

December 16, 1993

Docket No. 50-423

Mr. John F. Opeka
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Opeka:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M77362)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 88 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your application dated March 19, 1993.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) to reflect staff positions and improvements to the TS in response to Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability, and Generic Issue 94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light Water Reactors.'" Generic Issue 94 was closed out by Amendment 80 dated July 12, 1993. With the issuance of this TS amendment, we consider your response to Generic Letter 90-06 and Generic Issue 70 (TAC No. M77362) complete for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

9312210131 931216
PDR ADOCK 05000423
P PDR

Vernon L. Rooney, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 88 to NPF-49
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 16, 1993

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Executive Vice President, Nuclear
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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "V. L. Rooney".

Vernon L. Rooney, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4*
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 88 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Mr. John F. Opeka
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 3

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 88
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated March 19, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 88 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 16, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 88

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 4-12
3/4 4-13
3/4 4-43
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B 3/4 4-2a
B 3/4 4-14
--

Insert

3/4 4-12
3/4 4-13
3/4 4-43
3/4 4-43a
B 3/4 4-2a
B 3/4 4-14
B 3/4 4-15*

*Spill over page

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4. Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both PORV(s) inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With one or both block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or place its associated PORV(s) control switch to "CLOSE." Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to operable status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

RELIEF VALVES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and
- b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel during MODES 3 or 4.

4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b. or c. in Specification 3.4.4.

4.4.4.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.11 At least one Reactor Coolant System vent path consisting of two parallel trains with two valves in series powered from emergency busses shall be OPERABLE and the vent closed* at each of the following locations:

- a. Reactor vessel head, and
- b. Pressurizer steam space.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one train of the reactor vessel head vent path inoperable, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable train is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all valves in the inoperable train; restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With both trains of the reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable; maintain both trains closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all valves in the inoperable trains, and restore at least one of the trains to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With any valve(s) of the pressurizer steam space vent path inoperable in MODES 1, 2, or 3, follow the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.4.
- d. With any valve(s) of the pressurizer steam space vent path inoperable in MODE 4, follow the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.9.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.11.1 Each train of the reactor vessel head vent path isolation valve not required to be closed by ACTION a. or b., above, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel from the control room.

* For an OPERABLE vent path using a power-operated relief valve (PORV) as the vent path, the PORV block valve is not required to be closed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.11.2 Each train of the reactor vessel head vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position,
- b. Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room, and
- c. Verifying flow through the Reactor Coolant System vent paths during venting.

4.4.11.3 Each train of the pressurizer steam space vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable requirement of Specifications 4.4.4.1 through 4.4.4.3 and 4.4.9.3.1. In addition, flow shall be verified through the pressurizer steam space vent path during venting at least once per 18 months.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

RELIEF VALVES (Continued)

Action statements a, b, and c distinguishes the inoperability of the power operated relief valves (PORV). Specifically, a PORV may be designated inoperable but it may be able to manually open and close and therefore, able to perform its function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small-break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the action requires power to be maintained to the valve. This allows quick access to the PORV for pressure control. On the other hand if a PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it must be either restored or isolated by closing the associated block valve and removing power.

The prime importance for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck-open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve(s) cannot be restored to operable status within 1 hour, the remedial action is to place the PORV in manual control (i.e. the control switch in the "CLOSE" position) to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential of a stuck-open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable. The time allowed to restore the block valve(s) to operable status is based upon the remedial action time limits for inoperable PORV per ACTION requirements b and c. These actions do not specify closure of the block valves because such action would not likely be possible when the block valve is inoperable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration.

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or two RHR suction relief valves or one PORV and one RHR suction relief valve or an RCS vent opening of at least 5.4 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350°F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50° above the RCS cold leg temperature, or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water-solid RCS. The relieving capacity of each RHR suction relief valve is more than adequate to relieve the combined flow of two centrifugal charging pumps. The RHR suction relief valves provides this protection only when the RHR suction valves are open.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS) is derived by analysis which models the performance of the COPS assuming various mass input and heat input transients. Operation with a PORV Setpoint less than or equal to the maximum Setpoint ensures that Appendix G criteria will not be violated with consideration for a maximum pressure overshoot beyond the PORV Setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and single failure. To ensure that mass and heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require lockout of all but one centrifugal charging pump

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES (Continued)

while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head installed and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temperature is more than 50° above primary temperature.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the COPS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 80 Edition and Addenda through Winter except where specific written relief has been granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensable gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of least one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensures that the capability exists to perform this function. The reactor vessel head vent path consists of two parallel flow paths with redundant isolation valves (3RCS*SV8095A, 3RCS*SV8096A and 3RCS*SV8095B, 3RCS*SV8096B) in each flow path. The pressurizer steam space vent path consists of two parallel paths with a power operated relief valve (PORV) and PORV block valve in series (3RCS*PCV455A, 3RCS*MV800A and 3RCS*PCV456, 3RCS*MV8000B).

