




# Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/6

Bases

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Washington, DC 20555-0001



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# **Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/6**

## **Bases**

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
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## PREFACE

This NUREG contains the improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for General Electric (GE) BWR/6 plants. Revision 2 incorporates the cumulative changes to Revision 1, which was published in April 1995. The changes reflected in Revision 2 resulted from the experience gained from license amendment applications to convert to these improved STS or to adopt partial improvements to existing technical specifications. This publication is the result of extensive public technical meetings and discussions among the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff and various nuclear power plant licensees, Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Owners Groups, and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). The improved STS were developed based on the criteria in the Final Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, dated July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), which was subsequently codified by changes to Section 36 of Part 50 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 50.36) (60 FR 36953). Licensees are encouraged to upgrade their technical specifications consistent with those criteria and conforming, to the practical extent, to Revision 2 to the improved STS. The Commission continues to place the highest priority on requests for complete conversions to the improved STS. Licensees adopting portions of the improved STS to existing technical specifications should adopt all related requirements, as applicable, to achieve a high degree of standardization and consistency.

The Table of Contents is now a Table of Contents / Revision Summary where the revision number and date are listed for each specification and bases, in lieu of traditional page numbers. Each limiting condition for operation (LCO) starts with page 1, with a specification, e.g., "2.0" or bases "B 2.0" number prefix. Subsequent approved revisions to sections will be noted in the table of contents, as well as on each affected page, using a decimal number to indicate the number of revisions to that section, along with the date, e.g., (Rev 2.3, 04/01/01) indicates the third approved change and date since Revision 2.0 was published. Additionally, the final page of each LCO section will be a historical listing of the changes affecting that section. This publication will be maintained in electronic format. Subsequent revisions will not be printed in hard copy. Users may access the subsequent revisions to the STS in the PDF format at (<http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/sts/sts.htm>). This Web site will be updated as needed and the contents may differ from the last printed version. Users may print or download copies from the NRC Web site.

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The information collections contained in this NUREG are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, and NRC Form 5, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0014, 0011, and 0006.

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## B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

### B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

GDC 10 (Ref. 1) requires, and SLs ensure, that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during steady state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs).

The fuel cladding integrity SL is set such that no significant fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not violated. Because fuel damage is not directly observable, a stepback approach is used to establish an SL, such that the MCPR is not less than the limit specified in Specification 2.1.1.2 for [both General Electric Company (GE) and Advanced Nuclear Fuel Corporation (ANF) fuel]. MCPR greater than the specified limit represents a conservative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding integrity.

The fuel cladding is one of the physical barriers that separate the radioactive materials from the environs. The integrity of this cladding barrier is related to its relative freedom from perforations or cracking. Although some corrosion or use related cracking may occur during the life of the cladding, fission product migration from this source is incrementally cumulative and continuously measurable. Fuel cladding perforations, however, can result from thermal stresses, which occur from reactor operation significantly above design conditions.

While fission product migration from cladding perforation is just as measurable as that from use related cracking, the thermally caused cladding perforations signal a threshold beyond which still greater thermal stresses may cause gross, rather than incremental, cladding deterioration. Therefore, the fuel cladding SL is defined with a margin to the conditions that would produce onset of transition boiling (i.e., MCPR = 1.00). These conditions represent a significant departure from the condition intended by design for planned operation. The MCPR fuel cladding integrity SL ensures that during normal operation and during AOOs, at least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core do not experience transition boiling.

Operation above the boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperature because of the onset of transition boiling and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer coefficient. Inside the steam film, high cladding temperatures are reached, and a

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BACKGROUND (continued)

cladding water (zirconium water) reaction may take place. This chemical reaction results in oxidation of the fuel cladding to a structurally weaker form. This weaker form may lose its integrity, resulting in an uncontrolled release of activity to the reactor coolant.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES

The fuel cladding must not sustain damage as a result of normal operation and AOOs. The reactor core SLs are established to preclude violation of the fuel design criterion that an MCPR limit is to be established, such that at least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core would not be expected to experience the onset of transition boiling.

The Reactor Protection System setpoints (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), in combination with other LCOs, are designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions for Reactor Coolant System water level, pressure, and THERMAL POWER level that would result in reaching the MCPR limit.

2.1.1.1a Fuel Cladding Integrity [General Electric Company (GE) Fuel]

GE critical power correlations are applicable for all critical power calculations at pressures  $\geq 785$  psig and core flows  $\geq 10\%$  of rated flow. For operation at low pressures or low flows, another basis is used, as follows:

Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low power and flows will always be  $> 4.5$  psi. Analyses (Ref. 2) show that with a bundle flow of  $28 \times 10^3$  lb/hr, bundle pressure drop is nearly independent of bundle power and has a value of 3.5 psi. Thus, the bundle flow with a 4.5 psi driving head will be  $> 28 \times 10^3$  lb/hr. Full scale ATLAS test data taken at pressures from 14.7 psia to 800 psia indicate that the fuel assembly critical power at this flow is approximately 3.35 MWt. With the design peaking factors, this corresponds to a THERMAL POWER  $> 50\%$  RTP. Thus, a THERMAL POWER limit of 25% RTP for reactor pressure  $< 785$  psig is conservative.

2.1.1.1b Fuel Cladding Integrity [Advanced Nuclear Fuel Corporation (ANF) Fuel]

The use of the XN-3 correlation is valid for critical power calculations at pressures  $> 580$  psig and bundle mass fluxes  $> 0.25 \times 10^6$  lb/hr-ft<sup>2</sup> (Ref. 3). For operation at low pressures or low flows, the fuel cladding

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

integrity SL is established by a limiting condition on core THERMAL POWER, with the following basis:

Provided that the water level in the vessel downcomer is maintained above the top of the active fuel, natural circulation is sufficient to ensure a minimum bundle flow for all fuel assemblies that have a relatively high power and potentially can approach a critical heat flux condition. For the ANF 9x9 fuel design, the minimum bundle flow is  $> 30 \times 10^3$  lb/hr. For the ANF 8x8 fuel design, the minimum bundle flow is  $> 28 \times 10^3$  lb/hr. For all designs, the coolant minimum bundle flow and maximum flow area are such that the mass flux is always  $> 0.25 \times 10^6$  lb/hr-ft<sup>2</sup>. Full scale critical power tests taken at pressures down to 14.7 psia indicate that the fuel assembly critical power at  $0.25 \times 10^6$  lb/hr-ft<sup>2</sup> is approximately 3.35 MWt. At 25% RTP, a bundle power of approximately 3.35 MWt corresponds to a bundle radial peaking factor of  $> 3.0$ , which is significantly higher than the expected peaking factor. Thus, a THERMAL POWER limit of 25% RTP for reactor pressures  $< 785$  psig is conservative.

2.1.1.2a MCPR [GE Fuel]

The fuel cladding integrity SL is set such that no significant fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not violated. Since the parameters that result in fuel damage are not directly observable during reactor operation, the thermal and hydraulic conditions that result in the onset of transition boiling have been used to mark the beginning of the region in which fuel damage could occur. Although it is recognized that the onset of transition boiling would not result in damage to BWR fuel rods, the critical power at which boiling transition is calculated to occur has been adopted as a convenient limit. However, the uncertainties in monitoring the core operating state and in the procedures used to calculate the critical power result in an uncertainty in the value of the critical power. Therefore, the fuel cladding integrity SL is defined as the critical power ratio in the limiting fuel assembly for which more than 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core are expected to avoid boiling transition, considering the power distribution within the core and all uncertainties.

The MCPR SL is determined using a statistical model that combines all the uncertainties in operating parameters and the procedures used to calculate critical power. The probability of the occurrence of boiling transition is determined using the approved General Electric Critical

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Power correlations. Details of the fuel cladding integrity SL calculation are given in Reference 2. Reference 2 also includes a tabulation of the uncertainties used in the determination of the MCPR SL and of the nominal values of the parameters used in the MCPR SL statistical analysis.

2.1.1.2b MCPR [ANF Fuel]

The MCPR SL ensures sufficient conservatism in the operating MCPR limit that, in the event of an AOO from the limiting condition of operation, at least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core would be expected to avoid boiling transition. The margin between calculated boiling transition (i.e., MCPR = 1.00) and the MCPR SL is based on a detailed statistical procedure that considers the uncertainties in monitoring the core operating state. One specific uncertainty included in the SL is the uncertainty inherent in the XN-3 critical power correlation. Reference 3 describes the methodology used in determining the MCPR SL.

The XN-3 critical power correlation is based on a significant body of practical test data, providing a high degree of assurance that the critical power, as evaluated by the correlation, is within a small percentage of the actual critical power being estimated. As long as the core pressure and flow are within the range of validity of the XN-3 correlation, the assumed reactor conditions used in defining the SL introduce conservatism into the limit because bounding high radial power factors and bounding flat local peaking distributions are used to estimate the number of rods in boiling transition. Still further conservatism is induced by the tendency of the XN-3 correlation to overpredict the number of rods in boiling transition. These conservatisms and the inherent accuracy of the XN-3 correlation provide a reasonable degree of assurance that there would be no transition boiling in the core during sustained operation at the MCPR SL. If boiling transition were to occur, there is reason to believe that the integrity of the fuel would not be compromised. Significant test data accumulated by the NRC and private organizations indicate that the use of a boiling transition limitation to protect against cladding failure is a very conservative approach. Much of the data indicate that BWR fuel can survive for an extended period of time in an environment of boiling transition.

2.1.1.3 Reactor Vessel Water Level

During MODES 1 and 2, the reactor vessel water level is required to be above the top of the active fuel to provide core cooling capability. With

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

fuel in the reactor vessel during periods when the reactor is shut down, consideration must be given to water level requirements due to the effect of decay heat. If the water level should drop below the top of the active irradiated fuel during this period, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced. This reduction in cooling capability could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation in the event that the water level becomes  $< 2/3$  of the core height. The reactor vessel water level SL has been established at the top of the active irradiated fuel to provide a point that can be monitored and to also provide adequate margin for effective action.

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**SAFETY LIMITS**      The reactor core SLs are established to protect the integrity of the fuel clad barrier to the release of radioactive materials to the environs. SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 ensure that the core operates within the fuel design criteria. SL 2.1.1.3 ensures that the reactor vessel water level is greater than the top of the active irradiated fuel in order to prevent elevated clad temperatures and resultant clad perforations.

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**APPLICABILITY**      SLs 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2, and 2.1.1.3 are applicable in all MODES.

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**SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS**      Exceeding an SL may cause fuel damage and create a potential for radioactive releases in excess of 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 4). Therefore, it is required to insert all insertable control rods and restore compliance with the SL within 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time ensures that the operators take prompt remedial action and the probability of an accident occurring during this period is minimal.

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- REFERENCES**
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10.
  2. NEDE-24011-P-A, (latest approved revision).
  3. XN-NF524(A), Revision 1, November 1983.
  4. 10 CFR 100.
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## B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

### B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The SL on reactor steam dome pressure protects the RCS against overpressurization. In the event of fuel cladding failure, fission products are released into the reactor coolant. The RCS then serves as the primary barrier in preventing the release of fission products into the atmosphere. Establishing an upper limit on reactor steam dome pressure ensures continued RCS integrity. According to 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 14, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," and GDC 15, "Reactor Coolant System Design" (Ref. 1), the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) shall be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs).

During normal operation and AOOs, RCS pressure is limited from exceeding the design pressure by more than 10%, in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code (Ref. 2). To ensure system integrity, all RCS components are hydrostatically tested at 125% of design pressure, in accordance with ASME Code requirements, prior to initial operation when there is no fuel in the core. Any further hydrostatic testing with fuel in the core may be done under LCO 3.10.1, "Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation." Following inception of unit operation, RCS components shall be pressure tested in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 3).

Overpressurization of the RCS could result in a breach of the RCPB, reducing the number of protective barriers designed to prevent radioactive releases from exceeding the limits specified in 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" (Ref. 4). If this occurred in conjunction with a fuel cladding failure, the number of protective barriers designed to prevent radioactive releases from exceeding the limits would be reduced.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The RCS safety/relief valves and the Reactor Protection System Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function have settings established to ensure that the RCS pressure SL will not be exceeded.

The RCS pressure SL has been selected such that it is at a pressure below which it can be shown that the integrity of the system is not endangered. The reactor pressure vessel is designed to ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, [1971 Edition], including Addenda through the [winter of 1972] (Ref. 5), which permits a maximum pressure

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

transient of 110%, 1375 psig, of design pressure 1250 psig. The SL of 1325 psig, as measured in the reactor steam dome, is equivalent to 1375 psig at the lowest elevation of the RCS. The RCS is designed to ASME Code, Section III, 1974 Edition (Ref. 6), for the reactor recirculation piping, which permits a maximum pressure transient of 110% of design pressures of 1250 psig for suction piping and 1650 psig for discharge piping. The RCS pressure SL is selected to be the lowest transient overpressure allowed by the applicable codes.

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**SAFETY LIMITS**

The maximum transient pressure allowable in the RCS pressure vessel under the ASME Code, Section III, is 110% of design pressure. The maximum transient pressure allowable in the RCS piping, valves, and fittings is 110% of design pressures of 1250 psig for suction piping and 1500 psig for discharge piping. The most limiting of these allowances is the 110% of the suction piping design pressure; therefore, the SL on maximum allowable RCS pressure is established at 1325 psig as measured at the reactor steam dome.

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**APPLICABILITY**

SL 2.1.2 applies in all MODES.

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**SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS**

Exceeding the RCS pressure SL may cause immediate RCS failure and create a potential for radioactive releases in excess of 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 4). Therefore, it is required to insert all insertable control rods and restore compliance with the SL within 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time ensures that the operators take prompt remedial action and also assures that the probability of an accident occurring during this period is minimal.

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**REFERENCES**

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 14, GDC 15, and GDC 28.
2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Article NB-7000.
3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Article IW-5000
4. 10 CFR 100.
5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, [1971 Edition], Addenda, [winter of 1972].

**BASES**

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**REFERENCES (continued)**

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6. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, [1974 Edition].
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## B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

### BASES

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LCOs	LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.7 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
LCO 3.0.1	LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e., when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).
LCO 3.0.2	<p>LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification and</li><li>Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.</li></ol> <p>There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.</p>

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**BASES**

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**LCO 3.0.2 (continued)**

Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or is no longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications.

The nature of some Required Actions of some Conditions necessitates that, once the Condition is entered, the Required Actions must be completed even though the associated Conditions no longer exist. The individual LCO's ACTIONS specify the Required Actions where this is the case. An example of this is in LCO 3.4.11, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."

The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The reasons for intentionally relying on the ACTIONS include, but are not limited to, performance of Surveillances, preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or investigation of operational problems. Entering ACTIONS for these reasons must be done in a manner that does not compromise safety. Intentional entry into ACTIONS should not be made for operational convenience. Additionally, if intentional entry into ACTIONS would result in redundant equipment being inoperable, alternatives should be used instead. Doing so limits the time both subsystems/division of a safety function are inoperable and limits the time conditions exist which may result in LCO 3.0.3 being entered. Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires, if the equipment remains removed from service or bypassed.

When a change in MODE or other specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the unit may enter a MODE or other specified condition in which another Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable, and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered.

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**LCO 3.0.3**

LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and either:

- a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies or
- b. The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of

**BASES**

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**LCO 3.0.3 (continued)**

Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.

This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience that permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable.

Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, 1 hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit operation. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section 1.3, Completion Times.

A unit shutdown required in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 may be terminated and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following occurs:

- a. The LCO is now met,
- b. A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed, or
- c. ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.3 is exited.

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LCO 3.0.3 (continued)

The time limits of LCO 3.0.3 allow 37 hours for the unit to be in MODE 4 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for reaching the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is reached in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to reach MODE 4, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 2 is reached in 2 hours, then the time allowed for reaching MODE 3 is the next 11 hours, because the total time for reaching MODE 3 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to reach a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, LCO 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LCO 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.7, "Fuel Pool Water Level." LCO 3.7.7 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the associated fuel storage pool." Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.7 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.7 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the associated fuel storage pool(s)" is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.

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LCO 3.0.4

LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It precludes placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., Applicability desired to be entered) when the following exist:

- a. Unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met in the Applicability desired to be entered and

**BASES**

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**LCO 3.0.4 (continued)**

- b. Continued noncompliance with the LCO requirements, if the Applicability were entered, would result in the unit being required to exit the Applicability desired to be entered to comply with the Required Actions.

Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Exceptions may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable when entering MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, LCO 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5, or in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken. [ In some cases (e.g., ..) these ACTIONS provide a Note that states "While this LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability is not permitted, unless required to comply with ACTIONS." This Note is a requirement explicitly precluding entry into a MODE or other specified condition of the Applicability. ]

**BASES**

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**LCO 3.0.4 (continued)**

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, changing MODES or other specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, either in compliance with LCO 3.0.4 or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is stated, is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surveillances that do not have to be performed due to the associated inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

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**LCO 3.0.5**

LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate either:

- a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service or
- b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions, and must be reopened to perform the required testing.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.

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## BASES

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### LCO 3.0.6

LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for support systems that have an LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions.

When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.

However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Specification 5.5.12, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)," ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.

Cross division checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support safety systems are required. The cross

BASES

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LCO 3.0.6 (continued)

division check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. [ A loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable (EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-1),
- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable (EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-2), or
- c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable (EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-3).

EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-1

If System 2 of Train A is inoperable and System 5 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in supported System 5.

EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-2

If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 11 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in System 11 which is in turn supported by System 5.


EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-3

If System 2 of Train A is inoperable, and System 1 of Train B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in Systems 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11. ]

If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

BASES

LCO 3.0.6 (continued)



[ Figure B 3.0-1  
Configuration of Trains and Systems ]

This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or loss of offsite power. Since operations is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit(s) and inoperable diesel generator(s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges that supported system(s) are not declared inoperable solely as a result of inoperability of a normal or emergency electrical power source (refer to the definition of OPERABILITY).

When loss of safety function is determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected. Where a loss of function is solely due to a single Technical Specification support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) the appropriate LCO is the LCO for

**BASES**

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**LCO 3.0.6 (continued)**

the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCO adequately addresses the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering its supported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system.

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**LCO 3.0.7**

There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.10 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

The Applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met regardless of that LCO's Applicability (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met. The Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCO's requirements (ACTIONS and SRs) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO.

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## B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

### BASES

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SRs	SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
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SR 3.0.1	SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.
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Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when either:

- a. The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs or
- b. The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known to be not met between required Surveillance performances.

Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a Special Operations LCO are only applicable when the Special Operations LCO is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification.

Unplanned events may satisfy the requirements (including applicable acceptance criteria) for a given SR. In this case, the unplanned event may be credited as fulfilling the performance of the SR. This allowance includes those SRs whose performance is normally precluded in a given MODE or other specified condition.

Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.

Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current

## BASES

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### SR 3.0.1 (continued)

MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.

Some examples of this process are:

- a. Control rod drive maintenance during refueling that requires scram testing at [ $> 800$  psi]. However, if other appropriate testing is satisfactorily completed and the scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.3 is satisfied, the control rod can be considered OPERABLE. This allows startup to proceed to reach [800 psi] to perform other necessary testing.
- b. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) maintenance during shutdown that requires system functional tests at a specified pressure. Provided other appropriate testing is satisfactorily completed, startup can proceed with RCIC considered OPERABLE. This allows operation to reach the specified pressure to complete the necessary post maintenance testing.

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SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per..." interval.

SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This program establishes testing requirements and Frequencies in accordance with the requirements of regulations. The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test interval specified in the regulations.

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SR 3.0.2 (continued)

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per ..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

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SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay period of up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.

This delay period provides adequate time to complete Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the completion of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude completion of the Surveillance.

The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements. When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions or operational situations, is discovered not to have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows the full delay period of 24 hours to perform the Surveillance.

SR 3.0.3 also provides a time limit for completion of Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

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**BASES**

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**SR 3.0.3 (continued)**

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals.

If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

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**SR 3.0.4** SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit.

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change. When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes.

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BASES

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SR 3.0.4 (continued)

The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown.

The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCO Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.

SR 3.0.4 is only applicable when entering MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, SR 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3. The requirements of SR 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5, or in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.

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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

SDM requirements are specified to ensure:

- a. The reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions and transients and Design Basis Events,
- b. The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and
- c. The reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

These requirements are satisfied by the control rods, as described in GDC 26 (Ref. 1), which can compensate for the reactivity effects of the fuel and water temperature changes experienced during all operating conditions.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The control rod drop accident (CRDA) analysis (Refs. 2 and 3) assumes the core is subcritical with the highest worth control rod withdrawn. Typically, the first control rod withdrawn has a very high reactivity worth and, should the core be critical during the withdrawal of the first control rod, the consequences of a CRDA could exceed the fuel damage limits for a CRDA (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control"). Also, SDM is assumed as an initial condition for the control rod removal error during a refueling accident (Ref. 4). The analysis of this reactivity insertion event assumes the refueling interlocks are OPERABLE when the reactor is in the refueling mode of operation. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod from the core during refueling. (Special consideration and requirements for multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling are covered in Special Operations LCO 3.10.6, "Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling.") The analysis assumes this condition is acceptable since the core will be shut down with the highest worth control rod withdrawn, if adequate SDM has been demonstrated.

Prevention or mitigation of reactivity insertion events is necessary to limit energy deposition in the fuel to prevent significant fuel damage, which could result in undue release of radioactivity. Adequate SDM ensures inadvertent criticalities and potential CRDAs involving high worth control

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## BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

rods (namely the first control rod withdrawn) will not cause significant fuel damage.

SDM satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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## LCO

The specified SDM limit accounts for the uncertainty in the demonstration of SDM by testing. Separate SDM limits are provided for testing where the highest worth control rod is determined analytically or by measurement. This is due to the reduced uncertainty in the SDM test when the highest worth control rod is determined by measurement. When SDM is demonstrated by calculations not associated with a test (e.g., to confirm SDM during the fuel loading sequence), additional margin is included to account for uncertainties in the calculation. To ensure adequate SDM during the design process, a design margin is included to account for uncertainties in the design calculations (Ref. 5).

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## APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, SDM must be provided because subcriticality with the highest worth control rod withdrawn is assumed in the CRDA analysis (Ref. 3). In MODES 3 and 4, SDM is required to ensure the reactor will be held subcritical with margin for a single withdrawn control rod. SDM is required in MODE 5 to prevent an inadvertent criticality during the withdrawal of a single control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

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## ACTIONS

A.1

With SDM not within the limits of the LCO in MODE 1 or 2, SDM must be restored within 6 hours. Failure to meet the specified SDM may be caused by a control rod that cannot be inserted. The 6 hour Completion time is acceptable, considering that the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional failures of control rods to insert, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

B.1

If the SDM cannot be restored, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours, to prevent the potential for further reductions in available SDM (e.g., additional stuck control rods). The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

With SDM not within limits in MODE 3, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods. Action must continue until all insertable control rods are fully inserted. This action results in the least reactive condition for the core.

D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4

With SDM not within limits in MODE 4, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods. Action must continue until all insertable control rods are fully inserted. This action results in the least reactive condition for the core. Actions must also be initiated within 1 hour to provide means for control of potential radioactive releases. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; at least one Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem is OPERABLE; and [secondary containment] isolation capability (i.e., at least one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE, or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, SRs may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4, and E.5

With SDM not within limits in MODE 5, the operator must immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS that could reduce SDM, e.g., insertion of fuel in the core or the withdrawal of control rods. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Inserting control rods or removing fuel from the core will reduce the total reactivity and are therefore excluded from the suspended actions.

Action must also be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one

## BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

or more fuel assemblies have been fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and therefore do not have to be inserted.

Action must also be initiated within 1 hour to provide means for control of potential radioactive releases. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; at least one SGT subsystem is OPERABLE; and [secondary containment] isolation capability (i.e., at least one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE, or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, SRs may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTSSR 3.1.1.1

Adequate SDM must be demonstrated to ensure the reactor can be made subcritical from any initial operating condition. Adequate SDM is demonstrated by testing before or during the first startup after fuel movement, control rod replacement, or shuffling within the reactor pressure vessel. Control rod replacement refers to the decoupling and removal of a control rod from a core location, and subsequent replacement with a new control rod or a control rod from another core location. Since core reactivity will vary during the cycle as a function of fuel depletion and poison burnup, the beginning of cycle (BOC) test must also account for changes in core reactivity during the cycle. Therefore, to obtain the SDM, the initial measured value must be increased by an adder, "R", which is the difference between the calculated value of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated BOC core reactivity. If the value of R is negative (i.e., BOC is the most reactive point in the cycle), no correction to the BOC measured value is required (Ref. 6). For the SDM demonstrations that rely solely on calculation of the highest worth control rod, additional margin (0.10%  $\Delta k/k$ ) must be added to the SDM limit as specified in the COLR to account for uncertainties in the calculation.

