

**From:** Gregory Cranston  
**To:** David Lew, Diane Screnci, Michael Modes, Wayne Schmidt  
**Date:** Mon, Jul 24, 2000 3:04 PM  
**Subject:** Re: Q&A's for Special Inspection

Attached is my first cut at a Summary paragraph, which is somewhat longer than a paragraph. Please provide comments to me where you think some whittling down is appropriate. The last paragraph is a repeat of the closing paragraph from the AIT Follow-up Summary.

>>> David Lew 07/24 1:51 PM >>>

Greg, Please put together a one paragraph summary of the SG special inspection. Provide to Mike Modes to incorporate as a lead in to the Q&A's

Mike, Attached are some Q's for the Q&A. Take the lead on developing and work with Wayne, Greg and Diane Screnci. We should have this ready to go mid afternoon tomorrow.

Diane, Please forward me the communications plan for the RAI letter to Con Ed. That model seemed like the lastet and greatest.

All, Provide additional Q's as appropriate.

Thanks.

**CC:** Brian Holian

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## Summary of the Indian Point Unit 2 Special Team Inspection of the February 15, 2000, Steam Generator Tube Failure Event

7/24/2000, Rev. A

In conjunction with the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) and Follow-Up AIT inspections that were conducted after the February 15, 2000, steam generator (SG) tube failure event, the NRC conducted a special team inspection to review the causes of the tube failure. This inspection identified new performance and enforcement issues. The NRC team determined that Con Edison returned Indian Point 2 to service in 1997 in a condition that deteriorated with time to the point that a steam generator tube failure occurred within approximately 23 months of operation. A failure by Con Edison's technical management and oversight of the SG inspection program resulted in Con Edison not identifying significant SG testing program performance issues during the 1997 SG inspection and not ensuring an adequate, integrated technical understanding of the SG conditions. This performance issue resulted in, most significantly, Con Edison's failure to identify in 1997 inside diameter (ID) primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in several small radius U-bend SG tubes, including tube Row 2, Column 5 (R2C5) in SG 24, which failed in February 2000. Con Edison did not properly: evaluate poor quality eddy current data (low signal to noise ratios); respond to a PWSCC indication in the U-bend area of tube R2C67 in SG 24; assess eddy current probe restrictions in the upper support plate with respect to the potential for flow slot hour-glassing; and, set-up the U-bend plus-point eddy current probe, which negatively affected the probability of detection of U-bend indications. The team also concluded that Con Edison's root cause analysis for the event, dated June 14, 2000, did not adequately address their failure to identify deficiencies and limitations related to the 1997 inspection of the low radius U-bend regions.

The team, which included personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Region I, and NRC-contracted specialists in SG eddy current testing, found that the short term corrective actions taken in response to the February 2000 event for issues within the scope of this inspection were adequate.

As you are aware, Indian Point 2 is an agency-focus plant and has a Long Term Improvement Program in progress. In accordance with the NRC letter issued May 23, 2000 (subsequent to the NRC Senior Management Meeting), we expect to be reviewing the progress of the licensee's Improvement Program which is aimed at improving overall station performance. In that vein, a meeting will be conducted in the near future between the NRC and the licensee to further understand the results of the licensee's assessment of their progress towards improvement, to review the status of the licensee's progress, and to understand remaining planned actions regarding completing their Long Term Improvement Program.