In addition, paragraph 3.K of the Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3.K Additional Conditions

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No. 222 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Energy Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and the change to the facility shall be implemented prior to performance of the surveillance tests during the Unit 1 end-of-cycle 17 outage. Implementation of this amendment shall include the provisions that the licensee provide in the facility Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) the prescribed lower limit and the minimum required value of Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tendon forces for each group of tendons prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1. In addition, the portion of the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual related to the establishment of these limits will be submitted as soon as available.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachments:
1. Page 10a of the License and Page 1 of Appendix C of the License
2. Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 15, 1997

3.I. Iodine Monitoring

The licensee shall implement a program which will ensure the capability to accurately determine the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,

2. Procedures for monitoring, and

3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

3.J. Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin

The licensee shall implement a program which will ensure the capability to accurately monitor the Reactor Coolant System subcooling margin. This program shall include the following:

I. Training of personnel, and

2. Procedures for monitoring.

3.K. Additional Conditions

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No. 222 , are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Energy Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

4. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight, July 19, 2014.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Voss A. Moore, Assistant Director
for Light Water Reactors, Group 2
Directorate of Licensing

Attachments:
1. Change No. 13 to Appendices A and B
   Technical Specifications License No. DPR-38
2. Appendix C - Additional Conditions

Date of Issuance: July 19, 1974

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

Duke Energy Corporation shall comply with the following conditions on the schedules noted below:

Amendment Number	Additional Conditions	Implementation Date
221	This amendment authorizes the licensee to incorporate in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report certain changes to the main turbine-generated missile protection criteria. Implementation of this amendment is the incorporation of these changes as described in the licensee's application dated April 29, 1997, and evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation dated May 16, 1997.	May 16, 1997
222	Prior to performing the seventh tendon surveillance for Unit 1, the licensee will modify the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (specifically the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual) to incorporate the prescribed lower limit and the minimum required value of tendon forces for each group of Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tendons. In addition, the portion of the Selected Licensee Commitment Manual related to the establishment of these limits will be submitted as soon as available. Implementation of this amendment includes the incorporation of these commitments as described in the licensee's application dated October 30, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated April 22 and July 2, 1997, evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation attached to this amendment, and acknowledged by letter dated September 4, 1997.	September 15, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 225

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

DOCKET NO. 50-269

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 225

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

DOCKET NO. 50-270

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 222

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DOCKET NO. 50-287

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
iv	iv
3.6-2a	3.6-3
3.6-3	3.6-4
3.6-3a	3.6-5
-----	3.6-6*
4.4-14	4.4-14
4.4-15	4.4-15
4.4-16	4.4-16
-----	4.4-16a
-----	4.4-16b
-----	4.4-16c
6.6-5	6.6-5

*overflow - no change

Section		Page
3.10	GAS STORAGE TANK AND EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE	3.10-1
3.11	(Not Used)	3.11-1
3.12	REACTOR BUILDING POLAR CRANE AND AUXILIARY HOIST	3.12-1
3.13	SECONDARY SYSTEM ACTIVITY	3.13-1
3.14	SNUBBERS	3.14-1
3.15	CONTROL ROOM PRESSURIZATION AND FILTERING SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEMS	3.15-1
3.16	HYDROGEN PURGE SYSTEM	3.16-1
3.17	(NOT USED)	
3.18	STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY	3.18-1
4	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	4.0-1
4.0	SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS	4.0-1
4.1	OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW	4.1-1
4.2	STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF ASME CODE CLASS 1, 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS	4.2-1
4.3	TESTING FOLLOWING OPENING OF SYSTEM	4.3-1
4.4	REACTOR BUILDING	4.4-1
4.4.1	Containment Leakage Tests	4.4-1
4.4.2	Reactor Building Structural Integrity	4.4-14
4.4.3	Hydrogen Purge System	4.4-17
4.4.4	Reactor Building Purge System	4.4-20
4.5	EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEMS PERIODIC TESTING	4.5-1
4.5.1	Emergency Core Cooling Systems	4.5-1
4.5.2	Reactor Building Cooling Systems	4.5-4
4.5.3	Containment Heat Removal Capability	4.5-6
4.5.4	Penetration Room Ventilation System	4.5-7
4.5.5	Low Pressure Injection System Leakage	4.5-9
4.6	EMERGENCY POWER PERIODIC TESTING	4.6-1
4.7	REACTOR CONTROL ROD SYSTEM TESTS	4.7-1
4.7.1	Control Rod Trip Insertion Time	4.7-1
4.7.2	Control Rod Program Verification	4.7-2
4.8	MAIN STEAM STOP VALVES	4.8-1