## BASES

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

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The SDM may be demonstrated during an in sequence control rod withdrawal, in which the highest worth control rod is analytically determined, or during local criticals, where the highest worth control rod is determined by testing. Local critical tests require the withdrawal of out of sequence control rods. This testing would therefore require bypassing of the Rod Pattern Control System to allow the out of sequence withdrawal, and therefore additional requirements must be met (see LCO 3.10.7, "Control Rod Testing - Operating").

The Frequency of 4 hours after reaching criticality is allowed to provide a reasonable amount of time to perform the required calculations and appropriate verification.

During MODE 5, adequate SDM is also required to ensure the reactor does not reach criticality during control rod withdrawals. An evaluation of each in vessel fuel movement during fuel loading (including shuffling fuel within the core) is required to ensure adequate SDM is maintained during refueling. This evaluation ensures the intermediate loading patterns are bounded by the safety analyses for the final core loading pattern. For example, bounding analyses that demonstrate adequate SDM for the most reactive configurations during the refueling may be performed to demonstrate acceptability of the entire fuel movement sequence. These bounding analyses include additional margins to the associated uncertainties. Spiral offload or reload sequences inherently satisfy the SR, provided the fuel assemblies are reloaded in the same configuration analyzed for the new cycle. Removing fuel from the core will always result in an increase in SDM.

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**REFERENCES**

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Section [15.4.9].
  3. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence 111," Section 4.1, January 1977.
  4. FSAR, Section [15.4.1.1].
  5. FSAR, Section [4.3.2.4.1].
  6. NDE-24011-P-A-9, "GE Standard Application for Reactor Fuel," Section 3.2.4.1, Sept. 1988.
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

In accordance with GDC 26, GDC 28, and GDC 29 (Ref. 1), reactivity shall be controllable such that subcriticality is maintained under cold conditions and acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. Reactivity anomaly is used as a measure of the predicted versus measured core reactivity during power operation. The continual confirmation of core reactivity is necessary to ensure that the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient safety analyses remain valid. A large reactivity anomaly could be the result of unanticipated changes in fuel reactivity, control rod worth, or operation at conditions not consistent with those assumed in the predictions of core reactivity, and could potentially result in a loss of SDM or violation of acceptable fuel design limits. Comparing predicted versus measured core reactivity validates the nuclear methods used in the safety analysis and supports the SDM demonstrations (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)") in ensuring the reactor can be brought safely to cold, subcritical conditions.

When the reactor core is critical or in normal power operation, a reactivity balance exists and the net reactivity is zero. A comparison of predicted and measured reactivity is convenient under such a balance, since parameters are being maintained relatively stable under steady state power conditions. The positive reactivity inherent in the core design is balanced by the negative reactivity of the control components, thermal feedback, neutron leakage, and materials in the core that absorb neutrons, such as burnable absorbers, producing zero net reactivity.

In order to achieve the required fuel cycle energy output, the uranium enrichment in the new fuel loading and the fuel loaded in the previous cycles provide excess positive reactivity beyond that required to sustain steady state operation at the beginning of cycle (BOC). When the reactor is critical at RTP and operating moderator temperature, the excess positive reactivity is compensated by burnable absorbers (if any), control rods, and whatever neutron poisons (mainly xenon and samarium) are present in the fuel.

The predicted core reactivity, as represented by  $k_{\text{eff}}$ , is calculated by a 3D core simulator code as a function of cycle exposure. This calculation is performed for projected operating states and conditions throughout the cycle. The monitored  $k_{\text{eff}}$  is calculated by the

BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued)

core monitoring system for actual plant conditions and is then compared to the predicted value for the cycle exposure.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES

Accurate prediction of core reactivity is either an explicit or implicit assumption in the accident analysis evaluations (Ref. 2). In particular, SDM and reactivity transients, such as control rod withdrawal accidents or rod drop accidents, are very sensitive to accurate prediction of core reactivity. These accident analysis evaluations rely on computer codes that have been qualified against available test data, operating plant data, and analytical benchmarks. Monitoring reactivity anomaly provides additional assurance that the nuclear methods provide an accurate representation of the core reactivity.

The comparison between measured and predicted initial core reactivity provides a normalization for the calculational models used to predict core reactivity. If the measured and predicted  $k_{\text{eff}}$  for identical core conditions at BOC do not reasonably agree, then the assumptions used in the reload cycle design analysis or the calculation models used to predict  $k_{\text{eff}}$  may not be accurate. If reasonable agreement between measured and predicted core reactivity exists at BOC, then the prediction may be normalized to the measured value. Thereafter, any significant deviations in the measured  $k_{\text{eff}}$  from the predicted  $k_{\text{eff}}$  that develop during fuel depletion may be an indication that the assumptions of the DBA and transient analyses are no longer valid, or that an unexpected change in core conditions has occurred.

Reactivity anomalies satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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LCO

The reactivity anomaly limit is established to ensure plant operation is maintained within the assumptions of the safety analyses. Large differences between monitored and predicted core reactivity may indicate that the assumptions of the DBA and transient analyses are no longer valid, or that the uncertainties in the Nuclear Design Methodology are larger than expected. A limit on the difference between the monitored core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  and the predicted core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  of 1%  $\Delta k/k$  has been established based on engineering judgment. A > 1% deviation in reactivity from that predicted is larger than expected for normal operation and should therefore be evaluated.

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## BASES

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### APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, most of the control rods are withdrawn and steady state operation is typically achieved. Under these conditions, the comparison between predicted and monitored core reactivity provides an effective measure of the reactivity anomaly. In MODE 2, control rods are typically being withdrawn during a startup. In MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are fully inserted, and, therefore, the reactor is in the least reactive state, where monitoring core reactivity is not necessary. In MODE 5, fuel loading results in a continually changing core reactivity. SDM requirements (LCO 3.1.1) ensure that fuel movements are performed within the bounds of the safety analysis, and an SDM demonstration is required during the first startup following operations that could have altered core reactivity (e.g., fuel movement, control rod replacement, control rod shuffling). The SDM test, required by LCO 3.1.1, provides a direct comparison of the predicted and monitored core reactivity at cold conditions; therefore, reactivity anomaly is not required during these conditions.

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### ACTIONS

#### A.1

Should an anomaly develop between measured and predicted core reactivity, the core reactivity difference must be restored to within the limit to ensure continued operation is within the core design assumptions. Restoration to within the limit could be performed by an evaluation of the core design and safety analysis to determine the reason for the anomaly. This evaluation normally reviews the core conditions to determine their consistency with input to design calculations. Measured core and process parameters are also normally evaluated to determine that they are within the bounds of the safety analysis, and safety analysis calculational models may be reviewed to verify that they are adequate for representation of the core conditions. The required Completion Time of 72 hours is based on the low probability of a DBA during this period, and allows sufficient time to assess the physical condition of the reactor and complete the evaluation of the core design and safety analysis.

#### B.1

If the core reactivity cannot be restored to within the 1%  $\Delta k/k$  limit, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.2.1

Verifying the reactivity difference between the monitored and predicted core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  is within the limits of the LCO provides further assurance that plant operation is maintained within the assumptions of the DBA and transient analyses. The Core Monitoring System calculates the core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  for the reactor conditions obtained from plant instrumentation. A comparison of the monitored core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  to the predicted core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  at the same cycle exposure is used to calculate the reactivity difference. The comparison is required when the core reactivity has potentially changed by a significant amount. This may occur following a refueling in which new fuel assemblies are loaded, fuel assemblies are shuffled within the core, or control rods are replaced or shuffled. Control rod replacement refers to the decoupling and removal of a control rod from a core location, and subsequent replacement with a new control rod or a control rod from another core location. Also, core reactivity changes during the cycle. The 24 hour interval after reaching equilibrium conditions following a startup is based on the need for equilibrium xenon concentrations in the core, such that an accurate comparison between the monitored and predicted core  $k_{\text{eff}}$  values can be made. For the purposes of this SR, the reactor is assumed to be at equilibrium conditions when steady state operations (no control rod movement or core flow changes) at  $\geq 75\%$  RTP have been obtained. The 1000 MWD/T Frequency was developed, considering the relatively slow change in core reactivity with exposure and operating experience related to variations in core reactivity. This comparison requires the core to be operating at power levels which minimize the uncertainties and measurement errors, in order to obtain meaningful results. Therefore, the comparison is only done when in MODE 1.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26, GDC 28, and GDC 29.
  2. FSAR, Chapter [15].
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, which is the primary reactivity control system for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity changes to ensure that under conditions of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to hold the reactor core subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System. The CRD System is designed to satisfy the requirements of GDC 26, GDC 27, GDC 28, and GDC 29, (Ref. 1).

The CRD System consists of 193 locking piston control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and a hydraulic control unit for each drive mechanism. The locking piston type CRDM is a double acting hydraulic piston, which uses condensate water as the operating fluid. Accumulators provide additional energy for scram. An index tube and piston, coupled to the control rod, are locked at fixed increments by a collet mechanism. The collet fingers engage notches in the index tube to prevent unintentional withdrawal of the control rod, but without restricting insertion.

This Specification, along with LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators," ensure that the performance of the control rods in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in the evaluations involving control rods are presented in References 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The control rods provide the primary means for rapid reactivity control (reactor scram), for maintaining the reactor subcritical, and for limiting the potential effects of reactivity insertion events caused by malfunctions in the CRD System.

The capability of inserting the control rods provides assurance that the assumptions for scram reactivity in the DBA and transient analyses are not violated. Since the SDM ensures the reactor will be subcritical with the highest worth control rod withdrawn (assumed single failure), the

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

additional failure of a second control rod to insert could invalidate the demonstrated SDM and potentially limit the ability of the CRD System to hold the reactor subcritical. If the control rod is stuck at an inserted position and becomes decoupled from the CRD, a control rod drop accident (CRDA) can possibly occur. Therefore, the requirement that all control rods be OPERABLE ensures the CRD System can perform its intended function.

The control rods also protect the fuel from damage that could result in release of radioactivity. The limits protected are the MCPR Safety Limit (SL) (see Bases for SL 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs," and LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), the 1% cladding plastic strain fuel design limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLGHR)," and LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), and the fuel damage limit (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control") during reactivity insertion events.

The negative reactivity insertion (scram) provided by the CRD System provides the analytical basis for determination of plant thermal limits and provides protection against fuel damage limits during a CRDA. Bases for LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, and LCO 3.1.6 discuss in more detail how the SLs are protected by the CRD System.

Control rod OPERABILITY satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**LCO**

OPERABILITY of an individual control rod is based on a combination of factors, primarily the scram insertion times, the control rod coupling integrity, and the ability to determine the control rod position. Accumulator OPERABILITY is addressed by LCO 3.1.5. The associated scram accumulator status for a control rod only affects the scram insertion times and therefore an inoperable accumulator does not immediately require declaring a control rod inoperable. Although not all control rods are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the intended reactivity control requirements, strict control over the number and distribution of inoperable control rods is required to satisfy the assumptions of the DBA and transient analyses.

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**APPLICABILITY**

In MODES 1 and 2, the control rods are assumed to function during a DBA or transient and are therefore required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. In MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is

BASES

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APPLICABILITY (continued)

applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions. Control rod requirements in MODE 5 are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling."

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each control rod. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable control rods are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4

A control rod is considered stuck if it will not insert by either CRD drive water or scram pressure. With a fully inserted control rod stuck, no actions are required as long as the control rod remains fully inserted. The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows a stuck control rod to be bypassed in the Rod Action Control System (RACS) to allow continued operation. SR 3.3.2.1.9 provides additional requirements when control rods are bypassed in RACS to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis. With one withdrawn control rod stuck, the local scram reactivity rate assumptions may not be met if the stuck control rod separation criteria are not met. Therefore, a verification that the separation criteria are met must be performed immediately. The separation criteria are not met if a) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to two "slow" control rods, b) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod, and the one "slow" control rod is also adjacent to another "slow" control rod, or c) if the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods adjacent to one another. The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed within 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable amount of time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. Isolating the control rod from scram prevents damage to the CRDM. The control rod can be isolated from scram by isolating the hydraulic control unit from scram and normal insert and withdraw pressure, yet still maintain cooling water to the CRD.

BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

Monitoring of the insertion capability for each withdrawn control rod must also be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing each withdrawn control rod ensures that a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.2 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the rod pattern controller (RPC), since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and the RPC (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"). The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours from discovery of Condition A, concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the LPSP of the RWM, provides a reasonable time to test the control rods, considering the potential for a need to reduce power to perform the tests.

To allow continued operation with a withdrawn control rod stuck, an evaluation of adequate SDM is also required within 72 hours. Should a DBA or transient require a shutdown, to preserve the single failure criterion an additional control rod would have to be assumed to have failed to insert when required. Therefore, the original SDM demonstration may not be valid. The SDM must therefore be evaluated (by measurement or analysis) with the stuck control rod at its stuck position and the highest worth OPERABLE control rod assumed to be fully withdrawn.

The allowed Completion Time of 72 hours to verify SDM is adequate, considering that with a single control rod stuck in a withdrawn position, the remaining OPERABLE control rods are capable of providing the required scram and shutdown reactivity. Failure to reach MODE 4 is only likely if an additional control rod adjacent to the stuck control rod also fails to insert during a required scram. Even with the postulated additional single failure of an adjacent control rod to insert, sufficient reactivity control remains to reach and maintain MODE 3 conditions (Ref. 7).

B.1

With two or more withdrawn control rods stuck, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The occurrence of more than one control rod stuck at a withdrawn position increases the probability that the reactor

## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

cannot be shut down if required. Insertion of all insertable control rods eliminates the possibility of an additional failure of a control rod to insert. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

#### C.1 and C.2

With one or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than being stuck in the withdrawn position, operation may continue, provided the control rods are fully inserted within 3 hours and disarmed (electrically or hydraulically) within 4 hours. Inserting a control rod ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. The control rod is disarmed to prevent inadvertent withdrawal during subsequent operations. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that allows control rods to be bypassed in the RACS if required to allow insertion of the inoperable control rods and continued operation. SR 3.3.2.1.9 provides additional requirements when the control rods are bypassed to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the small number of allowed inoperable control rods, and provide time to insert and disarm the control rods in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

#### D.1 and D.2

Out of sequence control rods may increase the potential reactivity worth of a dropped control rod during a CRDA. At  $\leq 10\%$  RTP, the generic banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) analysis (Ref. 7) requires inserted control rods not in compliance with BPWS to be separated by at least two OPERABLE control rods in all directions, including the diagonal. Therefore, if two or more inoperable control rods are not in compliance with BPWS and not separated by at least two OPERABLE control rods, action must be taken to restore compliance with BPWS or restore the control rods to OPERABLE status. A Note has been added to the Condition to clarify that the Condition is not applicable when  $> 10\%$  RTP since the BPWS is not required to be followed under these conditions, as described in the Bases for LCO 3.1.6. The allowed Completion Time of

BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

4 hours is acceptable, considering the low probability of a CRDA occurring.

E.1

In addition to the separation requirements for inoperable control rods, an assumption in the CRDA analysis for ANF fuel is that no more than three inoperable control rods are allowed in any one BPWS group. Therefore, with one or more BPWS groups having four or more inoperable control rods, the control rods must be restored to OPERABLE status. Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note indicating that the Condition is not applicable when THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP since the BPWS is not required to be followed under these conditions, as described in the Bases for LCO 3.1.6. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours is acceptable, considering the low probability of a CRDA occurring.

F.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, or E are not met or nine or more inoperable control rods exist, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. This ensures all insertable control rods are inserted and places the reactor in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods. The number of control rods permitted to be inoperable when operating above 10% RTP (i.e., no CRDA considerations) could be more than the value specified, but the occurrence of a large number of inoperable control rods could be indicative of a generic problem, and investigation and resolution of the potential problem should be undertaken. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3.1

The position of each control rod must be determined, to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining CRD OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, by moving control rods to a position with an OPERABLE indicator, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR is based on operating experience related to

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

expected changes in control rod position and the availability of control rod position indications in the control room.

SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod at least one notch and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. These Surveillances are not required when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the actual LPSP of the RPC since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the Banked Position-Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) (LCO 3.1.6) and the RPC (LCO 3.3.2.1). The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on operating experience related to the changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing notch testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested at a 31 day Frequency, based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement, and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.

SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying the scram time for each control rod to notch position 13 is  $\leq [ ]$  seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the functional testing of SDV vent and drain valves in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.1.3.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the CRDM and will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying that a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position when it is fully withdrawn. The overtravel position feature provides a positive check on the coupling integrity, since only an uncoupled CRD can reach the overtravel position. The verification is required to be performed anytime a control rod is withdrawn to the "full out" position (notch position 48) or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This includes control rods inserted one notch and then returned to the "full out" position during the performance of SR 3.1.3.2. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved and operating experience related to uncoupling events.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26, GDC 27, GDC 28, and GDC 29.
  2. FSAR, Section [4.3.2.5.5].
  3. FSAR, Section [4.6.1.1.2.5.3].
  4. FSAR, Section [5.2.2.2.3].
  5. FSAR, Section [15.4.1].
  6. FSAR, Section [15.4.9].
  7. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," Section 7.2, January 1977.
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The scram function of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System controls reactivity changes during abnormal operational transients to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded (Ref. 1). The control rods are scrammed by positive means, using hydraulic pressure exerted on the CRD piston.

When a scram signal is initiated, control air is vented from the scram valves, allowing them to open by spring action. Opening the exhaust valves reduces the pressure above the main drive piston to atmospheric pressure, and opening the inlet valve applies the accumulator or reactor pressure to the bottom of the piston. Since the notches in the index tube are tapered on the lower edge, the collet fingers are forced open by cam action, allowing the index tube to move upward without restriction because of the high differential pressure across the piston. As the drive moves upward and accumulator pressure drops below the reactor pressure, a ball check valve opens, letting the reactor pressure complete the scram action. If the reactor pressure is low, such as during startup, the accumulator will fully insert the control rod within the required time without assistance from reactor pressure.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the control rod scram function are presented in References 2, 3, 4, and 5. The Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses assume that all of the control rods scram at a specified insertion rate. The resulting negative scram reactivity forms the basis for the determination of plant thermal limits (e.g., the MCPR). Other distributions of scram times (e.g., several control rods scramming slower than the average time, with several control rods scramming faster than the average time) can also provide sufficient scram reactivity. Surveillance of each individual control rod's scram time ensures the scram reactivity assumed in the DBA and transient analyses can be met.

The scram function of the CRD System protects the MCPR Safety Limit (SL) (see Bases for SL 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs," and LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), and the 1% cladding plastic strain fuel design limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," and LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), which ensure that no fuel damage will occur if these limits are not exceeded.

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

Above 950 psig, the scram function is designed to insert negative reactivity at a rate fast enough to prevent the actual MCPR from becoming less than the MCPR SL during the analyzed limiting power transient. Below 950 psig, the scram function is assumed to perform during the control rod drop accident (Ref. 6) and, therefore, also provides protection against violating fuel damage limits during reactivity insertion accidents (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control"). For the reactor vessel overpressure protection analysis, the scram function, along with the safety/relief valves, ensure that the peak vessel pressure is maintained within the applicable ASME Code limits.

Control rod scram times satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**LCO**

The scram times specified in Table 3.1.4-1 (in the accompanying LCO) are required to ensure that the scram reactivity assumed in the DBA and transient analysis is met. To account for single failure and "slow" scrambling control rods, the scram times specified in Table 3.1.4-1 are faster than those assumed in the design basis analysis. The scram times have a margin to allow up to 7.5% of the control rods (e.g.,  $193 \times 7.5\% = 14$ ) to have scram times that exceed the specified limits (i.e., "slow" control rods) assuming a single stuck control rod (as allowed by LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY") and an additional control rod failing to scram per the single failure criterion. The scram times are specified as a function of reactor steam dome pressure to account for the pressure dependence of the scram times. The scram times are specified relative to measurements based on reed switch positions, which provide the control rod position indication. The reed switch closes ("pickup") when the index tube passes a specific location and then opens ("dropout") as the index tube travels upward. Verification of the specified scram times in Table 3.1.4-1 is accomplished through measurement of the "dropout" times.

To ensure that local scram reactivity rates are maintained within acceptable limits, no more than two of the allowed "slow" control rods may occupy adjacent locations.

Table 3.1.4-1 is modified by two Notes, which state control rods with scram times not within the limits of the Table are considered "slow" and that control rods with scram times  $> [ ]$  seconds are considered inoperable as required by SR 3.1.3.4.

This LCO applies only to OPERABLE control rods since inoperable control rods will be inserted and disarmed (LCO 3.1.3). Slow scrambling

BASES

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LCO (continued)

control rods may be conservatively declared inoperable and not accounted for as "slow" control rods.

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APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, a scram is assumed to function during transients and accidents analyzed for these plant conditions. These events are assumed to occur during startup and power operation; therefore, the scram function of the control rods is required during these MODES. In MODES 3 and 4, the control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod scram capability during these conditions. Scram requirements in MODE 5 are contained in LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling."

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ACTIONS

A.1

When the requirements of this LCO are not met, the rate of negative reactivity insertion during a scram may not be within the assumptions of the safety analyses. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

The four SRs of this LCO are modified by a Note stating that during a single control rod scram time surveillance, the CRD pumps shall be isolated from the associated scram accumulator. With the CRD pump isolated (i.e., charging valve closed), the influence of the CRD pump head does not affect the single control rod scram times. During a full core scram, the CRD pump head would be seen by all control rods and would have a negligible effect on the scram insertion times.

SR 3.1.4.1

The scram reactivity used in DBA and transient analyses is based on assumed control rod scram time. Measurement of the scram times with reactor steam dome pressure  $\geq 950$  psig demonstrates acceptable scram times for the transients analyzed in References 3 and 4.

Scram insertion times increase with increasing reactor pressure because of the competing effects of reactor steam dome pressure and stored accumulator energy. Therefore, demonstration of adequate scram times

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

at reactor steam dome pressure  $\geq 950$  psig ensures that the scram times will be within the specified limits at higher pressures. Limits are specified as a function of reactor pressure to account for the sensitivity of the scram insertion times with pressure and to allow a range of pressures over which scram time testing can be performed. To ensure scram time testing is performed within a reasonable time following a shutdown  $\geq 120$  days, control rods are required to be tested before exceeding 40% RTP. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the additional surveillances performed for control rod OPERABILITY, the frequent verification of adequate accumulator pressure, and the required testing of control rods affected by fuel movement within the associated core cell and by work on control rods or the CRD System.

SR 3.1.4.2

Additional testing of a sample of control rods is required to verify the continued performance of the scram function during the cycle. A representative sample contains at least 10% of the control rods. The sample remains representative if no more than 20% of the control rods in the sample tested are determined to be "slow." If more than 20% of the sample is declared to be "slow" per the criteria in Table 3.1.4-1, additional control rods are tested until this 20% criterion (e.g., 20% of the entire sample size) is satisfied, or until the total number of "slow" control rods (throughout the core, from all Surveillances) exceeds the LCO limit. For planned testing, the control rods selected for the sample should be different for each test. Data from inadvertent scrams should be used whenever possible to avoid unnecessary testing at power, even if the control rods with data were previously tested in a sample. The 120 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has shown control rod scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle. This Frequency is also reasonable, based on the additional Surveillances done on the CRDs at more frequent intervals in accordance with LCO 3.1.3 and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators."

SR 3.1.4.3

When work that could affect the scram insertion time is performed on a control rod or the CRD System, testing must be done to demonstrate that each affected control rod retains adequate scram performance over the range of applicable reactor pressures from zero to the maximum permissible pressure. The scram testing must be performed once before declaring the control rod OPERABLE. The required scram time testing must demonstrate that the affected control rod is still within acceptable

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

limits. The limits for reactor pressures < 950 psig are established based on a high probability of meeting the acceptance criteria at reactor pressures  $\geq$  950 psig. Limits for reactor pressures  $\geq$  950 psig are found in Table 3.1.4-1. If testing demonstrates the affected control rod does not meet these limits, but is within 7-second limit of Table 3.1.4-1, Note 2, the control rod can be declared OPERABLE and "slow."

Specific examples of work that could affect the scram times include (but are not limited to) the following: removal of any CRD for maintenance or modification; replacement of a control rod; and maintenance or modification of a scram solenoid pilot valve, scram valve, accumulator isolation valve, or check valves in the piping required for scram.

The Frequency of once prior to declaring the affected control rod OPERABLE is acceptable because of the capability of testing the control rod over a range of operating conditions and the more frequent surveillances on other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY.

