

NOV 3 1977

Docket Nos. 50-269
80-270
and 50-287

Duke Power Company
ATTN: Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.
Vice President - Steam Production
Post Office Box 2178
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 50, 50 and 47 for License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3, respectively. These amendments consist of changes to the Station's common Technical Specifications and are in response to your request dated October 13, 1976, as supplemented September 29, 1977.

These amendments revise the Technical Specifications to allow operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, (1) with one Keowee hydro unit out of service for periods not to exceed 72 hours or operation with the underground feeder out of service for periods not to exceed 72 hours; (2) with one Keowee hydro unit out of service from 72 hours up to a maximum of 45 days when the remaining Keowee unit and both the overhead and underground transmission circuits are operable and the standby buses are energized by one of the two Lee gas turbines; and (3) with both Keowee hydro units out of service for 72 hours for planned reasons or 24 hours for unplanned reasons. Revisions are also made to surveillance requirements of the Emergency Power System.

Copies of our Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

151
A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures and cc:
See next page

OFFICE >						
SURNAME >						
DATE >						

Duke Power Company

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NOV 3 1977

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 50 to DPR-38
2. Amendment No. 50 to DPR-47
3. Amendment No. 47 to DPR-55
4. Safety Evaluation
5. Notice

cc w/encl:

Mr. William L. Porter
Duke Power Company
Post Office Box 2178
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

J. Michael McGarry, III, Esquire
Debevoise & Liberman
700 Shoreham Building
806 - 15th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005

Oconee County Library
201 South Spring Street
Walhalla, South Carolina 29691

Office of Intergovernmental Relations
116 West Jones Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27603

Chief, Energy Systems
Analyses Branch (AM-459)
Office of Radiation Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Room 646, East Tower
401 M Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20460

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IV Office
ATTN: RIS COORDINATOR
345 Courtland Street, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Honorable James M. Phinney
County Supervisor of Oconee County
Walhalla, South Carolina 29621

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 3, 1977

Docket Nos. 50-269
50-270
and 50-287

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Copies of our Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. Schwencer", is written over the typed name.

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures and cc:
See next page

November 3, 1977

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Honorable James M. Phinney
County Supervisor of Oconee County
Walhalla, South Carolina 29621



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-269

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 50
License No. DPR-38


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendments by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated October 13, 1976, as supplemented September 29, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-38 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"3.B Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 50 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."

3. This license amendment is effective within 30 days after the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment;
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 3, 1977



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-270

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 50
License No. DPR-47


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendments by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated October 13, 1976, as supplemented September 29, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"3.B Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 50 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."

3. This license amendment is effective within 30 days after the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 3, 1977



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-287

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 47
License No. DPR-55


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendments by Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated October 13, 1976, as supplemented September 29, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-55 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"3.B Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 47, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."

3. This license amendment is effective within 30 days after the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 3, 1977

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO DPR-47

AMENDMENT NO. 47 TO DPR-55

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

3.7-2
3.7-3
3.7-4
3.7-5
3.7-6
3.7-7
3.7-8
3.7-9
4.6-1
4.6-2

Insert Pages

3.7-2
3.7-3
3.7-4
3.7-5
3.7-6
3.7-7
3.7-8
-
4.6-1
4.6-2

Add page 4.6-3

- (i) The Keowee batteries with their respective chargers, buses and isolating diodes shall be operable.
- (j) The level of the Keowee Reservoir shall be at least 775 feet above sea level.