3.6.6 The combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves shall be determined in accordance with Specification 4.4.1.2. If, based on the most recent surveillance testing results the combined leakage rate exceeds the specified value and containment integrity is required then,

1) corrective action of Specification 3.6.3.c is met, or

2) repairs shall be initiated immediately and conformance with specified value shall be demonstrated within 48 hours or the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within an additional 36 hours.

3.6.7 Whenever containment integrity is required as specified in Specifications 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, the structural integrity of the reactor building(s) shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria identified in Specification 4.4.2.

1. If abnormal degradation of the reactor building structural integrity is indicated by the conditions in Specification 4.4.2.2.a.4,

THEN

a) Restore the reactor building(s) to the required level of structural integrity within 72 hours,

OR

b) Verify that reactor building(s) structural integrity is maintained, by performing an engineering evaluation of the reactor building(s) structural integrity, within 72 hours,

AND

c) Provide a Special Report to the Commission within 15 days in accordance with Specification 6.6.3.f,

OR

d) At the end of the 72 hour period, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

2. If the indicated abnormal degradation of the reactor building structural integrity, other than Action (1) above, is at a level below any other acceptance criteria of Specification 4.4.2,

THEN

a) Restore the reactor building(s) to the required level of structural integrity within 15 days,

OR

b) Verify that reactor building structural integrity is maintained by performing an engineering evaluation of the reactor building(s) structural integrity, within 15 days,

AND

c) Provide a Special Report to the Commission within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.6.3.f,

OR

d) At the end of the 15 day period, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

BASES

The Reactor Coolant System conditions of cold shutdown assure that no steam will be formed and hence no pressure buildup in the containment if the Reactor Coolant System ruptures.

The selected shutdown conditions are based on the type of activities that are being carried out and will preclude criticality in any occurrence.

The reactor building is designed for an internal pressure of 59 psig and an external pressure 3.0 psi greater than the internal pressure. The design external pressure of 3.0 psi corresponds to a margin of 0.5 psi above the differential pressure that could be developed if the building is sealed with an internal temperature of 120 °F with a barometric pressure of 29.0 inches of Hg and the building is subsequently cooled to an internal temperature of 80°F with a concurrent rise in barometric pressure to 31.0 inches of Hg. The weather conditions assumed here are conservative since an evaluation of National Weather Service records for this area

indicates that from 1918 to 1970 the lowest barometric pressure recorded is 29.05 inches of Hg and the highest of 30.85 inches of Hg.

The Reactor Building is a free standing post-tensioned reinforced concrete structure. The Reactor Building consists of a vertical cylinder supported by a reinforced concrete foundation slab and supporting a shallow domed roof. The entire interior surface of the structure is covered with a 0.25 inch thick welded steel liner plate. The Reactor Building Post-Tensioning system serves to provide a counter-acting force to the internal pressure. The internal pressure load on the foundation slab is resisted by the foundation reaction due to dead load and by the strength of the reinforcing. Based on information provided in Regulatory Guide 1.35, the action times required to restore the Reactor Building Structural Integrity are acceptable as specified in Technical Specifications 3.6.7.1 and 3.6.7.2.

Operation with a personnel or emergency hatch inoperable does not impair containment integrity since either door meets the design specifications for structural integrity and leak rate. Momentary passage through the outer door is necessary should the inner door gasket be inoperative to install or remove auxiliary restraint beams on the inner door to allow testing of the hatch. The time limits imposed permit completion of maintenance action and the performance of a local leak rate test when required or the orderly shutdown and cooldown of the reactor. Timely corrective action for an inoperable containment isolation valve is also specified.