SR 3.1.4.4

When work that could affect the scram insertion time is performed on a control rod or CRD System, or when fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel occurs, testing must be done to demonstrate each affected control rod is still within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with the reactor steam dome pressure  $\geq$  950 psig. Where work has been performed at high reactor pressure, the requirements of SR 3.1.4.3 and SR 3.1.4.4 will be satisfied with one test. For a control rod affected by work performed while shut down, however, a zero pressure and a high pressure test may be required. This testing ensures that the control rod scram performance is acceptable for operating reactor pressure conditions prior to withdrawing the control rod for continued operation. Alternatively, a test during hydrostatic pressure testing could also satisfy both criteria. When fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel occurs, only those control rods associated with the core cells affected by the fuel movement are required to be scram time tested. During a routine refueling outage, it is expected that all control rods will be affected.

The Frequency of once prior to exceeding 40% RTP is acceptable because of the capability of testing the control rod at the different conditions and the more frequent surveillances on other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY.

**BASES**

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- REFERENCES**
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10.
  2. FSAR, Section [4.3.2.5.5].
  3. FSAR, Section [4.6.1.1.2.5.3].
  4. FSAR, Section [5.2.2.2.2.3].
  5. FSAR, Section [15.4.1].
  6. FSAR, Section [15.4.9].
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The control rod scram accumulators are part of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System and are provided to ensure that the control rods scram under varying reactor conditions. The control rod scram accumulators store sufficient energy to fully insert a control rod at any reactor vessel pressure. The accumulator is a hydraulic cylinder with a free floating piston. The piston separates the water used to scram the control rods from the nitrogen, which provides the required energy. The scram accumulators are necessary to scram the control rods within the required insertion times of LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times."

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the control rod scram function are presented in References 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses assume that all of the control rods scram at a specified insertion rate. OPERABILITY of each individual control rod scram accumulator, along with LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," and LCO 3.1.4, ensures that the scram reactivity assumed in the DBA and transient analyses can be met. The existence of an inoperable accumulator may invalidate prior scram time measurements for the associated control rod.

The scram function of the CRD System, and, therefore, the OPERABILITY of the accumulators, protects the MCPR Safety Limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") and the 1% cladding plastic strain fuel design limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," and LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), which ensure that no fuel damage will occur if these limits are not exceeded (see Bases for LCO 3.1.4). Also, the scram function at low reactor vessel pressure (i.e., startup conditions) provides protection against violating fuel design limits during reactivity insertion accidents (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control").

Control rod scram accumulators satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**LCO** The OPERABILITY of the control rod scram accumulators is required to ensure that adequate scram insertion capability exists when needed over the entire range of reactor pressures. The OPERABILITY of the scram accumulators is based on maintaining adequate accumulator pressure.

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BASES

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APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the scram function is required for mitigation of DBAs and transients and, therefore, the scram accumulators must be OPERABLE to support the scram function. In MODES 3 and 4, control rods are only allowed to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod scram accumulator OPERABILITY under these conditions. Requirements for scram accumulators in MODE 5 are contained in LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling."

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each control rod. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory action for each affected control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation and subsequent affected control rods governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1 and A.2

With one control rod scram accumulator inoperable and the reactor steam dome pressure  $\geq 900$  psig, the control rod may be declared "slow," since the control rod will still scram at the reactor operating pressure but may not satisfy the required scram times in Table 3.1.4-1. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note, which clarifies that declaring the control rod "slow" is only applicable if the associated control scram time was within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 during the last scram time test. Otherwise, the control rod would already be considered "slow" and the further degradation of scram performance with an inoperable accumulator could result in excessive scram times. In this event, the associated control rod is declared inoperable (Required Action A.2) and LCO 3.1.3 entered. This would result in requiring the affected control rod to be fully inserted and disarmed, thereby satisfying its intended function in accordance with ACTIONS of LCO 3.1.3.

The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is considered reasonable, based on the large number of control rods available to provide the scram function and the ability of the affected control rod to scram only with reactor pressure at high reactor pressures.

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

With two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and reactor steam dome pressure  $\geq 900$  psig, adequate pressure must be supplied to the charging water header. With inadequate charging water pressure, all

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**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

of the accumulators could become inoperable, resulting in a potentially severe degradation of the scram performance. Therefore, within 20 minutes from discovery of charging water header pressure < 1520 psig concurrent with Condition B, adequate charging water header pressure must be restored. The allowed Completion Time of 20 minutes is considered a reasonable time to place a CRD pump into service to restore the charging header pressure, if required. This Completion Time also recognizes the ability of the reactor pressure alone to fully insert all control rods.

The control rod may be declared "slow," since the control rod will still scram using only reactor pressure, but may not satisfy the times in Table 3.1.4-1. Required Action B.2.1 is modified by a Note indicating that declaring the control rod "slow" is only applicable if the associated control scram time was within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 during the last scram time test. Otherwise, the control rod would already be considered "slow" and the further degradation of scram performance with an inoperable accumulator could result in excessive scram times. In this event, the associated control rod is declared inoperable (Required Action B.2.2) and LCO 3.1.3 entered. This would result in requiring the affected control rod to be fully inserted and disarmed, thereby satisfying its intended function in accordance with ACTIONS of LCO 3.1.3.

The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is considered reasonable, based on the ability of only the reactor pressure to scram the control rods and the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring while the affected accumulators are inoperable.

C.1 and C.2

With one or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and the reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig, the pressure supplied to the charging water header must be adequate to ensure that accumulators remain charged. With the reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig, the function of the accumulators in providing the scram force becomes much more important since the scram function could become severely degraded during a depressurization event or at low reactor pressures. Therefore, immediately upon discovery of charging water header pressure < [1520] psig, concurrent with Condition C, all control rods associated with inoperable accumulators must be verified to be fully inserted. Withdrawn control rods with inoperable scram accumulators may fail to scram under these low pressure conditions. The associated control rods must also be declared inoperable within 1 hour. The allowed

BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable for Required Action C.2, considering the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring during the time the accumulator is inoperable.

D.1

The reactor mode switch must be immediately placed in the shutdown position if either Required Action and associated Completion Time associated with loss of the CRD charging pump (Required Actions B.1 and C.1) cannot be met. This ensures that all insertable control rods are inserted and that the reactor is in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods. This Required Action is modified by a Note stating that the Required Action is not applicable if all control rods associated with the inoperable scram accumulators are fully inserted, since the function of the control rods has been performed.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.5.1

SR 3.1.5.1 requires that the accumulator pressure be checked every 7 days to ensure adequate accumulator pressure exists to provide sufficient scram force. The primary indicator of accumulator OPERABILITY is the accumulator pressure. A minimum accumulator pressure is specified, below which the capability of the accumulator to perform its intended function becomes degraded and the accumulator is considered inoperable. The minimum accumulator pressure of 1520 psig is well below the expected pressure of 1750 psig to 2000 psig (Ref. 2). Declaring the accumulator inoperable when the minimum pressure is not maintained ensures that significant degradation in scram times does not occur. The 7 day Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and takes into account indications available in the control room.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [4.3.2.5.5].
  2. FSAR, Section [4.6.1.1.2.5.3].
  3. FSAR, Section [5.2.2.2.2.3].
  4. FSAR, Section [15.4.1].
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod pattern controller (RPC) (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"), so that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range of all control rods inserted to [10] RTP. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount of reactivity addition that could occur in the event of a control rod drop accident (CRDA).

This Specification assures that the control rod patterns are consistent with the assumptions of the CRDA analyses of References 1, 2, and 3.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the CRDA are summarized in References 1, 2, and 3. CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the CRDA analysis. The RPC (LCO 3.3.2.1) provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure that the initial conditions of the CRDA analysis are not violated.

Prevention or mitigation of positive reactivity insertion events is necessary to limit the energy deposition in the fuel, thereby preventing significant fuel damage, which could result in undue release of radioactivity. Since the failure consequences for  $UO_2$  have been shown to be insignificant below fuel energy depositions of 300 cal/gm (Ref. 4), the fuel damage limit of 280 cal/gm provides a margin of safety from significant core damage, which would result in release of radioactivity (Refs. 5 and 6). Generic evaluations (Refs. 1 and 7) of a design basis CRDA (i.e., a CRDA resulting in a peak fuel energy deposition of 280 cal/gm) have shown that if the peak fuel enthalpy remains below 280 cal/gm, then the maximum reactor pressure will be less than the required ASME Code limits (Ref. 8) and the calculated offsite doses will be well within the required limits (Ref. 6).

Control rod patterns analyzed in Reference 1 follow the banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) described in Reference 9. The BPWS is applicable from the condition of all control rods fully inserted to 10% RTP (Ref. 2). For the BPWS, the control rods are required to be moved in groups, with all control rods assigned to a specific group required to be within specified banked positions (e.g., between notches 08 and 12). The

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**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

banked positions are defined to minimize the maximum incremental control rod worths without being overly restrictive during normal plant operation. The generic BPWS analysis (Ref. 9) also evaluated the effect of fully inserted, inoperable control rods not in compliance with the sequence, to allow a limited number (i.e., eight) and distribution of fully inserted, inoperable control rods.

Rod pattern control satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**LCO**

Compliance with the prescribed control rod sequences minimizes the potential consequences of a CRDA by limiting the initial conditions to those consistent with the BPWS. This LCO only applies to OPERABLE control rods. For inoperable control rods required to be inserted, separate requirements are specified in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," consistent with the allowances for inoperable control rods in the BPWS.

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**APPLICABILITY**

In MODES 1 and 2, when THERMAL POWER is  $\leq$  10% RTP, the CRDA is a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and, therefore, compliance with the assumptions of the safety analysis is required. When THERMAL POWER is  $>$  10% RTP, there is no credible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the 280 cal/gm fuel damage limit during a CRDA (Ref. 2). In MODES 3, 4, and 5, since the reactor is shut down and only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will remain subcritical with a single control rod withdrawn.

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**ACTIONS**

A.1 and A.2

With one or more OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with the prescribed control rod sequence, action may be taken to either correct the control rod pattern or declare the associated control rods inoperable within 8 hours. Noncompliance with the prescribed sequence may be the result of "double notching," drifting from a control rod drive cooling water transient, leaking scram valves, or a power reduction to  $\leq$  [10]% RTP before establishing the correct control rod pattern. The number of OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with the prescribed sequence is limited to eight to prevent the operator from attempting to correct a control rod pattern that significantly deviates from the prescribed sequence. When the control rod pattern is not in compliance with the

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**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

prescribed sequence, all control rod movement should be stopped except for moves needed to correct the control rod pattern, or scram if warranted.

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note, which allows control rods to be bypassed in Rod Action Control System (RACS) to allow the affected control rods to be returned to their correct position. This ensures that the control rods will be moved to the correct position. A control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence is not considered inoperable except as required by Required Action A.2. OPERABILITY of control rods is determined by compliance with LCO 3.1.3; LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is reasonable, considering the restrictions on the number of allowed out of sequence control rods and the low probability of a CRDA occurring during the time the control rods are out of sequence.

**B.1 and B.2**

If nine or more OPERABLE control rods are out of sequence, the control rod pattern significantly deviates from the prescribed sequence. Control rod withdrawal should be suspended immediately to prevent the potential for further deviation from the prescribed sequence. Control rod insertion to correct control rods withdrawn beyond their allowed position is allowed since, in general, insertion of control rods has less impact on control rod worth than withdrawals have. Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that allows the affected control rods to be bypassed in RACS in accordance with SR 3.3.2.1.8 to allow insertion only.

With nine or more OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with BPWS, the reactor mode switch must be placed in the shutdown position within 1 hour. With the reactor mode switch in shutdown, the reactor is shut down, and therefore does not meet the applicability requirements of this LCO. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable to allow insertion of control rods to restore compliance, and is appropriate relative to the low probability of a CRDA occurring with the control rods out of sequence.

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.6.1

The control rod pattern is verified to be in compliance with the BPWS at a 24 hour Frequency, ensuring the assumptions of the CRDA analyses are met. The 24 hour Frequency of this Surveillance was developed considering that the primary check of the control rod pattern compliance with the BPWS is performed by the RPC (LCO 3.3.2.1). The RPC provides control rod blocks to enforce the required control rod sequence and is required to be OPERABLE when operating at  $\leq 10\%$  RTP.

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REFERENCES

1. Current Cycle Safety Analysis.
  2. "Modifications to the Requirements for Control Rod Drop Accident Mitigating Systems," BWR Owners Group, July 1987.
  3. FSAR, Section 15.4.9.
  4. NUREG-0979, "NRC Safety Evaluation Report for GESSAR II BWR/6 Nuclear Island Design, Docket No. 50-447," Section 4.2.1.3.2, April 1983.
  5. NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan," Section 15.4.9, "Radiological Consequences of Control Rod Drop Accident (BWR)," Revision 2, July 1981.
  6. 10 CFR 100.11, "Determination of Exclusion Area Low Population Zone and Population Center Distance."
  7. NEDO-21778-A, "Transient Pressure Rises Affected Fracture Toughness Requirements for Boiling Water Reactors," December 1978.
  8. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
  9. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," January 1977.
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The SLC System is designed to provide the capability of bringing the reactor, at any time in a fuel cycle, from full power and minimum control rod inventory (which is at the peak of the xenon transient) to a subcritical condition with the reactor in the most reactive xenon free state without taking credit for control rod movement. The SLC System satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (Ref. 1) on anticipated transient without scram (ATWS).

The SLC System consists of a boron solution storage tank, two positive displacement pumps, two explosive valves, which are provided in parallel for redundancy, and associated piping and valves used to transfer borated water from the storage tank to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The borated solution is discharged through the high pressure core spray system sparger.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The SLC System is manually initiated from the main control room, as directed by the emergency operating procedures, if the operator believes the reactor cannot be shut down, or kept shut down, with the control rods. The SLC System is used in the event that not enough control rods can be inserted to accomplish shutdown and cooldown in the normal manner. The SLC System injects borated water into the reactor core to compensate for all of the various reactivity effects that could occur during plant operation. To meet this objective, it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron that produces a concentration of 660 ppm of natural boron in the reactor core at 68°F. To allow for potential leakage and imperfect mixing in the reactor system, an additional amount of boron equal to 25% of the amount cited above is added (Ref. 2). The temperature versus concentration limits in Figure 3.1.7-1 are calculated such that the required concentration is achieved accounting for dilution in the RPV with normal water level and including the water volume in the residual heat removal shutdown cooling piping and in the recirculation loop piping. This quantity of borated solution is the amount that is above the pump suction shutoff level in the boron solution storage tank. No credit is taken for the portion of the tank volume that cannot be injected.

The SLC System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**BASES**

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**LCO**                      The OPERABILITY of the SLC System provides backup capability for reactivity control, independent of normal reactivity control provisions provided by the control rods. The OPERABILITY of the SLC System is based on the conditions of the borated solution in the storage tank and the availability of a flow path to the RPV, including the OPERABILITY of the pumps and valves. Two SLC subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, each containing an OPERABLE pump, an explosive valve and associated piping, valves, and instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

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**APPLICABILITY**        In MODES 1 and 2, shutdown capability is required. In MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate controls to ensure the reactor remains subcritical. In MODE 5, only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies. Demonstration of adequate SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)") ensures that the reactor will not become critical. Therefore, the SLC System is not required to be OPERABLE during these conditions, when only a single control rod can be withdrawn.

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**ACTIONS**

A.1

If the boron solution concentration is less than the required limits for ATWS mitigation but greater than the concentration required for cold shutdown (original licensing basis), the concentration must be restored to within limits in 72 hours. It is not necessary under these conditions to enter Condition C for both SLC subsystems inoperable, since they are capable of performing their original design basis function. Because of the low probability of an ATWS event and that the SLC System capability still exists for vessel injection under these conditions, the allowed Completion Time of 72 hours is acceptable and provides adequate time to restore concentration to within limits.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of concentration out of limits or inoperable SLC subsystems during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, an SLC subsystem is inoperable and that subsystem is subsequently returned to OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 days (7 days in Condition B, followed by 3 days in Condition A), since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the SLC System. Then an SLC subsystem could be found inoperable again, and concentration could be restored to within limits. This could continue indefinitely.

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## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock", resulting in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met instead of at the time Condition A was entered. The 10 day Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

#### B.1

If one SLC System subsystem is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem is adequate to perform the shutdown function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced SLC System shutdown capability. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the availability of an OPERABLE subsystem capable of performing the intended SLC System function and the low probability of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or severe transient occurring concurrent with the failure of the Control Rod Drive System to shut down the plant.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of concentration out of limits or inoperable SLC subsystems during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, concentration is out of limits, and is subsequently returned to within limits, the LCO may already have been not met of up to 3 days. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 days (3 days in Condition A, followed by 7 days in Condition B), since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the SLC System. Then concentration could be found out of limits again, and the SLC subsystem could be restored to OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock", resulting in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 10 day Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

#### C.1

If both SLC subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is

## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

considered acceptable, given the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring concurrent with the failure of the control rods to shut down the reactor.

#### D.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

#### SR 3.1.7.1, SR 3.1.7.2, and SR 3.1.7.3

SR 3.1.7.1 through SR 3.1.7.3 are 24 hour Surveillances, verifying certain characteristics of the SLC System (e.g., the volume and temperature of the borated solution in the storage tank), thereby ensuring the SLC System OPERABILITY without disturbing normal plant operation. These Surveillances ensure the proper borated solution and temperature, including the temperature of the pump suction piping, are maintained. Maintaining a minimum specified borated solution temperature is important in ensuring that the boron remains in solution and does not precipitate out in the storage tank or in the pump suction piping. The 24 hour Frequency of these SRs is based on operating experience that has shown there are relatively slow variations in the measured parameters of volume and temperature.

#### SR 3.1.7.4 and SR 3.1.7.6

SR 3.1.7.4 verifies the continuity of the explosive charges in the injection valves to ensure proper operation will occur if required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.1.7.6 verifies each valve in the system is in its correct position, but does not apply to the squib (i.e., explosive) valves. Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the SLC System flow path ensures that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, provided it can be aligned to the accident position from the control room,

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

or locally by a dedicated operator at the valve control. This is acceptable since the SLC System is a manually initiated system. This Surveillance does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This verification of valve alignment does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct positions. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation that ensure correct valve positions.

SR 3.1.7.5

This Surveillance requires an examination of the sodium pentaborate solution by using chemical analysis to ensure the proper concentration of boron exists in the storage tank. SR 3.1.7.5 must be performed anytime boron or water is added to the storage tank solution to establish that the boron solution concentration is within the specified limits. This Surveillance must be performed anytime the temperature is restored to within the limits of Figure 3.1.7-1, to ensure no significant boron precipitation occurred. The 31 day Frequency of this Surveillance is appropriate because of the relatively slow variation of boron concentration between surveillances.

SR 3.1.7.7

Demonstrating each SLC System pump develops a flow rate  $\geq 41.2$  gpm at a discharge pressure  $\geq 1300$  psig ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the fuel cycle. This minimum pump flow rate requirement ensures that, when combined with the sodium pentaborate solution concentration requirements, the rate of negative reactivity insertion from the SLC System will adequately compensate for the positive reactivity effects encountered during power reduction, cooldown of the moderator, and xenon decay. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this Surveillance is [in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program or 92 days].

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.1.7.8 and SR 3.1.7.9

These Surveillances ensure that there is a functioning flow path from the boron solution storage tank to the RPV, including the firing of an explosive valve. The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. The pump and explosive valve tested should be alternated such that both complete flow paths are tested every 36 months, at alternating 18 month intervals. The Surveillance may be performed in separate steps to prevent injecting boron into the RPV. An acceptable method for verifying flow from the pump to the RPV is to pump demineralized water from a test tank through one SLC subsystem and into the RPV. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance test when performed at the 18 month Frequency; therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the boron solution storage tank and the suction inlet to the injection pumps is unblocked ensures that there is a functioning flow path for injecting the sodium pentaborate solution. An acceptable method for verifying that the suction piping is unblocked is to pump from the storage tank to the test tank. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable since there is a low probability that the subject piping will be blocked due to precipitation of the boron from solution in the heat traced piping. This is especially true in light of the daily temperature verification of this piping required by SR 3.1.7.3. However, if, in performing SR 3.1.7.3, it is determined that the temperature of this piping has fallen below the specified minimum, SR 3.1.7.9 must be performed once within 24 hours after the piping temperature is restored within the limits of Figure 3.1.7-1.

SR 3.1.7.10

Enriched sodium pentaborate solution is made by mixing granular, enriched sodium pentaborate with water. Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate to verify the actual B-10 enrichment must be performed prior to addition to the SLC tank in order to ensure that the proper B-10 atom percentage is being used.

**BASES**

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**REFERENCES**

1. 10 CFR 50.62.
  2. FSAR, Section [9.3.5.3].
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## B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### B 3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The SDV vent and drain valves are normally open and discharge any accumulated water in the SDV to ensure that sufficient volume is available at all times to allow a complete scram. During a scram, the SDV vent and drain valves close to contain reactor water. The SDV consists of header piping that connects to each hydraulic control unit (HCU) and drains into an instrument volume. There are two headers and two instrument volumes, each receiving approximately one half of the control rod drive (CRD) discharges. The two instrument volumes are connected to a common drain line with two valves in series. Each header is connected to a common vent line with two valves in series. The header piping is sized to receive and contain all the water discharged by the CRDs during a scram. The design and functions of the SDV are described in Reference 1.

**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The Design Basis Accident and transient analyses assume all the control rods are capable of scramming. The primary function of the SDV is to limit the amount of reactor coolant discharged during a scram. The acceptance criteria for the SDV vent and drain valves are that they operate automatically to:

- a. Close during scram to limit the amount of reactor coolant discharged so that adequate core cooling is maintained and offsite doses remain within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2) and
- b. Open on scram reset to maintain the SDV vent and drain path open so there is sufficient volume to accept the reactor coolant discharged during a scram.

Isolation of the SDV can also be accomplished by manual closure of the SDV valves. Additionally, the discharge of reactor coolant to the SDV can be terminated by scram reset or closure of the HCU manual isolation valves. For a bounding leakage case, the offsite doses are well within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2) and adequate core cooling is maintained (Ref. 3). The SDV vent and drain valves also allow continuous drainage of the SDV during normal plant operation to ensure the SDV has sufficient capacity to contain the reactor coolant discharge during a full core scram. To automatically ensure this capacity, a reactor

BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation") is initiated if the SDV water level exceeds a specified setpoint. The setpoint is chosen such that all control rods are inserted before the SDV has insufficient volume to accept a full scram.

SDV vent and drain valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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LCO

The OPERABILITY of all SDV vent and drain valves ensures that, during a scram, the SDV vent and drain valves will close to contain reactor water discharged to the SDV piping. Since the vent and drain lines are provided with two valves in series, the single failure of one valve in the open position will not impair the isolation function of the system. Additionally, the valves are required to be open to ensure that a path is available for the SDV piping to drain freely at other times.

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APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, scram may be required, and therefore, the SDV vent and drain valves must be OPERABLE. In MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate controls to ensure that only a single control rod can be withdrawn. Also, during MODE 5, only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies. Therefore, the SDV vent and drain valves are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES since the reactor is subcritical and only one rod may be withdrawn and subject to scram.

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each SDV vent and drain line. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SDV line. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SDV lines are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1

When one SDV vent or drain valve is inoperable in one or more lines, the valves must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time is reasonable, given the level of redundancy in the lines and the low probability of a scram occurring during the time the valve(s) are inoperable. The SDV is still isolable since the redundant valve in the affected line is OPERABLE. During these periods, the single failure

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**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

criterion may not be preserved, and a higher risk exists to allow reactor water out of the primary system during a scram.

**B.1**

If both valves in a line are inoperable, the line must be isolated to contain the reactor coolant during a scram. When a line is isolated, the potential for an inadvertent scram due to high SDV level is increased. Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that allows periodic draining and venting of the SDV when a line is isolated. During these periods, the line may be unisolated under administrative control. This allows any accumulated water in the line to be drained, to preclude a reactor scram on SDV high level. This is acceptable, since the administrative controls ensure the valve can be closed quickly, by a dedicated operator, if a scram occurs with the valve open.

The 8 hour Completion Time to isolate the line is based on the low probability of a scram occurring while the line is not isolated and unlikelihood of significant CRD seal leakage.

**C.1**

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

**SR 3.1.8.1**

During normal operation, the SDV vent and drain valves should be in the open position (except when performing SR 3.1.8.2) to allow for drainage of the SDV piping. Verifying that each valve is in the open position ensures that the SDV vent and drain valves will perform their intended function during normal operation. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that the valves are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, which ensure correct valve positions. Improper valve position (closed) would not affect the isolation function.

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

**SR 3.1.8.2**

During a scram, the SDV vent and drain valves should close to contain the reactor water discharged to the SDV piping. Cycling each valve through its complete range of motion (closed and open) ensures that the valve will function properly during a scram. The 92 day Frequency is based on operating experience and takes into account the level of redundancy in the system design.

