

August 28, 1995

Mr. John F. Opeka  
Executive Vice President, Nuclear  
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
Post Office Box 270  
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M92197)

Dear Mr. Opeka:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 119 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your application dated April 28, 1995, as supplemented August 2, 1995.

The amendment changes Technical Specification (TS) Sections 3.7.5, 4.7.5, and 3/4.7.5, to permit Millstone Unit 3 to remain in operation with the average ultimate heat sink water temperature greater than 75° F (but less than or equal to 77° F) for a period of 12 hours.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Vernon L. Rooney, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No.119 to NPF-49  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 28, 1995

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "V. Rooney", written over a horizontal line.

Vernon L. Rooney, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

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2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

J. Opeka  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 3

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 119  
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated April 28, 1995, as supplemented August 2, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 119 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Phillip F. McKee, Director  
Project Directorate I-3  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 28, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.119

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

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xv  
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B 3/4 7-3  
B 3/4 7-4  
B 3/4 7-5  
B 3/4 7-5a  
B 3/4 7-6  
B 3/4 7-7

Insert

xiv  
xv  
3/4 7-13  
B 3/4 7-3  
B 3/4 7-4  
B 3/4 7-5  
B 3/4 7-6  
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### 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink (UHS) shall be OPERABLE with an average water temperature of less than or equal to 75°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

If the UHS temperature is above 75°F, monitor the UHS temperature once per hour for 12 hours. If the UHS temperature does not drop below 75°F during this period, place the plant in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. During this period, if the UHS temperature increases above 77°F, place the plant in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.5 The UHS shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the average water temperature to be within limits.
- b. At least once per 6 hours by verifying the average water temperature to be within limits when the average water temperature exceeds 70°F.

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#### 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator  $RT_{NDT}$  of 60°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

#### 3/4.7.3 REACTOR PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

#### 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

##### Background

The ultimate heat sink (UHS) for Millstone Unit No. 3 is Long Island Sound. It serves as a heat sink for both safety and nonsafety-related cooling systems. Sensible heat is discharged to the UHS via the service water and circulating water systems.

##### Limiting Condition for Operation

The UHS is required to be OPERABLE and is considered OPERABLE if the average water temperature is less than or equal to 75°F. The limitation on the UHS temperature ensures that cooling water at less than the design temperature (75°F)

## PLANT SYSTEMS

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#### Limiting Condition for Operation (Continued)

is available to either (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits. It is based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974.

The UHS temperature is measured at the six circulating water system inlet waterboxes. The plant process computer samples the operating waterbox temperature measurements, excludes the highest and lowest measurements, and averages the remaining temperatures. An evaluation has determined that measuring at this location is representative of the UHS temperature. The only exception to this would be when a condenser thermal backwashing evolution is being conducted. During this evolution, there is a potential for significant intake structure temperature stratification. Therefore, during condenser thermal backwashing evolutions, the UHS temperature should be monitored by temperature instruments in the service water system to assure OPERABILITY of the UHS.

#### Applicability

In MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4, the UHS is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the UHS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

#### Action Statement

When the UHS temperature is above 75°F, the Action Statement for the LCO requires that the UHS temperature be monitored for 12 hours, and the plant be placed in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours in the event the UHS temperature does not drop below 75°F during the 12-hour monitoring period.

The 12-hour interval is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable modes. During this period, the UHS temperature will be monitored on an increased frequency. If the trend shows improvement, and if the trend of the UHS temperature gives reasonable expectations that the temperature will decrease below 75°F during the 12 hour monitoring period, the UHS temperature will be continued to be monitored during the remaining portion of the 12-hour period. However, if it becomes apparent that the UHS temperature will remain above 75°F throughout the 12-hour monitoring period, conservative action regarding compliance with the Action Statement should be taken.

An evaluation was conducted to qualify the risk significance of various Chapter 15 initiating events and earthquakes during periods of elevated UHS temperature. It concluded that a seismic event was not credible for the time periods with elevated UHS temperature. Additionally, the risk significance of a Condition IV accident occurring during a period of elevated UHS temperature is considered to be negligibly small when compared to the risk significance of Chapter 15 events that are more likely to occur.

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#### Action Statement (Continued)

With respect to the service water loads, the limiting Condition II and III Chapter 15 event initiators are those that add additional heat loads to the service water system. A loss of offsite power event is limiting because of the added loads due to the diesel generator and the residual heat removal heat exchanger. A steam generator tube rupture event is limiting because of the addition of the safety injection and diesel generator loads without isolation of the turbine plant component cooling water loads (no loss of offsite power or containment depressurization actuation signal). Both of these scenarios have been evaluated with the additional consideration of a single failure. The evaluation investigated whether or not these events could be resolved with an elevated UHS temperature. It was determined that Millstone Unit No. 3 could recover from these events, even with an elevated temperature of 77°F.