Penetration flow paths, except for the Reactor Building Purge flow path, may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls. Per NRC Generic Letter 91-08, acceptable administrative control for opening a containment isolation valve includes (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close the valve in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valve and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

When containment integrity is established, the limits of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded should the maximum hypothetical accident occur.

The Reactor Building purge system was designed to allow cleanup of the Reactor Building atmosphere. It is normally operated during a unit shutdown which will require entry into the Reactor Building. It is used to purge the Reactor Building with fresh air to reduce

the contaminant levels within the Reactor Building atmosphere, thus reducing overall personnel exposure. At times, certain safety related functions necessitate entry into the Reactor Building prior to cold shutdown conditions. These include isolation of leaking primary coolant system valves and visual inspections following outages. Use of the purge system tends to minimize any personnel exposure while not significantly contributing to overall plant risk.

The Reactor Building Purge System is required to be isolated whenever the RCS temperature is above 250 °F and pressure is above 350 psig. The maximum pressure limit of 350 psig is based on the Oconee Unit 1 NPSH curve for RC pump operation. This will give a reasonable operating margin for the pumps while operating the purge. The LCO allows one isolation valve to be open on each penetration at or below hot shutdown for testing or maintenance.

REFERENCES

FSAR, Section 3.8

4.4.2 Reactor Building Structural Integrity

Applicability

Applies to structural integrity of the Reactor Building, specifically, the prestressed concrete cylinder and dome portions of the reactor building.

Objective

To define the inservice surveillance program for the Reactor Building post-tensioning system and concrete cylinder and dome.

Specification

4.4.2.1 Inspection Intervals

The inspection intervals to demonstrate the structural integrity of the reactor building shall be as follows:

a. For Unit 1, the inspection interval, as measured from 1/1/93, shall be every five years thereafter.

b. For Unit 2, the inspection interval, as measured from 11/1/94, shall be every five years thereafter.

c. For Unit 3, the inspection interval, as measured from 6/1/95, shall be every five years thereafter.

d. Tendon surveillance may be conducted during reactor operation provided design conditions regarding loss of adjacent tendons are satisfied at all times.

e. Inspection intervals in Specification 4.4.2.1 (a), (b), and (c) may be modified in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL.

4.4.2.2 Tendons

Adequacy of prestressing forces in tendons shall be demonstrated by performing the following activities:

a. Determine that a random, but representative, sample of at least eleven tendons (five hoop, three vertical, three dome) each have an observed lift-off force within the predicted limits established for each tendon group. For each subsequent inspection, one tendon from each group shall be kept unchanged to develop a history and to

correlate the observed data. The procedure of inspection and the tendon acceptance criteria shall be as follows:

1. If the measured prestressing force of the selected tendon in a group lies above the prescribed lower limit, the lift-off test is considered to be a positive indication of the sample tendon's acceptability.

2. If the measured prestressing force of the selected tendon in a group lies between 95% of the prescribed lower limit and 90% of the prescribed lower limit, two tendons, one on each side of this tendon, shall be checked for their prestressing forces. If the prestressing forces of these two tendons are above 95% of the prescribed lower limits for the tendons, all three tendons shall be restored to the required level of integrity, and the tendon group shall be considered acceptable. If the measured prestressing forces of any two adjoining tendons fall below 95% of the prescribed lower limits of the tendons, additional lift-off testing shall be done to detect the cause and extent of such occurrence. The conditions shall be considered as an indication of abnormal degradation of the reactor building(s). In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

3. If the measured prestressing force of any tendon lies below 90% of the prescribed lower limit, the defective tendon shall be fully investigated and additional lift-off testing shall be done so as to determine the cause and extent of such occurrence. The condition shall be considered as an indication of abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

4. If the average of all measured prestressing forces for any group (corrected for average condition) is found to be less than the minimum required prestress level at anchorage location for that group, the condition shall be considered as abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.1.