**SR 3.1.8.3**

SR 3.1.8.3 is an integrated test of the SDV vent and drain valves to verify total system performance. After receipt of a simulated or actual scram signal, the closure of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified. The closure time of [30] seconds after a receipt of a scram signal is based on the bounding leakage case evaluated in the accident analysis. Similarly, after receipt of a simulated or actual scram reset signal, the opening of the SDV vent and drain valves is verified. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1 and the scram time testing of control rods in LCO 3.1.3 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency; therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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**REFERENCES**

1. FSAR, Section [4.6.1.1.2.4.2.6].
  2. 10 CFR 100.
  3. NUREG-0803, "Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR Scram System Piping," August 1981.
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## B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### B 3.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The APLHGR is a measure of the average LHGR of all the fuel rods in a fuel assembly at any axial location. Limits on the APLHGR are specified to ensure that the fuel design limits identified in Reference 1 are not exceeded during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and that the peak cladding temperature (PCT) during the postulated design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) does not exceed the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the fuel design limits are presented in the FSAR, Chapters 4, 6, and 15, and in References 1 and 2. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), anticipated operational transients, and normal operations that determine APLHGR limits are presented in FSAR, Chapters 4, 6, and 15, and in References 1, 2, and 3.

Fuel design evaluations are performed to demonstrate that the 1% limit on the fuel cladding plastic strain and other fuel design limits described in Reference 1 are not exceeded during AOOs for operation with LHGR up to the operating limit LHGR. APLHGR limits are equivalent to the LHGR limit for each fuel rod divided by the local peaking factor of the fuel assembly. APLHGR limits are developed as a function of exposure and the various operating core flow and power states to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the limiting AOOs (Refs. 2 and 3). Flow dependent APLHGR limits are determined using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 4) to analyze slow flow runout transients. The flow dependent multiplier,  $MAPFAC_r$ , is dependent on the maximum core flow runout capability.  $MAPFAC_r$  curves are provided based on the maximum credible flow runout transient for Loop Manual and Non Loop Manual operation. The result of a single failure or single operator error during Loop Manual operation is the runout of only one loop because both recirculation loops are under independent control. Non Loop Manual operational modes allow simultaneous runout of both loops because a single controller regulates core flow.

Based on analyses of limiting plant transients (other than core flow increases) over a range of power and flow conditions, power dependent multipliers,  $MAPFAC_p$ , are also generated. Due to the sensitivity of the transient response to initial core flow levels at power levels below those

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**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

at which turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scram signals are bypassed, both high and low core flow MAPFAC<sub>p</sub> limits are provided for operation at power levels between 25% RTP and the previously mentioned bypass power level. The exposure dependent APLHGR limits are reduced by MAPFAC<sub>p</sub> and MAPFAC<sub>r</sub> at various operating conditions to ensure that all fuel design criteria are met for normal operation and AOOs. A complete discussion of the analysis code is provided in References 1 and 3.

LOCA analyses are then performed to ensure that the above determined APLHGR limits are adequate to meet the PCT and maximum oxidation limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The analysis is performed using calculational models that are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. A complete discussion of the analysis code is provided in Reference 5. The PCT following a postulated LOCA is a function of the average heat generation rate of all the rods of a fuel assembly at any axial location and is not strongly influenced by the rod to rod power distribution within an assembly. The APLHGR limits specified are equivalent to the LHGR of the highest powered fuel rod assumed in the LOCA analysis divided by its local peaking factor. A conservative multiplier is applied to the LHGR assumed in the LOCA analysis to account for the uncertainty associated with the measurement of the APLHGR.

For single recirculation loop operation, the MAPFAC multiplier is limited to a maximum of 0.86 (Ref. 2). This limit is due to the conservative analysis assumption of an earlier departure from nucleate boiling with one recirculation loop available, resulting in a more severe cladding heatup during a LOCA.

The APLHGR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**LCO**

The APLHGR limits specified in the COLR are the result of fuel design, DBA, and transient analyses. For two recirculation loops operating, the limit is determined by multiplying the smaller of the MAPFAC<sub>r</sub> and MAPFAC<sub>p</sub> factors times the exposure dependent APLHGR limits. With only one recirculation loop in operation, in conformance with the requirements of LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," the limit is determined by multiplying the exposure dependent APLHGR limit by the smallest of MAPFAC<sub>r</sub>, MAPFAC<sub>p</sub>, and 0.86, where 0.86 has been determined by a specific single recirculation loop analysis (Ref. 2).

**BASES**

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**APPLICABILITY** The APLHGR limits are primarily derived from fuel design evaluations and LOCA and transient analyses that are assumed to occur at high power levels. Design calculations (Ref. 4) and operating experience have shown that as power is reduced, the margin to the required APLHGR limits increases. This trend continues down to the power range of 5% to 15% RTP when entry into MODE 2 occurs. When in MODE 2, the intermediate range monitor (IRM) scram function provides prompt scram initiation during any significant transient, thereby effectively removing any APLHGR limit compliance concern in MODE 2. Therefore, at THERMAL POWER levels  $\leq$  25% RTP, the reactor operates with substantial margin to the APLHGR limits; thus, this LCO is not required.

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**ACTIONS**

A.1

If any APLHGR exceeds the required limits, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the DBA and transient analyses may not be met. Therefore, prompt action is taken to restore the APLHGR(s) to within the required limits such that the plant will be operating within analyzed conditions and within the design limits of the fuel rods. The 2 hour Completion Time is sufficient to restore the APLHGR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or DBA occurring simultaneously with the APLHGR out of specification.

B.1

If the APLHGR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to  $<$  25% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to  $<$  25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.2.1.1

APLHGRs are required to be initially calculated within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is  $\geq$  25% RTP and then every 24 hours thereafter. They are compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution under normal conditions. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER  $\geq$  25% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.

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**BASES**

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**REFERENCES**

1. [Plant specific current cycle safety analysis].
  2. FSAR, [Chapter 15, Appendix C].
  3. FSAR, [Chapter 15, Appendix D].
  4. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), "Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, Neutronics Methods for Design and Analysis," Volume 1, June 1981.
  5. XN-NF-80-19(A), "Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, ECCS Evaluation Model," Volume 2, Revision 1, June 1981.
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## B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

MCPR is a ratio of the fuel assembly power that would result in the onset of boiling transition to the actual fuel assembly power. The MCPR Safety Limit (SL) is set such that 99.9% of the fuel rods avoid boiling transition if the limit is not violated (refer to the Bases for SL 2.1.1.2). The operating limit MCPR is established to ensure that no fuel damage results during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). Although fuel damage does not necessarily occur if a fuel rod actually experiences boiling transition (Ref. 1), the critical power at which boiling transition is calculated to occur has been adopted as a fuel design criterion.

The onset of transition boiling is a phenomenon that is readily detected during the testing of various fuel bundle designs. Based on these experimental data, correlations have been developed to predict critical bundle power (i.e., the bundle power level at the onset of transition boiling) for a given set of plant parameters (e.g., reactor vessel pressure, flow, and subcooling). Because plant operating conditions and bundle power levels are monitored and determined relatively easily, monitoring the MCPR is a convenient way of ensuring that fuel failures due to inadequate cooling do not occur.

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##### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the AOOs to establish the operating limit MCPR are presented in the FSAR, Chapters 4, 6, and 15, and References 2, 3, 4, and 5. To ensure that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during any transient event that occurs with moderate frequency, limiting transients have been analyzed to determine the largest reduction in critical power ratio (CPR). The types of transients evaluated are loss of flow, increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease. The limiting transient yields the largest change in CPR ( $\Delta$ CPR). When the largest  $\Delta$ CPR is added to the MCPR SL, the required operating limit MCPR is obtained.

The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on the operating core flow and power state ( $MCPR_f$  and  $MCPR_p$ , respectively) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency (Refs. 3, 4, and 5). Flow dependent MCPR limits are determined by steady state thermal hydraulic methods using the three dimensional BWR simulator code (Ref. 6) and the multichannel thermal hydraulic code (Ref. 7).  $MCPR_f$

BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

curves are provided based on the maximum credible flow runout transient for Loop Manual and Non Loop Manual operation. The result of a single failure or single operator error during Loop Manual operation is the runout of only one loop because both recirculation loops are under independent control. Non Loop Manual operational modes allow simultaneous runout of both loops because a single controller regulates core flow.

Power dependent MCPR limits ( $MCPR_p$ ) are determined by the three dimensional BWR simulator code and the one dimensional transient code (Ref. 8). Due to the sensitivity of the transient response to initial core flow levels at power levels below those at which the turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure scram trips are bypassed, high and low flow  $MCPR_p$  operating limits are provided for operating between 25% RTP and the previously mentioned bypass power level.

The MCPR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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LCO

The MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis. The MCPR operating limits are determined by the larger of the  $MCPR_r$  and  $MCPR_p$  limits.

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APPLICABILITY

The MCPR operating limits are primarily derived from transient analyses that are assumed to occur at high power levels. Below 25% RTP, the reactor is operating at a slow recirculation pump speed and the moderator void ratio is small. Surveillance of thermal limits below 25% RTP is unnecessary due to the large inherent margin that ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded even if a limiting transient occurs. Statistical analyses documented in Reference 9 indicate that the nominal value of the initial MCPR expected at 25% RTP is  $> 3.5$ . Studies of the variation of limiting transient behavior have been performed over the range of power and flow conditions. These studies (Ref. 5) encompass the range of key actual plant parameter values important to typically limiting transients. The results of these studies demonstrate that a margin is expected between performance and the MCPR requirements, and that margins increase as power is reduced to 25% RTP. This trend is expected to continue to the 5% to 15% power range when entry into MODE 2 occurs. When in MODE 2, the intermediate range monitor (IRM) provides rapid scram initiation for any significant power increase transient, which effectively eliminates any MCPR compliance concern. Therefore, at THERMAL POWER levels  $< 25\%$  RTP, the reactor is

BASES

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APPLICABILITY (continued)

operating with substantial margin to the MCP PR limits and this LCO is not required.

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ACTIONS

A.1

If any MCP PR is outside the required limits, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the design basis transient analyses may not be met. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the MCP PR(s) to within the required limits such that the plant remains operating within analyzed conditions. The 2 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore the MCP PR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or DBA occurring simultaneously with the MCP PR out of specification.

B.1

If the MCP PR cannot be restored to within the required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.2.2.1

The MCP PR is required to be initially calculated within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is  $\geq$  25% RTP and then every 24 hours thereafter. It is compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution during normal operation. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER reaches  $\geq$  25% RTP is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.

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REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0562, June 1979.
  2. [Plant specific current cycle safety analysis].
  3. FSAR, [Appendix 15B].
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**BASES**

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**REFERENCES (continued)**

4. FSAR, [Appendix 15C].
  5. FSAR, [Appendix 15D].
  6. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), "Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, Neutronics Methods for Design and Analysis," Volume 1 (as supplemented).
  7. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), "Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, THERMEX Thermal Limits Methodology Summary Description," Volume 3, Revision 2, January 1987.
  8. XN-NF-79-71(P), "Exxon Nuclear Plant Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors," Revision 2, November 1981.
  9. "BWR/6 Generic Rod Withdrawal Error Analysis," General Electric Standard Safety Analysis Report, GESSAR-II, Appendix 15B.
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## B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### B 3.2.3 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR) (Optional)

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The LHGR is a measure of the heat generation rate of a fuel rod in a fuel assembly at any axial location. Limits on the LHGR are specified to ensure that fuel design limits are not exceeded anywhere in the core during normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). Exceeding the LHGR limit could potentially result in fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive materials. Fuel design limits are specified to ensure that fuel system damage, fuel rod failure or inability to cool the fuel does not occur during the anticipated operating conditions identified in Reference 1.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the fuel system design are presented in References 1 and 2. The fuel assembly is designed to ensure (in conjunction with the core nuclear and thermal hydraulic design, plant equipment, instrumentation, and protection system) that fuel damage will not result in the release of radioactive materials in excess of the guidelines of 10 CFR, Parts 20, 50, and 100. The mechanisms that could cause fuel damage during operational transients and that are considered in fuel evaluations are:

- a. Rupture of the fuel rod cladding caused by strain from the relative expansion of the UO<sub>2</sub> pellet and
- b. Severe overheating of the fuel rod cladding caused by inadequate cooling.

A value of [1%] plastic strain of the fuel cladding has been defined as the limit below which fuel damage caused by overstraining of the fuel cladding is not expected to occur (Ref. 3).

Fuel design evaluations have been performed and demonstrate that the [1%] fuel cladding plastic strain design limit is not exceeded during continuous operation with LHGRs up to the operating limit specified in the COLR. The analysis also includes allowances for short term transient operation above the operating limit to account for AOOs, plus an allowance for densification power spiking.

The LHGR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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BASES

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**LCO**                      The LHGR is a basic assumption in the fuel design analysis. The fuel has been designed to operate at rated core power with sufficient design margin to the LHGR calculated to cause a 1% fuel cladding plastic strain. The operating limit to accomplish this objective is specified in the COLR.

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**APPLICABILITY**        The LHGR limits are derived from fuel design analysis that is limiting at high power level conditions. At core thermal power levels < 25% RTP, the reactor is operating with a substantial margin to the LHGR limits and, therefore, the Specification is only required when the reactor is operating at  $\geq$  25% RTP.

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**ACTIONS**

A.1

If any LHGR exceeds its required limit, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the fuel design analysis is not met. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the LHGR(s) to within its required limits such that the plant is operating within analyzed conditions. The 2 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore the LHGR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or Design Basis Accident occurring simultaneously with the LHGR out of specification.

B.1

If the LHGR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.2.3.1

The LHGR is required to be initially calculated within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is  $\geq$  25% RTP and then every 24 hours thereafter. It is compared with the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution under normal conditions. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER  $\geq$  25% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at lower power levels.

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**BASES**

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**REFERENCES**

1. [Non GE Fuel Analysis].
  2. FSAR, Chapter [4].
  3. NUREG-0800, Section II A.2(g), Revision 2, July 1981.
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## B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### B 3.2.4 Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The OPERABILITY of the APRMs and their setpoints is an initial condition of all safety analyses that assure rod insertion upon reactor scram. Applicable GDCs are GDC 10, "Reactor Design," GDC 13, "Instrumentation and Control," GDC 20, "Protection System Functions," and GDC 29, "Protection against Anticipated Operation Occurrences" (Ref. 1). This LCO is provided to require the APRM gain or APRM flow biased scram setpoints to be adjusted when operating under conditions of excessive power peaking to maintain acceptable margin to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit (SL) and the fuel cladding 1% plastic strain limit.

The condition of excessive power peaking is determined by the ratio of the actual power peaking to the limiting power peaking at RTP. This ratio is equal to the ratio of the core limiting MFLPD to the Fraction of RTP (FRTP) where FRTP is the measured THERMAL POWER divided by the RTP. Excessive power peaking exists when:

$$[ \text{MFLPD} / \text{FRTP} ] > 1,$$

indicating that MFPLD is not decreasing proportionately to the overall power reduction, or conversely, that power peaking is increasing. To maintain margins similar to those at RTP conditions, the excessive power peaking is compensated by gain adjustment on the APRMs or adjustment of the APRM setpoints. Either of these adjustments has effectively the same result as maintaining MFLPD less than or equal to FRTP and thus maintains RTP margins for APLHGR and MCPR.

The normally selected APRM setpoints position the scram above the upper bound of the normal power/flow operating region that has been considered in the design of the fuel rods. The setpoints are flow biased with a slope that approximates the upper flow control line, such that an approximately constant margin is maintained between the flow biased trip level and the upper operating boundary for core flows in excess of about 45% of rated core flow. In the range of infrequent operations below 45% of rated core flow, the margin to scram or rod blocks is reduced because of the nonlinear core flow versus drive flow relationship. The normally selected APRM setpoints are supported by the analyses presented in References 1 and 2 that concentrate on events initiated from rated conditions. Design experience has shown that minimum deviations occur within expected margins to operating limits (APLHGR and MCPR), at

BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued)

rated conditions for normal power distributions. However, at other than rated conditions, control rod patterns can be established that significantly reduce the margin to thermal limits. Therefore, the flow biased APRM scram setpoints may be reduced during operation when the combination of THERMAL POWER and MFLPD indicates an excessive power peaking distribution.

The APRM neutron flux signal is also adjusted to more closely follow the fuel cladding heat flux during power transients. The APRM neutron flux signal is a measure of the core thermal power during steady state operation. During power transients, the APRM signal leads the actual core thermal power response because of the fuel thermal time constant. Therefore, on power increase transients, the APRM signal provides a conservatively high measure of core thermal power. By passing the APRM signal through an electronic filter with a time constant less than, but approximately equal to, that of the fuel thermal time constant, an APRM transient response that more closely follows actual fuel cladding heat flux is obtained, while a conservative margin is maintained. The delayed response of the filtered APRM signal allows the flow biased APRM scram levels to be positioned closer to the upper bound of the normal power and flow range, without unnecessarily causing reactor scrams during short duration neutron flux spikes. These spikes can be caused by insignificant transients such as performance of main steam line valve surveillances or momentary flow increases of only several percent.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES

The acceptance criteria for the APRM gain or setpoint adjustments are that acceptable margins (to APLHGR and MCPR) be maintained to the fuel cladding integrity SL and the fuel cladding 1% plastic strain limit.

FSAF safety analyses (Refs. 2 and 3) concentrate on the rated power condition for which the minimum expected margin to the operating limits (APLHGR and MCPR) occurs. LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," and LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limit the initial margins to these operating limits at rated conditions so that specified acceptable fuel design limits are met during transients initiated from rated conditions. At initial power levels less than rated levels, the margin degradation of either the APLHGR or the MCPR during a transient can be greater than at the rated condition event. This greater margin degradation during the transient is primarily offset by the larger initial margin to limits at the lower than rated power levels. However, power distributions can be hypothesized that would result in reduced margins to the pretransient

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

operating limit. When combined with the increased severity of certain transients at other than rated conditions, the SLs could be approached. At substantially reduced power levels, highly peaked power distributions could be obtained that could reduce thermal margins to the minimum levels required for transient events. To prevent or mitigate such situations, either the APRM gain is adjusted upward by the ratio of the core limiting MFLPD to the FRTP, or the flow biased APRM scram level is required to be reduced by the ratio of FRTP to the core limiting MFLPD. Either of these adjustments effectively counters the increased severity of some events at other than rated conditions by proportionally increasing the APRM gain or proportionally lowering the flow biased APRM scram setpoints dependent on the increased peaking that may be encountered.

The APRM gain and setpoints satisfy Criteria 2 and 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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**LCO**

Meeting any one of the following conditions ensures acceptable operating margins for events described above:

- a. Limiting excess power peaking,
- b. Reducing the APRM flow biased neutron flux upscale scram setpoints by multiplying the APRM setpoints by the ratio of FRTP and the core limiting value of MFLPD, or
- c. Increasing the APRM gains to cause the APRM to read greater than 100(%) times MFLPD. This Condition is to account for the reduction in margin to the fuel cladding integrity SL and the fuel cladding 1% plastic strain limit.

MFLPD is the ratio of the limiting LHGR to the LHGR limit for the specific bundle type. As power is reduced, if the design power distribution is maintained, MFLPD is reduced in proportion to the reduction in power. However, if power peaking increases above the design value, the MFLPD is not reduced in proportion to the reduction in power. Under these conditions, the APRM gain is adjusted upward or the APRM flow biased scram setpoints are reduced accordingly. When the reactor is operating with peaking less than the design value, it is not necessary to modify the APRM flow biased scram setpoints. Adjusting the APRM gain or setpoints is equivalent to maintaining MFLPD less than or equal to FRTP, as stated in the LCO.

BASES

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LCO (continued)

For compliance with LCO Item b (APRM setpoint adjustment) or Item c (APRM gain adjustment), only APRMs required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," are required to be adjusted. In addition, each APRM may be allowed to have its gain or setpoints adjusted independently of other APRMs that are having their gain or setpoints adjusted.

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APPLICABILITY

The MFLPD limit, APRM gain adjustment, or APRM flow biased scram and associated setdowns are provided to ensure that the fuel cladding integrity SL and the fuel cladding 1% plastic strain limit are not violated during design basis transients. As discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.2.1 and LCO 3.2.2 sufficient margin to these limits exists below 25% RTP and, therefore, these requirements are only necessary when the plant is operating at  $\geq 25\%$  RTP.

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ACTIONS

A.1

If the APRM gain or setpoints are not within limits while the MFLPD has exceeded FRTP, the margin to the fuel cladding integrity SL and the fuel cladding 1% plastic strain limit may be reduced. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the MFLPD to within its required limit or make acceptable APRM adjustments such that the plant is operating within the assumed margin of the safety analyses.

The 6 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore either the MFLPD to within limits or the APRM gain or setpoints to within limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or Design Basis Accident occurring simultaneously with the LCO not met.

B.1

If the APRM gain or setpoints cannot be restored to within their required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to  $< 25\%$  RTP within 4 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to  $< 25\%$  RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2

The MFLPD is required to be calculated and compared to FRTP or APRM gain or setpoints to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. These SRs are required only to determine the MFLPD and, assuming MFLPD is greater than FRTP, the appropriate gain or setpoint, and is not intended to be a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the APRM gain or flow biased neutron flux scram circuitry. The 24 hour Frequency of SR 3.2.4.1 is chosen to coincide with the determination of other thermal limits, specifically those for the APLHGR (LCO 3.2.1). The 24 hour Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution during normal operation. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER  $\geq$  25% RTP is achieved is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.

The 12 hour Frequency of SR 3.2.4.2 requires a more frequent verification than if MFLPD is less than or equal to fraction of rated power (FRP). When MFLPD is greater than FRP, more rapid changes in power distribution are typically expected.

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**REFERENCES**

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10, GDC 13, GDC 20, and GDC 29.
  2. FSAR, Section [ ].
  3. FSAR, Section [ ].
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## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The RPS initiates a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit, to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This can be accomplished either automatically or manually.

The protection and monitoring functions of the RPS have been designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RPS, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters, and equipment performance. Technical specifications are required by 10 CFR50.36 to contain LSSS defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices...so chosen that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytic Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytic Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytic Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The Trip Setpoint is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytic Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded. As such, the Trip Setpoint accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the Trip Setpoint plays an important role in ensuring that SLs are not exceeded. As such, the Trip Setpoint meets the definition of an LSSS (Ref. 13) and could be used to meet the requirement that they be contained in the technical specifications.

Technical specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. Operable is defined in technical specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety

BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued)

function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and therefore the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36 is the same as the OPERABILITY limit for these devices. However, use of the Trip Setpoint to define OPERABILITY in technical specifications and its corresponding designation as the LSSS required by 10 CFR 50.36 would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protective device setting during a surveillance. This would result in technical specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the Trip Setpoint due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the Trip Setpoint and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded with the "as found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the Trip Setpoint to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Use of the Trip Setpoint to define "as found" OPERABILITY and its designation as the LSSS under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and technical specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value needs to be specified in the technical specifications in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which, as stated above, is the same as the LSSS.

The Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1-1 serves as the LSSS such that a channel is OPERABLE if the trip setpoint is found not to exceed the Allowable Value. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the Trip Setpoint by an amount primarily equal to the expected instrument loop uncertainties, such as drift, during the surveillance interval. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will still meet the LSSS definition and ensure that a Safety Limit is not exceeded at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to have exceeded the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a technical specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic

## BASES

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### BACKGROUND (continued)

protective devices do not function as required. Note that, although the channel is "OPERABLE" under these circumstances, the trip setpoint should be left adjusted to a value within the established trip setpoint calibration tolerance band, in accordance with uncertainty assumptions stated in the referenced setpoint methodology (as-left criteria), and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned.

The RPS, as shown in the FSAR, Figure [ ] (Ref. 1), includes sensors, relays, bypass circuits, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of a reactor scram. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of dependent and independent parameters. The input parameters to the scram logic are from instrumentation that monitors reactor vessel water level, reactor vessel pressure, neutron flux main steam line isolation valve position, turbine control valve (TCV) fast closure trip oil pressure low, turbine stop valve (TSV) trip oil pressure low, drywell pressure and scram discharge volume (SDV) water level, as well as reactor mode switch in shutdown position and manual scram signals. There are at least four redundant sensor input signals from each of these parameters (with the exception of the reactor mode switch in shutdown scram signal). Most channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When a setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an RPS trip signal to the trip logic. Table B 3.3.1.1-1 summarizes the diversity of sensors capable of initiating scrams during anticipated operating transients typically analyzed.