3.7.2 During hot standby or power operation, provisions of 3.7.1 may be modified to allow any one of the following conditions to exist:

- (a) One of the two required startup transformers may be removed from service for 48 hours provided it is expected to be restored to service within 48 hours and the other required startup transformer is available for automatic connection to the unit's main feeder bus.
- (b) One Keowee hydro unit may be inoperable for periods not exceeding 72 hours for test or maintenance provided the operable Keowee hydro unit is connected to the underground feeder circuit and is verified operable within one hour of the loss and every eight hours thereafter.
- (c) The underground feeder circuit may be inoperable for periods not exceeding 72 hours for test and maintenance.
- (d) In each unit, the following items may be inoperable for periods not exceeding 24 hours:
 - 1. One 4160 volt main feeder bus.
 - 2. One complete single string of any unit's Engineered Safety Features 4160 volt switchgear bus, 600 volt load center - 600V-208V MCC and their loads.
 - 3. One complete single string of any unit's 125 VDC instrumentation and control batteries, chargers, buses, and all associated isolating and transfer diodes.
 - 4. One 125 VDC instrumentation and control panel board and/or its associated loads.
- (e) One complete single string of the 125 VDC switching station batteries, buses, chargers, and the related diode assemblies may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods not exceeding 24 hours.
- (f) One complete single string of the Keowee batteries, chargers, buses, and isolating diodes may be de-energized for test or maintenance for periods not exceeding 24 hours.

- (g) One 4160 volt standby bus may be inoperable for test or maintenance for periods not exceeding 24 hours.

3.7.3 In the event that the conditions of Specification 3.7.1 are not met within the time specified in Specification 3.7.2, except as noted below in Specification 3.7.4, 3.7.5, 3.7.6, and 3.7.7 the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within 12 hours. If these requirements are not met within an additional 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

3.7.4 In the event that all conditions in Specification 3.7.1 are met except that one of the two Keowee hydro units is expected to be unavailable for longer than the test or maintenance period of 72 hours, the reactor may be heated above 200°F if previously shutdown or be permitted to remain critical or be restarted provided the following restrictions are observed.

- (a) Prior to heating the reactor above 200°F or prior to the restart of a shutdown reactor or within 72 hours of the loss of one Keowee hydro unit, the 4160 volt standby buses shall be energized by a Lee gas turbine through the 100 kV circuit. The Lee gas turbine and 100 kV transmission circuit shall be electrically separate from the system grid and non-safety-related loads.
- (b) The remaining Keowee hydro unit shall be connected to the underground feeder circuit and this path shall be verified operable within 1 hour and weekly thereafter.
- (c) The remaining Keowee hydro unit shall be available to the overhead transmission circuit but generation to the system grid shall be prohibited except for periods of test.
- (d) Operation in this mode is restricted to periods not to exceed 45 days and the provisions of this specification may be utilized without prior NRC approval only once in three years for each Keowee hydro unit. Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II, will be notified within 24 hours.

3.7.5 In the event that all conditions of Specification 3.7.1 are met except that all 230 kV transmission lines are lost, the reactor shall be permitted to remain critical or be restarted provided the following restrictions are observed:

- (a) Prior to the restart of a shutdown reactor or within 1 hour of losing all 230 kV transmission lines for an operating reactor, the 4160 volt standby buses shall be energized by one of the Lee gas turbines through the 100 kV transmission circuit. The Lee gas turbine and the 100 kV transmission circuit shall be completely separate from the system grid and non-safety-related loads.

- (b) The reactor coolant T_{avg} shall be above 525°F. Reactor coolant pump power may be used to elevate the temperature from 500°F to 525° in the case of restart. If T_{avg} decreases below 500°F, restart is not permitted by this specification..
- (c) If all 230 kV transmission lines are lost, restore at least one of the inoperable 230 kV offsite sources to operable status within 24 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours. With only one offsite source restored, restore at least two 230 kV offsite circuits to operable status within 72 hours from time of initial loss or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.
- (d) After loss of all 230 kV transmission lines, this information shall be reported within 24 hours to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, , Region II. If the outage is expected to exceed 24 hours, a written report shall be submitted detailing the circumstances of the outage and the estimated time to return the 230 kV transmission lines to operating condition.

