



James Scarola
Vice President
Harris Nuclear Plant

SERIAL: HNP-01-088
10CFR50.90

JUN 29 2001

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63
REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.4.3 – “PRESSURIZER” and Associated Bases

Dear Sir or Madam:

On May 7, 2001, Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) submitted a proposed license amendment for a revision to the HNP Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.4.3 and “Pressurizer - Reactor Coolant System” and the associated surveillance requirement, T/S Surveillance 4.4.3.1. As stated in the May 7, 2001 letter, HNP proposes to revise the applicable TS to eliminate the pressurizer water volume value in the specification and change “volume” to “level” in the surveillance. Water volume for the pressurizer is not a parameter that can be monitored directly by the control room operators. The pressurizer water level value of 92%, which is also specified in the TS, is a value that is monitored by the control room operators via pressurizer level instrumentation. This change will amend the HNP TS for the pressurizer to be consistent with the corresponding TS in the Improved Technical Specifications (NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants, WOG ITS 3.4.9, “Pressurizer” and SR 3.4.9.1). Since the parameter setpoint is not being changed the limit for pressurizer water level is not impacted by this change to TS.

In addition to the changes described above, the bases for TS 3/4.4.3 refer to volume rather than level. In order to ensure consistency and avoid confusion, HNP also proposes to change the TS bases for TS 3/4.4.3 to refer to level instead of volume when describing the liquid volume contained in the pressurizer. This will make the HNP TS Bases consistent with the changes to the HNP TS that are proposed in the letter dated May 7, 2001.

This supplemental information does not affect the conclusions of either the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation or the Environmental Considerations submitted as part of HNP's May 7, 2001 letter.

CP&L requests that the proposed amendment be issued such that implementation will occur within 60 days of issuance to allow time for procedure revision and orderly incorporation into copies of the Technical Specifications.


P.O. Box 165
New Hill, NC 27562

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A001

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Mark Ellington at (919) 362-2057.

Sincerely,


James Scarola

RTG

James Scarola, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief, and the sources of his information are employees, contractors, and agents of Carolina Power & Light Company.




Notary (Seal)

My commission expires: 2-21-2005

Enclosures:

1. Page Change Instructions
2. Technical Specification Pages



c: Mr. J. B. Brady, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. Mel Fry, Director, N.C. DEHNR
Mr. R. J. Laufer, NRC Project Manager
Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator

bc.

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO SERIAL: HNP-01-088

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.4.3 and Associated Bases

PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS

<u>Removed Page</u>	<u>Inserted Page</u>
B 3/4 4-2	B 3/4 4-2

ENCLOSURE 2 TO SERIAL: HNP-01-088

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.4.3 and Associated Bases

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no reactor trip until the second Reactor Trip System trip setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shut-down and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water level in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water level also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

In MODES 1, 2, and 3 the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) provide an RCS pressure boundary, manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of accidents, and automatic RCS pressure relief to minimize challenges to the safety valves.

Providing an RCS pressure boundary and manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) are the safety-related functions of the PORVs in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The capability of the PORV to perform its function of providing an RCS pressure boundary requires that the PORV or its associated block valve is closed. The capability of the PORV to perform manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a SGTR accident is based on manual actuation and does not require the automatic RCS pressure control function. The automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs is not a safety-related function in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The automatic pressure control function limits the number of challenges to the safety valves, but the safety valves perform the safety function of RCS overpressure protection. Therefore, the automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs does not have to be available for the PORVs to be operable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no reactor trip until the second Reactor Trip System trip setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

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3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

Delete level Add

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

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3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

level Add

In MODES 1, 2, and 3 the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) provide an RCS pressure boundary, manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of accidents, and automatic RCS pressure relief to minimize challenges to the safety valves.

Providing an RCS pressure boundary and manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) are the safety-related functions of the PORVs in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The capability of the PORV to perform its function of providing an RCS pressure boundary requires that the PORV or its associated block valve is closed. The capability of the PORV to perform manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a SGTR accident is based on manual actuation and does not require the automatic RCS pressure control function. The automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs is not a safety-related function in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The automatic pressure control function limits the number of challenges to the safety valves, but the safety valves perform the safety function of RCS overpressure protection. Therefore, the automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs does not have to be available for the PORVs to be operable.

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