This evaluation provides the basis for the action statement requirement to place the plant in HOT STANDBY with six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours, if the UHS temperature goes above 77°F during the 12-hour monitoring period.

#### Surveillance Requirements

For the surveillance requirements, the UHS temperature is measured at the locations described in the LCO write-up provided in this section.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5.a verifies that the UHS is capable of providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature. The 24-hour frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable modes. This surveillance requirement verifies that the average water temperature of the UHS is less than or equal to 75°F.

Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5.b requires that the UHS temperature be monitored on an increased frequency whenever the UHS temperature is greater than 70°F during the applicable modes. The intent of this Surveillance Requirement is to increase the awareness of plant personnel regarding UHS temperature trends above 70°F. The frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable modes.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

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#### 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION

The limitation on flood protection ensures that the service water pump cubicle watertight doors will be closed before the water level reaches the critical elevation of 14.5 feet Mean Sea Level. Elevation 14.5 feet MSL is the level at which external flood waters could enter the service water pump cubicle.

#### 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent for the duration of the accident. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

#### 3/4.7.8 CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the two independent Control Room Envelope Pressurization Systems ensures that: (1) breathable air is supplied to the control room, instrumentation rack room, and computer room, and (2) a positive pressure is maintained within the control room envelope during control building isolation. Each system will provide air to the control room for 1 hour following an initiation of a control building isolation signal at which time, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System would be started.

#### 3/4.7.9 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building Filter System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the equipment within the charging pump,

## PLANT SYSTEMS

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#### 3/4.7.9 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM (Continued)

component cooling water pump and heat exchanger areas following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The charging pump/reactor plant component cooling water pump ventilation system must be operational to ensure operability of the auxiliary building filter system and the supplementary leak collection and release system. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

#### 3/4.7.10 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. For the purpose of declaring the affected system OPERABLE with the inoperable snubber(s), an engineering evaluation may be performed, in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. Snubbers of the same manufacturer but having different internal mechanisms are classified as different types. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system. In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a

## PLANT SYSTEMS

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#### 3/4.7.10 SNUBBERS (Continued)

safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers. For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 5% tested for each functional testing failure, or
2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or
3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

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#### 3/4.7.11 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(a)(3) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with Surveillance Requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

#### 3/4.7.14 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance for instrument error of  $\pm 2.2^{\circ}\text{F}$ .



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 119

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 28, 1995, as supplemented August 2, 1995, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would change TS Sections 3.7.5, 4.7.5, and 3/4.7.5 to permit Millstone Unit 3 to remain in operation with the average ultimate heat sink (UHS) water temperature greater than 75° F (but less than or equal to 77° F) for 12 hours and would delete from the TS the location specified for measurement of the UHS water temperature. The August 2, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The UHS for Millstone Unit 3 is the Long Island Sound which is the source of cooling water for removing heat from both safety and non-safety related cooling systems during normal power operation, shutdowns and accident conditions via the service water and circulating water systems. It is required to be OPERABLE and is considered OPERABLE if the average water temperature is less than or equal to 75° F. Due to the unusually hot weather experienced in July 1994 (the highest average monthly temperature on record in Connecticut), the Long Island Sound temperature approached the 75° F limit. It is expected that, in the future, the Long Island Sound water temperature may approach or exceed the 75° F limit for a short duration. Therefore, by letter dated April 28, 1995, the licensee requested an amendment to Operating License NPF-49.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 TS Section 3.7.5 - Limiting Condition for Operation

With regard to LCO, current TS Section 3.7.5 states that:

The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with an average water temperature of less than or equal to 75° F at the Unit 3 intake structure.

The licensee proposed to delete the phrase, "at the Unit 3 intake structure," from the current TS.

The licensee stated that the average UHS temperature is obtained by averaging the temperatures measured at the service and circulating water system inlet waterboxes located at the intake structure. Based on an evaluation, the licensee determined that measuring at this location is representative of the UHS temperature. The only exception to this would be when a condenser thermal backwashing evolution is being conducted. Since there is a potential for significant water temperature stratification at the intake structure during this evolution, the licensee stated that when thermal backwashing occurs, operability of the UHS should be monitored by temperature instruments in the service water system. Deleting the phrase, "at the Unit 3 intake structure," from the current TS will permit the use of the temperatures measured in the service water system to represent the average UHS temperature during the evolution when a condenser thermal backwashing is being conducted, and is acceptable as described below.