likely to be less than the minimum required for the group before the next scheduled surveillance, additional lift-off testing shall be done so as to determine the cause and extent of such occurrence. The condition shall be considered as an indication of abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

b. Perform tendon detensioning, inspections, and material tests on a tendon from each group. A randomly selected tendon from each group shall be completely detensioned in order to identify any broken or damaged wires and to determine the following conditions over the entire length of a removed tendon wire sample (this wire sample should be the broken wire if so identified):

1. Tendon wires are free of corrosion, cracks, and damage, and

2. Minimum tensile strength of 240,000 psi (guaranteed ultimate tensile strength of the wire material) exists for at least three wire samples (one from each end and one at mid-length) cut from the removed wire.

Failure to meet requirements of 4.4.2.2.b shall be considered as an indication of abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

c. Retension tendons detensioned for inspection to a force at least equal the force recorded prior to detensioning or the predicted value at the time of inspection, whichever is greater, but do not exceed 70% of the guaranteed ultimate tensile strength of the tendon wire material. Tendon seating force tolerance shall be -0 / +6%. During retensioning of these tendons, change in load versus elongation should be measured at varying levels of force. The following table provides levels of force, pressure, and elongation at which measurements should be taken:

	Force (Kips)	Pressure (psi)	Elongation (In)
PTF			
Step 1			
Step 2			
LOF			
OSF			

Where:
Total Elongation (actual) = (LOF-PTF) Elongation
PTF - Pretensioning Force necessary to bring the tendon into a slightly stressed condition to remove slack and seat the buttonheads.
Step 1-2 - An intermediate force approximately equally spaced between PTF and LOF.
LOF - Lock Off Force at which the tendon is seated on the shims.
OSF - Overstress Force at which the maximum elongation is measured.

If the elongation corresponding to a specific load differs by more than 10% from that recorded during the original installation, an investigation should be made to ensure that the difference is not related to wire failures or slip of wires at anchorages. This condition shall be considered as an indication of abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

d. Verify acceptability of the sheathing filler grease by assuring that:

1. No free water is present and no changes in the presence or physical appearance of the sheathing filler grease occur.
2. Amount of grease replaced does not exceed 5% of the net duct volume when injected at +/-10% of the specified installation pressure.
3. Minimum grease coverage exists for the different parts of the anchorage system.
4. Reactor building exterior surface does not exhibit grease leakage that could affect reactor building integrity.
5. Chemical properties of the sheathing filler grease are within the following tolerance limits:

Water Content	0 - 10% (by dry wt.)
Chlorides	0 - 10 ppm
Nitrates	0 - 10 ppm
Sulfides	0 - 10 ppm
Reserve Alkalinity (Base Numbers)	> 50% of installed value; > 0 (for older grease)

Failure to meet requirements of 4.4.2.2.d shall be considered as an indication of potential abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

4.4.2.3 End Anchorages and Adjacent Concrete Surfaces

As an assurance of the structural integrity of the reactor building(s), tendon anchorage assembly hardware (such as bearing plates, stressing washers, wedges, and buttonheads) of all tendons selected for inspection shall be visually examined. Tendon anchorages selected for inspection shall be visually examined to the extent practical without dismantling the load bearing components of the anchorages. Top and bottom grease caps of all vertical tendons shall be visually inspected to detect grease leakage or grease cap deformations. The surrounding concrete should also be checked visually for indication of any abnormal condition.

Significant grease leakage, grease cap deformation or abnormal concrete condition shall be considered as an indication of abnormal degradation of the reactor building. In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

4.4.2.4 Reactor Building Surfaces

The exterior surface of the reactor building(s) should be visually examined to detect areas of large spall, severe scaling, D-cracking in an area of 25 sq. ft. or more, other surface deterioration or disintegration, or grease leakage. Each of these conditions can be considered as evidence of abnormal degradation of structural integrity of the reactor building(s). This inspection may be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test (Refer to Technical Specification 4.4.1). In the event of an indication of abnormal degradation, refer to Technical Specification 3.6.7.2.

