Mr. Neil S. Carns
Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus
Director - Regulatory Affairs
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

December 18, 1

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M99747)

Dear Mr. Carns:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 154 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your application dated October 7, 1997, as supplemented December 17, 1997.

Technical Specifications 4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, and 3/4.6.1.3 require the testing of the containment to verify leakage limits at a specified test pressure. The amendment (1) modifies the list of valves that can be opened in Modes 1 through 4; (2) removes a footnote on Type A testing; and (3) makes editorial changes to the Technical Specifications and associated Bases sections.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

James W. Andersen, Project Manager
Special Projects Office - Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 154 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 18, 1997

Mr. Neil S. Carns
Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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Director - Regulatory Affairs
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2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 154
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated October 7, 1997, as supplemented December 17, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) <u>Technical Specifications</u>

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 154 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Phillip F. McKee

Phillip F. McKee
Deputy Director for Licensing
Special Projects Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 18, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 154

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2	3/4 6-2
3/4 6-3	3/4 6-3
3/4 6-5	3/4 6-5
3/4 6-6	3/4 6-6
B 3/4 6-1	B 3/4 6-1
B 3/4 6-1a	B 3/4 6-1a

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves are opened under administrative control,** and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at a pressure greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L_a.

* Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

** The following valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. Manual valves 3SSP*V13, 3SSP*V14, 3HCS*V2, 3HCS*V3, 3HCS*V9, 3HCS*V10, 3HCS*V6, 3HCS*V13, 3CHS*V371, 3MSS*V885, 3MSS*V886, 3MSS*V887. Remote manual valves 3RHS*MV8701A, 3RHS*MV8701B, 3RHS*MV8702A, 3RHS*MV8702B.

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L_a, 0.3% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, 38.57 psig;

b. A combined leakage rate of less than 0.60 L_a for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a; and

c. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.042 L_a for all penetrations that are Secondary Containment bypass leakage paths when pressurized to P_a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L_a, or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L_a, or the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.042 L_a, restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than 0.75 L_a, the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L_a, and the combined bypass leakage rate to less than 0.042 L_a prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 (Total Time Method) and/or ANSI/ANS 56.8-1981 (Mass Point Method):

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at approximately equal intervals during shutdown at a pressure greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig, during each 10-year service period.

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet 0.75 L_a, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet 0.75 L_a, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet 0.75 L_a at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:

   1) Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the supplemental test results, L_c, minus the sum of the Type A and the superimposed leak, L_o, is equal to or less than 0.25 L_a;

   2) Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test; and

   3) Requires that the rate at which gas is injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test is between 0.75 L_a and 1.25 L_a.

d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at a pressure greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig, at intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving:

   1) Air locks

e. The combined bypass leakage rate shall be determined to be less than or equal to 0.042 L_a by applicable Type B and C tests at least once per 24 months except for penetrations which are not individually testable; penetrations not individually testable shall be determined to have no detectable leakage when tested with soap bubbles while the containment is pressurized to greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig, during each Type A test;

f. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.3;

g. Purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specifications 4.6.3.2.c and 4.9.9.

h. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 The containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L_a at P_a, 38.57 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:

1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed* and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed,

2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days,

3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, and

4. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements.

b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

*Except during entry to repair an inoperable inner door, for a cumulative time not to exceed 1 hour per year.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. 1) Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying no detectable seal leakage by pressure decay when the volume between the door seals is pressurized to greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig, for at least 15 minutes; |

or

2) Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying that the seal leakage is less than 0.01 L_a as determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 30 seconds with the volume between the seals at a constant pressure of greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig; |

or

3) Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by completing an overall air lock leakage test per 4.6.1.3.b.

b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests at a pressure greater than or equal to P_a, 38.57 psig, and verifying the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit: |

1) At least once per 6 months,* and

2) Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.**

c. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

**This represents an exemption to Appendix J, paragraph III.D.2.(b)(ii), of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions and the control room operators dose to within the guidelines of GDC 19.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a. As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than 0.75 L_a during performance of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The Limiting Condition for Operation defines the limitations on containment leakage rates for compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix J. The leakage rates are verified by surveillance testing in accordance with the requirements of Appendix J. Although the LCO specifies the leakage rates at accident pressure, P_a, it is not feasible to perform a test at such an exact value for pressure. Consequently, the surveillance testing is performed at a pressure greater than or equal to P_a to account for test instrument uncertainties and stabilization changes. This conservative test pressure ensures that the measured leakage rates are representative of those which would occur at accident pressure while meeting the intent of the LCO. This test methodology is consistent with the guidance provided in ANSI/ANS 56.8-1981 for meeting the requirements set forth in Appendix J.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50. A partial exemption has been granted from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Section III.D.1(a). The exemption removes the requirement that the third Type A test for each 10-year period be conducted when the plant is shut down for the 10-year plant inservice inspection (Reference License Amendment No. 111).

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE (continued)

The enclosure building bypass leakage paths are listed in Operating Procedure 3273, "Technical Requirements - Supplementary Technical Specifications." The addition or deletion of the enclosure building bypass leakage paths shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10CFR50 and approved [by the Plant Operation Review Committee.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests. While the leakage rate limitation is specified at accident pressure, P_a, the actual surveillance testing is performed by applying a pressure greater than or equal to P_a. This higher pressure accounts for test instrument uncertainties and test volume stabilization changes which occurs under actual test conditions. This method of performing surveillance testing is consistent with the guidance provided in ANSI 56.8-1981 and ensures that the leakage rate measured meets the intent of the LCO and Appendix J.