Based on the staff's review of the licensee's rationale, the staff finds that there is no change to the measuring method used to determine the average UHS temperature during normal operation (when a condenser thermal backwashing is not being conducted), and that the use of the temperatures measured in the service water system to represent the average UHS temperature during the evolution when a condenser thermal backwashing occurs provides an alternate method and a more conservative approach to determine the average UHS temperature. Therefore, the staff agrees with the licensee that operability of the UHS should be monitored by temperature instruments in the service water system during the brief period when a condenser thermal backwashing evolution is being conducted. No safety significance is attached to the UHS temperature monitoring location, as long as the location is representative of the average temperature of the circulating and service water systems. The monitoring location should measure a temperature representative of the temperature of cooling water which reaches the heat exchangers where heat is rejected from reactor and plant heat sources. The optimum location can vary for a particular plant based on the operation configuration (as in this case during condenser backwash). The location of measurement is not required to be in Technical specifications by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(A), (B), (C), or (D). Also, the staff concludes that deleting the phrase, "at the Unit 3 intake structure," from the current TS will have insignificant or no impact on the performance of both safety and non-safety systems. Therefore, the staff finds the above proposed changes acceptable.

## 2.2 TS Section 3.7.5 - Action

With regard to action, current TS Section 3.7.5 requires that:

With the requirement of the above application not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

The licensee proposed to revise the above action requirement as follows:

If the UHS temperature is above 75° F, monitor the UHS temperature for 12 hours. If the UHS temperature does not drop below 75° F during this period, place the plant in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. During this period, if the UHS temperature increases above 77° F place the plant in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

The licensee stated that based on plant data, the average UHS temperature varies approximately 2° F to 3° F during a typical summer day. Allowing a 12-hour period for monitoring the UHS temperature, if it rises above 75° F, will allow for continuous plant operation without the potential for cyclic power changes as the UHS temperature cycles above and below 75° F. Should the UHS temperature cycle above 75° F for extended periods, the plant will be placed in HOT STANDBY within 18 hours based on a 12-hour monitoring period and a 6 hour time to place the plant in HOT STANDBY. The licensee performed evaluations and concluded that the risk significance of increasing the allowable time to be in HOT STANDBY from 6 to 18 hours should the UHS temperature rise above 75° F is very low. In addition, by letter dated August 2, 1995, the licensee stated that an evaluation of the service water system heat removal capability was performed and concluded that the service water system is capable of performing its accident mitigation function given a UHS temperature of 77° F.

Based on the staff's review of the licensee's rationale, the low probability of an event during this brief period of 12 hours, and the evaluation which was performed to demonstrate that the service water system is capable of performing its accident mitigation function given a UHS temperature of 77° F, the staff concludes that the above proposed changes will have insignificant or no impact on the performance of both safety and non-safety systems. Therefore, the staff finds them acceptable.

### 2.3 TS Section 4.7.5 - Surveillance Requirements

Current TS Surveillance Requirements Section 4.7.5 states that:

The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the average water temperature at the Unit 3 intake structure to be within limits.
- b. At least once per 6 hours by verifying the average water temperature at the Unit 3 intake structure to be within limits when the average water temperature exceeds 70° F.

The licensee proposed to delete the phrase, "at the Unit 3 intake structure," from the above TS Surveillance Requirements. Based on the evaluation described in the above Section 2.1, the staff finds the above proposed changes to TS Surveillance Requirements Section 4.7.5 acceptable.

## 2.3 TS Section 3/4.7.5 - Bases

Current TS Bases Section 3/4.7.5 states that:

The limitation on the ultimate heat sink temperature ensures that cooling water at less than the design temperature limit is available to either: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitation on maximum temperature is based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974.

The licensee proposed to replace the above paragraphs with more detailed descriptions to better describe the bases for establishing the proposed LCO, action and surveillance requirements for the UHS.

Based on the staff's review, the staff finds the proposed replacement for the above paragraphs which clarifies and states the bases for the intent of TS Section 3.7.5 and TS Surveillance Requirements Section 4.7.5. for the UHS acceptable.

Based on the staff's review and evaluation, as described above, the staff finds that the proposed changes to TS Section 3.7.5 and TS Surveillance Requirements Section 4.7.5 will provide added flexibility in plant operation and will not endanger the public health and safety. In addition, the proposed modification to the TS Bases will provide personnel with detailed information regarding the bases for establishing the proposed LCO, action and surveillance requirements for the UHS and does not alter the manner in which equipment is operated, nor does it affect equipment availability. Therefore, the staff concludes that the above proposed changes are acceptable and should be approved.

## 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

## 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 29881). Accordingly, the amendment

meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

#### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: August 28, 1995