3.7.6 In the event that all conditions of Specification 3.7.1 are met, and planned tests or maintenance is required which will make both Keowee units unavailable , the 4160 volt standby buses shall first be energized by a Lee gas turbine through the 100 kV transmission circuit and shall be separate from the system grid and non-safety-related loads. The reactor shall then be permitted to remain critical for periods not to exceed 72 hours with both Keowee units unavailable.

Prior to hot restart of a reactor from a tripped condition, the causes and the effects of the shutdown shall be established and analyzed. A restart will be permitted if the cause of such trips are the result of error or of minor equipment malfunctions. A restart will not be permitted if the trip is a result of system transients or valid protection system action.

3.7.7 In the event that all conditions of Specification 3.7.1 are met except that both Keowee hydro units become unavailable for unplanned reasons, the reactor shall be permitted to remain critical for periods not to exceed 24 hours provided the 4160 volt standby buses are energized within 1 hour by the Lee gas turbine through the 100 kV transmission circuit and it shall be separate from the system grid and all offsite non safety-related loads.

Prior to hot restart of a reactor from a tripped condition, the causes and the effects of the shutdown shall be established and analyzed. A restart will be permitted if the cause of such trips are the result of error or of minor equipment malfunctions. A restart will not be permitted if the trip is a result of system transients or valid protection system action.

3.7.8 Any degradation beyond Specification 3.7.2, 3.7.4, 3.7.5, 3.7.6 or 3.7.7 above shall be reported to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II, within 24 hours. A safety evaluation shall be performed by Duke Power Company for the specific situation involved which justifies the safest course of action to be taken. The results of this evaluation together with plans for expediting the return to the unrestricted operating conditions of Specification 3.7.1 above shall be submitted in a written report to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation with a copy to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II, within five days.

Bases

The auxiliary electrical power systems are designed to supply the required Engineered Safeguards loads in one unit and safe shutdown loads of the other two units and are so arranged that no single contingency can inactivate enough engineered safety features to jeopardize plant safety. These systems were designed to meet the following criteria:

"Alternate power systems shall be provided and designed with adequate independency, redundancy, capacity and testability to permit the functions required of the engineered safety features of each unit."

The auxiliary power system meets the above criteria and the intent of AEC Criterion 17. The adequacies of the AC and DC systems are discussed below as are the bases for permitting degraded conditions for AC power.

Capacity of AC Systems

The auxiliaries of two units in hot shutdown (6.0MVA each) plus the auxiliaries activated by ESG signal in the other unit (4.8 MVA) require a total AC power capacity of 16.8 MVA. The continuous AC power capacity available from the on-site power systems (Keowee Hydro Units) is 20 MVA (limited by transformer CT4) if furnished by the underground circuit or 30 MVA (limited by CT1 or CT2) if furnished through the 230 kV off-site transmission lines. Capacity available from the backup 100 kV off-site transmission line (Lee Station Gas Turbine Generator) is 20 MVA (limited by CT5).

Thus, the minimum available capacity from any one of the multiple sources of AC power, 20 MVA, is adequate.

Capacity of DC Systems

Normally, for each unit AC power is rectified and supplies the DC system buses as well as keeping the storage batteries on these buses in a charged state. Upon loss of this normal AC source of power, each unit's DC auxiliary systems important to reactor safety have adequate stored capacity (ampere-hours) to independently supply their required emergency loads for at least one hour. One hour is considered to be conservative since there are redundant sources of AC power providing energy to these DC auxiliary systems. The loss of all AC power to any DC system is expected to occur very infrequently, and for very short periods of time. The following tabulation demonstrates the margin of installed battery charger rating and battery capacity when compared to one hour of operation (a) with AC power (in amps) and (b) without AC power (in ampere hours) for each of the three safety-related DC systems installed at Oconee:

A. 125 VDC Instrumentation and Control Power System

Charger XCA, XCB, or XCS
Battery 1CA and 1CB Combined Capacity
(X = 1, 2, or 3)
Actual active loads on both 125 VDC
I & C buses XDCA and XDCE
during 1st hour of LOCA
(X = 1, 2, or 3)