Bases

Provisions have been made for an inservice inspection program intended to provide sufficient evidence that the integrity of the Reactor Building is being preserved. This program will be conducted in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Position C of Regulatory Guide 1.35, *Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containments*, Revision 3 dated July 1990. Regulatory Guide 1.35 describes a basis acceptable to the NRC staff for developing an appropriate inservice inspection and surveillance program for ungrouted tendons in prestressed concrete reactor buildings of light-water-cooled reactors. The inservice inspection program will be subject to review and revision as warranted based on studies and on results obtained for this and other prestressed concrete reactor buildings throughout the life of the plant.

Prior to implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.35 methodology in accordance with this specification, Reactor Building Post Tensioning System surveillances were performed by examining specific, pre-designated test tendons. Therefore, this specification conservatively identifies the date of the last surveillance performed for each unit under the superseded Technical Specification 4.4.2, and measures the periodicity of future inspections from these dates.

Seating forces for all tendons were documented at the time of installation, thus providing one data point. A second point will be obtained from data obtained during the initial tendon surveillance for each unit. The data from the initial surveillance is considered reliable since any error due to tensioning and retensioning had not been introduced. This data will be averaged on a per unit basis and used in the trend analysis along with new data obtained from the new proposed surveillance program in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.35.

6.6.3 Special Reports

Special reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator, Region II, within the time period specified for each report. These reports shall be submitted covering the activities identified below pursuant to the requirements of the applicable reference specification:

a. Auxiliary Electrical Systems, Specification 3.7

b. (Not Used)

c. (Not Used)

d. Reactor Coolant System Surveillance,
Inservice Inspection, Specification 4.2.1
Reactor Vessel Speciment, Specification 4.2.4

e. Reactor Building Surveillance,
Containment Leakage Tests, Specification 4.4.1

f. Structural Integrity Surveillance,
Tendon Surveillance, Specification 3.6.7

g. (Not Used)

h. (Not Used)

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 225 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 225 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-47

AND AMENDMENT NO. 222 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-55

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 30, 1996, and supplemented by letters dated April 22, July 2, September 3, and September 4, 1997, Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee - formerly Duke Power Company) submitted a request for changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise the Reactor Building Structural Integrity TS regarding the tendon surveillance program. The letters dated April 22, July 2, September 3, and September 4, 1997, provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The purpose of the proposed amendments is to change the tendon surveillance program by adopting Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.35, Revision 3. RG 1.35, Revision 3, which stipulates that tendon lift-off tests be performed on randomly selected tendons, instead of repeatedly on the same tendons, as required by the existing tendon surveillance TS. In addition, RG 1.35, Revision 3, contains guidance concerning the acceptability of the tendon forces by requiring that the tendon lift-off forces be within limits established on the basis of the prescribed lower limit (PLL). It also prescribes the actions to be taken when the lift-off forces are below the specified limit.

In order to assure that the trend of the lift-off force will not go below the minimum required tendon force for each group of tendons before the next surveillance, it is necessary to specify the minimum required values (MRVs) for each of the tendon groups. RG 1.35, Revision 3, refers to RG 1.35.1 for guidance in establishing PLLs and MRVs. By adopting RG 1.35, Revision 3, the licensee will use the criteria stipulated therein for the tendon surveillance programs at the three Oconee units.

2.0 Background

By letters dated October 11, 1995, and March 14 and July 30, 1996, the licensee submitted the results of the previous tendon surveillance tests and resulting graphs for the MRVs. By letter dated March 14, 1996, the licensee committed to perform a re-analysis of the containment structure in order to establish more accurate tendon group MRVs, and to evaluate the causes of any loss of

prestresses in excess of the PLLs computed during the original plant design, because the existing PLLs have been shown to be inaccurate. Therefore, the licensee will establish new PLLs as part of the containment reanalysis.

The change to the surveillance program will allow the licensee to obtain new inspection data, which will be used to enhance the level of knowledge of the current state of the Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System and the ability to predict the future state of the system.

