

5.4 Technical Support

The team concluded that technical support to operations during the event was untimely and weak. This was evident as identified below.

1. The initial assessment of the magnitude of the SGTR, that the tube leak "got much worse" was based on limited plant data (i.e., pressurizer level) and without appropriate consideration of the effects that the rapid RCS cooldown was having on RCS temperature, RCS pressure and pressurizer level due to the operators using the high pressure steam dump valves to dump steam to the main condensers.
2. When the control room operators initiated SI, the TSC should have recognized and alerted the control room that SJAE exhaust would now be directed to the outside atmosphere and that the RHR heat exchanger CCW outlet valves went to full open, which later caused a delay in warming up the heat exchangers.
3. The TSC was not timely in informing the control room operators of the RCS boron concentration sample which delayed RCS cooldown.
4. The TSC should have been aware of the long standing use of the manual bypass to control steam to the main condenser SJAE and alerted the control room to reposition the valve before condenser vacuum was lost.
5. The TSC did not recognize that procedure ES-3.1 had established an incorrect pressurizer spray valve lineup which was causing the pressurizer auxiliary spray to be initially ineffective in controlling RCS pressure.
6. The TSC was slow in providing support for pinning the main steam lines, such that the pinning was not complete until the approximate time the water was expected to enter the main steam line.
7. The TSC did not act to properly resolve a discrepancy between two radiation readings at the #24 ASDV (the first reading indicated 500 - 600 cpm and the second reading indicated background) without NRC involvement. Subsequently, the licensee took a reading with a gamma spectroscopy and positively identified short lived Xe activity.
8. A recent, planned organizational change to combine the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC) into one center was implemented during the event and created some confusion.
9. The TSC was proactive in providing a contingency plan and method to reduce the #24 SG water level by transferring the water to the secondary boiler blowdown purification system (SBBPS) in the event that RCS cooldown on RHR was further delayed.

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