- a. 600 amps each
- b. 698 ampere-hours
- a. First min. - 1371 amps
next 59 min. - 568.5 amps
- b. 581.9 ampere-hours

B. 125 VDC Switching Station Power System

Charger SY-1, SY-2, or SY-3 Rating
Battery SY-1 or SY-2 Capacity

- a. 50 amps each
- b. 14.4 ampere-hours

Actual active load per battery
during 1st hour of LOCA

- a. First min. - 130 amps
next 59 min. - 10 amps
- b. 12 ampere-hours

C. 125 VDC Keowee Station Power System

Charger No. 1, No. 2 or Standby Rating
Battery No. 1 or No. 2 Capacity

- a. 200 amps each
- b. 233 ampere-hours

Actual active load per battery
during 1st hour of LOCA

- a. First min. - 1031 amps
next 59 min. - 179.4 amps
- b. 193.6 ampere-hours

Redundancy of AC Systems

There are three 4160 engineered safety feature switchgear buses per unit. Each bus can receive power from either of the two 4160 main feeder buses per unit. Each feeder bus in turn can receive power from the 230 kV switchyard through the startup transformers, through the unit auxiliary transformer by backfeeding through the main step-up transformer, or from the 4160V standby bus. Another unit's startup transformer serving as an alternate supply can be placed in service in one hour. The standby bus can receive power from the Hydro Station through the underground feeder circuit or from a combustion turbine generator at the Lee Steam Station over an isolated 100 kV transmission line. The 230 kV switchyard can receive power from the on-site Keowee Hydro station or from several off-site sources via transmission lines which connect the Oconee Station with the Duke Power system power distribution network.

Redundancy of DC Systems

A. 125 VDC Instrument and Control Power System

All reactor protection and engineered safety features loads on this system can be powered from either the Unit 1 and Unit 2 or Unit 2 and Unit 3 or Unit 3 and Unit 1 125 VDC Instrument and Control Power Buses. The units' 125 VDC Instrument and Control Power Buses can be powered from two battery banks and three battery chargers. As shown above, one battery (e.g., 1CA) can supply all loads for one hour. Also, one battery charger can supply all connected ESF and reactor protection loads.

B. 125 VDC Switching Station Power System

There are two essentially independent subsystems each complete with an AC/DC power supply (battery charger), a battery bank, a battery charger bus, motor control center (distribution panel). All safety-related equipment and the relay house in which it is located are Class I (seismic) design. Each subsystem provides the necessary DC power to:

- a. Continuously monitor operations of the protective relaying.
- b. Isolate Oconee (including Keowee) from all external 230 kV grid faults,

- c. Connect on-site power to Oconee from a Keowee hydro unit or,
- d. Restore off-site power to Oconee from non-faulted portions of the external 230 kV grid.

Provisions are included to manually connect a standby battery charger to either battery/charger bus.

C. 125 VDC Keowee Station Power System

There are essentially two independent physically separated Class I (seismic) subsystems, each complete with an AC/DC power supply (charger) a battery bank, a battery/charger bus and a DC distribution center. Each subsystem provides the necessary power to automatically or manually start, control and protect one of the hydro units.

An open or short in any one battery, charger or DC distribution center, cannot cause loss of both hydro units.

The 230 KV sources, while expected to have excellent availability, are not under the direct control of the Oconee station and, based on past experience, cannot be assumed to be available at all times. However, the operation of the on-site hydro-station is under the direct control of the Oconee Station and requires no off-site power to startup. Therefore, an on-site backup source of auxiliary power is provided in the form of twin hydro-electric turbine generators powered through a common penstock by water taken from Lake Keowee. The use of a common penstock is justified on the basis of past hydro plant experience of the Duke Power Company (since 1919) which indicates that the cumulative need to dewater the penstock can be expected to be limited to about one day a year, principally for inspection, plus perhaps four days every tenth year.

