

March 22, 1995

Mr. E. Thomas Boulette, Ph.D
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Boston Edison Company
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, MA 02360

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35, PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. M90366)

Dear Mr. Boulette:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 161 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This amendment is in response to your application dated September 6, 1994, as supplemented February 15, 1995.

This amendment revises Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.7.B.1.a, 3.7.B.1.c, 3.7.B.1.e, 3.7.B.2.a, and 3.7.B.2.c and adds Sections 3.7.B.1.f and 3.7.B.2.e. The additional section requires both trains of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System to be operable for the initiation of fuel movement. In the event either train becomes inoperable, the other train must be demonstrated to be operable within 2 hours and fuel handling operations may continue for 7 days with one train inoperable. Additionally, this change allows one train to be defined as operable without its associated emergency power supply, provided one source of normal power (startup transformer or unit auxiliary power) is available.

The NRC staff finds this TS change acceptable as specified in the enclosed Safety Evaluation.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Karen R. Colton
for Ronald B. Eaton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-293

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 161 to License No. DPR-35
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 22, 1995

Mr. E. Thomas Boulette, Ph.D
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Boston Edison Company
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, MA 02360

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-35, PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. M90366)

Dear Mr. Boulette:


The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 161 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. This amendment is in response to your application dated September 6, 1994, as supplemented February 15, 1995.

This amendment revises Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.7.B.1.a, 3.7.B.1.c, 3.7.B.1.e, 3.7.B.2.a, and 3.7.B.2.c and adds Sections 3.7.B.1.f and 3.7.B.2.e. The additional section requires both trains of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System to be operable for the initiation of fuel movement. In the event either train becomes inoperable, the other train must be demonstrated to be operable within 2 hours and fuel handling operations may continue for 7 days with one train inoperable. Additionally, this change allows one train to be defined as operable without its associated emergency power supply, provided one source of normal power (startup transformer or unit auxiliary power) is available.

The NRC staff finds this TS change acceptable as specified in the enclosed Safety Evaluation.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,


Ronald B. Eaton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-293

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No.161 to License No. DPR-35
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

E. Thomas Boulette

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

cc:

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DATED: March 22, 1995

AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35-PILGRIM NUCLEAR
POWER STATION

Docket File

PUBLIC

PDI-1 Reading

S. Varga, 14/E/4

J. Zwolinski, 14/H/3

L. Marsh

S. Little

R. Eaton

OGC

D. Hagan, T-4 A43

G. Hill (2), T-5 C3

C. Grimes, 11/E/22

ACRS (4)

OPA

OC/LFDCB

PD plant-specific file

J. Linville, Region I

cc: Plant Service list

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-293

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 161
License No. DPR-35

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Boston Edison Company (the licensee) dated September 6, 1994, as supplemented February 15, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


for Ledyard B. Marsh, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 22, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 161

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35

DOCKET NO. 50-293

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

3/4.7-11
3/4.7-12
3/4.7-13
3/4.7-14
3/4.7-15
3/4.7-16
3/4.7-17

Insert

3/4.7-11
3/4.7-12
3/4.7-13
3/4.7-14
3/4.7-15
3/4.7-16
3/4.7-17

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

A. Primary Containment (Cont)

With no H₂ analyzer operable, reactor operation is allowed for up to 48 hours. If one of the inoperable analyzers is not made fully operable within 48 hours, the reactor shall be in a least Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours.

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System

1. Standby Gas Treatment System

- a. Except as specified in 3.7.B.1.c or 3.7.B.1.f below, both trains of the standby gas treatment system and the diesel generators required for operation of such trains shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required or the reactor shall be shutdown in 36 hours.
- b. 1. The results of the in-place cold DOP tests on HEPA filters shall show ≥99% DOP removal. The results of halogenated hydrocarbon tests on charcoal adsorber banks shall show ≥99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System

1. Standby Gas Treatment System

- a. 1. At least once per operating cycle, it shall be demonstrated that pressure drop across the combined high efficiency filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches of water at 4000 cfm.
2. At least once per operating cycle, demonstrate that the inlet heaters on each train are operable and are capable of an output of at least 14 kW.
3. The tests and analysis of Specification 3.7.B.1.b. shall be performed at least once per operating cycle or following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system while the system is operating that could contaminate the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers.
4. At least once per operating cycle, automatic initiation of

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)

2. The results of the laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show $\geq 95\%$ methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 10% of system design, 0.5 to 1.5 mg/m³ inlet methyl iodide concentration, $\geq 70\%$ R.H. and $\geq 190^\circ\text{F}$. The analysis results are to be verified as acceptable within 31 days after sample removal, or declare that train inoperable and take the actions specified 3.7.B.1.c.

c From and after the date that one train of the Standby Gas Treatment System is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, except as specified in 3.7.B.1.f below, continued reactor operation, irradiated fuel handling, or new fuel handling over spent fuel pool or core is permissible only during the succeeding seven days providing that within 2 hours all active components of the other standby gas treatment train shall be demonstrated to be operable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)

each branch of the standby gas treatment system shall be demonstrated, with Specification 3.7.B.1.d satisfied.

