

DCD-016

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NRC PDR PWagner October 15, 1982  
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Dockets Nos. 50-269, 50-270  
and 50-287

Mr. Hal B. Tucker  
Vice President - Nuclear Production  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 33189  
422 South Church Street  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Tucker:

This confirms our telephone authorization given on October 14, 1982 for a change to the Oconee Nuclear Station common Technical Specifications (TSs) requested by your telecopied letter dated October 14, 1982. Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 are amended as of October 14, 1982 by the TS change:

Add the following footnote to page 3.1-1:

\*The requirements of Specification 3.1.1 c.1. are waived for Unit 1 until 11:59 p.m., October 29, 1982,

Copies of the license amendments, our evaluation and Federal Register Notice for this TS change will be forwarded in the near future.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director  
for Operating Reactors  
Division of Licensing

cc:  
See next page

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| OFFICE  | ORB#4:DL | ORB#4:DL   | C-ORB#4:DL | AD-ORB#4:DL |  |  |  |
| SURNAME | RIngram  | PWagner/cb | JSto       | Glainas     |  |  |  |
| DATE    | 10/15/82 | 10/15/82   | 10/15/82   | 10/15/82    |  |  |  |

~~Safety Evaluation Report  
Oconee Unit 1  
Technical Specification Modification  
Relative to RCS Safety Valves~~

## Evaluation

The licensee has proposed to operate Oconee Unit 1 for the period 10/14/82 to 10/29/82 with the <sup>Reader-Coded System</sup> (RCS) Safety Valves declared inoperable on the

basis of the low probability of needing the safety valves and on an analysis of the limiting anticipate transients and accident which demonstrate that the RCS pressure limit of 2750 psig would not be exceeded for these events.

The low probability of challenging the safety valves is based on a review of operating experience for

Babcock & Wilcox

(B+W) and Westinghouse PWR's. The estimated mean annual frequency for safety valve challenge is <sup>quoted</sup> ~~quoted~~ as  $4.8 \times 10^{-3}$ . This value is consistent with the <sup>NRC</sup> staff's understanding of operator's experience.

The licensing event relative to overpressure protection were reanalyzed by the licensee using the RELAP5 <sup>computer</sup> code and using the core physics parameters appropriate for the present time in <sup>core</sup> cycle. These analyses are summarized in the licensee's letter of <sup>October 4, 1982</sup> 10/4/82 and indicate that the peak RCS pressure could be less than 2750 psig. These analyses are consistent with the <sup>Partial Safety Analysis Report</sup> (FSAR) analyses which indicate that little safety valve discharge would be required to protect against a design basis accident.

therefore, we find that even in the unlikely event that the RCS safety valves are called upon within the <sup>October 14, 1982,</sup> ~~10/14/82~~ to <sup>October 23, 1982,</sup> ~~10/23/82~~ period, the RCS pressure limit will not be exceeded as a result of degraded valve performance. As a result of our review, we find that operation in the proposed mode is ~~therefore~~ acceptable

P. Wagner 10/14/82