The RPS is comprised of two independent trip systems (A and B), with two logic channels in each trip system (logic channels A1 and A2, B1 and B2), as shown in Reference 1. The outputs of the logic channels in a trip system are combined in a one-out-of-two logic so either channel can trip the associated trip system. The tripping of both trip systems will produce a reactor scram. This logic arrangement is referred to as one-out-of-two taken twice logic. Each trip system can be reset by use of a reset switch. If a full scram occurs (both trip systems trip), a relay prevents reset of the trip systems for 10 seconds after the full scram signal is received. This 10 second delay on reset ensures that the scram function will be completed.

Two scram pilot valves are located in the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for each control rod drive (CRD). Each scram pilot valve is solenoid operated, with the solenoids normally energized. The scram pilot valves

**BASES**

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**BACKGROUND (continued)**

control the air supply to the scram inlet and outlet valves for the associated CRD. When either scram pilot valve solenoid is energized, air pressure holds the scram valves closed and, therefore, both scram pilot valve solenoids must be de-energized to cause a control rod to scram. The scram valves control the supply and discharge paths for the CRD water during a scram. One of the scram pilot valve solenoids for each CRD is controlled by trip system A, and the other solenoid is controlled by trip system B. Any trip of trip system A in conjunction with any trip in trip system B results in de-energizing both solenoids, air bleeding off, scram valves opening, and control rod scram.

The backup scram valves, which energize on a scram signal to depressurize the scram air header, are also controlled by the RPS. Additionally, the RPS System controls the SDV vent and drain valves such that when both trip systems trip, the SDV vent and drain valves close to isolate the SDV.

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**APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES, LCO,  
and APPLICABILITY**

The actions of the RPS are assumed in the safety analyses of References 2, 3, and 4. The RPS initiates a reactor scram when monitored parameter values exceed the Allowable Values specified by the setpoint methodology and listed in Table 3.3.1.1-1 to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB), and the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA.

RPS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

The OPERABILITY of the RPS is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels per RPS trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time.

Allowable Values are specified for each RPS Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the actual setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than

## BASES

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The OPERABILITY of scram pilot valves and associated solenoids, backup scram valves, and SDV valves, described in the Background section, are not addressed by this LCO.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES specified in the Table that may require an RPS trip to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient. To ensure a reliable scram function, a combination of Functions is required in each MODE to provide primary and diverse initiation signals.

RPS is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and therefore are not required to have the capability to scram. Provided all other control rods remain inserted, the RPS function is not required. In this condition, the required SDM (LCO 3.1.1) and refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) ensure that no event requiring RPS will occur. During normal operation in MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1) does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. Under these conditions, the RPS function is not required to be OPERABLE.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1.a. Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Neutron Flux - High

The IRMs monitor neutron flux levels from the upper range of the source range monitors (SRMs) to the lower range of the average power range monitors (APRMs). The IRMs are capable of generating trip signals that can be used to prevent fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in the intermediate power range. In this power range, the most significant source of reactivity change is due to control rod withdrawal. The IRM provides diverse protection for the rod withdrawal limiter (RWL), which monitors and controls the movement of control rods at low power. The RWL prevents the withdrawal of an out of sequence control rod during startup that could result in an unacceptable neutron flux excursion (Ref. 5). The IRM provides mitigation of the neutron flux excursion. To demonstrate the capability of the IRM System to mitigate control rod withdrawal events, generic analyses have been performed (Ref. 6) to evaluate the consequences of control rod withdrawal events during startup that are mitigated only by the IRM. This analysis, which assumes that one IRM channel in each trip system is bypassed, demonstrates that the IRMs provide protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and results in peak fuel energy depositions below the 170 cal/gm fuel failure threshold criterion.

The IRMs are also capable of limiting other reactivity excursions during startup, such as cold water injection events, although no credit is specifically assumed.

The IRM System is divided into two groups of IRM channels, with four IRM channels inputting to each trip system. The analysis of Reference 6 assumes that one channel in each trip system is bypassed. Therefore, six channels with three channels in each trip system are required for IRM OPERABILITY to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. This trip is active in each of the 10 ranges of the IRM, which must be selected by the operator to maintain the neutron flux within the monitored level of an IRM range.

The analysis of Reference 6 has adequate conservatism to permit an IRM Allowable Value of 120 divisions of a 125 division scale.

The Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn and

## BASES

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

the potential for criticality exists. In MODE 5, when a cell with fuel has its control rod withdrawn, the IRMs provide monitoring for and protection against unexpected reactivity excursions. In MODE 1, the APRM System, the RWL, and the Rod Pattern Controller (RPC) provide protection against control rod withdrawal error events and the IRMs are not required.

#### 1.b. Intermediate Range Monitor - Inop

This trip signal provides assurance that a minimum number of IRMs are OPERABLE. Anytime an IRM mode switch is moved to any position other than "Operate," the detector voltage drops below a preset level, or a module is not plugged in, an inoperative trip signal will be received by the RPS unless the IRM is bypassed. Since only one IRM in each trip system may be bypassed, only one IRM in each RPS trip system may be inoperable without resulting in an RPS trip signal.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

Six channels of Intermediate Range Monitor - Inop with three channels in each trip system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

Since this Function is not assumed in the safety analysis, there is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE when the Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High Function is required.

#### 2.a. Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown

The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRM) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP. For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range. For most operation at low power levels,

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function will provide a secondary scram to the Intermediate Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High Function because of the relative setpoints. With the IRMs at Range 9 or 10, it is possible that the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function will provide the primary trip signal for a corewide increase in power.

No specific safety analyses take direct credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function. However, this Function indirectly ensures that, before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed 25% RTP (SL 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow. Therefore, it indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER < 25% RTP.

The APRM System is divided into two groups of channels with three APRM channel inputs to each trip system. The system is designed to allow one channel in each trip system to be bypassed. Any one APRM channel in a trip system can cause the associated trip system to trip. Six channels of Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown, with three channels in each trip system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, at least 11 LPRM inputs are required for each APRM channel, with at least two LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located.

The Allowable Value is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < 25% RTP.

The Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since the potential for criticality exists. In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High Function provides protection against reactivity transients and the RWL and RPC protect against control rod withdrawal error events.

2.b. Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

THERMAL POWER being transferred to the reactor coolant. The APRM neutron flux is electronically filtered with a time constant representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics to generate a signal proportional to the THERMAL POWER in the reactor. The trip level is varied as a function of recirculation drive flow (i.e., at lower core flows the setpoint is reduced proportional to the reduction in power experienced as core flow is reduced with a fixed control rod pattern) but is clamped at an upper limit that is always lower than the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function Allowable Value. The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function provides protection against transients where THERMAL POWER increases slowly (such as the loss of feedwater heating event) and protects the fuel cladding integrity by ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded. During these events, the THERMAL POWER increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux response and, because of a lower trip setpoint, will initiate a scram before the high neutron flux scram. For rapid neutron flux increase events, the THERMAL POWER lags the neutron flux and the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function will provide a scram signal before the Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function setpoint is exceeded.

The APRM System is divided into two groups of channels with four APRM inputs to each trip system. The system is designed to allow one channel in each trip system to be bypassed. Any one Average Power Range Monitor channel in a trip system can cause the associated trip system to trip. Six channels of Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High, with three channels in each trip system arranged in one-out-of-three logic, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, at least 11 LPRM inputs are required for each APRM channel, with at least two LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located. Each APRM channel receives one total drive flow signal representative of total core flow. The recirculation loop drive flow signals are generated by eight flow units. One flow unit from each recirculation loop is provided to each APRM channel. Total drive flow is determined by each APRM by summing up the flow signals provided to the APRM from the two recirculation loops.

The clamped Allowable Value is based on analyses that take credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function for the mitigation of the loss of feedwater heater

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

event. The THERMAL POWER time constant of < 7 seconds is based on the fuel heat transfer dynamics and provides a signal that is proportional to the THERMAL POWER.

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 when there is the possibility of generating excessive THERMAL POWER and potentially exceeding the SL applicable to high pressure and core flow conditions (MCPR SL). During MODES 2 and 5, other IRM and APRM Functions provide protection for fuel cladding integrity.

2.c. Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases. The Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is capable of generating a trip signal to prevent fuel damage or excessive RCS pressure. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is assumed to terminate the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure event and, along with the safety/relief valves (S/RVs), limits the peak reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) analysis (Ref. 7) takes credit for the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function to terminate the CRDA.

The APRM System is divided into two groups of channels with four APRM channels inputting to each trip system. The system is designed to allow one channel in each trip system to be bypassed. Any one APRM channel in a trip system can cause the associated trip system to trip. Six channels of Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High with three channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-three logic are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, at least 11 LPRM inputs are required for each APRM channel, with at least two LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located.

The Allowable Value is based on the Analytical Limit assumed in the CRDA analyses.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

The Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result in the SLs (e.g., MCPR and RCS pressure) being exceeded. Although the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is assumed in the CRDA analysis that is applicable in MODE 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function conservatively bounds the assumed trip and, together with the assumed IRM trips, provides adequate protection. Therefore, the Average Power Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is not required in MODE 2.

2.d. Average Power Range Monitor - Inop

This signal provides assurance that a minimum number of APRMs are OPERABLE. Anytime an APRM mode switch is moved to any position other than Operate, an APRM module is unplugged, the electronic operating voltage is low, or the APRM has too few LPRM inputs (< 11), an inoperative trip signal will be received by the RPS, unless the APRM is bypassed. Since only one APRM in each trip system may be bypassed, only one APRM in each trip system may be inoperative without resulting in an RPS trip signal. This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

Four channels of Average Power Range Monitor - Inop with two channels in each trip system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High

An increase in the RPV pressure during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion. This causes the neutron flux and THERMAL POWER transferred to the reactor coolant to increase, which could challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding and the RCPB. No specific safety analysis takes direct credit for this Function. However, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function initiates a scram for transients that results in a pressure increase, counteracting the pressure increase by rapidly reducing core

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

power. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 2, the reactor scram (the analyses conservatively assume scram on the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High signal, not the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure-High signal), along with the S/RVs, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code limits.

High reactor pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense reactor pressure. The Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Allowable Value is chosen to provide a sufficient margin to the ASME Section III Code limits during the event.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function, with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 when the RCS is pressurized and the potential for pressure increase exists.

**4. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3**

Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated at Level 3 to substantially reduce the heat generated in the fuel from fission. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 3). The reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function, with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value is selected to ensure that, for transients involving loss of all normal

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

feedwater flow, initiation of the low pressure ECCS at RPV Water Level 1 will not be required.

The Function is required in MODES 1 and 2 where considerable energy exists in the RCS resulting in the limiting transients and accidents. ECCS initiations at Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 and Low Low Low, Level 1 provide sufficient protection for level transients in all other MODES.

#### 5. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8

High RPV water level indicates a potential problem with the feedwater level control system, resulting in the addition of reactivity associated with the introduction of a significant amount of relatively cold feedwater. Therefore, a scram is initiated at Level 8 to ensure that MCPR is maintained above the MCPR SL. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing a reactor scram during transients analyzed in Reference 3. It is directly assumed in the analysis of feedwater controller failure, maximum demand (Ref. 4).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is specified to ensure that the MCPR SL is not violated during the assumed transient.

Four channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function, with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are available and are required to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 25\%$  RTP to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. With THERMAL POWER  $< 25\%$  RTP, this Function is not required since MCPR is not a concern below 25% RTP.

#### 6. Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure

MSIV closure results in loss of the main turbine and the condenser as a heat sink for the Nuclear Steam Supply System and indicates a need to shut down the reactor to reduce heat generation. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on a Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure signal before the MSIVs are completely closed in anticipation of the complete loss of

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

the normal heat sink and subsequent overpressurization transient. However, for the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 2, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function, along with the S/RVs, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. That is, the direct scram on position switches for MSIV closure events is not assumed in the overpressurization analysis. Additionally, MSIV closure is assumed in the transients analyzed in Reference 4 (e.g., low steam line pressure, manual closure of MSIVs, high steam line flow). The reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the ECCS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

MSIV closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the eight MSIVs. Each MSIV has two position switches; one inputs to RPS trip system A while the other inputs to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from eight Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure channels, each consisting of one position switch. The logic for the Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure Function is arranged such that either the inboard or outboard valve on three or more of the main steam lines (MSLs) must close in order for a scram to occur.

The Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure Allowable Value is specified to ensure that a scram occurs prior to a significant reduction in steam flow, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Sixteen channels of the Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure Function with eight channels in each trip system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude the scram from this Function on a valid signal. This Function is only required in MODE 1 since, with the MSIVs open and the heat generation rate high, a pressurization transient can occur if the MSIVs close. In MODE 2, the heat generation rate is low enough so that the other diverse RPS functions provide sufficient protection.

7. Drywell Pressure - High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. A reactor scram is initiated to minimize the possibility of fuel damage and to reduce the amount of energy being added to the coolant and the drywell. The Drywell Pressure - High Function is a secondary scram signal to Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 for LOCA events inside the drywell. This Function was not specifically credited in the accident

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

Four channels of Drywell Pressure - High Function, with two channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required in MODES 1 and 2 where considerable energy exists in the RCS, resulting in the limiting transients and accidents.

**8.a. 8.b. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High**

The SDV receives the water displaced by the motion of the CRD pistons during a reactor scram. Should this volume fill to a point where there is insufficient volume to accept the displaced water, control rod insertion would be hindered. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated when the remaining free volume is still sufficient to accommodate the water from a full core scram. However, even though the two types of Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High Functions are an input to the RPS logic, no credit is taken for a scram initiated from these Functions for any of the design basis accidents or transients analyzed in the FSAR. However, they are retained to ensure that the RPS remains OPERABLE.

SDV water level is measured by two diverse methods. The level in each of the two SDVs is measured by two float type level switches and two transmitters and trip units for a total of eight level signals. The outputs of these devices are arranged so that there is a signal from a level switch and a transmitter and trip unit to each RPS logic channel. The level measurement instrumentation satisfies the recommendations of Reference 8.

The Allowable Value is chosen low enough to ensure that there is sufficient volume in the SDV to accommodate the water from a full scram.

Four channels of each type of Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High Function, with two channels of each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from these Functions on a valid signal. These Functions are required in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn. At all other times, this Function may be bypassed.

**9. Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low**

Closure of the TSVs results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated at the start of TSV closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is the primary scram signal for the turbine trip event analyzed in Reference 4. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low signals are initiated by the electrohydraulic control (EHC) fluid pressure at each stop valve. Two independent pressure transmitters are associated with each stop valve. One of the two transmitters provides input to RPS trip system A; the other, to RPS trip system B. Thus, each RPS trip system receives an input from four Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low channels, each consisting of one pressure transmitter. The logic for the Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is such that three or more TSVs must be closed to produce a scram.

This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER  $\geq$  40% RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure transmitters sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, to consider this Function OPERABLE, the turbine bypass valves must remain shut at THERMAL POWER  $\geq$  40% RTP. The setpoint is feedwater temperature dependent as a result of the subcooling changes that affect the turbine first stage pressure/reactor power relationship. For RTP operation with feedwater temperature  $\geq$  420°F, an allowable setpoint of  $\leq$  26.9% of control valve wide open turbine first stage pressure is provided by the bypass function. The allowable setpoint is reduced to  $\leq$  22.5% of control valve wide open turbine first stage pressure for RTP operation with feedwater temperature  $>$  370°F and  $<$  420°F.

The Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Allowable Value is selected to be high enough to detect imminent TSV closure thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Eight channels of Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function, with four channels in each trip system, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function even if one TSV should fail to close. This Function is required, consistent with analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is  $< 40\%$  RTP since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

10. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low

Fast closure of the TCVs results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on TCV fast closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is the primary scram signal for the generator load rejection event analyzed in Reference 4. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the EOC-RPT System, ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low signals are initiated by the EHC fluid pressure at each control valve. There is one pressure transmitter associated with each control valve, the signal from each transmitter being assigned to a separate RPS logic channel. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure transmitters sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, to consider this Function OPERABLE, the turbine bypass valves must remain shut at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. The basis for the setpoint of this automatic bypass is identical to that described for the Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function.

The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

Four channels of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function, with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

valid signal. This Function is required, consistent with the analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is  $< 40\%$  RTP since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

**11. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position**

The Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function provides signals, via the manual scram logic channels, that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provide manual reactor trip capability. This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

The reactor mode switch is a single switch with four channels, each of which inputs into one of the RPS logic channels.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on reactor mode switch position.

Four channels of Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Mode - Switch Shutdown Position Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn.

**12. Manual Scram**

The Manual Scram push button channels provide signals, via the manual scram logic channels, to each of the four RPS logic channels that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provide manual reactor trip capability. This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is one Manual Scram push button channel for each of the four RPS logic channels. In order to cause a scram it is necessary that at least one channel in each trip system be actuated.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of Manual Scram with two channels in each trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two logic, are available and required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, since these are the MODES and other specified conditions when control rods are withdrawn.

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ACTIONS

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**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.

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A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate, inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RPS instrumentation channel.

A.1 and A.2

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals and the redundancy of the RPS design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 9) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip

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ACTIONS (continued)

system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1 and B.2

Condition B exists when, for any one or more Functions, at least one required channel is inoperable in each trip system. In this condition, provided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Function, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic for any Function would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Function). The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not evaluated in Reference 9 for the 12 hour Completion Time. Within the 6 hour allowance, the associated Function will have all required channels either OPERABLE or in trip (or in any combination) in one trip system.

Completing one of these Required Actions restores RPS to an equivalent reliability level as that evaluated in Reference 9, which justified a 12 hour allowable out of service time as presented in Condition A. The trip system in the more degraded state should be placed in trip or, alternatively, all the inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels, if the two inoperable channels are in the same Function while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functions). The decision as to which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgment and current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in). If this action would result in a scram or recirculation pump trip, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.

The 6 hour Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram [or RPT]), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

#### C.1

Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same trip system for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining RPS trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining RPS trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system is in trip), such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. For the typical Function with one-out-of-two taken twice logic and the IRM and APRM Functions, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip). For Function 6 (Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure), this would require both trip systems to have each channel associated with the MSIVs in three MSLs (not necessarily the same MSLs for both trip systems), OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).

For Function 9 (Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low), this would require both trip systems to have three channels, each OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

#### D.1

Required Action D.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A, B, or C, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition D will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

E.1, F.1, G.1, and H.1

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required Action E.1 is consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)."

I.1

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that, when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the RPS reliability analysis (Ref. 9)

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

**SR 3.3.1.1.1**

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift on one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The agreement criteria includes an expectation of one decade of overlap when transitioning between neutron flux instrumentation. The overlap between SRMs and IRMs must be demonstrated prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs. This will ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range (entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1). On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are above mid-scale on Range 1 before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.

If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channels(s) declared inoperable. Only

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

**SR 3.3.1.1.2**

To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. LCO 3.2.4, "Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain and Setpoints," allows the APRMs to be reading greater than actual THERMAL POWER to compensate for localized power peaking. When this adjustment is made, the requirement for the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated power is modified to require the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated MFLPD. The Frequency of once per 7 days is based on minor changes in LPRM sensitivity, which could affect the APRM reading between performances of SR 3.3.1.1.6.

A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 25% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at  $\geq$  25% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 25% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR and APLHGR). At  $\geq$  25% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the last 7 days in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 25% if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after reaching or exceeding 25% RTP. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

**SR 3.3.1.1.3**

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function uses the recirculation loop drive flows to vary the trip setpoint. This SR ensures that the total loop drive flow signals from the flow unit used to vary the setpoint are appropriately compared to a calibrated flow signal and therefore the APRM Function accurately reflects the required setpoint as a function of flow. Each flow signal from

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

the respective flow unit must be  $\leq 105\%$  of the calibrated flow signal. If the flow unit signal is not within the limit, the APRMs that receive an input from the inoperable flow unit must be declared inoperable.

The Frequency of 7 days is based on engineering judgment, operating experience, and the reliability of this instrumentation.

**SR 3.3.1.1.4**

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 since testing of the MODE 2 required IRM and APRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

A Frequency of 7 days provides an acceptable level of system average unavailability over the Frequency interval and is based on reliability analysis (Ref. 9).

**SR 3.3.1.1.5**

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended Function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications (TS) and non-TS tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. In accordance with Reference 9, the scram contacts must be tested as part of the Manual Scram Function. A Frequency of 7 days provides an acceptable level of system average availability over the Frequency and is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9. (The Manual Scram Function's CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST Frequency was credited in the analysis to extend many automatic scram Functions' Frequencies.)

SR 3.3.1.1.6

LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System. The 1000 MWD/T Frequency is based on operating experience with LPRM sensitivity changes.

SR 3.3.1.1.7 and SR 3.3.1.1.10

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other TS and non-TS tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.7 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.8

The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days for SR 3.3.1.1.8 is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.

SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.11

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the 7 day calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) and the 1000 MWD/T LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.6). A second Note is provided that requires the APRM and IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM and IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This Note allows entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is based upon the assumption of a 184 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.11 is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.1.12

The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High Function uses an electronic filter circuit to generate a signal proportional to the core THERMAL POWER from the APRM neutron flux signal. This filter circuit is representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics that produce the relationship between the neutron flux and the core THERMAL POWER. The filter time constant must be verified to ensure that the channel is accurately reflecting the desired parameter.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

SR 3.3.1.1.13

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The functional testing of control rods, in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," and SDV vent and drain valves, in LCO 3.1.8, "Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.1.14

This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodology are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid.

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

If any bypass channel setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at  $\geq 40\%$  RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) or other reasons), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve, Trip Oil Pressure - Low and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

**SR 3.3.1.1.15**

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 10.

RPS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements.

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**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

The following Bases are applicable for plants adopting NEDO-32291-A and/or Supplement 1.

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However, the sensors for Functions 3, 4, and 5 are allowed to be excluded from specific RPS RESPONSE TIME measurement if the conditions of Reference 11 are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied, sensor response time may be allocated based on either assumed design sensor response time or the manufacturer's stated design response time. When the requirements of Reference 11 are not satisfied, sensor response time must be measured. Furthermore, measurement of the instrument loops response times for Functions 3, 4, and 5 is not required if the conditions of Reference 12 are satisfied.]

As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Note 2 requires STAGGERED TEST

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

BASIS Frequency to be determined based on 4 channels per trip system, in lieu of the 8 channels specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the MSIV Closure Function. This Frequency is based on the logic interrelationships of the various channels required to produce an RPS scram signal. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent.

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**REFERENCES**

1. FSAR, Figure [ ].
  2. FSAR, Section [5.2.2].
  3. FSAR, Section [6.3.3].
  4. FSAR, Chapter [15].
  5. FSAR, Section [15.4.1].
  6. NEDO-23842, "Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18, 1978.
  7. FSAR, Section [15.4.9].
  8. Letter, P. Check (NRC) to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.
  9. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.
  10. FSAR, Table [ ].
  - [11. NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
  12. NEDO-32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for The Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.]
  13. Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 3, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation."
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Table B 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 1)  
RPS Instrumentation Sensor Diversity

Initiation Events	Scram Sensors for Initiating Events						
	RPV Variables			Anticipatory			Fuel
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
MSIV Closure	x		x			x	x
Turbine Trip (w/bypass)	x			x	x		x
Generator Trip (w/bypass)	x			x			x
Pressure Regulator Failure (primary pressure decrease) (MSIV closure trip)	x	x	x			x	x
Pressure Regulator Failure (primary pressure decrease) (Level 8 trip)	x				x		x
Pressure Regulator Failure (primary pressure increase)	x						x
Feedwater Controller Failure (high reactor water level)	x	x			x		x
Feedwater Controller Failure (low reactor water level)	x		x			x	
Loss of Condenser Vacuum	x				x	x	x
Loss of AC Power (loss of transformer)	x		x		x	x	
Loss of AC Power (loss of grid connections)	x		x	x	x	x	x

- (a) Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High
- (b) Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8
- (c) Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3
- (d) Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure
- (e) Turbine Stop Valve - Closure
- (f) Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure
- (g) Average Power Range Monitor Neutron Flux - High

- REVIEWER'S NOTE -

This Table for illustration purposes only.

## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron level at very low flux levels in the core. As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and to determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are maintained fully inserted until the count rate is greater than a minimum allowed count rate (a control rod block is set at this condition). After SRM to intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.1), the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.

The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of five channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.

During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling and low power operation are provided by:

LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks,"  
LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM),"  
LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation,"  
Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) Neutron Flux High and  
Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Neutron Flux -  
High, Setdown Functions, and

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BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

The SRMs have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any design basis accident or transient analysis. However, the SRMs provide the only on scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during startup and refueling. Therefore, they are being retained in the Technical Specifications.

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LCO

During startup in MODE 2, four of the five SRM channels are required to be OPERABLE to monitor the reactor flux level prior to and during control rod withdrawal, to monitor subcritical multiplication and reactor criticality, and to monitor neutron flux level and reactor period until the flux level is sufficient to maintain the IRM on Range 3 or above. All channels but one are required in order to provide a representation of the overall core response during those periods when reactivity changes are occurring throughout the core.