3.0 EVALUATION

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed change and the following is the staff's evaluation of the proposed change.

3.1 Modification of the Tendon Test Program

Presently, in Section TS 4.4.2.1, Tendon Surveillance, the tendons to be inspected by lift-off force testing are preselected and fixed, that is, the same tendons are inspected by lift-off tests for all of the surveillances. The surveillance program consists of periodic inspections of nine predesignated tendons; three horizontal, three verticle, and three dome tendons on each unit. One of the three tendons in each group is detensioned and retensioned for wire sample removal on a rotational basis. The acceptability of the tendon lift-off test depends on whether the force-time trend line extends below the lower bound of the predicted design band. Presently there are no stipulations as to what actions should be taken for such a condition. The licensee has reported that because of repeated detensioning and retensioning, one dome tendon (2D28) in Unit 2 and one hoop tendon (51H9) in Unit 1 have been damaged to the extent that they will be precluded from future lift-off tests. This raises questions as to whether the information from the lift-off of fixed tendons can be used to truly represent the tendon forces in the group of tendons. The results of the recent sixth tendon inspection for Unit 3 show low tendon forces, which can be attributed mostly to the repeated testing of the same tendons. Thus, experience has shown that long-term wear on the pre-selected sample tendons, caused by repetitive surveillance tests, can adversely affect the quality of the observed surveillance data.

Instead of using nine fixed tendons (i.e., three from each group), 11 representative tendons (five hoop, three vertical, and three dome) will be selected randomly with one in each group to be kept unchanged for the subsequent inspection.

On the basis of the experience obtained to date, as described above, the licensee has proposed to change the present TS by adopting the inspection program that will comply with the guidance in RG 1.35, Revision 3. The staff agrees with the licensee that such a change should eliminate, as much as possible, the deficiencies in the present TS.

In response a staff request, the licensee incorporated the tendon surveillance interval start dates for each unit into TS Section 4.4.2.1 by supplement dated April 22, 1997. However, as explained in the

supplemental letter dated September 3, 1997, the licensee has determined that the date specified for Unit 1 of July 1, 1991, was overly conservative. This is the date that the Unit 1 Sixth Tendon Surveillance began, not the date the test was completed. Because portions of the test were carried over to the next refueling outage, the test was not completed until January 1, 1993. Therefore, this is the date that the licensee has determined should be used to determine the date when the Seventh Tendon Surveillance should be performed. The staff agrees that establishing the date as 5 years from January 1, 1993, rather than 5 years from July 1, 1991, is acceptable since it correctly reflects the interval between completion a test to completion of the next test. In addition, the test will be performed within the interval required by RG 1.35.

3.2 Establish the PLLs and Revise the MRVs

Since the present tendon surveillance TS do not specify any PLL and do not use PLL, but instead uses MRV as an acceptability criterion, it is necessary for the licensee to establish the PLL for each group of tendons. RG 1.35 requires the comparison of measured tendon forces with the predicted forces of randomly selected tendons. The predicted forces at a given time are based on the measurement of the tendon forces during installation minus the losses in the tendon forces that were predicted to have occurred since that time because of material and structural characteristics. Because of the various complex interacting phenomena involved, the chance is small that the measured tendon force will agree closely with the predicted value. Hence, RG 1.35 recommends the determination of the upper and lower bounds. The PLL is the lower bound. For each prestressed concrete containment, the upper and lower bounds should be determined before the initiation of the tendon surveillance program. Without the PLL, there is no basis to establish the 95 percent and 90 percent PLL limits as the criteria for the acceptance of the tendon force. If the tendon lift-off forces chronically cannot meet the criteria, then the lower bound should be revised or the tendons should be retensioned, depending on whether the lower bound is predicted to go below the MRV before the end of the plant life. If the containment design pressure is not changed, there should not be a major change in the MRVs provided during the staff's review of the sixth tendon surveillance of Unit 3.

