

From: A. Randolph Blough
To: David Lew
Date: Thu, May 4, 2000 1:56 PM
Subject: Re: IP2 SG Meeting

great summary. thanks.
randy

>>> David Lew 05/04 8:55 AM >>>

The meeting yesterday included Brian Sheron and Jack Strosnider. Con Edison was accompanied by Westinghouse, Altran and NEI. Members of the public included Dave Lochbaum and John Roberts. The NRC staff took questions from the public after the meeting, which appeared to go well. The meeting was transcribed and will be on the web. Here's my take on the meeting:

* Con Edison's portrayal of their role in the 1997 SG inspection was overly positive. They seem to indicate that they followed the industry guidance. While they indicated that the tube leak was preventable based on what they NOW know, they did not say that it was preventable in 1997.

*Westinghouse stated that the condition of the IP2 SG was not much different than other operating SGs of the same vintage. (The Con Ed speaker Jimmy Mark initially indicated otherwise, but was corrected by Westinghouse.) We did not buy Westinghouse's assertion, but that statement, if true, would carry significant generic implications.

*We did not feel that Con Ed answered all seventeen questions that we provided them. Underlying some of the questions was the depth of their causal analyses. Some were technical in nature, such as Con Edison attributing the leak in C2R5 to PWSCC, but not going further to determine the causes of the PWSCC, e.g., hourglassing. Others were performance related, such as determining whether this was preventable by better Con Ed performance in 1997.

*Altran and Westinghouse presented stress analysis and the approach to the operational assessment, respectively. We had some concerns with what was presented, including the assumptions in the finite element analysis on stresses induced by flow slot hourglassing, the use of a power of 4 correlation to the time between degradation of row 2 tubes and row 3 tubes, the lack of pinpointing the cause of the PWSCC before performing an operational assessment. While most of this information was presented to the staff for the first time, it appeared that the stress analysis and their approach to the operation assessment fell far short of satisfying the technical staff.

*We ended the meeting with noting that ... (1) not all questions were answered and we expect continued interaction with them. we expect the answers to the questions in writing.... (2) the root cause lacked rigor... (3) a reminder that we, as in all events, will look at generic implications, in any.

*While I do not want to speculate on Con Edison's motives, there are a couple of economic issues associated with the SGs. First, Con Edison can provide a more convincing argument for the operational assessment by plugging row 3 tubes preventively. However, this will cause about a 3% derating (my best guess) of the unit. Second, New York is looking at whether the cost of the outage should be put on Con Edison or the rate payers.

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