In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor shut down, two SRM channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

In MODE 5, during a spiral offload or reload, an SRM outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring neutron flux in the fueled region of the core. Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRM in an adjacent quadrant, as provided in the Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b), requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded or spiral offloaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE SRM is met. Spiral reloading and offloading encompass reloading or offloading a cell on the edges of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or offloaded in any sequence).

In nonspiral routine operations, two SRMs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity changes occurring in the reactor core. Because of the local nature of reactivity changes during refueling, adequate coverage is provided by requiring one SRM to be OPERABLE in the quadrant of the reactor core where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other SRM to be OPERABLE in an adjacent quadrant containing fuel. These requirements ensure that the reactivity of the core will be continuously monitored during CORE ALTERATIONS.

Special movable detectors, according to Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (c), may be used during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of the normal SRM

**BASES**

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**LCO (continued)**

nuclear detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRM circuits in the NMS such that the applicable neutron flux indication can be generated. These special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading, since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling. They must still meet the location requirements of SR 3.3.1.2.2, and all other required SRs for SRMs.

For an SRM channel to be considered OPERABLE, it must be providing neutron flux monitoring indication.

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**APPLICABILITY**

The SRMs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2, 3, 4, and 5, prior to the IRMs being on scale on Range 3 to provide for neutron monitoring. In MODE 1, the APRMs provide adequate monitoring of reactivity changes in the core; therefore, the SRMs are not required. In MODE 2, with IRMs on Range 3 or above, the IRMs provide adequate monitoring and the SRMs are not required.

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**ACTIONS**

A.1 and B.1

In MODE 2, with the IRMs on Range 2 or below, SRMs provide the means of monitoring core reactivity and criticality. With any number of the required SRMs inoperable, the ability to monitor is degraded. Therefore, a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status.

Providing that at least one SRM remains OPERABLE, Required Action A.1 allows 4 hours to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status. This is a reasonable time since there is adequate capability remaining to monitor the core, limited risk of an event during this time, and sufficient time to take corrective actions to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status or to establish alternate IRM monitoring capability. During this time, control rod withdrawal and power increase are not precluded by this Required Action. Having the ability to monitor the core with at least one SRM, proceeding to IRM Range 3 or greater (with overlap verified by SR 3.3.1.1.1) and thereby exiting the Applicability of this LCO, is acceptable for ensuring adequate core monitoring and allowing continued operation.

With four required SRMs inoperable, Required Action B.1 allows no positive changes in reactivity (control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended) due to the inability to monitor the changes. Required

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BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

Action A.1 still applies and allows 4 hours to restore monitoring capability prior to requiring control rod insertion. This allowance is based on the limited risk of an event during this time, provided that no control rod withdrawals are allowed, and the desire to concentrate efforts on repair, rather than to immediately shut down, with no SRMs OPERABLE.

C.1

In MODE 2, if the required number of SRMs is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the reactor shall be placed in MODE 3. With all control rods fully inserted, the core is in its least reactive state with the most margin to criticality. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1 and D.2

With one or more required SRM channels inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the neutron flux monitoring capability is degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity level while no neutron monitoring capability is available. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position prevents subsequent control rod withdrawal by maintaining a control rod block. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is sufficient to accomplish the Required Action, and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring the SRM occurring during this time.

E.1 and E.2

With one or more required SRMs inoperable in MODE 5, the capability to detect local reactivity changes in the core during refueling is degraded. CORE: ALTERATIONS must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Suspending CORE ALTERATIONS prevents the two most probable causes of reactivity changes, fuel loading and control rod withdrawal, from occurring. Inserting all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity, given that fuel is present in the core. Suspension of CORE: ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of the movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

Action (once required to be initiated) to insert control rods must continue until all insertable rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are inserted.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

The SRs for each SRM Applicable MODE or other specified condition are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.2-1.

SR 3.3.1.2.1 and SR 3.3.1.2.3

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to the same parameter indicated on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency of once every 12 hours for SR 3.3.1.2.1 is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. While in MODES 3 and 4, reactivity changes are not expected; therefore, the 12 hour Frequency is relaxed to 24 hours for SR 3.3.1.2.3. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.1.2.2

To provide adequate coverage of potential reactivity changes in the core, one SRM is required to be OPERABLE in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, and the other OPERABLE SRM must be in an adjacent quadrant containing fuel. Note 1 states that this SR is required to be met only during CORE ALTERATIONS. It is not required to be met at other times in MODE 5 since core reactivity changes are not occurring. This Surveillance consists of a review of plant

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

logs to ensure that SRMs required to be OPERABLE for given CORE ALTERATIONS are, in fact, OPERABLE. In the event that only one SRM is required to be OPERABLE, per Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b), only the a. portion of this SR is required. Note 2 clarifies that more than one of the three requirements can be met by the same OPERABLE SRM. The 12 hour Frequency is based upon operating experience and supplements operational controls over refueling activities, which include steps to ensure that the SRMs required by the LCO are in the proper quadrant.

SR 3.3.1.2.4

This Surveillance consists of a verification of the SRM instrument readout to ensure that the SRM reading is greater than a specified minimum count rate. This ensures that the detectors are indicating count rates indicative of neutron flux levels within the core. With few fuel assemblies loaded, the SRMs will not have a high enough count rate to satisfy the SR. Therefore, allowances are made for loading sufficient "source" material, in the form of irradiated fuel assemblies, to establish the minimum count rate.

To accomplish this, the SR is modified by a Note that states that the count rate is not required to be met on an SRM that has less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies are in the associated core quadrant. With four or less fuel assemblies loaded around each SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated quadrant, even with a control rod withdrawn the configuration will not be critical.

The Frequency is based upon channel redundancy and other information available in the control room, and ensures that the required channels are frequently monitored while core reactivity changes are occurring. When no reactivity changes are in progress, the Frequency is relaxed from 12 hours to 24 hours.

SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the associated channel will function properly. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. SR 3.3.1.2.5 is required in MODE 5, and the 7 day Frequency ensures that the channels are OPERABLE while core reactivity changes could be in progress. This 7 day Frequency is reasonable, based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (such as a CHANNEL CHECK) that ensure proper functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.

SR 3.3.1.2.6 is required in MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below and in MODES 3 and 4. Since core reactivity changes do not normally take place, the Frequency has been extended from 7 days to 31 days. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (such as (CHANNEL CHECK) that ensure proper functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.

Verification of the signal to noise ratio also ensures that the detectors are inserted to a normal operating level. In a fully withdrawn condition, the detectors are sufficiently removed from the fueled region of the core to essentially eliminate neutrons from reaching the detector. Any count rate obtained while fully withdrawn is assumed to be "noise" only.

The Note to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 31 day Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels. Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances.

SR 3.3.1.2.7

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies the performance of the SRM detectors and associated circuitry. The Frequency considers the plant conditions required to perform the test, the ease of performing the test, and the likelihood of a change in the system or component status. The neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they cannot readily be adjusted. The detectors

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

are fission chambers that are designed to have a relatively constant sensitivity over the range, and with an accuracy specified for a fixed useful life.

Note 2 to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the 18 month Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels. Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances.

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REFERENCES      None.

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## B 3.3. INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

Control rods provide the primary means for control of reactivity changes. Control rod block instrumentation includes channel sensors, logic circuitry, switches, and relays that are designed to ensure that specified fuel design limits are not exceeded for postulated transients and accidents. During high power operation, the rod withdrawal limiter (RWL) provides protection for control rod withdrawal error events. During low power operations, control rod blocks from the rod pattern controller (RPC) enforce specific control rod sequences designed to mitigate the consequences of the control rod drop accident (CRDA). During shutdown conditions, control rod blocks from the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position ensure that all control rods remain inserted to prevent inadvertent criticalities.

The purpose of the RWL is to limit control rod withdrawal to preclude a M CPR Safety Limit (SL) violation. The RWL supplies a trip signal to the Rod Control and Information System (RCIS) to appropriately inhibit control rod withdrawal during power operation equal to or greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP). The RWL has two channels, either of which can initiate a control rod block when the channel output exceeds the control rod block setpoint. The rod block logic circuitry in the RCIS is arranged as two redundant and separate logic circuits. These circuits are energized when control rod movement is allowed. The output of each logic circuit is coupled to a comparator by the use of isolation devices in the rod drive control cabinet. The two logic circuit signals are compared and rod blocks are applied when either circuit trip signal is present. Control rod withdrawal is permitted only when the two signals agree. Each rod block logic circuit receives control rod position indication from a separate channel of the Rod Position Information System, each with a set of reed switches for control rod position indication. Control rod position is the primary data input for the RWL. First stage turbine pressure is used to determine reactor power level, with an LPSP and a high power setpoint (HPSP) used to determine allowable control rod withdrawal distances. Below the LPSP, the RWL is automatically bypassed (Ref. 1).

The purpose of the RPC is to ensure control rod patterns during startup are such that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to 10% RTP. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase during a CRDA. The RPC, in conjunction with the RCIS, will initiate control rod withdrawal and insert blocks when the actual

BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued)

sequence deviates beyond allowances from the specified sequence. The rod block logic circuitry is the same as that described above. The RPC also uses the turbine first stage pressure to determine when reactor power is above the power at which the RPC is automatically bypassed (Ref. 1).

With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod withdrawal block is applied to all control rods to ensure that the shutdown condition is maintained. This function prevents criticality resulting from inadvertent control rod withdrawal during MODE 3 or 4, or during MODE 5 when the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown position. The reactor mode switch has two channels, with each providing inputs into a separate rod block circuit. A rod block in either circuit will provide a control rod block to all control rods.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY  
ANALYSES, LCO,  
and APPLICABILITY

1.a. Rod Withdrawal Limiter

The RWL is designed to prevent violation of the MCPR SL and the cladding 1% plastic strain fuel design limit that may result from a single control rod withdrawal error (RWE) event. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the RWE event are summarized in Reference 2. A statistical analysis of RWE events was performed to determine the MCPR response as a function of withdrawal distance and initial operating conditions. From these responses, the fuel thermal performance was determined as a function of RWL allowable control rod withdrawal distance and power level.

The RWL satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Two channels of the RWL are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude a rod block from this Function.

Nominal trip set points are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Values between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor power), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for

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BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drive, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The RWL is assumed to mitigate the consequences of an RWE event when operating > 35% RTP. Below this power level, the consequences of an RWE event will not exceed the MCP, and therefore the RWL is not required to be OPERABLE (Ref. 3).

1.b. Rod Pattern Controller

The RPC enforces the banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) to ensure that the initial conditions of the CRDA analysis are not violated. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the CRDA are summarized in References 4, 5, and 6. The BPWS requires that control rods be moved in groups, with all control rods assigned to a specific group required to be within specified banked positions. Requirements that the control rod sequence is in compliance with BPWS are specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control."

The Rod Pattern Controller Function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Since the RPC is a backup to operator control of control rod sequences, only a single channel would be required OPERABLE to satisfy Criterion 3 (Ref. 6). However, the RPC is designed as a dual channel system and will not function without two OPERABLE channels. Required Actions of LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," and LCO 3.1.6 may necessitate bypassing individual control rods in the Rod Action Control System (RACS) to allow continued operation with inoperable control rods or to allow correction of a control rod pattern not in compliance with the BPWS. The individual control rods may be bypassed as required by the conditions, and the RPC is not considered inoperable provided SR 3.3.2.1.9 is met.

Compliance with the BPWS, and therefore OPERABILITY of the RPC, is required in MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER  $\leq$  10% RTP. When THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the 280 cal/gm fuel damage limit during a CRDA. In MODES 3 and 4, all control rods are required to be inserted in the core. In MODE 5, since

BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will be subcritical.

2. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position

During MODES 3 and 4, and during MODE 5 when the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown position, the core is assumed to be subcritical; therefore, no positive reactivity insertion events are analyzed. The Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block ensures that the reactor remains subcritical by blocking control rod withdrawal, thereby preserving the assumptions of the safety analysis.

The Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Two channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single channel failure will preclude a rod block when required. No Allowable Value is applicable for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on reactor mode switch position.

During shutdown conditions (MODE 3, 4, or 5) no positive reactivity insertion events are analyzed because assumptions are that control rod withdrawal blocks are provided to prevent criticality. Therefore, when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, the control rod withdrawal block is required to be OPERABLE. During MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refueling position, the required position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) provides the required control rod withdrawal blocks.

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ACTIONS

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.

A.1

If either RWL channel is inoperable, the RWL may not be capable of performing its intended function. In most cases, with an inoperable channel, the RWL will initiate a control rod withdrawal block because the

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

two channels will not agree. To ensure erroneous control rod withdrawal does not occur, however, Required Action A.1 requires that further control rod withdrawal be suspended immediately.

**B.1**

If the RPC is inoperable, it may not be capable of performing its intended function even though, in most cases, all control rod movement will be blocked. All control rod movement should be suspended under these conditions until the RPC is restored to OPERABLE status. This action does not preclude a reactor scram. The RPC is not considered inoperable if individual control rods are bypassed in the RACS as required by LCO 3.1.3 or LCO 3.1.6. Under these conditions, continued operation is allowed if the bypassing of control rods and movement of control rods is verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff per SR 3.3.2.1.9.

**C.1 and C.2**

If one Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block channel is inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the control rod withdrawal block function. Required Action C.1 and Required Action C.2 are consistent with the normal action of an OPERABLE Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function to maintain all control rods inserted. Therefore, there is no distinction between Required Actions for the Conditions of one or two channels inoperable. In both cases (one or both channels inoperable), suspending all control rod withdrawal immediately, and immediately fully inserting all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies will ensure that the core is subcritical, with adequate SDM ensured by LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)." Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are therefore not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

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BASES

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

As noted at the beginning of the SR, the SRs for each Control Rod Block instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.2.1-1.

The Surveillances are also modified by a Note to indicate that when an RWL channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 8) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that a control rod block will be initiated when necessary.

SR 3.3.2.1.1, SR 3.3.2.1.2, SR 3.3.2.1.3, and SR 3.3.2.1.4

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS for the RPC and RWL are performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying that a control rod block occurs. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. As noted, the SRs are not required to be performed until 1 hour after specified conditions are met (e.g., after any control rod is withdrawn in MODE 2). This allows entry into the appropriate conditions needed to perform the required SRs. The Frequencies are based on reliability analysis (Ref. 7).

SR 3.3.2.1.5

The LPSP is the point at which the RPCS makes the transition between the function of the RPC and the RWL. This transition point is automatically varied as a function of power. This power level is inferred from the first stage turbine pressure (one channel to each trip system). These power setpoints must be verified periodically to be within the Allowable Values. If any LPSP is nonconservative, then the affected

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

Functions are considered inoperable. Since this channel has both upper and lower required limits, it is not allowed to be placed in a condition to enable either the RPC or RWL Function. Because main turbine bypass steam flow can affect the LPSP nonconservatively for the RWL, the RWL is considered inoperable with any main turbine bypass valves open. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the setpoint methodology utilized for these channels.

**SR 3.3.2.1.6**

This SR ensures the high power function of the RWL is not bypassed when power is above the HPSP. The power level is inferred from turbine first stage pressure signals. Periodic testing of the HPSP channels is required to verify the setpoint to be less than or equal to the limit. Adequate margins in accordance with setpoint methodologies are included. If the HPSP is nonconservative, then the RWL is considered inoperable. Alternatively, the HPSP can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypassed condition, the SR is met and the RWL would not be considered inoperable. Because main turbine bypass steam flow can affect the HPSP nonconservatively for the RWL, the RWL is considered inoperable with any main turbine bypass valve open. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the setpoint methodology utilized for these channels.

**SR 3.3.2.1.7**

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

**SR 3.3.2.1.8**

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function is performed by attempting to withdraw any control rod with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

verifying a control rod block occurs. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

As noted in the SR, the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 1 hour after the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, since testing of this interlock with the reactor mode switch in any other position cannot be performed without using jumpers, lifted leads, or movable limits. This allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 if the 18 month Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.2.1.9

LCO 3.1.3 and LCO 3.1.6 may require individual control rods to be bypassed in RACS to allow insertion of an inoperable control rod or correction of a control rod pattern not in compliance with BPWS. With the control rods bypassed in the RACS, the RPC will not control the movement of these bypassed control rods. To ensure the proper bypassing and movement of those affected control rods, a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff must verify the bypassing and movement of these control rods. Compliance with this SR allows the RPC to be OPERABLE with these control rods bypassed.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [7.6.1.7.3].
2. FSAR, Section [15.4.2].

**BASES**

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**REFERENCES (continued)**

3. NEDE-24011-P-A-9-US, "General Electrical Standard Application for Reload Fuel," Supplement for United States, Section S 2.2.3.1, September 1988.
  4. "Modifications to the Requirements for Control Rod Drop Accident Mitigating Systems," BWR Owners Group, July 1986.
  5. NEDO-21231, "Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," January 1977.
  6. NRC SER, Acceptance of Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A, "General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Revision 8, Amendment 17," December 27, 1987.
  7. NEDC-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," October 1988.
  8. GENE-770-06-1, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
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## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

The primary purpose of the PAM instrumentation is to display plant variables that provide information required by the control room operators during accident situations. This information provides the necessary support for the operator to take the manual actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for Design Basis Events. The instruments that monitor these variables are designated as Type A, Category I, and non-Type A, Category I in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Ref. 1).

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess plant status and behavior following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 1.

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##### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The PAM instrumentation LCO ensures the OPERABILITY of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Type A, variables so that the control room operating staff can:

- Perform the diagnosis specified in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP). These variables are restricted to preplanned actions for the primary success path of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (e.g., loss of coolant accident (LOCA)) and
- Take the specified, preplanned, manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided, which are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function.

The PAM instrumentation LCO also ensures OPERABILITY of Category I, non-Type A, variables. This ensures the control room operating staff can:

- Determine whether systems important to safety are performing their intended functions,
  - Determine the potential for causing a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release,
  - Determine whether a gross breach of a barrier has occurred, and
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**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)**

- Initiate action necessary to protect the public and to obtain an estimate of the magnitude of any impending threat.

The plant specific Regulatory Guide 1.97 analysis (Ref. 2) documents the process that identified Type A and Category I, non-Type A, variables.

PAM instrumentation that meets the definition of Type A in Regulatory Guide 1.97 satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Category I, non-Type A, instrumentation is retained in the Technical Specifications (TS) because it is intended to assist operators in minimizing the consequences of accidents. Therefore, these Category I, non-Type A, variables are important for reducing public risk.

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**LCO**

LCO 3.3.3.1 requires two OPERABLE channels for all but one Function to ensure no single failure prevents the operators from being presented with the information necessary to determine the status of the unit and to bring the unit to, and maintain it in, a safe condition following that accident.

Furthermore, provision of two channels allows a CHANNEL CHECK during the post accident phase to confirm the validity of displayed information. [More than two channels may be required at some units if the Regulatory Guide 1.97 analysis determined that failure of one accident monitoring channel results in information ambiguity (e.g., the redundant displays disagree) that could lead operators to defeat or to fail to accomplish a required safety function.]

The exception of the two channel requirement is primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) position. In this case, the important information is the status of the primary containment penetrations. The LCO requires one position indicator for each active PCIV. This is sufficient to redundantly verify the isolation status of each isolable penetration either via indicated status of the active valve and prior knowledge of passive valve or via system boundary status. If a normally active PCIV is known to be closed and deactivated, position indication is not needed to determine status. Therefore, the position indication for valves in this state is not required to be OPERABLE.

Listed below is a discussion of the specified instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3.1-1, in the accompanying LCO. These discussions are intended as examples of what should be provided for each Function when the plant specific Bases are prepared.

## BASES

### LCO (continued)

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#### 1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

Reactor steam dome pressure is a Category I variable provided to support monitoring of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) integrity and to verify operation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Two independent pressure transmitters with a range of 0 psig to 1500 psig monitor pressure. Wide range recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.

#### 2. Reactor Vessel Water Level

Reactor vessel water level is a Category I variable provided to support monitoring of core cooling and to verify operation of the ECCS. The wide range water level channels provide the PAM Reactor Vessel Water Level Function. The wide range water level channels measure from 17 inches below the dryer skirt down to a point just below the bottom of the active fuel. Wide range water level is measured by two independent differential pressure transmitters. The output from these channels is recorded on two independent pen recorders. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.

The wide range water level instruments are uncompensated for variation in reactor water density and are calibrated to be most accurate at operational pressure and temperature.

#### 3. Suppression Pool Water Level

Suppression pool water level is a Category I variable provided to detect a breach in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). This variable is also used to verify and provide long term surveillance of ECCS function. The wide range suppression pool water level measurement provides the operator with sufficient information to assess the status of the RCPB and to assess the status of the water supply to the ECCS. The wide range water level indicators monitor the suppression pool level from the center line of the ECCS suction lines to the top of the pool. Two wide range suppression pool water level signals are transmitted from separate differential pressure transmitters and are continuously recorded on two recorders in the control room. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.

BASES

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LCO (continued)

4. Drywell Pressure

Drywell pressure is a Category I variable provided to detect breach of the RCPB and to verify ECCS functions that operate to maintain RCS integrity. Two wide range drywell pressure signals are transmitted from separate pressure transmitters and are continuously recorded and displayed on two control room recorders. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.

5. Primary Containment Area Radiation (High Range)

Primary containment area radiation (high range) is provided to monitor for the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plans.

[ For this plant, primary containment area radiation (high range) PAM instrumentation consists of the following: ]

6. Drywell Sump Level

Drywell sump level is a Category I variable provided for verification of ECCS functions that operate to maintain RCS integrity.

[ For this plant, the drywell sump level PAM instrumentation consists of the following: ]

7. Drywell Drain Sump Level

Drywell drain sump level is a Category I variable provided to detect breach of the RCPB and for verification and long term surveillance of ECCS functions that operate to maintain RCS integrity.

[ For this plant, the drywell drain sump level PAM instrumentation consists of the following: ]

8. Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) Position

PCIV position is provided for verification of containment integrity. In the case of PCIV position, the important information is the isolation status of the containment penetration. The LCO requires one channel of valve

## BASES

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### LCO (continued)

position indication in the control room to be OPERABLE for each active PCIV in a containment penetration flow path, i.e., two total channels of PCIV position indication for a penetration flow path with two active valves. For containment penetrations with only one active PCIV having control room indication, Note (b) requires a single channel of valve position indication to be OPERABLE. This is sufficient to verify redundantly the isolation status of each isolable penetration via indicated status of the active valve, as applicable, and prior knowledge of passive valve or system boundary status. If a penetration is isolated, position indication for the PCIV(s) in the associated penetration flow path is not needed to determine status. Therefore, the position indication for valves in an isolated penetration is not required to be OPERABLE. Each penetration is treated separately and each penetration flow path is considered a separate function. Therefore, separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable penetration flow path.

[ For this plant, the PCIV position PAM instrumentation consists of the following: ]

#### 9. Wide Range Neutron Flux

Wide range neutron flux is a Category I variable provided to verify reactor shutdown.

[ For this plant, wide range neutron flux PAM instrumentation consists of the following: ]

#### 10, 11. Drywell and Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Analyzer

Drywell and containment hydrogen and oxygen analyzers are Category I instruments provided to detect high hydrogen or oxygen concentration conditions that represent a potential for containment breach. This variable is also important in verifying the adequacy of mitigating actions.

[ For this plant, the drywell and containment hydrogen and oxygen analyzers PAM instrumentation consists of the following: ]

#### 12. Primary Containment Pressure

Primary containment pressure is a Category I variable provided to verify RCS and containment integrity and to verify the effectiveness of ECCS actions taken to prevent containment breach. Two wide range primary containment pressure signals are transmitted from separate pressure

BASES

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LCO (continued)

transmitters and are continuously recorded and displayed on two control room recorders. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channel.

13. Suppression Pool Water Temperature

Suppression pool water temperature is a Category I variable provided to detect a condition that could potentially lead to containment breach, and to verify the effectiveness of ECCS actions taken to prevent containment breach. The suppression pool water temperature instrumentation allows operators to detect trends in suppression pool water temperature in sufficient time to take action to prevent steam quenching vibrations in the suppression pool. Twenty-four temperature sensors are arranged in six groups of four independent and redundant channels, located such that there is a group of sensors within a 30 ft line of sight of each relief valve discharge location.

