June 27, 1996

Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum
Executive Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Northeast Utilities Service Company
c/o Mr. Terry L. Harpster
Director - Nuclear Licensing Services
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M92803)

Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 129 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to license amendment application dated June 27, 1995, as supplemented July 21, 1995.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) to relocate TS requirements for the containment purge exhaust and supply valves, and to remove a duplicate testing requirement for the safety injection input from engineered safety features from the TS.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:
Vernon L. Rooney, Senior Project Manager
Northeast Utilities Project Directorate
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 129 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 27, 1996

Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum
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Docket No. 50-423

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2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 129
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated June 27, 1995, as supplemented July 21, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 129 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Phillip F. McKee, Director
Northeast Utilities Project Directorate
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 27, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 129

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3/4 3-3	3/4 3-3
3/4 3-11	3/4 3-11
3/4 3-19	3/4 3-19
3/4 3-24	3/4 3-24
3/4 3-25	3/4 3-25
3/4 3-27	3/4 3-27
3/4 3-37	3/4 3-37
3/4 3-41	3/4 3-41
3/4 3-43	3/4 3-43
3/4 3-44	3/4 3-44
3/4 3-45	3/4 3-45
B 3/4 3-3	B 3/4 3-3

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
12. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low					
a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	3/loop in each operating loop	2/loop in any operating loop	2/loop in each operating loop	1	6
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	3/loop in each operating loop	2/loop in two operating loops	2/loop each operating loop	1	6
13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	4/stm. gen. in each operating stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. each operating stm. gen.	1, 2	6 (1)
14. Low Shaft Speed--Reactor Coolant Pumps					
a. Four loop operation	4-1/pump	2	3	1**	6
b. Three loop operation	3-1/pump	2	2	1**	6
15. Turbine Trip					
a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	3	2	2	1***	12
b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	4	4	4	1***	6
16. Deleted					
17. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	2	1	2	2##	8
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
P-10 Input	4	2	3	1	8
or					
P-13 Input	2	1	2	1	8

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	S	R	Q(18)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
14. Low Shaft Speed - Reactor Coolant Pumps	N.A.	R(13)	Q	N.A.	N.A.	1
15. Turbine Trip						
a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 10)****	N.A.	1
b. Turbine Stop Valve Closure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 10)****	N.A.	1
16. Deleted						
17. Reactor Trip System Interlocks						
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	2**
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
f. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	R	R	N.A.	N.A.	1

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)					
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	4	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	17
c. Purge Isolation	2	1	2	5, 6‡	26
4. Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation					
1) Individual	1/steam line	1/steam line	1/operating steam line	1, 2, 3, 4	24
2) System	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	23
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	22
c. Containment Pressure--High-2	3	2	2	1, 2, 3, 4	20
d. Steam Line Pressure--Low	3/steam line in each operating loop	2/steam line in any operating loop	2/steam line in each operating loop	1, 2, 3#	20
e. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High	3/steam line in each operating loop	2/steam line in any operating loop	2/steam line in each operating loop	3****	20

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

The Steamline Isolation Logic and Safety Injection Logic for this trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.

**** Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

‡ During core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15 - (not used).

ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 18 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation.

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 20 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and

b. the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 21 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 26 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the containment purge and exhaust valves shall be maintained closed. Fuel movement and CORE ALTERATIONS may continue. The containment radiation monitoring channels required for containment area purge and exhaust isolation are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests.

TABLE 3.3-4

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)					
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
b. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	3.3	1.01	1.75	≤ 8.0 psig	≤ 8.8 psig
c. Purge Isolation	N.A	N.A	N.A.	≤ 1 R/h	≤ 1 R/h
4. Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure--High-2	3.3	1.01	1.75	≤ 3.0 psig	≤ 3.8 psig
d. Steam Line Pressure--Low	17.7	15.6	2.2	≥ 658.6 psig*	≥ 648.3 psig*
e. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High	5.0	0.5	0	≤ 100 psi/s**	≤ 122.7 psi/s**

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
3. Containment Isolation								
a. Phase "A" Isolation								
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
b. Phase "B" Isolation								
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Containment Pressure-High-3	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Purge Isolation	S	R	Q	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	5, 6#
4. Steam Line Isolation								
a. Manual Initiation								
1) Individual	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
2) System	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

(1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(2) This surveillance may be performed continuously by the emergency generator load sequencer auto test system as long as the EGLS auto test system is demonstrated operable by the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST at least once per 92 days.

(3) On a monthly basis, a loss of voltage condition will be initiated at each undervoltage monitoring relay to verify individual relay operation. Setpoint verification and actuation of the associated logic and alarm relays will be performed as part of the channel calibration required once per 18 months.

