



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 22, 1985

Docket Nos.: 50-443
and 50-444

Mr. Robert J. Harrison
President & Chief Executive Officer
Public Service Company of New Hampshire
Post Office Box 330
Manchester, New Hampshire 03105

Dear Mr. Harrison:

Subject: Request for Exemption from a Portion of General Design
Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 Regarding the
Need to Analyze Large Primary Loop Pipe Ruptures as a
Structural Design Basis for Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2

In a letter to H. R. Denton dated August 9, 1984, Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) requested construction permits' amendments and a permanent exemption from a portion of the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 for Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2. Your letter provided Westinghouse Report WCAP-10567 (proprietary) which serves as the technical basis in support of the request. The Westinghouse report addressed the "leak-before-break" concept as an alternative to providing protective devices against the dynamic effects of postulated ruptures in the primary coolant loops. Your submittal dated February 1, 1985, provided a value-impact analysis associated with your exemption request. In a letter to H. R. Denton dated July 10, 1985, you modified your prior request from permanent exemption (for the lifetime of the plant) to schedular exemption. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the related Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, which has been published in the Federal Register.

On the basis of the staff's evaluation of these submittals, the Commission has granted your exemption request for Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 which is enclosed. The exemption granted will become effective upon the date of issuance and will expire upon completion of the GDC 4 rulemaking changes

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but no later than the second refueling outage of Unit 1. A copy of the enclosed exemption is being forwarded to the Office of Federal Register for publication, accordingly.

Sincerely,

George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc: See next page

*Previously concurred on by:

LB#3/DL	LB#4/DL	LB#1/DL	LB#3/DL	MEB/DE	DE/AAD	DE/MEB
*VNurses/dh	*KJabbour JZee	JZee	GWKnighton	BDL Yaw	RBosnak	FCherny
08/28/85	08/29/85	08/28/85	08/14/85	08/23/85	08/28/85	08/28/85
AD/MC/DET:DE	RAB/DSI	AD/DSI	OELD	DSI/CSB	DSI/AD	
WJohnson	FCongel	DWYler	JScinto	JShapaker	RWHouston	
08/ /85	10/24/85	08/24/85	08/13/85	08/25/85	10/25/85	
DL/AD/LP	DE	D/DSI	DL/DIR			
MMBosak	JPKnight	RBernero	HLThompson			
08/4/85	08/3/85	08/28/85	08/8/85			

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Seabrook Nuclear Power Station

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)	
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,)	Docket Nos. 50-443 and
ET AL.*)	50-444
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2))	

EXEMPTION

I.

On March 30, 1973, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al. (applicants) tendered an application for licenses to construct Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 (Seabrook or the facility) with the Atomic Energy Commission (currently the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Commission). Following a public hearing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the Commission issued Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-135 and CPPR-136 permitting the construction of the Units 1 and 2, respectively, on July 7, 1976. Each unit of the facility is a pressurized water reactor, containing a Westinghouse Electric Company nuclear steam supply system, located at the applicants' site in Seabrook, New Hampshire.

On June 29, 1981, the applicants tendered an application for Operating Licenses for the facilities, currently in the licensing review process.

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*The current construction permit holders for Seabrook Station are: Bangor Hydor-Electric Company, Canal Electric Company, Central Maine Power Company, Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, Connecticut Light & Power Company, Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Company, Hudson Light & Power Department, Maine Public Service Company, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Montaup Electric Company, New England Power Company, New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant, United Illuminating Company, Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Inc., and Washington Electric Cooperative, Inc.

II.

The Construction Permits issued for constructing Units 1 and 2 of the Seabrook Station provide, in pertinent part, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations and orders of the Commission. This includes General Design Criterion (GDC) 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. GDC 4 requires that structures, systems and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of, and to be compatible with, the environmental conditions associated with the normal operation, maintenance, testing and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents. These structures, systems and components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, discharging fluids that may result from equipment failures, and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit.

In a submittal dated August 9, 1984, the applicants enclosed Westinghouse Report WCAP-10567 (Reference 1) containing the technical basis for their request to eliminate the postulated breaks in the reactor coolant loop (RCL) piping of Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2. The applicants further stated that eliminating these postulated breaks would result in eliminating their associated dynamic effects which are specifically defined as the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, and fluid jets. In the February 1, 1985 submittal, the applicants stated that granting of their request (1) eliminates the need to postulate longitudinal and circumferential pipe breaks in the RCL primary piping (hot leg, cold leg, and crossover leg piping); (2) eliminates the need to install associated pipe whip restraints in the RCL primary piping; and (3) eliminates the requirement to

analyze and design for the dynamic effects of these breaks including jet impingement, reactor cavity pressurization and load combination assumptions. The exemption request will not apply to the containment design bases, the emergency core cooling system, or environmental qualification, engineered safety features systems response, or the design of the RCS heavy component supports.

The applicants' submittal of February 1, 1985, contains the results of an analysis of the occupational radiation dose reduction which provides the value-impact analysis for Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2. The technical information contained in Reference (1) together with the value-impact analysis, provided a comprehensive justification for requesting limited exemptions from the requirements of GDC 4.

From the deterministic fracture mechanics analysis contained in the technical information furnished, the applicants concluded that postulated breaks up to and including the double-ended guillotine breaks (DEGB) of the primary loop coolant piping in Seabrook 1 and 2 need not be considered as a design basis for installing protective structures, such as pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields, to guard against the dynamic effects associated with such postulated breaks. However, the applicants will continue to postulate the equivalent area of a DEGB as the design basis for the containment, the ECCS, the engineered safety systems response, environmental qualification and the design of the RCS heavy component supports.

III.

The Commission's regulations require that applicants provide

protective measures against the dynamic effects of postulated pipe breaks in high energy fluid system piping. Protective measures include physical isolation from postulated pipe rupture locations, if feasible, or the installation of pipe whip restraints, jet impingement shields or compartments. In 1975, concerns arose as to the asymmetric loads on pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessels and their internals which could result from these large postulated breaks at discrete locations in the main primary coolant loop piping. This led to the establishment of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-2, "Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary Systems."

The NRC staff, after several review meetings with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and a meeting with the NRC Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR), concluded that an exemption from the regulations would be acceptable as an alternative for resolution of USI A-2 for sixteen facilities owned by eleven licensees in the Westinghouse Owners' Group (one of these facilities, Fort Calhoun, has a Combustion Engineering nuclear steam supply system). This NRC staff position was stated in Generic Letter 84-04, published on February 1, 1984 (Reference 2). The generic letter states that the affected licensees must justify an exemption to GDC 4 on a plant-specific basis. Other PWR applicants or licensees may request similar exemptions from the requirements of GDC 4 provided that they submit an acceptable technical basis for eliminating the need to postulate pipe breaks.

The acceptance of an exemption was made possible by the development of advanced fracture mechanics technology. These advanced fracture

mechanics techniques deal with relatively small flaws in piping components (either postulated or real) and examine their behavior under various pipe loads. The objective is to demonstrate by deterministic analyses that the detection of small flaws by either inservice inspection or leakage monitoring systems is assured long before the flaws can grow to critical or unstable sizes which could lead to large break areas such as the DEGB or its equivalent. The concept underlying such analyses is referred to as "leak-before-break" (LBB). There is no implication that piping failures cannot occur, but rather that improved knowledge of the failure modes of piping systems and the application of appropriate remedial measures, if indicated, can reduce the probability of catastrophic failure to insignificant values.

Advanced fracture mechanics technology was applied in topical reports (References 3, 4, and 5) submitted to the staff by Westinghouse on behalf of the licensees belonging to the USI A-2 Owners' Group. Although the topical reports were intended to resolve the issue of asymmetric blowdown loads that resulted from a limited number of discrete break locations, the technology advanced in these topical reports demonstrated that the probability of breaks occurring in the primary coolant system main loop piping is sufficiently low such that these breaks need not be considered as a design basis for requiring installation of pipe whip restraints or jet impingement shields. The staff's Topical Report Evaluation is included as a part of Reference 2.

Probabilistic fracture mechanics studies conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) on both Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering nuclear steam supply system main loop piping (Reference 6) confirm that both the probability of leakage (e.g., undetected flaw growth through the pipe wall by fatigue) and the probability of a DEGB are very low. The results given in Reference 6 are that the best-estimate leak probabilities for Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system main loop piping range from 1.2×10^{-8} to 1.5×10^{-7} per plant year and the best-estimate DEGB probabilities range from 1×10^{-12} to 7×10^{-12} per plant year. Similarly, the best-estimate leak probabilities for Combustion Engineering nuclear steam supply system main loop piping range from 1×10^{-8} per plant year to 3×10^{-8} per plant year, and the best-estimate DEGB probabilities range from 5×10^{-14} to 5×10^{-13} per plant year. The results do not affect core melt probabilities in any significant way.

During the past few years it has also become apparent that the requirement for installation of large, massive pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields is not necessarily the most cost effective way to achieve the desired level of safety, as indicated in Enclosure 2, Regulatory Analysis, to Reference 2. Even for new plants, these devices tend to restrict access for future inservice inspection of piping; or if they are removed and reinstalled for inspection, there is a potential risk of damaging the piping and other safety-related components in this process. If installed in operating plants, high occupational radiation

exposure (ORE) would be incurred while public risk reduction would be very low. Removal and reinstallation for inservice inspection also entail significant ORE over the life of a plant.

IV.

The primary coolant system of Seabrook, Units 1 and 2 described in Reference 1, has four main loops each comprising a 33.9 inch diameter (outside) hot leg, a 37.5 inch diameter crossover leg and 32.4 inch diameter cold leg piping. The materials in the primary loop piping are wrought stainless steel pipe with cast stainless steel fittings and associated welds. In its review of Reference 1, the staff evaluated the Westinghouse analyses with regard to:

- the location of maximum stresses in the piping, associated with combined loads from normal operation and the SSE;
- potential cracking mechanisms;
- size of through-wall cracks that would leak a detectable amount under normal loads and pressure;
- stability of a "leakage-size crack" under normal plus SSE loads and the expected margin in terms of load;
- margin based on crack size; and
- the fracture toughness properties of wrought and thermally-aged cast stainless steel piping and weld material.

The NRC staff's criteria for evaluation of the above parameters are delineated in its Topical Report Evaluation, Enclosure 1 to Reference 2, Section 4.1, "NRC Evaluation Criteria", and are as follows:

- (1) The loading conditions should include static forces and moments (pressure, deadweight and thermal expansion) due to normal operation, and the forces and moments associated with the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). These forces and moments should be located where the highest stresses and the lowest material toughness are coincident for base materials, weldments and safe-ends.
- (2) For the piping run/systems under evaluation, all pertinent information which demonstrates that degradation or failure of the piping resulting from stress corrosion cracking, fatigue or water hammer is not likely, should be provided. Relevant operating history should be cited, which includes system operational procedures; system or component modification; water chemistry parameters, limits and controls; resistance of material to various forms of stress corrosion, and performance under cyclic loadings.
- (3) A through-wall crack should be postulated at the highest stressed locations determined from (1) above. The size of the crack should be large enough so that the leakage is assured of detection with adequate margin using the minimum installed leak detection capability when the pipe is subjected to normal operational loads.
- (4) It should be demonstrated that the postulated leakage crack is stable under normal plus SSE loads for long periods of time;

that is, crack growth, if any, is minimal during an earthquake. The margin, in terms of applied loads, should be determined by a crack stability analysis, i.e., that the leakage-size crack will not experience unstable crack growth even if larger loads (larger than design loads) are applied. This analysis should demonstrate that crack growth is stable and the final crack size is limited, such that a double-ended pipe break will not occur.

- (5) The crack size margin should be determined by comparing the leakage-size crack to critical-size cracks. Under normal plus SSE loads, it should be demonstrated that there is adequate margin between the leakage-size crack and the critical-size crack to account for the uncertainties inherent in the analyses, and leakage detection capability. A limit-load analysis may suffice for the purpose; however, an elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (tearing instability) analysis is preferable.
- (6) The materials data provided should include types of materials and materials specifications used for base metal, weldments and safe-ends, the materials properties including the J-R curve used in the analyses, and long-term effects such as thermal aging and other limitations to valid data (e.g. J maximum, maximum crack growth).

V.

Based on its evaluation of the analysis contained in Westinghouse Report WCAP-10567 (Reference 1), the staff finds that the applicants have presented an acceptable technical justification, addressing the above criteria, for not installing protective devices to deal with the dynamic effects of large pipe ruptures in the main loop primary coolant system piping of Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2. This finding is predicated on the fact that each of the parameters evaluated for Seabrook is enveloped by the generic analysis performed by Westinghouse in Reference 3, and accepted by the staff in Enclosure 1 to Reference 2. Specifically:

- (1) The loads associated with the highest stressed location in the main loop primary system piping are 2332 kips (axial), 37,045 in-kips (bending moment) and result in maximum stresses of about 97% of the bounding stress used by Westinghouse in Reference 3. Further, these loads are approximately 88% of those established by the staff as limits .
- (2) For Westinghouse plants, there is no history of cracking failure in reactor primary coolant system loop piping. The Westinghouse reactor coolant system primary loop has an operating history which demonstrates its inherent stability. This includes a low susceptibility to cracking failure from the effects of corrosion (e.g. intergranular stress corrosion cracking), water

hammer, or fatigue (low and high cycle). This operating history totals over 400 reactor-years, including five (5) plants each having 15 years of operation and 15 other plants with over 10 years of operation.

- (3) The leak rate calculations performed for the Seabrook plants using an initial through-wall crack of 7.5 inches are identical to those of Enclosure 1 to Reference 2. The Seabrook plants have an RCS pressure boundary leak detection system which is consistent with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.45, and it can detect leakage of one (1) gpm in one hour. The calculated leak rate through the postulated flaw results in a factor of at least 10 relative to the sensitivity of the Seabrook plants' leak detection system.
- (4) The margin in terms of load based on fracture mechanics analyses for the leakage-size crack under normal plus SSE loads is within the bounds calculated by the staff in Section 4.2.3 of Enclosure 1 to Reference 2. Based on a limit-load analysis, the load margin is about 2.0 and based on the J-limit, the margin is at least 1.1.
- (5) The margin between the leakage-size crack and the critical-size crack was calculated by a limit-load analysis. Again, the results demonstrated that a margin of at least 3 on crack size exists and is within the bounds of Section 4.2.3 of Enclosure 1 to Reference 2.

(6) In addition to the wrought stainless steel pipes, the Seabrook units have cast stainless steel fittings and associated welds in the primary coolant system. As an integral part of its review, the staff's evaluation of the properties data of Reference 7 is enclosed as Appendix I to this exemption. In Reference 7, data for ten (10) plants are presented and lower bound or "worst case" materials properties were identified and used in the analysis performed in the Reference 1 report by Westinghouse. The applied J for Seabrook in Reference 1 for cast stainless steel fittings was less than 3000 in-lb/in². Hence, the staff's upper bound 3000 in-lb/in² on the applied J (refer to Appendix I, page 6) was not exceeded.

In view of the analytical results presented in the Westinghouse Report for Seabrook (Reference 1) and the staff's evaluation findings related above, the staff concludes that the probability of large pipe breaks occurring in the primary coolant system loops of Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2, is sufficiently low such that pipe breaks and their associated dynamic loading effects as indicated in the applicants submittals need not be considered as a design basis for requiring pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields. These dynamic loading effects include pipe whip, jet impingement, missiles, reactor cavity overpressurization, and load combination assumptions. Eliminating the need to consider these dynamic loading effects for this particular application will not in any way affect the design bases for the containment, the emergency core cooling system, the design of RCS heavy component supports, the engineered safety features systems response, or the environmental qualification of equipment for Seabrook.

However, in order to provide the Commission with an opportunity to consider the long term aspects of the NRC staff's recent acceptance of the "leak-before-break" approach, these limited exemptions are restricted to a period extending until the completion of the second refueling outage of Seabrook Station, Unit 1, pending the outcome of Commission rulemaking on this issue.

The staff also reviewed the value-impact analysis provided by the applicants in their submittal for not providing protective structures against postulated reactor coolant system loop pipe breaks to assure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) exposure to plant personnel. Consideration was given to design features for reducing doses to personnel who must operate, service and maintain the Seabrook instrumentation, controls, equipment, etc. The Seabrook value-impact analysis shows that the elimination of protective devices for RCS pipe breaks will save an occupational dose for plant personnel of approximately 1400 person-rem for both units over their operating lifetime. The staff review of the analysis shows it to be a reasonable estimate of dose savings. Therefore, with respect to occupational exposure and ALARA considerations, the staff finds that there is a radiological benefit to be gained by eliminating the need for the protective structures.

VI.


In view of the staff's evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations above, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the following exemption is authorized by law and

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest. The Commission hereby approves the requested schedular limited exemption from GDC 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, to permit the applicants to eliminate the protective devices and the dynamic loading effects, as described in Part II of this exemption, associated with the postulated primary loop pipe breaks for Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2. The exemption will expire upon completion of the GDC 4 rulemaking changes but no later than the second refueling outage of Seabrook Station, Unit 1.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the issuance of the exemption will have no significant impact on the environment (50 FR 47468).

The exemption will become effective upon date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland
this 22 day of November, 1985

REFERENCES

- (1) Westinghouse report WCAP-10567, "Technical Bases for Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Ruptures as the Structural Design Basis for Seabrook, Units 1 and 2, June 1984, Westinghouse Class 2 proprietary.
- (2) NRC Generic Letter 84-04, "Safety Evaluation of Westinghouse Topical Reports Dealing with Elimination of Postulated Breaks in PWR Primary Main Loops," February 1, 1984.
- (3) Mechanistic Fracture Evaluation of Reactor Coolant Pipe Containing a Postulated Circumferential Throughwall Crack, WCAP-9558, Rev. 2, May 1981, Westinghouse Class 2 proprietary.
- (4) Tensile and Toughness Properties of Primary Piping Weld Metal for Use in Mechanistic Fracture Evaluation, WCAP-9787, May 1981, Westinghouse Class 2 proprietary.
- (5) Westinghouse Response to Questions and Comments Raised by Members of ACRS Subcommittee on Metal Components During the Westinghouse Presentation of September 25, 1981, Letter Report NS-EPR-2519, E.P. Rahe to Darrell G. Eisenhut, November 10, 1981, Westinghouse Class 2 proprietary.
- (6) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report, UCRL-86249, "Failure Probability of PWR Reactor Coolant Loop Piping," by T. Lo, H. H. Woo, G. S. Holman and C. K. Chou, February 1984 (Reprint of a paper intended for publication).
- (7) Westinghouse Report WCAP-10456, "The Effects of Thermal Aging on the Structural Integrity of Cast Stainless Steel Piping for Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems," November 1983, Westinghouse Class 2 proprietary.

NOTE: Non-proprietary versions of References 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are available in the NRC Public Document Room as follows:

- (1) WCAP 10566
- (3) WCAP 9570
- (4) WCAP 9788
- (5) Non-proprietary version attached to the Letter Report
- (7) WCAP 10457

APPENDIX I

Evaluation of Westinghouse Report WCAP 10456, "The Effects of Thermal Aging on the Structural Integrity of Cast Stainless Steel Piping for Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems"

INTRODUCTION

The primary coolant piping in some Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS) contain cast stainless steel base metal and weld metal. The base metal and weld metal are fabricated to produce a duplex structure of delta (δ) ferrite in an austenitic matrix. The duplex structure produces a material that has a higher yield strength, improved weldability and greater resistance to intergranular stress corrosion cracking than a single phase austenitic material. However, as early as 1965 (Ref.1), it was recognized that long time thermal aging at primary loop water temperatures (550°F-650°F) could significantly affect the Charpy impact toughness of the duplex structured alloys. Since the Charpy impact test is a measure of a material's resistance to fracture, a loss in Charpy impact toughness could result in reduced structural stability in the piping system.

The purpose of Report WCAP 10456 is to evaluate whether cast stainless steel base metal and weld metal containing postulated cracks will be sensitive to unstable fracture during the 40 year life of a nuclear power plant. In order to determine whether a piping system will behave

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in such a fashion, the pipe materials' mechanical properties, design criteria and method of predicting failure must be established. In this evaluation, we will assess the mechanical properties of thermally aged cast stainless steel pipe materials, which are reported in Report WCAP 10456.

DISCUSSION

1. Weld Metal

Report WCAP 10456 refers to test results reported in a paper by Slama, et.al. (Ref. 2) to conclude that the weld metal in primary loop piping would not be overly sensitive to aging and that the aged cast pipe base metal material would be structurally limiting. In the Slama report eight (8) welds were evaluated. The tensile properties were only slightly affected by aging. The Charpy U-notch impact energy in the most highly sensitive weld decreased from 7daJ/cm^2 (40 ft-lbs) to near 4daJ/cm^2 (24 ft-lbs) after aging for 10,000 hours at 400°C (752°F).

This change was not considered significant. The relatively small effect of aging on the weld, as compared to cast pipe material was reported to be caused by a difference in microstructure and lower levels of ferrite in the weld than in the cast pipe material.

2. Cast Stainless Steel Pipe Base Metal

Report WCAP 10456 contains mechanical property test results from a number of heats of aged cast stainless steel material and a metallurgical study, which was performed by Westinghouse, to support a statistically based model for predicting the effect of thermal aging on the Charpy impact test properties of cast stainless steel. As a result of these tests and the proposed model, Westinghouse concludes that the fracture toughness test results from one heat of material tested represents end-of-life conditions for the ten (10) plants surveyed. The ten (10) plants surveyed are identified as Plants A through J.

a. Mechanical Property Test Results Reported in WCAP 10456

Mechanical property test results on aged and unaged cast stainless steel materials which were reported in a paper by Landerman and Bamford (Ref. 3), Bamford, Landerman and Diaz (Ref. 4), Slama et. al. (Ref. 2) were discussed in Report 10456. In addition, Westinghouse performed confirmatory Charpy V notch and J-integral tests on aged cast stainless steel material, which was tested and evaluated by Slama et. al.

The results of these tests indicate that:

- (1) The fatigue crack growth rate of aged or unaged material in air and pressurized water reactor environments were equivalent.
- (2) Tensile properties were essentially unaffected except for a slight increase in tensile strength and a decrease in ductility.
- (3) J-integral test results indicate that the J_{1C} and tearing modulus, T , are affected by aging.

b. Mechanism Study in WCAP 10456

The tests and literature survey conducted by Westinghouse indicate that the proposed mechanism of aging occurs in the range of operating temperatures for pressurized water reactors and the data from accelerated aging studies can be used to predict the behavior at operating temperatures.

c. Cast Stainless Steel Pipe Test

The materials data discussed in the previous section of this evaluation were obtained from small specimens. As a consequence, the J-R results are limited to relatively short crack extensions. To investigate the behavior of cast stainless steel in actual piping geometry, Westinghouse performed two experiments, one of which was with thermally aged cast stainless steel and the other test was identical except that the steel was not thermally aged.

Each pipe tested contained a throughwall circumferential crack to the extent specified in WCAP 10456. The pipe sections were closed at the ends, pressurized to nominal PWR operating pressure and then bending loads were applied.

The results of the tests were very similar, in that both pipes displayed extensive ductility, and stable crack extension. There was no observed unstable crack extension or fast fracture.

The results of the Westinghouse pipe experiments indicate that cast stainless steel, both aged and unaged, can withstand crack extensions well beyond the range of the J-R results with small specimens. However, if crack extension is predicted in an actual application of thermally aged cast stainless steel in a piping system, we believe that it is prudent to limit the applied J to 3000 in-lbs/in² or less unless further studies and/or experiments demonstrate that higher values are tolerable. Loss of initial toughness due to thermal aging of cast stainless steels at normal nuclear facility operating temperatures occurs slowly over the course of many years; therefore, continuing study of the aging phenomenon may lead to a relaxation of this position. Conversely, in the unlikely event that the total loss of toughness and the rate of toughness loss are greater than those projected in this evaluation, the staff will take appropriate action to limit the values to that which can be justified by experimental data. Because the aging is a slow process, the staff believes there would be sufficient time for the staff to recognize the problem and to rectify the situation. However, the staff believes this situation is highly unlikely because the staff has accepted only the lower bounds of data that were gathered among ten plants encompassing the range of materials in use.

d. Effects of Thermal Aging on Westinghouse Supplied Centrifugally
Cast Reactor Coolant Piping Reported in WCAP 10456

The reactor coolant cast stainless steel piping materials in the plants identified in WCAP 10456 as A through J, were produced to the specification SA-351, Class CF8A as outlined in ASME Code Section II, Part A and also to Westinghouse Equipment Specification G-678864, as revised. For these materials, Westinghouse has calculated the predicted end-of-life Charpy U-notch properties, based on their proposed model. The two (2) standard deviation end-of-life lower limit value for all the plants surveyed was greater than the Charpy V notch properties of the aged reference materials, which Westinghouse indicates represents end-of-life properties for all the plants. As a result, Westinghouse concluded that the amount of embrittlement in the aged reference material exceed the amount projected at end-of-life for all cast stainless steel pipe materials in Plants A through J.

Conclusions

Based on our review of the information and data contained in Westinghouse Report WCAP 10456, we conclude that:

1. Weld metal that is used in cast stainless steel piping system is initially less fracture resistant than the cast stainless steel base metal. However, the weld metal is less susceptible to thermal aging than the cast stainless steel base metal. Hence, at end-of-life the cast stainless steel base metal is anticipated to be the least fracture resistant material.

2. The Westinghouse proposed model may be used to predict the relative amount of embrittlement on a heat of cast stainless steel material. The two standard deviation lower confidence limit for this model will provide a useful engineering estimate of the predicted end-of-life Charpy impact properties for cast stainless steel base metal.

3. Since there is considerable scatter in J-integral test data for the heats of material tested, lower bound values for J_{1c} and T should be used as engineering estimates for the fracture resistance of the aged reference material. We believe these values should also provide a lower bound for the fracture resistance of aged and unaged weld metal. If crack extension is predicted in an actual application of cast stainless steel in a piping system, we conclude that the applied J should be limited to 3000 in-lbs/in² or less unless further studies and tests demonstrate that higher values are tolerable. The Westinghouse pipe tests demonstrate that this may be possible.

4. Since the predicted end-of-life Charpy impact values for the materials in Plants A through J are greater than the value measured for the aged reference material, the lower bound fracture properties for aged reference material may be used to determine the fracture resistance for the cast stainless steel material in Plants A through J.

REFERENCES

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- (2) G. Slama, P. Petrequin, S. H. Masson, T. R. Mager, "Effect of Aging on Mechanical Properties of Austenitic Stainless Steel Casting and Welds," presented at SMIRT 7 Post Conference Seminar 6 - Assuring Structural Integrity of Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components, August 29/30, 1983, Monterey, Ca.
- (3) E. I. Landerman and W. H. Bamford, "Fracture Toughness and Fatigue Characteristics of Centrifugally Cast Type 316 Stainless Steel After Simulated Thermal Service Conditions. Presented at the Winter Annual Meeting of the ASME, San Francisco, Ca., December 1978 (MPC-8 ASME)
- (4) W. H. Bamford, E. I. Landerman and E. Diaz, "Thermal Aging of Cast Stainless Steel and Its Impact on Piping Integrity." Presented at ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, Portland, Oregon, June 1983. To be published in ASME Trans.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET. AL.*
SEABROOK STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-443 AND 50-444
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an Exemption from a portion of the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 4 (10 CFR 50, Appendix A) to the Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et. al. (the applicants), for the Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2, located at the applicants' site in Seabrook, New Hampshire.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT:

Identification of Proposed Action: The Exemption would permit eliminating the need to install the pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields and their dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe breaks in eight locations per loop in the Seabrook Units 1 and 2 primary coolant systems, on the basis of advanced calculational methods for assuring that piping stresses would not result in rapid piping failure; i.e., pipe breaks.

*The current construction permit holders for Seabrook Station are: Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, Canal Electric Company, Central Maine Power Company, Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, Connecticut Light & Power Company, Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Company, Hudson Light & Power Department, Maine Public Service Company, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Montaup Electric Company, New England Power Company, New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant, United Illuminating Company, Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Inc., and Washington Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Need for Proposed Action: The proposed Exemption is needed because GDC 4 requires that structures, systems and components important to safety shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects including the effects of discharging fluids that may result from equipment failures, up to and including a double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the reactor coolant system (Definition of LOCA). In recent submittals the applicants have provided information to show by advanced fracture mechanics techniques that the detection of small flaws by either inservice inspection or leakage monitoring systems is assured long before flaws in the piping materials can grow to critical or unstable sizes which could lead to large break areas such as the double-ended guillotine break or its equivalent. The NRC staff has reviewed and accepted the applicants' conclusion. Therefore, the NRC staff agrees that the double-ended guillotine break in the primary pressure coolant loop piping need not be required as a design basis accident for pipe whip restraints and jet shields, and their associated dynamic effects, i.e., the restraints and jet shields are not needed. Accordingly, the NRC staff agrees that a partial exemption from GDC 4 is appropriate.

Environmental Impact of the Proposed Action: The proposed exemption would not affect the environmental impact of the facility. No credit is given for the barriers to be eliminated in calculating accident doses to the environment. While the jet impingement barriers would minimize the damage from jet forces from a broken pipe, the calculated limitation on stresses required to support the Exemption assure that the probability of pipe breaks which could give rise to such forces are extremely small; thus, the pipe whip restraints and jet shields would have no significant effect on the overall plant accident risk.

The Exemption does not otherwise affect radiological plant effluents. Likewise, the relief granted does not affect non-radiological plant effluents, and has no other environmental impact. The elimination of the pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields would tend to lessen the occupational doses to workers inside containment. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological or non-radiological impacts associated with this Exemption.

The proposed Exemption involves design features located entirely within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR 20. It does not affect plant non-radioactive effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no non-radiological impacts associated with the proposed Exemption.

Since we have concluded that there are no measurable negative environmental impacts associated with the Exemption, any alternatives would not provide any significant additional protection of the environment. The alternative to the compliance would be to require literal compliance with GDC 4.

Alternative Use of Resources: This action does not involve the use of resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement (operating license) for Seabrook Units 1 and 2.

Agencies and Persons Contacted: The NRC staff reviewed the applicants' request and applicable documents referenced therein that support the Exemption for Seabrook Units 1 and 2. The NRC did not consult other agencies or persons.

FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for this action. Based upon the environmental assessment, we conclude that

this action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For details with respect to this action, refer to the applicants' request for exemption dated August 9, 1984, February 1, 1985 and July 10, 1985. These documents, utilized in the NRC staff's technical evaluation of the exemption request, are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the Exeter Public Library, Front Street, Exeter, New Hampshire 03833. The staff's technical evaluation of the exemption request will be published with the exemption (if the exemption is granted) and will also be available for inspection at both locations listed above.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this day of 1985.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director
for Licensing
Division of Licensing

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REQUEST FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM A PORTION OF GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 4 OF
APPENDIX A TO 10 CFR PART 50 REGARDING THE NEED TO ANALYZE LARE PRIMARY
LOOP PIPE RUPTURES AS A STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASIS FOR SEABROOK STATION,
UNITS 1 AND 2

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