Thus, six groups of sensors are sufficient to monitor each relief valve discharge location. Each group of four sensors includes two sensors for normal suppression pool temperature monitoring and two sensors for PAM. The outputs for the PAM sensors are recorded on four independent recorders in the control room. (Channels A and C are redundant to channels B and D, respectively.) All four of these recorders must be OPERABLE to furnish two channels of PAM indication for each of the relief valve discharge locations. These recorders are the primary indication used by the operator during an accident. Therefore, the PAM Specification deals specifically with this portion of the instrument channels. Each suppression pool water temperature [relief valve discharge location] is treated separately and each [relief valve discharge location] is considered to be a separate function. Therefore, separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable [relief valve discharge location].

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APPLICABILITY

The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. These variables are related to the diagnosis and preplanned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1 and 2. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, plant conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is extremely low; therefore, PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

BASES

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ACTIONS

Note 1 has been added to the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the Actions even though the Actions may eventually require plant shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive function of the instruments, the operator's ability to diagnose an accident using alternate instruments and methods, and the low probability of an event requiring these instruments.

A Note has also been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to PAM instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable PAM instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable functions. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable PAM Function.

A.1

When one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel (or in the case of a Function that has only one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrument channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

B.1

If a channel has not been restored to OPERABLE status in 30 days, this Required Action specifies initiation of actions in accordance with Specification 5.6.7, which requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions. This Action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement since alternative Actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of plant conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation.

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

C.1

When one or more Functions have two required channels that are inoperable (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function), one channel in the Function should be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur. Condition C is modified by a Note that excludes hydrogen monitor channels. Condition D provides appropriate Required Actions for two inoperable hydrogen monitor channels.

D.1

When two hydrogen monitor channels are inoperable, one hydrogen monitor channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the backup capability of the Post Accident Sampling System to monitor the hydrogen concentration for evaluation of core damage and to provide information for operator decisions. Also, it is unlikely that a LOCA that would cause core damage would occur during this time.

E.1

This Required Action directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.3.1-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition C or D, as applicable, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition E is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

F.1

For the majority of Functions in Table 3.3.3.1-1, if any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D is not met, the plant

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1

Since alternate means of monitoring primary containment area radiation have been developed and tested, the Required Action is not to shut down the plant but rather to follow the directions of Specification 5.6.7. These alternate means may be temporarily installed if the normal PAM channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allotted time. The report provided to the NRC should discuss the alternate means used, describe the degree to which the alternate means are equivalent to the installed PAM channels, justify the areas in which they are not equivalent, and provide a schedule for restoring the normal PAM channels.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

The following SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.3.1-1.

SR 3.3.3.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross instrumentation failure has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrumentation should be compared to similar plant instruments located throughout the plant.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

The Frequency of 31 days is based upon plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given function in any 31 day interval is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of those displays associated with the required channels of this LCO.

**SR 3.3.3.1.2**

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycles.

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**REFERENCES**

1. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," [Date].
- [2. Plant specific documents (e.g., FSAR, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, SER letter). ]

## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The Remote Shutdown System provides the control room operator with sufficient instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room. This capability is necessary to protect against the possibility of the control room becoming inaccessible. A safe shutdown condition is defined as MODE 3. With the plant in MODE 3, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System, the safety/relief valves, and the Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling System can be used to remove core decay heat and meet all safety requirements. The long term supply of water for the RCIC and the ability to operate shutdown cooling from outside the control room allow extended operation in MODE 3.

In the event that the control room becomes inaccessible, the operators can establish control at the remote shutdown panel and place and maintain the plant in MODE 3. Not all controls and necessary transfer switches are located at the remote shutdown panel. Some controls and transfer switches will have to be operated locally at the switchgear, motor control panels, or other local stations. The plant automatically reaches MODE 3 following a plant shutdown and can be maintained safely in MODE 3 for an extended period of time.

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System control and instrumentation Functions ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to place and maintain the plant in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The Remote Shutdown System is required to provide equipment at appropriate locations outside the control room with a design capability to promptly shut down the reactor to MODE 3, including the necessary instrumentation and controls, to maintain the plant in a safe condition in MODE 3.

The criteria governing the design and the specific system requirements of the Remote Shutdown System are located in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 (Ref. 1).

The Remote Shutdown System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

**BASES**

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**LCO**

The Remote Shutdown System LCO provides the requirements for the **OPERABILITY** of the instrumentation and controls necessary to place and maintain the plant in **MODE 3** from a location other than the control room. The instrumentation and controls required are listed in Table B 3.3.3.2-1.

The controls, instrumentation, and transfer switches are those required for:

- Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure control,
- Decay heat removal,
- RPV inventory control, and
- Safety support systems for the above functions, including service water, component cooling water, and onsite power, including the diesel generators.

The Remote Shutdown System is **OPERABLE** if all instrument and control channels needed to support the remote shutdown function are **OPERABLE**. In some cases, Table B 3.3.3.2-1 may indicate that the required information or control capability is available from several alternate sources. In these cases, the Remote Shutdown System is **OPERABLE** as long as one channel of any of the alternate information or control sources for each Function is **OPERABLE**.

The Remote Shutdown System instruments and control circuits covered by this LCO do not need to be energized to be considered **OPERABLE**. This LCO is intended to ensure that the instruments and control circuits will be **OPERABLE** if plant conditions require that the Remote Shutdown System be placed in operation.

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**APPLICABILITY**

The Remote Shutdown System LCO is applicable in **MODES 1** and **2**. This is required so that the plant can be placed and maintained in **MODE 3** for an extended period of time from a location other than the control room.

This LCO is not applicable in **MODES 3, 4, and 5**. In these **MODES**, the plant is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced Reactor Coolant System energy. Under these conditions, considerable time is available to restore necessary instrument control Functions if control room instruments or control becomes unavailable. Consequently, the TS do not require **OPERABILITY** in **MODES 3, 4, and 5**.

## BASES

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### ACTIONS

A Note is included that excludes the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into an applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require a plant shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the low probability of an event requiring this system.

A Remote Shutdown System Division is inoperable when each function is not accomplished by at least one designated Remote Shutdown System channel that satisfies the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's Function. These criteria are outlined in the LCO section of the Bases.

Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to Remote Shutdown System Functions. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable Remote Shutdown System Functions provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate Functions.

As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable Remote Shutdown System Function.

#### A.1

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required Functions of the Remote Shutdown System is inoperable. This includes the control and transfer switches for any required Function.

The Required Action is to restore the Function (both divisions, if applicable) to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The Completion Time is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room.

#### B.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.3.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. As specified in the Surveillance, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized.

The Frequency is based upon plant operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.

SR 3.3.3.2.2

SR 3.3.3.2.2 verifies each required Remote Shutdown System transfer switch and control circuit performs the intended function. This verification is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. Operation of the equipment from the remote shutdown panel is not necessary. The Surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check. This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations. However, this Surveillance is not required to be performed only during a plant outage. Operating experience demonstrates that Remote Shutdown System control channels usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.3.2.3

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to measured parameter values with the necessary range and accuracy.

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

The 18 month Frequency is based upon operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.

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**REFERENCES**

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
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Table B 3.3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 1)  
Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation

FUNCTION (INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL PARAMETER)	REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIVISIONS
1. Reactor Pressure Vessel Pressure Control	
a. Reactor Pressure	[1]
2. Decay Heat Removal	
a. RCIC Flow	[1]
b. RCIC Controls	[1]
c. RHR Flow	[1]
d. RHR Controls	[1]
3. Reactor Pressure Vessel Inventory Control	
a. RCIC Flow	[1]
b. RCIC Controls	[1]
c. RHR Flow	[1]
d. RHR Controls	[1]

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

For channels that fulfill GDC 19 requirements, the number of OPERABLE channels required depends upon the plant's licensing basis as described in the NRC plant specific Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Generally, two divisions are required to be OPERABLE. However, only one channel per given Function is required if the plant has justified such a design and the NRC SER has accepted the justification.

This Table is for illustration purposes only. It does not attempt to encompass every Function used at every unit, but does contain the types of Functions commonly found.

## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The EOC-RPT instrumentation initiates a recirculation pump trip (RPT) to reduce the peak reactor pressure and power resulting from turbine trip or generator load rejection transients to provide additional margin to core thermal MCPR Safety Limits (SLs).

The need for the additional negative reactivity in excess of that normally inserted on a scram reflects end of cycle reactivity considerations. Flux shapes at the end of cycle are such that the control rods may not be able to ensure that thermal limits are maintained by inserting sufficient negative reactivity during the first few feet of rod travel upon a scram caused by Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low, or Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low (TSV). The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity at a faster rate than the control rods can add negative reactivity.

The EOC-RPT instrumentation as shown in Reference 1 is comprised of sensors that detect initiation of closure of the TSVs, or fast closure of the TCVs, combined with relays, logic circuits, and fast acting circuit breakers that interrupt the power from the recirculation pump motor generator (MG) set generators to each of the recirculation pump motors. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an EOC-RPT signal to the trip logic. When the RPT breakers trip open, the recirculation pumps coast down under their own inertia. The EOC-RPT has two identical trip systems, either of which can actuate an RPT.

Each EOC-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function; thus, either two TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low or two TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low signals are required for a trip system to actuate. If either trip system actuates, both recirculation pumps will trip. There are two EOC-RPT breakers in series per recirculation pump. One trip system trips one of the two EOC-RPT breakers for each recirculation pump and the second trip system trips the other EOC-RPT breaker for each recirculation pump.

## BASES

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low and the TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are designed to trip the recirculation pumps in the event of a turbinetrip or generator load rejection to mitigate the neutron flux, heat flux and pressurize transients, and to increase the margin to the MCPR SL. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the turbine trip and generator load rejection, as well as other safety analyses that assume EOC-RPT, are summarized in References 2, 3, and 4.

To mitigate pressurization transient effects, the EOC-RPT must trip the recirculation pumps after initiation of initial closure movement of either the TSVs or the TCVs. The combined effects of this trip and a scram reduce fuel bundle power more rapidly than does a scram alone, resulting in an increased margin to the MCPR SL. Alternatively, MCPR limits for an inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are sufficient to mitigate pressurization transient effects. The EOC-RPT function is automatically disabled when turbine first stage pressure is < [40%] RTP.

EOC-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The OPERABILITY of the EOC-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.4.1.3. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated EOC-RPT breakers. Each channel (including the associated EOC-RPT breakers) must also respond within its assumed response time.

Allowable Values are specified for each EOC-RPT Function specified in the LCO. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., TSV electrohydraulic control (EHC) pressure), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration,

BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The specific Applicable Safety Analysis, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Alternately, since this instrumentation protects against a MCPR SL violation with the instrumentation inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2) may be applied to allow this LCO to be met. The MCPR penalty for the Condition EOC-RPT inoperable is specified in the COLR.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low

Closure of the TSVs and a main turbine trip result in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from closure of these valves. EOC-RPT decreases reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.

Closure of the TSVs is determined by measuring the EHC fluid pressure at each stop valve. There is one pressure transmitter associated with each stop valve, and the signal from each transmitter is assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is such that two or more TSVs must be closed to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure transmitters sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, to consider this Function OPERABLE, the turbine bypass valves must remain shut at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. Four channels of TSV Closure, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TSV closure.

BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

This protection is required, consistent with the safety analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 40\%$  RTP with any recirculating pump in fast speed. Below 40% RTP or with the recirculation in slow speed, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Fixed Neutron Flux - High Functions of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

The automatic enable setpoint is feedwater temperature dependent as a result of the subcooling changes that affect the turbine first stage pressure/reactor power relationship. For operation with feedwater temperature  $\geq 420^\circ\text{F}$ , an Allowable Value setpoint of  $\leq 26.9\%$  of control valves wide open turbine first stage pressure is provided for the bypass function. The Allowable Value setpoint is reduced to  $\leq 22.5\%$  of control valve wide open turbine first stage pressure for operation with a feedwater temperature between  $370^\circ\text{F}$  and  $420^\circ\text{F}$ .

TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low

Fast closure of the TCVs during a generator load rejection results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, an RPT is initiated on TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves. The EOC-RPT decreases reactor power and aids the reactor scram in ensuring that the MCPR SL is not exceeded during the worst case transient.

Fast closure of the TCVs is determined by measuring the EHC fluid pressure at each control valve. There is one pressure transmitter associated with each control valve, and the signal from each transmitter is assigned to a separate trip channel. The logic for the TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is such that two or more TCVs must be closed (pressure transmitter trips) to produce an EOC-RPT. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This is normally accomplished automatically by pressure transmitters sensing turbine first stage pressure; therefore, to consider this Function OPERABLE, the turbine bypass valves must remain shut at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. Four channels of TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude an EOC-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Allowable Value is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

## BASES

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

This protection is required consistent with the analysis, whenever the THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 40\%$  RTP with any recirculating pump in fast speed. Below 40% RTP or with recirculation pumps in slow speed, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Functions of the RPS are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins. The turbine first stage pressure/reactor power relationship for the setpoint of the automatic enable is identical to that described for TSV closure.

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## ACTIONS

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### - REVIEWER'S NOTE -

Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.

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A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to EOC-RPT instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable EOC-RPT instrumentation channel.

### A.1 and A.2

With one or more required channels inoperable, but with EOC-RPT trip capability maintained (refer to Required Action B.1 and B.2 Bases), the EOC-RPT System is capable of performing the intended function. However, the reliability and redundancy of the EOC-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the EOC-RPT System to perform the intended function. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore compliance with the LCO. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT, 72 hours is allowed to restore the inoperable channels (Required Action A.1) [or apply the EOC-RPT

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

inoperable MCPR limit]. Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in trip (Required Action A.2) since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. As noted in Required Action A.2, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may not adequately compensate for the inoperable breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open). If it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an RPT), or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, Condition C must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

**B.1 and B.2**

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining EOC-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the EOC-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculation pumps can be tripped. This requires two channels of the Function, in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the associated EOC-RPT breakers to be OPERABLE or in trip. Alternatively, Required Action B.2 requires the MCPR limit for inoperable EOC-RPT, as specified in the COLR, to be applied. This also restores the margin to MCPR assumed in the safety analysis.

The 2 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the EOC-RPT instrumentation during this period. It is also consistent with the 2 hour Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, Required Action A.1, since this instrumentation's purpose is to preclude a MCPR violation.

**C.1 and C.2**

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 40% RTP within 4 hours. Alternately, the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 40% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

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The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary.

**SR 3.3.4.1.1**

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on reliability analysis (Ref. 5).

**SR 3.3.4.1.2**

The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the setting is discovered to

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BASES

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.4.1.3. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on assumptions of the reliability analysis (Ref. 5) and on the methodology included in the determination of the trip setpoint.

SR 3.3.4.1.3

**CHANNEL CALIBRATION** is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. **CHANNEL CALIBRATION** leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval, in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.4.1.4

The **LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST** demonstrates the **OPERABILITY** of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers is included as a part of this test, overlapping the **LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST**, to provide complete testing of the associated safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel would also be inoperable.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance test when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.4.1.5

This SR ensures that an EOC-RPT initiated from the TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is  $\geq 40\%$  RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. Because main turbine bypass flow can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed at THERMAL POWER  $\geq 40\%$  RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid. If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at  $\geq 40\%$  RTP either due to open main turbine bypass valves or other reasons), the affected TSV Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met and the channel considered OPERABLE.

The Frequency of 18 months has shown that channel bypass failures between successive tests are rare.

SR 3.3.4.1.6

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 6.

A Note to the Surveillance states that breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.7. This is allowed since the time to open the contacts after energization of the trip coil and the arc suppression time are short and do not appreciably change, due to the design of the breaker opening device and the fact that the breaker is not routinely cycled.

EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Response times cannot be determined at power because operation of final actuated devices is required. Therefore, the 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

components that cause serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

**SR 3.3.4.1.7**

This SR ensures that the RPT breaker interruption time (arc suppression time plus time to open the contacts) is provided to the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME test. The 60 month Frequency of the testing is based on the difficulty of performing the test and the reliability of the circuit breakers.

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**REFERENCES**

1. FSAR, Figure [ ] (EOC-RPT instrumentation logic).
  2. FSAR, Section [5.2.2].
  3. FSAR, Sections [15.1.1], [15.1.2], and [15.1.3].
  4. FSAR, Sections [5.5.16.1] and [7.6.10].
  5. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals And Allowed Out-Of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
  6. FSAR, Section [5.5.16.2].
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### B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### B 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

The ATWS-RPT System initiates a recirculation pump trip, adding negative reactivity, following events in which a scram does not (but should) occur, to lessen the effects of an ATWS event. Tripping the recirculation pumps adds negative reactivity from the increase in steam voiding in the core area as core flow decreases. When Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 or Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High setpoint is reached, the recirculation pump motor breakers trip.

The ATWS-RPT System (Ref. 1) includes sensors, relays, bypass capability, circuit breakers, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of a recirculation pump trip. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs an ATWS-RPT signal to the trip logic.

The ATWS-RPT consists of two independent trip systems, with two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High and two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2, in each trip system. Each ATWS-RPT trip system is a two-out-of-two logic for each Function. Thus, either two Reactor Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 or two Reactor Pressure - High signals are needed to trip a trip system. The outputs of the channels in a trip system are combined in a logic so that either trip system will trip both recirculation pumps (by tripping the respective fast speed and low frequency motor generator (LFMG) motor breakers).

There is one fast speed motor breaker and one LFMG breaker provided for each of the two recirculation pumps for a total of four breakers. The output of each trip system is provided to all four breakers.

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##### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The ATWS-RPT is not assumed in the safety analysis. The ATWS-RPT initiates an RPT to aid in preserving the integrity of the fuel cladding following events in which scram does not, but should, occur. ATWS-RPT instrumentation satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The OPERABILITY of the ATWS-RPT is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels in each

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BASES

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

trip system, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.4.2.4. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Channel OPERABILITY also includes the associated recirculation pump drive motor breakers. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Allowable Values are specified for each ATWS-RPT Function specified in the LCO. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 to protect against common mode failures of the Reactor Protection System by providing a diverse trip to mitigate the consequences of a postulated ATWS event. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High and Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, since the reactor is producing significant power and the recirculation system could be at high flow. During this MODE, the potential exists for pressure increases or low water level, assuming an ATWS event. In MODE 2, the reactor is at low power and the recirculation system is at low flow; thus, the potential is low for a pressure increase or low water level, assuming an ATWS event. Therefore, the ATWS-RPT is not necessary. In MODES 3 and 4, the reactor is shut down with all control rods inserted; thus, an ATWS event is not significant and the possibility of a significant pressure increase or low water level is negligible. In MODE 5, the one-rod-out interlock ensures the reactor

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

remains subcritical; thus, an ATWS event is not significant. In addition, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is not fully tensioned and no pressure transient threat to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) exists.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses and LCO discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

**a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2**

Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the ATWS-RPT System is initiated at Level 2 to aid in maintaining level above the top of the active fuel. The reduction of core flow reduces the neutron flux and THERMAL POWER and, therefore, the rate of coolant boiloff.

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Level - Low Low, Level 2, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude an ATWS-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2, Allowable Value is chosen so that the system will not initiate after a Level 3 scram with feedwater still available, and for convenience with the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) initiation.

**b. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High**

Excessively high RPV pressure may rupture the RCPB. An increase in the RPV pressure during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion. This increases neutron flux and THERMAL POWER, which could potentially result in fuel failure and RPV overpressurization. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High Function initiates an RPT for transients that result in a pressure increase, counteracting the pressure increase by rapidly reducing core power generation. For the overpressurization event, the RPT aids in the termination of the ATWS event and, along with the safety/relief valves

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

(S/RVs), limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code Service Level C limits (1500 psig).

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that monitor reactor steam dome pressure. Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High, with two channels in each trip system, are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude an ATWS-RPT from this Function on a valid signal. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High Allowable Value is chosen to provide an adequate margin to the ASME Section III Code Service Level C allowable Reactor Coolant System pressure.

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**ACTIONS**

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ATWS-RPT instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ATWS-RPT instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable ATWS-RPT instrumentation channel.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more channels inoperable, but with ATWS-RPT capability for each Function maintained (refer to Required Action B.1 and C.1 Bases), the ATWS-RPT System is capable of performing the intended function. However, the reliability and redundancy of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation is reduced, such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the ATWS-RPT System to perform the intended function. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of ATWS-RPT, 14 days is provided to restore the inoperable channel (Required Action A.1). Alternately, the inoperable channel may be placed in trip (Required Action A.2), since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

operation to continue. As noted, placing the channel in trip with no further restrictions is not allowed if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, since this may not adequately compensate for the inoperable breaker (e.g., the breaker may be inoperable such that it will not open). If it is not desirable to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel would result in an RPT), or if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker, Condition D must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

**B.1**

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the ATWS-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal, and both recirculation pumps can be tripped. This requires two channels of the Function in the same trip system to each be OPERABLE or in trip, and the four motor breakers (two fast speed and two LFMG) to be OPERABLE or in trip.

The 72 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action (e.g., restoration or tripping of channels) and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation during this period and the fact that one Function is still maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability.

**C.1**

Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within both Functions result in both Functions not maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability. The description of a Function maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability is discussed in the Bases for Required Action B.1, above.

The 1 hour Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation during this period.

BASES

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ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 2 within 6 hours (Required Action D.2). Alternately, the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service since this performs the intended Function of the instrumentation (Required Action D.1). The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, both to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions and to remove a recirculation pump from service in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note which states that the Required Action is only applicable if the inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable RPT breaker. The Note clarifies the situations under which the associated Required Action would be the appropriate Required Action.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 2) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the recirculation pumps will trip when necessary.

SR 3.3.4.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the required channels of this LCO.

SR 3.3.4.2.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 2.

SR 3.3.4.2.3

Calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in SR 3.3.4.2.4. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the setting

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 2.

**SR 3.3.4.2.4**

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

**SR 3.3.4.2.5**

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel. The system functional test of the pump breakers, included as part of this Surveillance, overlaps the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. Therefore, if a breaker is incapable of operating, the associated instrument channel(s) would be inoperable.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

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**REFERENCES**

1. FSAR, Figure [ ].

**BASES**

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**REFERENCES (continued)**

2. NEDE-770-06-1, "Bases For Changes To Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times For Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
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## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient.

For most anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), a wide range of dependent and independent parameters are monitored.

The ECCS instrumentation actuates low pressure core spray (LPCS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), high pressure core spray (HPCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and the diesel generators (DGs). The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating."

#### Low Pressure Core Spray System

The LPCS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by two redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to two trip units. The outputs of the four trip units (two trip units from each of the two variables) are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The high drywell pressure initiation signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually reset. The logic can also be initiated by use of a manual push button. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the LPCS pump is started immediately after power is available.

The LPCS test line isolation valve, which is also a primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), is closed on a LPCS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analysis and maintains containment isolation in the event LPCS is not operating.

The LPCS pump discharge flow is monitored by a flow transmitter. When the pump is running and discharge flow is low enough that pump overheating may occur, the minimum flow return line valve is opened. The valve is automatically closed if flow is above the minimum flow setpoint to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analysis.

## BASES

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### BACKGROUND (continued)

The LPCS System also monitors the pressure in the reactor vessel to ensure that, before the injection valve opens, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the LPCS System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant transmitters, which are, in turn, connected to trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

#### Low Pressure Coolant Injection Subsystems

The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, with three LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by two redundant transmitters per Division, which are, in turn, connected to two trip units. The outputs of the four Division 2 LPCI (loops B and C) trip units (two trip units from each of the two variables) are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The Division 1 LPCI (loop A) receives its initiation signal from the LPCS logic, which uses a similar one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The two Divisions can also be initiated by use of a manual push button (one per Division). Once an initiation signal is received by the LPCI control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset.

Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the LPCI Pump C is started immediately after power is available while LPCI A and LPCI B pumps are started after a 5 second delay, to limit the loading on the standby power sources.

Each LPCI subsystem's discharge flow is monitored by a flow transmitter. When a pump is running and discharge flow is low enough that pump overheating may occur, the respective minimum flow return line valve is opened. The valve is automatically closed if flow is above the minimum flow setpoint to allow the full system flow assumed in the analyses.

The RHR test line suppression pool cooling isolation and suppression pool spray isolation valves (which are also PCIVs) are closed on a LPCI initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analysis and maintain containment isolated in the event LPCI is not operating.

The LPCI subsystems monitor the pressure in the reactor vessel to ensure that, prior to an injection valve opening, the reactor pressure has

BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued)

fallen to a value below the LPCI subsystem's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant transmitters per Division, which are, in turn, connected to four trip units. The outputs of the four Division 2 LPCI (loops B and C) trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The Division 1 LPCI (loop A) receives its signal from the LPCS logic, which uses a similar one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

High Pressure Core Spray System

The HPCS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure - High. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each variable. The HPCS System initiation signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually reset.

The HPCS pump discharge flow is monitored by a flow transmitter. When the pump is running and discharge flow is low enough that pump overheating may occur, the minimum flow return line valve is opened. The valve is automatically closed if flow is above the minimum flow setpoint to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analyses.