\# During core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

TABLE 3.3-6

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNELS TO TRIP/ALARM	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ALARM/TRIP SETPOINT	ACTION
1. Containment					
a. Deleted					
b. RCS Leakage Detection					
1) Particulate Radioactivity	N.A.	1	1, 2, 3, 4	N.A.	29
2) Gaseous Radioactivity	N.A.	1	1, 2, 3, 4	N.A.	29
2. Fuel Storage Pool Area Monitors					
a. Radiation Level	1	2	*	≤ 15 mR/h	28

TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

* With fuel in the fuel storage pool areas.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 27 - Not used.

ACTION 28 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, fuel movement may continue for up to 30 days provided an appropriate portable continuous monitor with the same Alarm Setpoint is provided in the fuel storage pool area. Restore the inoperable monitors to OPERABLE status within 30 days or suspend all operations involving fuel movement in the fuel storage pool areas.

ACTION 29 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.6.1.

TABLE 4.3-3
RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Containment				
a. Deleted				
b. RCS Leakage Detection				
1) Particulate Radioactivity	S	R	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Gaseous Radioactivity	S	R	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
2. Fuel Storage Pool Area Monitors				
a. Radiation Level	S	R	Q	*

TABLE NOTATIONS

* With fuel in the fuel storage pool area.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valves on T_{avg} below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.

Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.

P-11 On increasing pressurizer pressure, P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure. On decreasing pressure, P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure.

P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.

P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves, main feed pumps and main turbine, and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 129

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 27, 1995, as supplemented July 21, 1995, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise the TS to relocate containment purge exhaust and supply valves TS requirements, and to remove a duplicate testing requirement for the safety injection input from engineered safety features (ESF) from the TS.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Relocation of Requirements for Containment High Range Radiation Monitors

The licensee proposed to relocate the operability and surveillance requirements for the containment high range radiation monitors (3RMS*RE41 and 3RMS*RE42) from TS Section 3/4.3.3, "Monitoring Instrumentation - Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations," to TS Section 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation." This change was initiated following an investigation of the December 10, 1991, failure of radiation monitor 3RMS*RE41, which resulted in the automatic closure of the containment purge exhaust and supply valves. After reviewing the reporting criteria under 10 CFR 50.73(a), the licensee initially determined that the event should be classified as non-reportable. However, subsequent evaluations concluded that the event described was an ESF actuation which must be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(iv). The licensee's misclassification of the event was attributed to the fact that the requirements for the containment purge exhaust and supply valves were not located in the ESF TS tables.

The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are part of the Containment Isolation System. These valves are normally closed during power operation and are designed to close automatically during cold shutdown on a high radiation signal from the containment area radiation monitors. Currently, the TS requirements for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are located in the Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TS

tables. In Chapter 6 of the Millstone Unit 3, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the Containment Isolation System is identified as an ESF. To avoid additional errors in reporting, the licensee proposed to move the containment purge exhaust and supply valves TS requirements to the ESF Instrumentation TS tables. The licensee proposed the following changes to remove all of the containment purge exhaust and supply valve requirements from the Radiation Monitoring portions of TS:

(1) Table 3.3-6, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation for Plant Operations"

   (a) Delete line item 1a, Containment Area Purge and Exhaust Isolation

   (b) Delete Action 26 from "Action Statements"

(2) Delete line item 1a, Containment Area Purge and Exhaust Isolation, from Table 4.3-3, "Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation for Plant Operations Surveillance Requirements"

(3) Remove "or automatic isolation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation System" from the latter part of the last sentence in TS Section 3/4.3.3.1, "Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations." The last sentence would read "Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms."

The licensee proposed the following changes to add all of the containment purge exhaust and supply valve requirements to the ESF portions of the TS. With the exception of a few editorial changes, the new table values and table notes were taken directly from the Radiation Monitoring TS tables:

(1) Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation"

   (a) Add an item to line item 3, Containment Isolation, that would describe the purge isolation as having 2 total number of channels, 1 trip channel, 2 minimum channels required operable, Modes 5 and 6 as the applicable modes (with a reference to change 1b below), and Action 26 (with a reference to change 1c below). The table details were obtained from Table 3.3-6.

   (b) Add a note to the table to clarify that in addition to Modes 5 and 6, the Action Statements are also applicable during core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. Also noted, the provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are applicable only in Modes 1 through 4.

   (c) Add Action 26 from Table 3.3-6 to the Action Statements list. The first sentence would be reworded for clarity.

(2) Table 3.3-4, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints" - Add an item to line item 3, Containment Isolation, that would denote the trip setpoint and allowable value to be ≤1R/h which is obtained from Table 3.3-6.