3/4.6.1.4 and 3/4.6.1.5 AIR PRESSURE and AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment pressure and average air temperature ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure of 8 psia, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 60 psia during LOCA conditions. Measurements shall be made at all listed locations, whether by fixed or portable instruments, prior to determining the average air temperature. The limits on the pressure and average air temperature are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis. The minimum total containment pressure of 10.6 psia is determined by summing the minimum permissible air partial pressure of 8.9 psia and the maximum expected vapor pressure of 1.7 psia (occurring at the maximum permissible containment initial temperature of 120°F).

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 154

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 7, 1997, as supplemented December 17, 1997, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). TS 4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, and 3/4.6.1.3 require the testing of the containment to verify leakage limits at a specified test pressure. The proposed amendment would (1) modify the list of valves that can be opened in Modes 1 through 4, (2) remove a footnote on Type A testing, and (3) make editorial changes to the Technical Specifications and associated Bases sections. The December 17, 1997, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the October 7, 1997, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Modify List of Valves - TS 4.6.1.1

TS 4.6.1.1 currently requires verification that all containment penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves are opened under administrative control, and required to be closed during accident conditions, are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions. A footnote for TS 4.6.1.1 lists the valves that may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control. In its letter dated October 7, 1997, the licensee stated that valves 3FPW-V661, 3FPW-V666, 3SAS-V875, 3SAS-V50, 3CCP-V886, 3CCP-887, and 3CVS-V13 are in lines that penetrate containment where either the inside containment isolation valve is a manual valve, or the line communicates with containment atmosphere, or has minimal operational need to be opened under administrative control. The licensee stated that deleting these valves from the list of valves that are allowed to be opened under administrative control means that the valves will remain closed (locked closed) and, therefore, cannot affect the failure probability of a containment isolation valve to close. The licensee further stated that deleting the valves from the list does not modify plant response to or mitigation strategy for any accident.

In addition, the licensee proposed adding seven valves (3MSS*V885, 3MSS*V886, 3MSS*V887, 3RHS*MV8701A/B, and 3RHS*MV8702A/B) to the list of valves allowed to be opened under administrative control. These valves are in the steam lines to the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and the residual heat removal (RHR) system. The licensee stated that valves 3MSS*V885, 3MSS*V886, and 3MSS*V887 are opened to warm the steam-driven AFW pump and were recently reclassified as containment isolation valves. The licensee stated that RHR valves (3RHS*MV8701A/B and 3RHS*MV8702A/B) are opened during cooldown and heatup in Mode 4.

The NRC staff has reviewed the deletions to the list of valves (3FPW-V661, 3FPW-V666, 3SAS-V875, 3SAS-V50, 3CCP-V886, 3CCP-887, and 3CVS-V13) that may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls. The staff has determined that the deletions from the list are acceptable since the valves can no longer be opened in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 and will continue to be verified closed in accordance with TS 4.6.1.1. The staff reviewed the additions to the list (3MSS*V885, 3MSS*V886, 3MSS*V887, 3RHS*MV8701A/B, and 3RHS*MV8702A/B) and has determined that the additions are acceptable since valves 3MSS*V885, 3MSS*V886, and 3MSS*V887 are required to be opened to warm the steam lines prior to testing the steam-driven AFW pump and valves 3RHS*MV8701A/B and 3RHS*MV8702A/B are opened during cooldown and heatup in Mode 4. In addition, the licensee stated that the opening of containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative controls includes (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. The licensee proposed to add the definition of administrative controls to the appropriate Bases section, which is acceptable to the staff. Therefore, the administrative controls provide assurance that these valves will be closed and allowing them to be opened will not adversely impact the consequences of the analyzed Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 15 events.

2.2 Footnote Deletion - TS 4.6.1.2

In its letter dated October 7, 1997, the licensee proposed deleting the footnote associated with TS 4.6.1.2.a. The footnote referred to an exemption granted by the NRC by letter dated May 8, 1995, which permitted the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Type A test to be delayed until the sixth refueling outage. However, in its October 7, 1997, letter, the licensee stated that it intends to perform the Type A test during the current extended shutdown; therefore, the footnote is not needed. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's request and finds it acceptable.

2.3 Editorial and Bases Changes

In its letter dated October 7, 1997, the licensee requested the following editorial changes (1) that the "-" be replaced with a "*" for a number of containment isolation valves in a footnote to TS 4.6.1.1; (2) the word "manual" be moved to before the list of manual valves and "remote manual" be added before the list of remote manual valves in a footnote to TS 4.6.1.1; and (3) that in TS 3.6.1.2.a, 3.6.1.3.b, 4.6.1.1.c, 4.6.1.2.a, 4.6.1.2.d, 4.6.1.2.e, 4.6.1.3.a, and 4.6.1.3.b where words similar to "P_a 53.27 psia (38.57 psig)" are used, be changed to "P_a, 38.57 psig" and that, where appropriate, words similar to "not less than" are used, be changed to "greater than or equal to." The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed editorial changes and finds them acceptable. In addition, the staff has reviewed the associated Bases changes and has no objection to the wording.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 59917). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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