On the basis of the above discussion, the licensee has committed in its July 2 and September 4, 1997, letters to the NRC to a license condition to include the revised PLL and MRV values in the Oconee Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual, which is Chapter 16 of the Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and to submit those values to the staff, prior to the implementation of the TS. The staff needs this information to verify that the values are reasonable and that they properly reflect the method used to generate them.

In the letter dated October 30, 1996, the change proposed by the licensee to Specification 4.4.2.2.a.2 required that two additional tendons be checked for their prestressing forces if the measured prestressing force for the first-examined tendon is between the PLL and 90 percent of the PLL. However, as explained in their letter dated September 3, 1997, the licensee has recently determined that the proposed change does not conform to RG 1.35, Revision 3, Section 7.1.2. The RG requires that two additional adjacent tendons be checked for their prestressing forces if the

measured prestressing force for the first-examined tendon is between 95 percent of the PLL and 90 percent of the PLL. As a result, as Specification 4.4.2.2.a.2 is currently worded, adjacent tendons to the first-examined tendon would have to be examined unnecessarily if the first-examined tendon exhibited a prestressing force between 100 percent of the PLL and 95 percent of the PLL. This is overly conservative and could result in the examination of additional tendons beyond the requirements of RG 1.35, Revision 3.

As explained in their letter dated September 3, 1997, the licensee also proposed adding the word "adjoining" to the change proposed in the October 30, 1996, submittal to clarify that additional lift-off testing needs to be done only if two adjoining tendons' prestressing force falls below 95 percent of the PLL. As originally proposed, the specification could have been misinterpreted to imply that additional testing would be required based on the results of any two tendons, regardless of whether or not they were adjacent. This wording is consistent with RG 1.35, Revision 3.

3.3 Provisions for Detension and Retension Tendons

The criterion for retensioning detensioned tendons is described in TS Section 4.4.2.2.c. The criterion incorporates the Regulatory Position (RP) 4.2 in RG 1.35, Rev. 3, for simultaneous measurement of tendon force and elongation and also RP 7.2 for determination of potential wire failure or wire slip at anchorages.

3.4 Other Areas of Inspection as Required in RG 1.35, Rev. 3

The following areas of inspection are adequately covered in the TS:

a) inspection of tendon wires for corrosion, cracks, and damage and testing of tendon wires for their strength;

b) sheathing filler grease for presence of water, voids in grease, grease leakage on the exterior surface, chemical contents, and the amount of each;

c) tendon anchorage and adjacent concrete surface for any abnormality; and

d) the reactor building surface for the detection of large spall, severe scaling, cracking, and other surface deterioration or disintegration or grease leakage.

4.0 SUMMARY

On the basis of it's evaluation as presented above, the staff concludes that the changes to the TS as proposed by the licensee are acceptable since they comply with RG 1.35. It is also based on the licensee's commitment to make available to the staff the PLL and the MRV of tendon force for each group of tendons by including them in the Oconee SLC Manual, which is Chapter 16 of the Oconee UFSAR, before the forthcoming tendon inspection. This commitment is contained in a change to

Appendix C of the Oconee TS and was acknowledged in the licensee's letter dated September 4, 1997.

On August 8, 1996, the NRC published in the Federal Register (61 FR 41311) changes to 10 CFR 50.55a that invoked the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Subsections IWE and IWL. This rule change requires that utilities perform inservice inspections of containments in accordance with the 1992 Edition of the ASME Code, through 1992 Addenda (with specific exceptions and limitations). For Oconee this will require that surveillance tests be performed in a manner similar to that specified in RG 1.35, as approved by this amendment. In addition, the rule change allows utilities to take credit for Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System tests to satisfy the IWL provisions for a 5-year period from the effective date of the rule change for tests that were performed in accordance with RG 1.35 before the effective date of the rule change. However, Oconee has not yet performed tests in accordance with RG 1.35 and is not yet prepared to perform the tests in accordance with the ASME Code. Therefore, this TS change also satisfies the Expedited Examination of Containment requirements contained in the rule change on an interim basis until final implementation of the rule change, which will occur within the five year period allowed for implementation of the Rule/ASME Code.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the South Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 64383 dated December 4, 1996). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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