(3) Table 4.3-2, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements"

(a) Add an item to line item 3, Containment Isolation, to describe the purge isolation Surveillance Requirements to include a semi-annual channel check, a refueling outage channel calibration, a quarterly analog channel operational test, and Modes 5 and 6 for which surveillance is required (with reference to change 3b below).

(b) Add a note to specify that in addition to Modes 5 and 6, the Actions are also applicable during core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel within the containment. It was also noted that the provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable (only applicable in Modes 1 through 4).

The NRC staff has determined that the change relocates previously approved TS requirements from one TS table to another and is therefore, acceptable.

2.2 Removal of Duplicate Testing Requirements for Safety Injection (SI) Input from ESF

The licensee proposed to remove line item 16, Safety Injection (SI) Input from ESF, from TS Table 3.3-1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation", and from TS Table 4.3-1, "RTS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements." As indicated in Table 4.3-1, the TS currently require that a trip actuating device operational test (TADOT) be performed on an 18-month frequency for line item 16. As defined in the TS, a TADOT consists of operating the trip actuating device and verifying operability of alarm, interlock, and/or trip functions.

A reactor trip occurs when the SI system is manually or automatically actuated. Automatic SI actuation is initiated by high containment pressure, low compensated steamline pressure, or pressurizer low pressure. The licensee stated that there is no single trip actuating device associated with the automatic SI actuation signal to cause a reactor trip. Instead, the signal originates as three separate inputs from the three pressure signals that cause an automatic SI actuation. Likewise, the manual SI actuation signal, which is generated by pressing two pushbuttons in the main control room, is fed directly to the reactor trip instrumentation to cause a reactor trip. A requirement for a TADOT for "Safety Injection Input from ESF" is very misleading since it does not correspond to a single device. In addition, a TADOT is not specified for any other automatic reactor trip signal.

The safety injection signal is listed as a reactor trip in FSAR Table 7.2-1, "List of Reactor Trips." However, the safety injection signal is not listed along with the other reactor trip signals as having associated instrumentation in FSAR Table 7.2-3, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation." In addition, FSAR Figure 7.2-1, Sheet 8, "Safeguards Actuation Signals," shows four separate signals going directly to the reactor trip instrumentation - high containment pressure, low compensated steamline pressure, pressurizer low pressure, and manual SI actuation. This confirms that there is no single trip actuating device associated with an automatic SI actuation signal to cause a reactor trip.

The licensee stated that the current testing associated with "SI Input from ESF" (Table 4.3-1, Item 16) is duplicated by the following line items: (1) Table 4.3-1, Item 19, "Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays," (2) Table 4.3-2, Item 1a, "Safety Injection - Manual Initiation," and (3) Table 4.3-2, Item 1b, "Safety Injection - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays." Item 19 requires the performance of an Actuation Logic Test on a monthly staggered test basis. The TS defines the actuation logic test to be the application of various simulated input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock state and verification of the required logic output. This test also includes a continuity check, as a minimum, of the output devices. Item 19 covers the testing of all of the logic circuitry that produces a signal to perform a reactor trip, which would therefore include the signals generated by a manual or automatic SI. In addition, this testing is performed on a more frequent basis than Item 16, monthly staggered versus refueling.

Item 1a, "SI - Manual Initiation," requires the performance of a TADOT on a refueling basis. This test verifies the operability of the manual SI pushbuttons in the control room through to the initiation of SI, as well as, a reactor trip. Item 1b, "SI - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays," requires the performance of an actuation logic test on a monthly staggered basis. This test covers the testing of all of the logic circuitry that produces a signal to initiate a safety injection, which would therefore include the signals generated by the manual SI pushbuttons, low pressurizer pressure, low steamline pressure, and high containment pressure.

The NRC staff concludes that removal of the tests required by line item 16 in TS Tables 3.3.1 and 4.3.1 will not impact overall testing of ESF or RTS instrumentation logics. The staff finds that the tests are duplicated by other RTS and ESF Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements. The change is therefore acceptable.

The licensee proposed two changes to the plant's TS. The first change relocates the TS requirements for the containment purge exhaust and supply valves from the radiation monitoring instrumentation tables to the ESF actuation system tables. This change resulted in the transfer of previously approved data from one table to another. The second proposed change removes line item 16, SI Input from ESF, from TS Tables 3.3-1 and 4.3-1. The NRC staff agrees that the tests required by Item 16, "SI Input from ESF," are in fact duplicated by other RTS and ESF Actuation System Instrumentation

Surveillance Requirements. The removal of line item 16 from Tables 4.3-1 and 3.3-1 has no impact on the overall testing of ESF or RTS instrumentation logics. In conclusion, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes and finds them to be acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 62494 dated December 6, 1995). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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