

August 20, 1986

DMB 016

Dockets Nos. 50-269, 50-270  
and 50-287

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Mr. Hal B. Tucker  
Vice President - Nuclear Production  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 33189  
422 South Church Street  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Tucker:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 148, 148 and 145 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3. These amendments consist of changes to the Station's common Technical Specifications (TSS) in response to your request dated September 17, 1985, as supplemented on March 25, 1986.

These amendments revise the TSS to include independent testing of the shunt and undervoltage trip attachments and silicon controlled rectifiers. These amendments are in response to Generic Letter 85-10, dated May 23, 1985, and the NRC letter to the Babcock and Wilcox Owner's Group, dated December 6, 1985.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance of the enclosed amendments will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Helen N. Pastis, Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate #6  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 148 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 148 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 145 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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GEdison  
8/12/86

AEE  
PBD-6  
JStolz  
8/12/86

OELD  
CWoodhead  
8/13/86

Mr. H. B. Tucker  
Duke Power Company

Oconee Nuclear Station  
Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3

cc:

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Honorable James M. Phinney  
County Supervisor of Oconee County  
Walhalla, South Carolina 29621



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-269

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 148  
License No. DPR-38

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1985, as supplemented March 25, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 148, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

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3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J F Stolz", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John F. Stolz, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #6  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 20, 1986



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 148  
License No. DPR-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1985, as supplemented March 25, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 148, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J F Stolz".

John F. Stolz, Director *for*  
PWR Project Directorate #6  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 20, 1986



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 145  
License No. DPR-55


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated September 17, 1985, as supplemented March 25, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 145, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "J F Stolz for".

John F. Stolz, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #6  
Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 20, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 148 TO DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 148 TO DPR-47

AMENDMENT NO. 145 TO DPR-55

DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment numbers and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3.5-1	3.5-1
3.5-2	3.5-2
3.5-3	3.5-3
3.5-5b	3.5-5b
3.5-5c	3.5-5c
4.1-3	4.1-3

### 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS

#### 3.5.1 Operation Safety Instrumentation

##### Applicability

Applies to unit instrumentation and control systems.

##### Objective

To delineate the conditions of the unit instrumentation and safety circuits necessary to assure reactor safety.

##### Specifications

- 3.5.1.1 The reactor shall not be in a startup mode or in a critical state unless the requirements of Table 3.5.1-1, Column C are met.
- 3.5.1.2 In the event that the number of protective channels operable falls below the limit given under Table 3.5.1-1, Column C; operation shall be limited as specified in Column D.
- 3.5.1.3 For on-line testing or in the event of a protective instrument or channel failure, a key-operated channel bypass switch associated with each reactor protective channel may be used to lock the channel trip relay in the untripped state. Status of the untripped state shall be indicated by a light. Only one channel bypass key shall be accessible for use in the control room. Only one channel shall be locked in this untripped state or contain a dummy bistable at any one time.
- 3.5.1.4 For on-line testing or maintenance during reactor power operation, a key-operated shutdown bypass switch associated with each reactor protective channel may be used in conjunction with a key-operated channel bypass switch as limited by 3.5.1.3. Status of the shutdown bypass switch shall be indicated by a light.
- 3.5.1.5 During startup when the intermediate range instruments come on scale, the overlap between the intermediate range and the source range instrumentation shall not be less than one decade. If the overlap is less than one decade, the flux level shall not be greater than that readable on the source range instruments until the one decade overlap is achieved.

## Bases

Every reasonable effort will be made to maintain all safety instrumentation in operation. A startup is not permitted unless three power range neutron instrument channels and three channels each of the following are operable: reactor coolant temperature, reactor coolant pressure, pressure-temperature, flux-imbalance flow, power-number of pumps, and high reactor building pressure. The engineered safety features actuation system must have three analog channels and two digital channels functioning correctly prior to a startup. Additional operability requirements are provided by Technical Specifications 3.1.12 and 3.4 for equipment which is not part of the RPS or ESFAS.

Operation at rated power is permitted as long as the systems have at least the minimum number of operable channels given in Column C (Table 3.5.1-1). This is in agreement with redundancy and single failure criteria of IEEE-279 as described in FSAR Section 7.

There are four reactor protective channels. A fifth channel that is isolated from the reactor protective system is provided as a part of the reactor control system. Normal trip logic is two out of four. The minimum number of operable channels required is three. While a bypassed channel is considered inoperable, a channel placed in the tripped condition is considered operable. Thus, only one channel may be placed in bypass at any one time in order to maintain the minimum number of required channels. This results in a trip logic of two out of three. It should be noted that, for a limited period of time, an effective trip logic of one out of two can be achieved by placing one channel in bypass and one channel in the tripped condition.

The four reactor protective channels are provided with key operated bypass switches to allow on-line testing or maintenance on only one channel at a time during power operation. Each channel is provided alarm and lights to indicate when that channel is bypassed. There will be one reactor protective system bypass switch key permitted in the control room. That key will be under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor. Spare keys will be maintained in a locked storage accessible only to the Station Manager.