Operation with one Keowee Hydro unit out of service for periods less than 72 hours is permitted. The operability of the remaining Keowee hydro unit is verified within one hour by starting the unit and energizing the standby buses through the underground feeder circuit. This action is repeated once every eight hours thereafter until the Keowee hydro unit is restored to service and will provide additional assurance of the operability of the remaining unit.

Provisions have been established for those conditions in which long term preventative maintenance of a Keowee Hydro unit are necessary. The primary long term maintenance items are expected to be hydro turbine runner and discharge ring welding repairs which are estimated to be necessary every six to eight years. Also, generator thrust and guide bearing replacements will be necessary. Other items which manifest as failures are expected to be extremely rare and could possibly be performed during the permitted maintenance periods. Time periods of up to 45 days for each Keowee Hydro unit are permitted every three years. During these outages the remaining Keowee Hydro unit will be verified to be operable within one hour and weekly thereafter by starting the unit and energizing the underground feeder circuit. The remaining Keowee hydro unit will also be available through the overhead transmission path and will not be used for system peaking. Additionally, the standby buses will be energized continuously by one of the Lee gas turbines through the 100 kV transmission circuits

This transmission circuit would be electrically separated from the system grid and all off-site non-safety-related loads. This arrangement provides a high degree of reliability for the emergency power systems.

Operation with both Keowee Hydro units out of service is permitted for planned or unplanned outages for periods of 72 or 24 hours respectively. Planned outages are necessary for the inspection of common underwater areas such as the penstock and to enable the removal of one Keowee unit from service. This would be a controlled evolution in which the availability and condition of the off-site grid, startup transformers and weather would be evaluated and a Lee gas turbine would be placed in operation on the isolated 100 kV transmission line prior to commencement of the outage.

A time period of 24 hours for unplanned outages of both Keowee units is acceptable since a Lee gas turbine will be started within one hour and will energize the standby buses through the dedicated 100 kV transmission line. This period of time is reasonable to determine and rectify the situation which caused the loss of both Keowee units.

In the event that none of the sources of off-site power are available and it is considered important to continue to maintain an Oconee reactor critical or return it to criticality from a hot shutdown condition, one of the Lee gas turbines can be made available as an additional backup source of power, thus assuring continued availability as an auxiliary power to perform an orderly shutdown of a unit should a problem develop requiring shutdown of both hydro units.

4.6 EMERGENCY POWER PERIODIC TESTING

Applicability

Applies to the periodic testing surveillance of the emergency power sources.

Objective

To verify that the emergency power sources and equipment will respond promptly and properly when required.

Specification

- 4.6.1 Monthly, a test of the Keowee Hydro units shall be performed to verify proper operation of these emergency power sources and associated equipment. This test shall assure that:
- a. Each hydro unit can be automatically started from the Unit 1 and 2 control room.
 - b. Each hydro unit can be synchronized through the 230 kV overhead circuit to the startup transformers.
 - c. Each hydro unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feeder.
 - d. The 4160 volt startup transformer main feeder bus breakers and standby bus breaker shall be exercised.
- 4.6.2 Annually, the Keowee Hydro units shall be started using the emergency start circuits in each control room to verify that each hydro unit and associated equipment will carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit within 25 seconds of a simulated requirement for engineered safety features.
- 4.6.3 Monthly, the Keowee Underground Feeder Breaker Interlock shall be verified to be operable.
- 4.6.4 Annually, a simulated emergency transfer of the 4160 volt main feeder buses to the startup transformer (i.e., CT1, CT2 or CT3) and to the 4160 volt standby buses shall be made to verify proper operation.
- 4.6.5 Quarterly, the External Grid Trouble Protection System logic shall be tested to demonstrate its ability to provide an isolated power path between Keowee and Oconee.
- 4.6.6 Annually and prior to planned extended Keowee outages, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee Station combustion turbine can be started and connected to the 100 kV line. It shall be demonstrated that the 100 kV line can be separated from the rest of the system and supply power to the 4160 volt main feeder buses.