5. Each train of the standby gas treatment system shall be operated for at least 15 minutes per month.

6. The tests and analysis of Specification 3.7.B.1.b.2 shall be performed after every 720 hours of system operation.

b. 1. In-place cold DOP testing shall be performed on the HEPA filters after each completed or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank and after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter system housing which could affect the HEPA filter bank bypass leakage.

2. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be performed on the charcoal adsorber bank after each partial or complete replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the charcoal adsorber housing which could affect the charcoal adsorber bank bypass leakage.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)

- d. Fans shall operate within \pm 10% of 4000 cfm.
- e Except as specified in 3.7.B.1.c or 3.7.B.1.f, both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System shall be operable during irradiated fuel handling, or new fuel handling over the spent fuel pool or core. If the system is not operable, fuel movement shall not be started. Any fuel assembly movement in progress may be completed.

- f. During refueling, one train of the Standby Gas Treatment System can be without its safety-related bus and/or emergency diesel generator without entering the LCO action statement provided the following conditions are met:
 - Fuel movement will not occur until five days following reactor shutdown.
 - Prior to and during fuel movement, the SBO D/G or the Shutdown Transformer is required to be operable and capable of supply power to the emergency bus.
 - Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor vessel is flooded up to elevation 114'.
 - The train of SGTS without its safety related bus or without its emergency diesel generator will have power supplied from a normal offsite source via a non safety-related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the Startup Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Backfeed Mode).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

- 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
- B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)
2. Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System
- a Except as specified in Specification 3.7.B.2.c or 3.7.B.2.e below, both trains of the Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System used for the processing of inlet air to the control room under accident conditions and the diesel generator(s) required for operation of each train of the system shall be operable whenever secondary containment integrity is required and during fuel handling operations.
- b. 1. The results of the in-place cold DOP tests on HEPA filters shall show $\geq 99\%$ DOP removal. The results of the halogenated hydrocarbon tests on charcoal adsorber banks shall show $\geq 99\%$ halogenated hydrocarbon removal when test results are extrapolated to the initiation of the test.
2. The results of the laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show $\geq 95\%$ methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 10% of system design, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m³ inlet methyl iodide concentration, $\geq 70\%$ R.H., and $\geq 125^\circ\text{F}$. The analysis results are to be verified as acceptable within 31 days after sample removal, or declare that train inoperable and take the

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
- B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)
2. Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System
- a. At least once per operating cycle the pressure drop across each combined filter train shall be demonstrated to be less than 6 inches of water at 1000 cfm or the calculated equivalent.
- b. 1. The tests and analysis of Specification 3.7.B.2.b shall be performed once per operating cycle or following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system while the system is operating.
2. In-place cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing which could affect the HEPA filter bank bypass leakage.
3. Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing which could affect the charcoal adsorber bank bypass leakage.
4. Each train shall be operated with the heaters in automatic for at least 15 minutes every month.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)

actions specified in
3.7.B.2.c.

- c. From and after the date that one train of the Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System is made or found to be incapable of supplying filtered air to the control room for any reason, reactor operation or refueling operations are permissible only during the succeeding 7 days providing that within 2 hours all active components of the other CRHEAF train shall be demonstrated operable. If the system is not made fully operable within 7 days, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours and irradiated fuel handling operations shall be terminated within 2 hours. Fuel handling operations in progress may be completed.
- d. Fans shall operate within \pm 10% of 1000 cfm.
- e. During refueling, one train of the CRHEAF can be without its safety-related bus and/or emergency diesel generator without entering the LCO action statement provided the following conditions are met:
 - Fuel movement will not occur until five days following reactor shutdown.
 - Prior to and during fuel movement, the SBO D/G or the

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

B. Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration System (Cont)

5. The test and analysis of Specification 3.7.B.2.b.2 shall be performed after every 720 hours of system operation.

- c. At least once per operating cycle demonstrate that the inlet heaters on each train are operable and capable of an output of at least 14 kw.
- d. Perform an instrument functional test on the humidistats controlling the heaters once per operating cycle.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

Shutdown Transformer is required to be operable and capable of supply power to the emergency bus.

- Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor vessel is flood up to elevation 114'.
- The train of CRHEAF without its safety related bus or without its emergency diesel generator will have power supplied from a normal offsite source via a non safety-related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the Startup Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Backfeed Mode).

