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Docket No. 50-423

Posted

Amout 18 to NPT-49

Mr. Edward J. Mroczka Senior Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Operations Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

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Dear Mr. Mroczka:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. 67383)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 18 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your application dated February 18, 1988.

The amendment revises Technical Specification Section 3.4.9.3 to change the minimum Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent area required for cold overpressure protection from 7.0 to 5.4 square inches. In addition, Technical Specification Sections 3.8.1.2, 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.3.1 are changed to make them consistent with the revised Section 3.4.9.3.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Originial signed by

Robert L. Ferguson, Project Manager Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 18 to NPF-49

2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PDI-4 SNOPTS

04/25/88

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JStolz 04/25/88 0GC 1 188

Mr. E. J. Mroczka Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3

cc:

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UNITED STATES UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.*

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 18 License No. NPF-49

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated February 18, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission:
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

^{*}Northeast Nuclear Energy Company is authorized to act as agent and representative for the following Owners: Central Maine Power Company, Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, Chicopeè Municipal Lighting Plant, City of Burlington, Vermont, Connecticut Municipal Electric Light Company, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Montaup Electric Company, New England Power Company, The Village of Lyndonville Electric Department, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, and Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Inc., and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) <u>Technical Specifications</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 18, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Director Project Directorate I-4

Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 19, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 18

FACILTIY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Rem	nove	<u>Insert</u>
3/4	4-38	3/4 4-38
3/4	8-9	3/4 8-9
3/4	8-14	3/4 8-14
3/4	8-17	3/4 8-17
B3/4	4-15	B3/4 4-15

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:
 - a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any 1-hour period,
 - b. A maximum cooldown of 200°F in any 1-hour period, and
 - c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 320°F.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psia within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours during auxiliary spray operation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be $\mathsf{OPERABLE}$:
 - Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a setpoint of 450 psig, or
 - b. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift settings which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4a or Figure 3.4-4b, as appropriate, or
 - c. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 5.4 square inches.

<u>APPLICABILITY</u>: MODE 3 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 350°F, MODES 4 and 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head

ACTION:

- a. With one required PORV inoperable or one required RHR suction relief valve inoperable, restore two PORVs or two RHR suction relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.
- b. With both required PORVs inoperable, within the next 8 hours either restore both RHR suction relief valves to OPERABLE status or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch vent.
- c. With both required RHR suction relief valves inoperable, within the next 8 hours either restore both PORVs to OPERABLE status or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch
- d. In the event the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves, or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

A.C. SOURCES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
 - a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Class IE Distribution System, and
 - b. One diesel generator with:
 - 1) A day tank containing a minimum volume of 205 gallons of fuel,
 - 2) A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 32,760 gallons of fuel,
 - 3) A fuel transfer pump,
 - 4) Lubricating oil storage containing a minimum total volume of 280 gallons of lubricating oil, and
 - 5) Capability to transfer lubricating oil from storage to the diesel generator unit.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over the fuel storage pool, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through a greater than or equal to 5.4 square inch vent. In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1, 4.8.1.1.2 (except for Specification 4.8.1.1.2a.6, and 4.8.1.1.3.

3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.8.2.1 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
 - a. 125-volt Battery Bank 301A-1, and an associated full capacity charger,
 - b. 125-volt Battery Bank 301A-2, and an associated full capacity charger.
 - c. 125-volt Battery Bank 301B-1 and an associated full capacity charger, and
 - d. 125-volt Battery Bank 301B-2 and an associated full capacity charger.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With either Battery Bank 301A-1 or 301B-1, and/or one of the required full capacity chargers inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank and/or full capacity charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With either Battery Bank 301A-2 or 301B-2 inoperable, restore the inoperable battery bank to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.8.2.1 Each 125-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
 - a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
 - 1) The parameters in Table 4.8-2a meet the Category A limits, and
 - 2) The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129 volts on float charge.

TABLE 4.8-2b

BATTERY CHARGER CAPACITY

	CHARGER	<u>AMPERAGE</u>
•	301A-1	200
	301A-2	50
	301A-3	200
	301B-1	200
	301B-2	50
	301B-3	200

D.C. SOURCES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, one 125-volt battery bank and its associated full-capacity charger shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With the required battery bank and/or full-capacity charger inoperable, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel; initiate corrective action to restore the required battery bank and full-capacity charger to OPERABLE status as soon as possible, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through a 5.4 square inch vent.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.2 The above required 125-volt battery bank and full-capacity charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 4.8.2.1.

ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.8.3.2 As a minimum, the following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner:
 - a. One train of A.C. emergency busses consisting of one 4160-volt and four 480-volt A.C. emergency busses.
 - b. Two 120-volt A.C. vital busses energized from their associated inverters connected to their respective D.C. busses, and
 - c. Two 125-volt D.C. busses energized from their associated battery banks.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel, initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical busses in the specified manner as soon as possible, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 5.4 square inch vent.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) given in Table 3.8-1 inoperable:

- a. Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, their inoperable circuit breakers racked out, or removed, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
 - a. At least once per 18 months:
 - By verifying that the medium voltage (4-15 kV) circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers of each voltage level, and performing the following:
 - a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays,
 - b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed, and

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration.

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or an RCS vent opening of at least 5.4 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 350° F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50° above the RCS cold temperatures, or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water-solid RCS.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS) is derived by analysis which models the performance of the COPS assuming various mass input and heat input transients. Operation with a PORV Setpoint less than or equal to the maximum Setpoint ensures that Appendix G criteria will not be violated with consideration for a maximum pressure overshoot beyond the PORV Setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and single failure. To ensure that mass and heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require lockout of all but one safety injection pump and all but one centrifugal charging pump while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head installed and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temperature is more than 50° above primary temperature.

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the COPS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5.

BASES	В	A	S	E	S
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3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by $10 \ \text{CFR} \ 50.55a(g)$ except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to $10 \ \text{CFR} \ 50.55a(g)(6)(i)$.

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 80 Edition and Addenda through Winter except where specific written relief has been granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of least one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensures that the capability exists to perform this function.

The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plant Requirements," November 1980.



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 18

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 18, 1988, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) submitted a change to the Millstone 3 Technical Specifications. In Technical Specification Section 3.4.9.3 the minimum Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent area required for cold overpressure protection would be changed from 7.0 to 5.4 square inches. In addition, Technical Specification Sections 3.8.1.2, 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.3.1 would be changed to make them consistent with the revised Section 3.4.9.3.

EVALUATION

The design cold overpressure transients are mitigated by the operation of one Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) (see FSAR Section 5.2.2.11.2). The size of the vent area in Technical Specification Section 3.4.9.3 was selected to ensure that one PORV would be removed to provide the vent area; however, there was an error made in selecting the current value of 7.0 square inches. The removal of one PORV provides a vent area equal to the cross-sectional area of the piping for each PORV which is 5.4 square inches (pipe outside diameter is 3.5 inches, the wall thickness is 0.438 inches).

The required vent area to mitigate the design basis cold overpressure transients is approximately two square inches. Therefore, the staff finds the vent area of 5.4 square inches acceptable.

The reactor coolant system vent area also appears in the action statements for Technical Specification Sections 3.8.1.2, 3.8.2.2, 3.8.3.2. These sections are changed to be consistent with the revised Section 3.4.9.3. These are administrative changes, therefore, the staff find these changes acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has

previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: May 19, 1988

Principal Contributor:

R. Ferguson