- 4.6.7 Annually, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee station combustion turbine can be started and connected to the isolated 100 kV line and carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit (4.8 MVA) within one hour.
- 4.6.8 Annually, it shall be demonstrated that a Lee station combustion turbine can be started and carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit plus the safe shutdown loads of two Oconee units on the system grid.
- 4.6.9 Batteries in the 125 VDC systems shall be tested as follows:
- a. The voltage and temperature of a pilot cell in each bank shall be measured and recorded five times per week for the Instrument and Control, Keowee Hydro, and Switching Station batteries.
 - b. The specific gravity and voltage of each cell shall be measured and recorded monthly for the Instrument and Control, Keowee Hydro, and Switching Station batteries.
 - c. Annually, a one-hour discharge test at the required maximum safeguards load shall be made on the instrument and control batteries.
 - d. Before initial operation and annually thereafter, a one-hour discharge test shall be made on the Keowee Hydro and Switching Station batteries.
- 4.6.10 The operability of the individual diode monitors in the Instrument and Control and Keowee Station 125 VDC systems shall be verified monthly by imposing a simulated diode failure signal on the monitor.
- 4.6.11 The peak inverse voltage capability of each auctioneering diode in the Instrument and Control, Switchyard and Keowee Hydro 125 VDC systems shall be measured and recorded semiannually.
- 4.6.12 The tests specified in 4.6.9, 4.6.10, and 4.6.11 will be considered satisfactory if control room indication and/or visual examination demonstrate that all components have operated properly.

Bases

The Keowee Hydro units, in addition to serving as the emergency power sources for the Oconee Nuclear Station, are power generating sources for the Duke system requirements. As power generating units, they are operated frequently, normally on a daily basis at loads equal to or greater than required by Table 8.5 of the FSAR for ESF bus loads. Normal as well as emergency startup and operation of these units will be from the Oconee Unit 1 and 2 Control Room. The frequent starting and loading of these units to meet Duke system power requirements assures the continuous availability for emergency power for the Oconee auxiliaries and engineered safety features equipment. It will be verified that these units will carry the equipment of the maximum safeguards load within 25 seconds, including instrumentation lag, after a simulated requirement for engineered safety features. To further assure the reliability of these units as emergency power sources, they will be, as specified, tested for automatic start on a monthly basis from the Oconee control room. These tests will include verification that each unit can be synchronized to the 230 kV bus and that each unit can energize the 13.8 kV underground feeder.

The interval specified for testing of transfer to emergency power sources is based on maintaining maximum availability of redundant power sources.

Starting a Lee Station gas turbine, separation of the 100 kV line from the remainder of the system, and charging of the 4160 volt main feeder buses are specified to assure the continuity and operability of this equipment. The one hour time limit is considered the absolute maximum time limit that would be required to accomplish this.

REFERENCE

FSAR Section 8



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-38

AMENDMENT NO. 50 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-47

AMENDMENT NO. 47 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-55

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NOS. 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Introduction

By letter dated October 13, 1976, as supplemented September 29, 1977, the Duke Power Company (licensee) requested changes to the common Technical Specifications incorporated in the operating licenses of Units 1, 2 and 3 of the Oconee Nuclear Station.

Discussion

The offsite power system for Oconee Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 consists of six 230 kV transmission lines to the 230 kV station switchyard and two 500 kV transmission lines to a 500 kV switchyard. Onsite power is provided by two 87.5 MVA hydroelectric generators available either through the 230 kV switchyard and the 45/60 MVA startup transformers or through a 13.8 kV underground feeder which utilizes its own 12/16/20 MVA transformer and supplies the 4160 V safety-related buses of the three units. In addition, one of the gas turbines located 30 miles away at the Lee Steam Station via an independent overhead 100 kV transmission system is available as standby to the onsite power system.