C. Secondary Containment

1. Secondary containment integrity shall be maintained during all modes of plant operation except when all of the following conditions are met.
 - a. The reactor is subcritical and Specification 3.3.A is met.
 - b. The reactor water temperature is below 212°F and the reactor coolant system is vented.
 - c. No activity is being performed which can reduce the shutdown margin below that specified in Specification 3.3.A.
 - d. The fuel cask or irradiated fuel is not being moved in the reactor building.
2. If Specification 3.7.C.1 cannot be met, procedures shall be initiated to establish conditions listed in Specification 3.7.C.1.a through d.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)

C. Secondary Containment

1. Secondary containment surveillance shall be performed as indicated below:
 - a. A preoperational secondary containment capability test shall be conducted after isolating the reactor building and placing either standby gas treatment system filter train in operation. Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (<5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 cfm.
 - b. Additional tests shall be performed during the first operating cycle under an adequate number of different environmental wind conditions to enable valid extrapolation of the test results.
 - c. Secondary containment capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

- 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
- C. Secondary Containment (Cont)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
- C. Secondary Containment (Cont)

calm wind (5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 4000 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35
BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-293

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 6, 1994, as supplemented February 15, 1995, Boston Edison Company (BECo), the licensee for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, proposed the addition of two new Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.7.B.1.f and 3.7.B.2.e, and proposed changes to existing TS 3.7.B.1.a, 3.7.B.1.c, 3.7.B.1.e, 3.7.B.2.a and 3.7.B.2.c to the Pilgrim TSs. The above specifications deal with the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and the control room high efficiency air filtration system (CRHEAF). Specifically, during refueling outages, BECo proposes to maintain one SGTS train and one CRHEAF train operable with both nonsafety-related and safety-related emergency power sources while the redundant SGTS train and CRHEAF train are maintained operable with only normal nonsafety-related power sources. BECo's justification is that the changes would reduce refueling outage duration and that compensatory measures (the compensatory measures are incorporated as TS Additions 3.7.B.1.f and 3.7.B.2.e) will be taken to account for the nonavailability of a safety-related power source to one SGTS train and one CRHEAF train during refueling outages. The February 15, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

During refueling operations, fuel handling accidents (FHA) can occur resulting in release of radioactive materials to the environs. In the event of a FHA during refueling operations, the SGTS performs its safety function, namely, limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environs and consequently limiting the offsite doses to below 10 CFR Part 100 limits. The plant TS "Bases" section for SGTS states that only one of the two trains is needed to perform the system's safety function. The CRHEAF is a subsystem of the main control room environmental control system and its safety function is supplying a source of filtered outside air to the control room during an accident. This, in turn, maintains the control room habitable by limiting the control room operator doses to within the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19 limits. The Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.17, states that there are two independent trains of CRHEAF and that only one train is needed to provide the system's safety function.

To account for nonavailability of emergency safety-related power sources for one SGTS train and one CHREAF train during refueling outages, BECo proposes the compensatory measures listed below for both the SGTS (See TS 3.7.B.1.f) and CRHEAF (See TS 3.7.B.2.e):

1. Fuel movement will not occur until 5 days following reactor shutdown.
2. Prior to and during fuel movement, the station blackout diesel generator or the shutdown transformer is required to be operable and capable of supplying power to the emergency bus.
3. Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor vessel is flooded up to Elevation 114 feet to provide an enlarged coolant inventory.
4. The SGTS train and CRHEAF train without their associated safety-related emergency power source will have power supplied from a normal offsite source via a non-safety-related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the startup transformer or unit auxiliary transformer (backfeed mode).

If during refueling operations, either Compensatory Measure 2 or 4 given above cannot be met, or the SGTS train with emergency power source (i.e., with associated diesel generator) becomes inoperable by the TS definition (excluding its associated emergency power source availability), refueling operations can continue during the succeeding 7 days provided that within 2 hours all the active components of the other SGTS train are demonstrated to be operable. The above action identified for the SGTS is also applicable to the CRHEAF. The new TS, 3.7.b.1.f and 3.7.B.2.e allow one train of SGTS and CRHEAF to be operable without its safety-related bus and/or emergency diesel generator. If there are no emergency diesel generators operable, irradiated fuel handling or new fuel handling over the spent fuel pool or core is not permitted.

The NRC staff recognizes that during refueling, the radiological consequences of an accident are less severe than during reactor operation in Modes 1, 2, or 3. The NRC staff also agrees with BECo that the probability of a worst-case FHA coincident with loss-of-offsite power and a random failure of a SGTS or CRHEAF component in the train being fed from its associated safety-related emergency diesel generator is very low.

Based on the above findings, the NRC staff concludes that BECo's proposed TS changes, as identified in BECo's submittal dated September 6, 1994, are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Massachusetts State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 53837). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Ronald B. Eaton

Date: March 22, 1995