

**From:** Laurence Kopp, *NRL*  
**To:** George Hubbard *NRL*  
**Date:** Fri, May 19, 2000 12:34 PM  
**Subject:** Loss of SFP Water

George:  
 It looks like it was Millstone 2.  
 Larry

January 29, 1999

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-I-99-006

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region I staff in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania on this date.

Facility	Licensee Emergency Classification
Northeast Utilities	Notification of Unusual Event
Millstone 2	Alert
Waterford, Connecticut	Site Area Emergency
Dockets: 50-336	General Emergency
	X Not Applicable

**Subject: INADVERTENT TRANSFER OF WATER FROM THE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 SPENT FUEL POOL**

On January 28, 1999, operators inadvertently reduced spent fuel pool water level by 2 inches (approximately 2700 gallons) when purification of the spent fuel pool water was initiated. For the previous several days, operators had been using the purification system to drain the refueling cavity inside containment and transfer the water to the liquid radioactive waste system. When the refueling cavity was nearly empty, operators secured the purification system pumps as specified in the purification system operating procedure. This operating procedure directed isolation of the purification system suction path. However, the procedure did not include specific steps to isolate the purification system discharge to the liquid radioactive waste system.

The operators held a shift briefing to discuss realigning the purification system to clean the spent fuel pool water and reviewed the purification system piping diagram. Then, the operators realigned the system to purify the spent fuel pool water using a different section of the purification system operating procedure. This section of the procedure directed the isolation of the flow path from the refueling cavity, as well as opening the suction and return path to the spent fuel pool. Again, the procedure did not include specific steps to isolate the purification system discharge to the clean liquid radioactive waste system.

After the purification system pumps were started, the operators noted unexpected flow to the clean liquid radioactive waste system, and secured the purification system pumps. The operators noted that spent fuel pool water level had decreased and that level still appeared to be decreasing

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with the purification system pumps secured, so the operators isolated the flow path to the clean liquid radioactive waste system. This action terminated the spent fuel pool level decrease.

Throughout the event, the spent fuel pool water level remained above the spent fuel pool low level alarm setpoint. Had the transfer of water continued with no operator action, passive design features would have ensured that adequate water remained in the spent fuel pool for cooling and shielding of the stored fuel; thus the risk significance of the event is low.

As a result of this event and a recent similar configuration control event, the licensee has initiated a formal root-cause investigation to identify corrective actions and an operations work stand-down to assess operations department work practices. The spent fuel pool level has been restored to its normal level. The licensee has concluded that this event was not reportable.

The resident inspectors have been following the licensee's response to this event.

The State of Connecticut has been notified.

The Region I Office of Public Affairs is prepared to respond to media inquiries.

The information in this notification is current as of 12:00 noon on January 29, 1998.

Contact: Jacquie Durr  
(610)337-5224