The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plant Requirements," November 1980.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 88

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 19, 1993, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, (NNECO, the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise the TS to reflect staff positions and improvements to the TS in response to Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, 'Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability, and Generic Issue 94, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light Water Reactors.'" Generic Issue 94 was closed out by Amendment 80 dated July 12, 1993. This Safety Evaluation addresses only Generic Issue 70.

2.0 EVALUATION

The actions proposed by the NRC staff to improve the reliability of power operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves represent a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety and a determination has been made that the attendant costs are justified in view of this increased protection. The technical findings and the regulatory analysis related to Generic Issue 70 are discussed in NUREG-1316, "Technical Findings and Regulatory Analysis Related to Generic Issue 70 - Evaluation of Power-Operated Relief Valve Reliability in PWR Nuclear Power Plants."

The proposed TS changes are described below:

A. Section 3/4.4.4 Relief Valves

1. Clarify the limiting condition for operation (LCO) and ACTION Statements by replacing "all" with "both" to reflect the Millstone Unit No. 3 design.
2. ACTION Statement a: Replace "because of excessive seat leakage" with "and capable of being manually cycled."

3. ACTION Statment b and c: Replace "because of excessive seat leakage" with "and not capable of being manually cycled." This will differentiate these ACTION Statements from ACTION a.
4. ACTION Statement c: Replace "each of the" with "at least one." This proposed change will make Action Statement c consistent with Action c proposed in GL 90-06.
5. ACTION Statement d: This has been modified to establish remedial measures that are consistent with the function of the block valves.
6. Surveillance 4.4.4.1.b: A requirement to operate the PORV(s) through one complete cycle of full travel during Modes 3 or 4 has been added.
7. Bases Section 3/4.4.4: This section has been revised to reflect changes to ACTION Statements a, b, c, and d.

B. Section 3.4.9.3 Overpressure Protection Systems
Bases Section 3.4.9.3 (page B 3/4-14)

Bases Section 3.4.9.3 is being revised to reflect recent changes to Technical Specification Section 3.4.9.3

C. Section 3/4.4.4.11 Reactor Coolant System Vents

1. LCO: The LCO has been revised to clarify that the RCS vent path consists of two parallel trains with two valves in series at the reactor vessel head and pressurizer steam space. In addition, it is noted that for an operable vent path using a PORV as the vent path, the PORV block valve is not required to be closed.
2. ACTION Requirements: Separate ACTION Statements are being proposed for the reactor vessel head vent path and the pressurizer steam space vent path. As a result of the above, two additional ACTION requirements are being added.
3. ACTION c has been added to require that if any valve(s) in the pressurizer steam space vent path are inoperable during Modes 1, 2, and 3, the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.4 are to be followed.
4. ACTION d has been added to require that if any valve(s) in the pressurizer steam space vent path are inoperable during Mode 4, the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.4.9.3 are to be followed.
5. Surveillance 4.4.11.1 and 4.4.11.2 have been revised to only apply to the reactor vessel head vent path and Surveillance 4.4.11.3 has been added to address the pressurizer steam space vent path. Surveillance 4.4.11.3 has the pressurizer steam space vent path demonstrated operable by Surveillance Specifications 4.4.4.1 through 4.4.4.3 and 4.4.9.3.1, and by verifying flow during venting every 18 months. The surveillances are not being changed or deleted.

6. Bases Section B3/4.4.11 is being revised to clarify the changes to the Technical Specification.

The proposed changes to the Millstone 3 TS included in the licensee's letter of March 19, 1993, are consistent with that proposed in the staff's Generic Letter 90-06. One of the proposed changes involves inoperable PORVs. The licensee has made an inoperability distinction based on whether or not the PORV is capable of being manually cycled. Although a PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed, and therefore, able to contribute to the performance of a safety function. PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The staff finds this acceptable.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed modifications to the Millstone 3 TS. Since the proposed modifications are consistent with the staff's position previously stated in Generic Letter 90-06, and found to be justified in the above mentioned regulatory analysis, the staff finds the proposed modifications to be acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 32388). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: V. Rooney

Date: December 16, 1993