Each reactor protective channel key operated shutdown bypass switch is provided with alarm and lights to indicate when the shutdown bypass switch is being used. There are four shutdown bypass keys in the control room under the administrative control of the Shift Supervisor. The use of a key operated shutdown bypass switch for on-line testing or maintenance during reactor power operation has no significance when used in conjunction with a key operated channel bypass switch since the channel trip relay is locked in the untripped state. The use of a key operated shutdown bypass switch alone during power operation will cause the channel to trip. When the shutdown bypass switch is operated for on-line testing or maintenance during reactor power operation, reactor power and RCS pressure limits as specified in Table 2.3-1 are not applicable.

The source range and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation overlap by one decade of neutron flux. This decade overlap will be achieved at  $10^{-10}$  amps on the intermediate range instrument.

Power is normally supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms from two separate parallel 600 volt sources. Each voltage source and its associated breakers and SCR control relays comprise a trip system. Thus, the two trip systems and their associated trip devices form a 1-out-of-2 logic used twice which is referred to as a 1-out-of-2x2 logic.

A logic channel refers to the output of a reactor trip module (RTM). Logic channel A controls CRD Breaker Unit 10, logic channel B controls CRD Breaker Unit 11, logic channel C controls CRD Breakers CB1 and CB2 and SCR Control Relay E, and logic channel D controls CRD Breaker CB3 and CB4 and SCR Control Relay F. If any logic channel or its associated breakers and/or relays fails to perform its function, operation is limited as specified by Notes (f), (i) and (j) of Table 3.5.1-1.

Because of the diverse shunt trip and undervoltage features of the reactor trip breakers, Table 3.5.1-1 allows up to 48 hours to repair a shunt trip device or undervoltage device before the associated breaker must be placed in the tripped condition. However, if a failure unrelated to the shunt trip or undervoltage devices occurs in a reactor trip breaker, the power supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms through the failed breaker must be removed within one hour.

Within each trip system there are four SCR control relays which provide a redundant means to trip the regulating rods (Groups 5-8). A fifth SCR control relay, which is associated with the auxiliary power supply in the Rod Drive Control System, is not considered in the operability requirements of Table 3.5.1-1. Thus, SCR Control Relay E refers to the four SCR control relays associated with the main voltage bus trip system and SCR Control Relay F refers to the four SCR control relays associated with the secondary voltage bus trip system. A failure of SCR Control Relays E or F would only affect the ability of the RPS to trip the regulating rods. Since the AC breaker connected in series with the inoperable SCR control relays provides a redundant means to trip the regulating rods, Table 3.5.1-1 allows up to 48 hours to repair an inoperable SCR control relay. If the inoperable SCR control relay is not repaired within 48 hours, or if more than one SCR relay fail, power must be removed from the CRD mechanisms supplied by the inoperable relays within the next hour.

Containment isolation valves on non-essential systems are isolated by diverse signals from high containment pressure and low reactor coolant system pressure devices. The systems considered to be non-essential include:

1. Letdown line
2. RC Pump seal return line
3. Quench Tank sample line
4. Quench Tank gaseous vent
5. Reactor Building purge lines
6. Reactor Building sump drain line
7. Reactor Building atmosphere sample line
8. Pressurizer sample line
9. OTSG sample line
10. OTSG drain line

Containment isolation valves on essential systems are isolated by high containment pressure only. The systems considered to be essential include:

1. Component cooling to RC pumps
2. Low pressure service water cooling to RC pump motor

#### REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 7.1

TABLE 3.5.1-1  
INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (cont'd)

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	(A) TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	(B) CHANNELS TO TRIP	(C) MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	(D) Operator Action If Conditions Of Column C Cannot Be Met
15. ESF Reactor Building Spray System				
a. Analog Reactor Building High Pressure Instrument Channel	3	2	3	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
b. Digital Logic Manual Pushbutton	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 12 hours (e)
c. Digital Logic Channels (7 and 8)	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 24 hours (e)
16. Turbine Stop Valves Closure	2	1	2	Bring to hot shutdown within 24 hours (e)
17. Protective Channel Coincidence Logic in the Reactor Trip Modules	4 logic channels; A, B, C, and D	AB or AD or BC or CD	4	See Note (f)
18. CRD Breakers	1 AC Breaker and 2 DC Breakers per trip system		1 AC Breaker and 2 DC Breakers per trip system	See Note (i)
19. SCR Control Relays E and F	4 SCR Control Relays per trip system		4 SCR Control Relays per trip system	See Note (j)

TABLE 3.5.1-1

INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (cont'd)

NOTES:

- (a) For channel testing, calibration, or maintenance, the minimum of three operable channels may be maintained by placing one channel in bypass and one channel in the tripped condition, leaving an effective one out of two trip logic for a maximum of four hours.
- (b) When 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10% rated power, hot shutdown is not required.
- (c) When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than  $10^{-10}$  amps, hot shutdown is not required.
- (d) (Deleted)
- (e) If minimum conditions are not met within 48 hours after hot shutdown, the unit shall be in the cold shutdown within 24 hours.
- (f)
  1. Place the inoperable Reactor Trip Module output in the tripped condition within one hour or
  2. Remove the power supplied to the control rod trip devices associated with the inoperable Reactor Trip Module within one hour.
- (g) (Deleted)
- (h) The RCP monitors provide input to this logic. For operability to be met either all RCP monitor channels must be operable or 3 operable with the remaining channel in the tripped state.
- (i)
  1. The power supplied to the control rod drive mechanisms through the failed CRD Trip Breaker shall be removed within one hour or
  2. With one of the CRD Trip Breaker diverse features (undervoltage or shunt trip device) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status in 48 hours or place the breaker in trip in the next hour.
- (j)
  1. With one SCR Control Relay inoperable in logic channel C or D, restore the inoperable SCR Control Relay to OPERABLE status in 48 hours or remove power from the CRD mechanisms supplied by the inoperable channel's SCR Control Relay within the next hour.
  2. With two or more SCR Control Relays inoperable in logic channel C or D, remove power from the CRD mechanisms supplied by the inoperable channel's SCR Control Relay within one hour.

Table 4.1-1  
INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>Channel Description</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Calibrate</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1. Protective Channel Coincidence Logic in the Reactor Trip Modules	NA	MO	NA	
2. Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers, SCR Control Relays E and F	NA	MO(1)	NA	(1) This test shall independently confirm the operability of the shunt trip device and the undervoltage device.
3. Power Range Amplifier	ES(1)	NA	(1)	(1) Heat balance check each shift. Heat balance calibration whenever indicated core thermal power exceeds neutron power by more than 2 percent.
4. Power Range	ES	MO	MO(1)(2)	(1) Using incore instrumentation. (2) Axial offset upper and lower chambers after each startup if not done previous week.
5. Intermediate Range	ES(1)	PS	NA	(1) When in service.
6. Source Range	ES(1)	PS	NA	(1) When in service.
7. Reactor Coolant Temperature	ES	MO	RF	
8. High Reactor Coolant Pressure	ES	MO	RF	
9. Low Reactor Coolant Pressure	ES	MO	RF	
10. Flux-Reactor Coolant Flow Comparator	ES	MO	RF	
11. Reactor Coolant Pressure Temperature Comparator	ES	MO	RF	



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 148 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 148 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-47

AMENDMENT NO. 145 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKETS NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 17, 1985, as supplemented on March 25, 1986, Duke Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units Nos. 1, 2 and 3. These amendments would consist of changes to the Station's common TSs.

These amendments revise the TSs to include independent testing of the shunt and undervoltage trip attachments and silicon controlled rectifiers (SCR). These amendments are in response to Generic Letter 85-10, dated May 23, 1985, and the NRC letter to the Babcock and Wilcox Owner's Group (BWO), dated December 6, 1985.

EVALUATION

Generic Letter 85-10 specifies actions to be taken when one of the reactor trip breaker diverse trip features or when one of the SCR relay channels is inoperable. Generic Letter 85-10 also specifies channel functional tests for the SCR relay channels and the control rod drive (CRD) trip breakers, including independent verification of the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the CRD trip breaker. The December 6, 1985, letter to the BWO modifies the action statement for the SCR relay channel for the condition of only one SCR relay inoperable in a channel.

The licensee's proposed amendment would remove TS 3.5.1.6 which specifies what action needs to be taken when one of the trip devices fails. We find this TS change acceptable because the new action statements will supersede it.

The licensee proposes to expand the description under the Bases section of 3.5.1 (Operation Safety Instrumentation). We find that this addition clarifies the way the system operates and is therefore acceptable.

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The licensee proposes to add functional unit 17 (protective channel coincidence logic in the reactor trip modules), functional unit 18 (CRD breakers) and functional unit 19 (SCR control relays E and F) and corresponding Notes (f), (i) and (j) to Table 3.5.1-1 (Instruments Operating Conditions). These additions correspond respectively to functional units 13, 12 and 15 of Table 3.3-1 enclosed with Generic Letter 85-10. We find the licensee's proposed additions consistent with those specified by Generic Letter 85-10 (and the revisions in the December 6, 1985 letter). Therefore, we consider these proposed changes to be acceptable.

Generic Letter 85-10 specifies channel functional tests for the SCR relay channels and for the CRD trip breakers, including independent verification of the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the latter. The licensee proposes to add this requirement to Table 4.1-1, Item 2 (CRD trip breakers, SCR control relays E and F). We find the licensee's proposed testing consistent with that of Generic Letter 85-10, and therefore acceptable.

The licensee also mentions an editorial change to Table 4.1-1. We find this change is indeed editorial without any safety significance and therefore acceptable.

We have compared the licensee's proposed TS changes for the Oconee Nuclear Station to those of Generic Letter 85-10 and the December 6, 1985 letter from NRC to the BWO. We find the proposed TSs to be acceptable.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change in the surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

#### CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: August 20, 1986

Principal Contributor: A. Toalston