Mr. Neil S. Carns
Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus
Director - Regulatory Affairs
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

September 3 1997

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M99131)

Dear Mr. Carns:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 148 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your application dated June 30, 1997.

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2 require the periodic testing of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to demonstrate operability. The amendment (1) clarifies when the MSIVs are partial stroked or full closure tested, (2) adds a note to the Mode 4 applicability of Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 to require that the MSIVs be closed and deactivated at less than 320 degrees F, (3) makes editorial changes, and (4) makes changes to the associated Bases sections.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by S.Dembek for:

James W. Andersen, Project Manager
Special Projects Office - Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 148 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 3, 1997

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and Chief Nuclear Officer
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Sincerely,

Mark Dinsmore, FOR

James W. Andersen, Project Manager
Special Projects Office - Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 148 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 148
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated June 30, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 148 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Phillip F. McKee
Deputy Director for Licensing
Special Projects Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 3, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 148

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3/4 7-9	3/4 7-9
B 3/4 7-5	B 3/4 7-5
B 3/4 7-6	B 3/4 7-6
-	B 3/4 7-6a
B 3/4 7-7	B 3/4 7-7

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1

MODES 2, 3, and 4*, except when a MSIV is closed and deactivated.

ACTION:

MODE 1:

With one MSIV inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours; otherwise be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours

MODES 2, 3, and 4:

With one or more MSIVs inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2, or 3, or 4 may proceed provided the inoperable isolation valve(s) are closed within 8 hours and verified closed once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Separate condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5.1 In MODES 1 and 2, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying a partial stroke in MODES 1 or 2, or a full closure per Surveillance 4.7.1.5.2.

4.7.1.5.2 In MODE 3, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying full closure within 10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal when full stroke tested in MODES 3 or 4. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

4.7.1.5.3 In MODE 4 with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit*, each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, by verifying full closure within 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal when full stroke tested in MODE 4. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4.

*In MODE 4, the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated with RCS temperature less than 320 degrees Fahrenheit.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

LCO

This LCO requires that four MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE. The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal.

This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10CFR100 limits or the NRC Staff approved licensing basis.

APPLICABILITY

The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 and in MODES 2, 3, and 4 except when closed and deactivated when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function.

The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 4 except when closed and deactivated. In MODE 4 with Reactor Coolant System temperature greater than or equal to 320°F, the MSIVs shall close within 120 seconds to ensure that the accident analysis assumptions are met. A temperature greater than or equal to 320°F has been specified because the steam energy is sufficient to provide the motive force to operate the MSIVs.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.

ACTIONS

MODE 1

With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours. Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs.

The 8 hour Completion Time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the MSIVs are valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides a passive barrier for containment isolation.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

MODES 2, 3, and 4

Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2, 3, and 4, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The 8 hour Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in MODE 1.

For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day verification time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.

If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within the next 30 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The Action Statement is modified by a note indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5.1 This surveillance performs a partial stroke test in MODES 1 or 2. The partial stroke test shows that the MSIV's actuation solenoid valves operate in the proper amount of time. In addition, the part stroke test shows that the main valve is free to move. This provides reasonable assurance that the MSIV will operate as assumed in the accident analysis. This surveillance is normally performed during full power operation with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature). In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1 or 2 is not required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

4.7.1.5.2 This surveillance demonstrates that MSIV closure time is less than 10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODE 3, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. A simulated signal is defined as any of the following engineering safety features actuation system instrumentation functional units per Technical Specifications Table 4.3-2: 4.a.1) manual initiation, individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation system, 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d. steam line pressure low, or 4.e. steam line pressure - negative rate high. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident analyses. This surveillance is normally performed upon returning the plant to operation following a refueling outage. The test is normally conducted in MODES 3 or 4 with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature). This surveillance requirement is modified by an exception which allows a delay of testing until the proper operating conditions are met, or until it is desired to operate the valves. This exception to Specification 4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to be cycled to demonstrate post repair OPERABILITY. In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.2, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1 or 2 is not required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1.

4.7.1.5.3 This surveillance verifies that MSIV closure time is less than 120 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in MODE 4, with the RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated with the RCS less than 320 degrees Fahrenheit in MODE 4. A simulated signal is defined as any of the following engineering safety features actuation system instrumentation functional units per Technical Specifications Table 3.4-2: 4.a.1) manual initiation, individual, 4.a.2) manual initiation, system 4.c. containment pressure high-2, 4.d steam line pressure low, or 4.e. steam line pressure - negative rate high. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident analyses.