The HPCS test line isolation valve (which is also a PCIV) is closed on a HPCS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain containment isolated in the event HPCS is not operating.

The HPCS System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool, since these are the two sources of water for HPCS operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal and preferred source. Upon receipt of a HPCS initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position), unless the suppression pool suction valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either transmitter and associated trip unit can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. The suppression pool suction valve also automatically opens and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool. To prevent losing suction to the

## BASES

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### BACKGROUND (continued)

pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

The HPCS System provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip, at which time the HPCS injection valve closes. The HPCS pump will continue to run on minimum flow. The logic is two-out-of-two to provide high reliability of the HPCS System. The injection valve automatically reopens if a low low water level signal is subsequently received.

#### Automatic Depressurization System

ADS may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs when signals indicating Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure - High or ADS Bypass Timer; confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3; and either LPCS or LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure - High are all present, and the ADS Initiation Timer has timed out. There are two transmitters each for Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 and Drywell Pressure - High, and one transmitter for confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 in each of the two ADS trip systems. Each of these transmitters connects to a trip unit, which then drives a relay whose contacts form the initiation logic.

Each ADS trip system (trip system A and trip system B) includes a time delay between satisfying the initiation logic and the actuation of the ADS valves. The time delay chosen is long enough that the HPCS has time to operate to recover to a level above Level 1, yet not so long that the LPCI and LPCS systems are unable to adequately cool the fuel if the HPCS fails to maintain level. An alarm in the control room is annunciated when either of the timers is running. Resetting the ADS initiation signals resets the ADS Initiation Timers.

The ADS also monitors the discharge pressures of the three LPCI pumps and the LPCS pump. Each ADS trip system includes two discharge pressure permissive transmitters from each of the two low pressure ECCS pumps in the associated Division (i.e., Division 1 ECCS inputs to ADS trip system A and Division 2 ECCS inputs to ADS trip system B). The signals are used as a permissive for ADS actuation, indicating that there is a source of core coolant available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Any one of the four low pressure pumps provides sufficient core coolant flow to permit automatic depressurization.

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### BACKGROUND (continued)

The ADS logic in each trip system is arranged in two strings. One string has a contact from each of the following variables: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure - High or ADS Bypass Timer; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3; ADS Initiation Timer; and two low pressure ECCS Discharge Pressure - High contacts. The other string has a contact from each of the following variables: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure - High; ADS Bypass Timer; and two low pressure ECCS Discharge Pressure - High contacts. To initiate an ADS trip system, the following applicable contacts must close in the associated string: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure - High or ADS Bypass Timer; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3; ADS Initiation Timer; and one of the two low pressure ECCS Discharge Pressure - High contacts. Either ADS trip system A or trip system B will cause all the ADS relief valves to open. Once the Drywell Pressure - High or ADS initiation signals are present, they are individually sealed in until manually reset.

Manual initiation is accomplished by operating the control switch for each safety/relief valve (S/RV) associated with the ADS. Manual inhibit switches are provided in the control room for ADS; however, their function is not required for ADS OPERABILITY (provided ADS is not inhibited when required to be OPERABLE).

#### Diesel Generators

The Division 1, 2, and 3 DGs may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High for DGs 11 and 12, and Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure - High for DG 13. The DGs are also initiated upon loss of voltage signals. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation," for a discussion of these signals.) Each of these diverse variables is monitored by two redundant transmitters per DG, which are, in turn, connected to two trip units. The outputs of the four divisionalized trip units (two trip units from each of the two variables) are connected to relays whose contacts are connected to a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The DGs receive their initiation signals from the associated Divisions' ECCS logic (i.e., DG 11 receives an initiation signal from Division 1 ECCS (LPCS and LPCI A); DG 12 receives an initiation signal from Division 2 ECCS (LPCI B and LPCI C); and DG 13 receives an initiation signal from Division 3 ECCS (HPCS)). The DGs can also be started manually from the control room and locally in the associated DG room. The DG initiation signal is a sealed in signal and must be manually

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**BACKGROUND** (continued)

reset. The DG initiation logic is reset by resetting the associated ECCS initiation logic. Upon receipt of a LOCA initiation signal, each DG is automatically started, is ready to load in approximately 10 seconds, and will run in standby conditions (rated voltage and speed, with the DG output breaker open). The DGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses if a loss of offsite power occurs. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.)

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The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1, 2, and 3. The ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each ECCS subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time. Table 3.3.5.1-1 is modified by two footnotes. Footnote (a) is added to clarify that the associated functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 only when their supported ECCS are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Shutdown. Footnote (b) is added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions also perform DG initiation and actuation of other Technical Specifications (TS) equipment.

Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip unit) changes state. The analytic limits

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient. To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Low Pressure Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems

1.a. 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated at Level 1 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are available to prevent or minimize fuel damage. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. In addition, the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function per associated Division are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE, to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. (Two channels input to LPCS and LPCI A, while the other two channels input to LPCI B and LPCI C.) Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1-1, this ECCS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems; LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.b. 2.b. Drywell Pressure - High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure - High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. Negative barometric fluctuations are accounted for in the Allowable Value.

The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS and DGs are required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the LPCS and LPCI Drywell Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. (Two channels input to LPCS and LPCI A, while the other two channels input to LPCI B and LPCI C.) In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure - High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell Pressure - High setpoint. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.c. 2.c. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump A and Pump B Start - Time Delay Relay

The purpose of this time delay is to stagger the start of the two ECCS pumps that are in each of Divisions 1 and 2, thus limiting the starting transients on the 4.16 kV emergency buses. This Function is only necessary when power is being supplied from the standby power sources (DG). However, since the time delay does not degrade ECCS operation, it remains in the pump start logic at all times. The LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relays are assumed to be OPERABLE in the accident and transient analyses requiring ECCS initiation. That is, the analysis assumes that the pumps will initiate when required and excess loading will not cause failure of the power sources.

There are two LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relays, one in each of the RHR "A" and RHR "B" pump start logic circuits. While each time delay relay is dedicated to a single pump start logic, a single failure of a LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relay could result in the failure of the two low pressure ECCS pumps, powered from the same ESF bus, to perform their intended function within the assumed ECCS RESPONSE TIMES (e.g., as in the case where both ECCS pumps on one ESF bus start simultaneously due to an inoperable time delay relay). This still leaves two of the four low pressure ECCS pumps OPERABLE; thus, the single failure criterion is met (i.e., loss of one instrument does not preclude ECCS initiation). The Allowable Value for the LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relay is chosen to be long enough so that most of the starting transient of the first pump is complete before starting the second pump on the same 4.16 kV emergency bus and short enough so that ECCS operation is not degraded.

Each LPCI Pump Start - Time Delay Relay Function is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated LPCI subsystem is required to be OPERABLE. Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1-1, this ECCS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the LPCI subsystems.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

1.d, 2.d. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. This ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. In addition, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. The four pressure transmitters each drive a master and slave trip unit (for a total of eight trip units).

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressurizing the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Three channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low Function per associated Division are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. (Three channels are required for LPCS and LPCI A, while three other channels are required for LPCI B and LPCI C.) Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1-1, this ECCS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.e, 1.f, 2.e. Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump. The LPCI and LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valves to ensure that the low pressure ECCS flows assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

One flow transmitter per ECCS pump is used to detect the associated subsystems' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the RHR shutdown cooling mode (for RHR A and RHR B). The Pump Discharge Flow - Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

Each channel of Pump Discharge Flow - Low Function (one LPCS channel and three LPCI channels) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE, to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the ECCS function. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.g, 2.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for each of the two Divisions of low pressure ECCS (i.e., Division 1 ECCS, LPCS and LPCI A; Division 2 ECCS, LPCI B and LPCI C).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per Division) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Per Footnote (a) to Table 3.3.5.1-1, this ECCS Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 whenever the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

High Pressure Core Spray System

3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2

Low RFPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCS System and associated DG is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating HPCS during the transients analyzed in References 1 and 3. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with HPCS is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is chosen such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System flow with HPCS assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 1.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

**3.b. Drywell Pressure - High**

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCS System and associated DG are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure - High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure - High Function is not assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2); that is, HPCS is assumed to be initiated on Reactor Water Level - Low Low, Level 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Drywell Pressure - High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the HPCS Drywell Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure - High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the drywell to the Drywell Pressure - High Function's setpoint. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCS System.

**3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8**

High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the HPCS injection valve to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function is not assumed in the accident and transient analyses. It was retained since it is a potentially significant contributor to risk. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for HPCS are initiated from two level transmitters from the narrow range water level measurement instrumentation. Both Level 8 signals are required in order to close the HPCS injection valve. This ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS initiation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to isolate flow from the HPCS System prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low

Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valves between HPCS and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCS initiation signal, water for HPCS injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. The Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCS) since the analyses assume that the HPCS suction source is the suppression pool.

Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either transmitter and associated trip unit can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS swap to suppression pool source. Thus, the Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the Function is required to be OPERABLE only when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to fulfill the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, HPCS is aligned to the CST, and the CST water level is not within the limits of SR 3.5.2.2. With CST water level within limits, a sufficient supply of water exists for injection to minimize the consequences of a vessel draindown event. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

**3.e. Suppression Pool Water Level - High**

Excessively high suppression pool water could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the S/RVs. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of HPCS from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of HPCS continuing to provide additional water from a source outside containment. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes. This Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCS) since the analyses assume that the HPCS suction source is the suppression pool.

Suppression Pool Water Level - High signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The logic is arranged such that either transmitter and associated trip unit can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function is chosen to ensure that HPCS will be aligned for suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression pool design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when HPCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCS swap to suppression pool source. In MODES 4 and 5, the Function is not required to be OPERABLE since the reactor is depressurized and vessel blowdown, which could cause the design values of the containment to be exceeded, cannot occur. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

**3.f, 3.g. HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass)**

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the HPCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow line valve is opened when low flow and high pump discharge pressure are sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump or the discharge pressure is low (indicating the HPCS pump is not operating). The HPCS System Flow Rate - Low and HPCS Pump

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Discharge Pressure - High Functions are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the minimum flow valve to ensure that the ECCS flow assumed during the transients and accidents analyzed in References 1, 2, and 3 are met. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

One flow transmitter is used to detect the HPCS System's flow rate. The logic is arranged such that the transmitter causes the minimum flow valve to open, provided the HPCS pump discharge pressure, sensed by another transmitter, is high enough (indicating the pump is operating). The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. (The valve will also close upon HPCS pump discharge pressure decreasing below the setpoint.)

The HPCS System Flow Rate - Low and HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is high enough to ensure that pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core. The HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure that the valve will not be open when the pump is not operating.

One channel of each Function is required to be OPERABLE when the HPCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

3.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channel introduces a signal into the HPCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for the HPCS System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button. One channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

**OPERABLE** when the HPCS System is required to be **OPERABLE**. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCS Applicability Bases.

**Automatic Depressurization System**

**4.a. 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1**

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be **OPERABLE** and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are only required to be **OPERABLE** when ADS is required to be **OPERABLE** to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (Two channels input to ADS trip system A while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B). Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is high enough to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to initiate and provide adequate cooling.

**4.b. 5.b. Drywell Pressure - High**

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure - High is assumed to be **OPERABLE** and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

Drywell Pressure - High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

Four channels of Drywell Pressure - High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (Two channels input to ADS trip system A while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B.) Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.c, 5.c. ADS Initiation Timer

The purpose of the ADS Initiation Timer is to delay depressurization of the reactor vessel to allow the HPCS System time to maintain reactor vessel water level. Since the rapid depressurization caused by ADS operation is one of the most severe transients on the reactor vessel, its occurrence should be limited. By delaying initiation of the ADS Function, the operator is given the chance to monitor the success or failure of the HPCS System to maintain water level, and then to decide whether or not to allow ADS to initiate, to delay initiation further by recycling the timer, or to inhibit initiation permanently. The ADS Initiation Timer Function is assumed to be OPERABLE for the accident analyses of Reference 2 that require ECCS initiation and assume failure of the HPCS System.

There are two ADS Initiation Timer relays, one in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the ADS Initiation Timer is chosen to be short enough so that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Two channels of the ADS Initiation Timer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (One channel inputs to ADS trip system A while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B.) Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.d, 5.d. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is used by the ADS only as a confirmatory low water level signal. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 signals. In order to prevent spurious initiation of

## BASES

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

the ADS due to spurious Level 1 signals, a Level 3 signal must also be received before ADS initiation commences.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from two level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Allowable Value for Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 is selected at the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value for convenience. Refer to LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," for Bases discussion of this Function.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (One channel inputs to ADS trip system A while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B.) Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

#### 4.e. 4.f. 5.e. Low Pressure Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure - High

The Pump Discharge Pressure - High signals from the LPCS and LPCI pumps are used as permissives for ADS initiation, indicating that there is a source of low pressure cooling water available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Pump Discharge Pressure - High is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting ADS initiation during the events analyzed in References 2 and 3 with an assumed HPCS failure. For these events, the ADS depressurizes the reactor vessel so that the low pressure ECCS can perform the core cooling functions. This core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Pump discharge pressure signals are initiated from eight pressure transmitters, two on the discharge side of each of the four low pressure ECCS pumps. In order to generate an ADS permissive in one trip system, it is necessary that only one pump (both channels for the pump) indicate the high discharge pressure condition. The Pump Discharge Pressure - High Allowable Value is less than the pump discharge pressure when the pump is operating in a full flow mode, and high enough to avoid any condition that results in a discharge pressure permissive when the LPCS and LPCI pumps are aligned for injection and

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

the pumps are not running. The actual operating point of this Function is not assumed in any transient or accident analysis.

Eight channels of LPCS and LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure - High Function (two LPCS and two LPCI A channels input to ADS trip system A, while two LPCI B and two LPCI C channels input to ADS trip system B) are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.g, 5.f. ADS Bypass Timer (High Drywell Pressure)

One of the signals required for ADS initiation is Drywell Pressure - High. However, if the event requiring ADS initiation occurs outside the drywell (for example, main steam line break outside primary containment), a high drywell pressure signal may never be present. Therefore, the ADS Bypass Timer is used to bypass the Drywell Pressure - High Function after a certain time period has elapsed. Operation of the ADS Bypass Timer Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. The instrumentation is retained in the TS because ADS is part of the primary success path for mitigation of a DBA.

There are four ADS Bypass Timer relays, two in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the ADS Timer is chosen to be short enough that so that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Four channels of the ADS Bypass Timer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.h, 5.g. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the ADS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There are two push buttons for each ADS trip system (total of four).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the ADS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons. Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function (two channels per ADS trip system) are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

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## ACTIONS

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### - REVIEWER'S NOTE -

Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.

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A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

#### A.1

Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

#### B.1, B.2, and B.3

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function (or in some cases, within the same variable) result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). Required Action B.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 feature would be HPCS. For Required Action B.1, redundant

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one or more Function 1.a channels and one or more Function 2.a channels are inoperable and untripped, or (b) one or more Function 1.b channels and one or more Function 2.b channels are inoperable and untripped.

For Divisions 1 and 2, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated Division of low pressure ECCS and DG to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both Divisions, this results in the affected portions in both Divisions of ECCS and DG being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1 and Required Action B.2), the two Required Actions are only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action B.3) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. Notes are also provided (Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in both Divisions (e.g., any Division 1 ECCS and Division 2 ECCS) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same variable as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCS System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability

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### ACTIONS (continued)

is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.3. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken.

#### C.1 and C.2

Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the same Function (or in some cases, within the same variable) result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). Required Action C.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, and 2.d (i.e., low pressure ECCS). For Functions 1.c and 2.c, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if the Function 1.c and Function 2.c channels are inoperable. For Functions 1.d and 2.d, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 1.d channels in the same trip system and two Function 2.d channels in the same trip system (but not necessarily the same trip system as the Function 1.d channels) are inoperable. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action C.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated Division to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both Divisions, this results in the affected portions in both Divisions being concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1.c and 2.c, the affected portions of the Division are LPCI A and LPCI B, respectively. For Functions 1.d and 2.d, the affected portions of the Division are the low pressure ECCS pumps (Divisions 1 and 2, respectively).

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour. As noted (Note 1), the Required Action is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5.

Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, and 2.d. The Required Action is not applicable to Functions 1.g, 2.f, and 3.h (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 4 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both Divisions (e.g., any Division 1 ECCS and Division 2 ECCS) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same variable as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

**D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2**

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCS System. Automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.d channels or two Function 3.e channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate and the HPCS System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of HPCS initiation capability. As noted, the Required Action is only applicable if the HPCS pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool, since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCS System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1 or the suction source must be aligned to the suppression pool per Required Action D.2.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Performance of either of these two Required Actions will allow operation to continue. If Required Action D.2.1 or Required Action D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the HPCS System piping remains filled with water. Alternately, if it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the HPCS suction piping), Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken.

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ACTIONS (continued)

E.1 and E.2

Required Action E.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the LPCS and LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). For Required Action E.1, the features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.e, 1.f, and 2.e (e.g., low pressure ECCS). Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if three of the four channels associated with Functions 1.e, 1.f, and 2.e are inoperable. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action E.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected low pressure ECCS pump to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for more than one low pressure ECCS pump are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels of the low pressure ECCS pumps, this results in the affected low pressure ECCS pumps being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both Divisions. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action E.1), Required Action E.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required Action E.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. A Note is also provided (Note 2 to Required Action E.1) to delineate that Required Action E.1 is only applicable to low pressure ECCS Functions. Required Action E.1 is not applicable to HPCS Functions 3.f and 3.g since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (one-out-of-one logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 4 and considered acceptable for the 7 days allowed by Required Action E.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that three channels of the variable (Pump Discharge Flow - Low) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss

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### ACTIONS (continued)

of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

If the instrumentation that controls the pump minimum flow valve is inoperable such that the valve will not automatically open, extended pump operation with no injection path available could lead to pump overheating and failure. If there were a failure of the instrumentation such that the valve would not automatically close, a portion of the pump flow could be diverted from the reactor injection path, causing insufficient core cooling. These consequences can be averted by the operator's manual control of the valve, which would be adequate to maintain ECCS pump protection and required flow. Furthermore, other ECCS pumps would be sufficient to complete the assumed safety function if no additional single failure were to occur. The 7 day Completion Time of Required Action E.2 to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status is reasonable based on the remaining capability of the associated ECCS subsystems, the redundancy available in the ECCS design, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during the allowed out of service time. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

#### F.1 and F.2

Required Action F.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) more than one Function 4.a channel and one Function 5.a channel are inoperable and untripped, (b) one Function 4.b channel and one Function 5.b channel are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one Function 4.d channel and one Function 5.d channel are inoperable and untripped.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action F.2 is not appropriate, and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability in both trip systems.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the

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ACTIONS (continued)

allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action F.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCS and RCIC are OPERABLE. If either HPCS or RCIC is inoperable, the time is shortened to 96 hours. If the status of HPCS or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours begins upon discovery of HPCS or RCIC inoperability. However, total time for an inoperable, untripped channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCS or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable, untripped channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action F.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken.

G.1 and G.2

Required Action G.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.c channel and one Function 5.c channel are inoperable, (b) one or more Function 4.e channels and one or more Function 5.e channels are inoperable, (c) one or more Function 4.f channels and one or more Function 5.e channels are inoperable, or (d) one or more Function 4.g channels and one or more Function 5.f channels are inoperable.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action G.2 is not appropriate,

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ACTIONS (continued)

and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability in both trip systems. The Note to Required Action G.1 states that Required Action G.1 is only applicable for Functions 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.c, 5.e, and 5.f. Required Action G.1 is not applicable to Functions 4.h and 5.g (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 96 hours or 8 days (as allowed by Required Action G.2) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action G.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions, as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCS and RCIC are OPERABLE (Required Action G.2). If either HPCS or RCIC is inoperable, the time is reduced to 96 hours. If the status of HPCS or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours, the 96 hours begins upon discovery of HPCS or RCIC inoperability. However, total time for an inoperable channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCS or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

H.1

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended

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ACTIONS (continued)

function and the supported feature(s) associated with the inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

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As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each ECCS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours as follows: (a) for Functions 3.c, 3.f, 3.g, and 3.h; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c, 3.f, 3.g, and 3.h provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 4) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 4.

SR 3.3.5.1.3

The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be not within its required Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analyses. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than the setting accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 4.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.1.4 and SR 3.3.5.1.5

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.4 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.5 is based upon the assumption of an [18] month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.5.1.6

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned transients if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency.

SR 3.3.5.1.7

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Reference 5.

ECCS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements.

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

[-----  
- REVIEWER'S NOTE -

The following Bases are applicable for plants adopting NEDO-32291-A.  
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However, the measurement of instrument loop response times may be excluded if the conditions of Reference 6 are satisfied.]

ECCS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an [18] month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The [18] month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [5.2].
  2. FSAR, Section [6.3].
  3. FSAR, Chapter [15].
  4. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2," December 1988.
  5. FSAR, Section [6.3], Table [6.3-2].
  - [6. NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.]
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## B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

### B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is unavailable, such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System."

The RCIC System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of reactor vessel Low Low water level. The variable is monitored by four transmitters that are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement. Once initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.

The RCIC test line isolation valve (which is also a primary containment isolation valve) is closed on a RCIC initiation signal to allow full system flow and maintain containment isolated in the event RCIC is not operating.

The RCIC System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool, since these are the two sources of water for RCIC operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction from the suppression pool valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close. The suppression pool suction valve also automatically opens and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool (one-out-of-two logic similar to the CST water level logic). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

**BASES**

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**BACKGROUND (continued)**

The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip (two-out-of-two logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply, steam supply bypass, and cooling water supply valves close (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valves). The RCIC System restarts if vessel level again drops to the low level initiation point (Level 2).

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY**

The function of the RCIC System, to provide makeup coolant to the reactor, is to respond to transient events. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analysis for RCIC System operation. The RCIC System instrumentation satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions.

Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Each Allowable Value specified accounts for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the Function. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since this is when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases for the RCIC System.)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

**1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2**

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal feedwater flow is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow with high pressure core spray assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level 1.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

**2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8**

High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the RCIC steam supply, steam supply bypass, and cooling water supply valves to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). (The injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve.)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for RCIC are initiated from two level transmitters from the narrow range water level measurement instrumentation, which sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is high enough to preclude isolating the injection valve of the RCIC during

## BASES

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### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

normal operation, yet low enough to trip the RCIC System prior to water overflowing into the MSLs.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

#### 3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low

Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally the suction valve between the RCIC pump and the CST is open and, upon receiving a RCIC initiation signal, water for RCIC injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valve automatically opens and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the RCIC pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the CST. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

#### 4. Suppression Pool Water Level - High

Excessively high suppression pool water level could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety/relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of RCIC from the CST to the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of RCIC continuing to provide additional water from a source outside primary containment. This Function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). To prevent losing suction to the

**BASES**

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)**

pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valve must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Suppression pool water level signals are initiated from two level transmitters. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function is set low enough to ensure that RCIC will be aligned to take suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

**5. Manual Initiation**

The Manual Initiation push button switch introduces a signal into the RCIC System initiation logic that is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provides manual initiation capability. There is one push button for the RCIC System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the RCIC function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button. One channel of Manual Initiation is required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE.

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**ACTIONS**

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the topical report.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions,

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel.

**A.1**

Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 in the accompanying LCO. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

**B.1 and B.2**

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System. In this case, automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 1 channels in the same trip system are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour allowance of Required Action B.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour after discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 channels in the same trip system. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

## BASES

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### ACTIONS (continued)

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

#### C.1

A risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours (Ref. 1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1), limiting the allowable out of service time if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function, whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result in a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability. As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. This Condition also applies to the Manual Initiation Function. Since this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, a total loss of manual initiation capability (Required Action C.1) for 24 hours is allowed. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in the safe state for the channel in all events.

#### D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). For Required Action D.1, the RCIC System is the only associated feature. In this case, automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3 channels or two Function 4 channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within

**BASES**

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**ACTIONS (continued)**

1 hour from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted, Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

**E.1**

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

**- REVIEWER'S NOTE -**

Certain Frequencies are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these Frequencies, the licensee must justify the Frequencies as required by the staff SER for the topical report.

As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours for Functions 2 and 5; and (b) for up to 6 hours for Functions 1, 3, and 4 provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.

**SR 3.3.5.2.1**

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal,

## BASES

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

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but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

**SR 3.3.5.2.2**

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1.

**SR 3.3.5.2.3**

The calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.5.2-1. If the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be re-adjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 1.

**SR 3.3.5.2.4**

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

**BASES**

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**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)**

The Frequency is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

**SR 3.3.5.2.5**

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

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**REFERENCES**

1. NEDE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
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