The use of the onsite Keowee Station with its two hydroelectric generating units is under the direct control of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station and was originally reviewed and found acceptable as the onsite source of power for the Oconee Station. During this evaluation, we considered the Lee Station's gas turbines and the dedicated 100 kV transmission circuit as a temporary substitute power source for use primarily during a period when the onsite hydro units are not available.

The proposed changes will update the Technical Specifications to be in conformance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.93 "Availability of Electrical Power Sources" and the Standard Technical Specifications.

In addition to the update changes, the licensee has identified an additional requirement for single unit outage of the Keowee hydro units for performance or major maintenance functions. This major maintenance outage was not identified during the initial review.

Evaluation

We have reviewed and evaluated the proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications as discussed below:

Specification 3.7.2

This specification would be revised to permit one Keowee unit and underground feeder circuit to be inoperable for periods not exceeding 72 hours instead of 24 hours.

The 72 hours proposed by the licensee is in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.93, Position C-1. The time constraints of one hour to verify operability and eight hours for periodic verification of operability satisfy Position C-4 of R.G. 1.93.

The typical onsite power sources and distribution systems are protected from natural phenomena. When the protected underground circuit is unavailable, the remaining sources of power are subjected to weather conditions. However, the Oconee design exceeds the minimum requirements for both onsite and offsite power sources. The six 230 kV circuits, two 500 kV circuits and the dedicated gas turbines via the 100 kV circuit (physically independent of the other power circuits and on its separate right-of-way) provide reasonable assurance that a power source will be available to the nuclear station for the 72-hour period.

We conclude that the proposed changes satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.93 and are acceptable.

Specification 3.7.4

This specification would be revised to permit one Keowee unit to be out of service for periods not to exceed 45 days in any three year period for each Keowee unit provided that the Lee Station gas turbine is available and energizing the 4160 volt standby buses.

The proposed period of 45 days for major maintenance to one of the Keowee units would be expected only once every six to eight years. The licensee has indicated that the 45 days time frame is based on double shift operations and will likely be completed in less than the 45 day period.

This scheduled period can be used only once, in each three-year period for each Keowee unit without the Commission's approval and the Regional Office of Inspection and Enforcement will be notified within 24 hours after the end of the initial 72 hours maintenance period.

Prior to the planned major maintenance outages, the licensee will consider the 30 day national weather service forecast for the area. As we have previously indicated, the existing design exceeds the minimum requirements for power sources and paths available to the plant.

Based on the design features of the Oconee Nuclear Station's power system and the use of the Lee Station gas turbine as a standby power source, we conclude that this change is acceptable.

Specification 3.7.5

The licensee has proposed to change from 1/2 hour to one hour the time allowed to energize the Lee Station gas turbine through the 100 kV transmission circuit.

The proposed one hour time satisfies the provision of Regulatory Guide 1.93, Position C-2, which allows 24 hours of continued operation if no immediate source of offsite power is available. However, Regulatory Guide 1.93 does not address the restart of a reactor under these conditions. The original Technical Specifications allowed the restart of a shutdown reactor based on the evaluation of the Oconee power system design.

In addition to the above changes, we have, with the licensee's agreement, required a report be made to the Regional Office, Office of Inspection and Enforcement as included in the existing Technical Specifications. Also with the licensee's agreement, we are including the provisions of R.G. 1.93, Position C-2, concerning restoration of offsite power within 24 hours.

We conclude that the above changes are acceptable.

Specifications 3.7.6 and 3.7.7

These specifications would be revised to allow a 72 hour and a 24 hour period for both Keowee units to be inoperable for planned or unplanned outages, respectively.

The original specifications did not include time limit restrictions on the unavailability of both Keowee units. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Position C-4, allows two hours with no restrictions for the unavailability of both onsite sources and if one source is restored operation can continue for a total of 72 hours.