This surveillance only applies in MODE 4, at an RCS temperature greater than or equal to 320 degrees Fahrenheit, because the MSIVs are steam operated and a minimum steam pressure is required to operate the valve. The test is normally conducted in MODE 4 with the plant at suitable (appropriate) conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature). If the valves are not to be opened or energized in MODE 4, the surveillance is not performed. This surveillance requirement is modified by an exception which allows a delay of testing until the proper operating conditions are met, or until it is desired to operate the valves. This exception to Specification 4.0.4 would also allow the MSIVs to be cycled to demonstrate post repair OPERABILITY. In addition, if the closure time of the MSIV is less than 10 seconds when verified in accordance with Specification 4.7.1.5.3, the OPERABILITY demonstration of the MSIV in MODES 1, 2, or 3 is not required per Specification 4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2.

BASES

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of 60°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 148

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 30, 1997, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). TS Surveillance Requirements 4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2 require the periodic testing of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to demonstrate operability. The proposed amendment would (1) clarify when the MSIVs are partial stroked or full closure tested, (2) add a note to the Mode 4 applicability of Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 to require that the MSIVs be closed and deactivated at less than 320 degrees F, (3) make editorial changes, and (4) make changes to the associated Bases sections.

2.0 BACKGROUND

By letter dated January 15, 1988, Millstone Unit 3 was granted relief for certain valves from the quarterly full stroke surveillance testing requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section XI. In the letter, the NRC stated that the licensee's proposal to partially stroke test the MSIVs during power and full stroke test the valves during shutdowns pursuant to TS 4.0.5 was acceptable. The basis for the relief was that full stroking the MSIVs to the closed position during power operation would result in an unbalanced steam flow condition producing an abnormal power distribution in the reactor core, possibly causing a reactor trip.

Currently, Millstone Unit 3 TS 4.7.1.5.1 requires that each MSIV be demonstrated operable by verifying full closure within 10 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal in Modes 1, 2, and 3 when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

3.0 EVALUATION

In its letter dated June 30, 1997, the licensee stated that the proposed changes to TS Surveillances 4.7.1.5.1 and 4.7.1.5.2, and associated footnote, would clarify the testing of the MSIVs by rewording and separating the

requirements into three surveillances. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.1 would identify a Mode 1 and 2 requirement to partial stroke test the MSIVs in Modes 1 and 2 unless a successful 10-second full stroke test was performed during the surveillance period. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.2 would identify a Mode 3 requirement to perform a 10-second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 3 or 4. Surveillance 4.7.1.5.3 would identify a Mode 4 requirement to perform a 120-second full closure test of the MSIVs in Mode 4 when the reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature is greater than or equal to 320 degrees F.

The licensee further proposed that a footnote be added to the limiting condition for operation and surveillance to identify that the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated when the RCS temperature is less than 320 degrees F. The licensee stated that the footnote would eliminate the potential to declare the MSIVs operable in the upper range of Mode 4 and then allow the MSIVs to remain open during a cooldown into the lower range of Mode 4 where they may not be able to meet their required stroke time.

Partial stroke testing of MSIVs shows that (1) the MSIVs actuation solenoid valves operate in the proper amount of time, and (2) the main valve is free to move. Partial stroke testing also reduces the possibility of reactor trip. Full stroke testing in Modes 3 and/or 4 demonstrate that the valves can fully cycle shut in the required time frames.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's request and the NRC's letter granting relief dated January 15, 1988. Since the licensee's proposed surveillance requirements are consistent with the granted relief request, do not change the required full stroke time limits, and continue to assure that the valves will function consistent with the Millstone Unit 3 accident analyses, the NRC staff finds the changes acceptable.

The staff has reviewed the addition of the footnote, which requires that in Mode 4, the MSIVs are required to be closed and deactivated with RCS temperature less than 320 degrees F. Since the temperature restriction is consistent with the valves manufacturers recommendations and, when the valves are closed they are performing their design function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures, the staff finds the addition of the footnote acceptable.

In addition, the staff has reviewed the editorial changes and has found them acceptable. The changes to the Bases were reviewed and the staff had no objection to the wording.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 40853 dated July 30, 1997). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Andersen

Date: **September 3, 1997**