The design of the Oconee system which allows one of the Lee gas turbines to provide power prior to a planned outage or within one hour for an unplanned outage and the 72 hour and 24 hour restrictions for the planned and unplanned outages of both Keowee units satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.93. For the planned outages, the licensee has provided details of the requirements for securing the common penstock of the Keowee units to prepare one of the hydros for major maintenance. Since the 24-hour period would provide a reasonable time to implement corrective actions for an unplanned outage and since the offsite power system would be available in conjunction with the Lee gas turbines, we find that there is reasonable assurance that a power source will be available for the 24-hour time period. The licensee has also provided an analysis of the complete loss of all station power in Section 14.1.2.8 of the FSAR. The analysis indicates that the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump without either offsite electric power or the Keowee units, provides an adequate heat sink for a period of 20 hours.

The licensee has indicated that in the event of loss of all offsite power in conjunction with the loss of the Lee gas turbine during a planned outage of the Keowee units, the Keowee units could be restored to service in a time considerably less than the 20 hours analyzed and documented in the FSAR at Section 14.1.2.8.3.

The existing Technical Specifications include a provision for hot restart of a reactor from a tripped condition. The licensee has agreed to retention of this provision in the proposed Technical Specifications.

We conclude that the above changes are acceptable.

Specification 4.6.1

A monthly test is proposed to verify proper operation of the 4160 volt startup transformer main feeder bus breakers and standby bus breaker. The verification of the operability of these circuit breakers provides a greater degree of assurance that the offsite power sources will be available when required. We, therefore, conclude that the above proposed addition is acceptable.

Specification 4.6.2

It is proposed that each of the Keowee units be tested annually with the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit.

The existing Technical Specifications do not require the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load be included in the test. The inclusion of a load test requirement provides a greater degree of assurance that the Keowee units will not only be available, but capable of supplying the required safety loads. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed additional requirements are acceptable.

Specification 4.6.6

To this Technical Specification has been added the requirement to demonstrate that a Lee Station gas turbine can be started prior to planned extended Keowee outages as well as annually.

We find that the proposed test provides additional assurance that the Lee Station gas turbine will be available and capable of performing its safety function and is, therefore, acceptable.

Specifications 4.6.7 and 4.6.8

Specifications 4.6.7 and 4.6.8 would be added to require a demonstration that the Lee Station gas turbine can carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit within one hour and a demonstration that the Lee Station gas turbine can carry the equivalent of the maximum safeguards load of one Oconee unit plus the safe shutdown loads of two Oconee units.

The existing Technical Specifications do not include a requirement to demonstrate the Lee Station gas turbine's capability to supply the required safety loads as identified above. These proposed additional tests provide assurance that the Lee Station's gas turbine will be capable of performing its function when required. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that these amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that these amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration,
(2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: November 3, 1977

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

DUKE POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSES

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment Nos. 50, 50 and 47 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38 DPR-47 and DPR-55, respectively, issued to Duke Power Company which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3, located in Oconee County, South Carolina. The amendments are effective within 30 days after the date of issuance.

These amendments revise the Technical Specifications to allow operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, (1) with one Keowee hydro unit out of service for periods not to exceed 72 hours or operation with the underground feeder out of service for periods not to exceed 72 hours, (2) with one Keowee hydro unit out of service from 72 hours up to a maximum of 45 days when the remaining Keowee unit and both the overhead and underground transmission circuits are operable and the standby buses are energized by one of the two Lee gas turbines, and (3) with both Keowee hydro units out of service for 72 hours for planned reasons or 24 hours for unplanned reasons. Revisions are also made to surveillance requirements of the Emergency Power System.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made


appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments was not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of these amendments will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated October 13, 1976, as supplemented September 29, 1977, (2) Amendment Nos. 50, 50 and 47 to License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55, respectively, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. and at the Oconee County Library, 201 South Spring Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addresses to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 3rd day of November 1977.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors