

June 13, 1990

Envelope No. 50-423

Mr. Edward J. Mrocza
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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Dear Mr. Mrocza:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NOS. 76396 and 76375)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 50 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your applications dated February 21 and March 15, 1990.

The amendment modifies the Technical Specifications (TS) as follows: (1) The cycle-specific operating limits are removed from a number of TS and incorporated in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) as defined in TS 1.42. The reporting requirements associated with the COLR are also established; (2) an editorial change to TS 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.2 is made to improve readability and (3) a change to TS 3/4.9.1 is made to correctly describe a method for immobilizing a manual valve.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 50 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:BDI-4
SNorris:rc
5/14/90

PM:BDI-4
DJaffe
5/14/90

D:PMI-4
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DATED: June 13, 1990

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 50
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The applications for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated February 21 and March 15, 1990, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 50 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 90 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 13, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 50

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove

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DEFINITIONS

VENTING

1.39 VENTING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not provided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system names, does not imply a VENTING process.

SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE PATTERNS:

1.40 Region I spent fuel racks contain a cell blocking device in every 4th location for criticality control. This 4th location will be referred to as the blocked location. A STORAGE PATTERN refers to the blocked location and all adjacent and diagonal Region I cell locations surrounding the blocked location. Boundary configuration between Region I and Region II must have cell blockers positioned in the outermost row of the Region I perimeter, as shown in Figure 3.9-2.

1.41 Region II contains no cell blockers.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

1.42 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit-specific document that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.6. Unit Operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

TABLE 1.1

FREQUENCY NOTATION

<u>NOTATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
S	At least once per 12 hours.
D	At least once per 24 hours.
W	At least once per 7 days.
M	At least once per 31 days.
Q	At least once per 92 days.
SA	At least once per 184 days.
R	At least once per 18 months.
S/U	Prior to each reactor startup.
N.A.	Not applicable.
P	Completed prior to each release.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T_{avg} LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1.6% $\Delta k/k$.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1.6% $\Delta k/k$, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6300 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1.6% $\Delta k/k$:

- a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s); and
- b. At least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:
 - 1) Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
 - 2) Control rod position,
 - 3) Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
 - 4) Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
 - 5) Xenon concentration, and
 - 6) Samarium concentration.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORTS (COLR). The maximum upper limit shall be less positive than $+0.5 \times 10^{-4} \Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ for all the rods withdrawn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), condition for power levels up to 70% RATED THERMAL POWER with a linear ramp to 0 $\Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: BOL - MODES 1 and 2* only**.
End of Cycle life (EOL) Limit - MODES 1, 2, and 3 only**.

ACTION:

- a. With the MTC more positive than the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3 above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:
 1. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to less positive than the above limits within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;
 2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition; and
 3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod withdrawal limits, and the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring the positive MTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.
- b. With the MTC more negative than the EOL limit specified in the COLR, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

*With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

**See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.3.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

- a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3, above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading; and
- b. The MTC shall be measured at any THERMAL POWER and compared to the 300 ppm surveillance limit specified in the COLR (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER condition) within 7 EFPD after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm. In the event this comparison indicates the MTC is more negative than the 300 ppm surveillance limit specified in the COLR, the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC limit specified in the COLR, at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) shall be greater than or equal to 551°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2* **.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) less than 551°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 551°F:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} is less than 561°F with the $T_{avg} - T_{ref}$ Deviation Alarm not reset.

*With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

**See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.3.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
 - 1) Verifying the boron concentration in the water,
 - 2) Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and
 - 3) Verifying the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Room temperature and the boric acid storage tank solution temperature.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

GROUP HEIGHT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All full-length shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within ± 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more full-length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With one full-length rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:
 1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
 2. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within ± 12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or
 3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:
 - a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions;
 - b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours;

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

TABLE 3.1-1

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION
IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH ROD

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment

Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in Large Pipes Which Actuates the Emergency Core Cooling System

Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power

Major Reactor-Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss-of-Coolant Accident)

Major Secondary Coolant System Pipe Rupture

Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

- c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors and $F_0(Z)$ and F_{AH}^N are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours; and
 - d) With four loops operating, the THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER, or
 - e) With three loops operating, the THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours the Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 60% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- c. With more than one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a. above, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that:
- 1. Within 1 hour, the remainder of the rods in the bank(s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within ± 12 steps of the inoperable rods while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, and
 - 2. The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.
- d. With more than one rod misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length rod shall be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

ROD DROP TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The individual full-length (shutdown and control) rod drop time from the fully withdrawn position shall be less than or equal to 2.2 seconds from beginning of decay of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry with:

- a. T_{avg} greater than or equal to 551°F, and
- b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With the drop time of any full-length rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.
- b. With the rod drop times within limits but determined with three reactor coolant pumps operating, operation may proceed provided THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER with the reactor coolant stop valves in the nonoperating loop closed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 The rod drop time of full-length rods shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

- a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,
- b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the Control Rod Drive System which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and
- c. At least once per 18 months.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be limited in physical insertion as specified in the core operating limits report (COLR).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* **.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod inserted beyond the insertion limits specified in the COLR except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

- a. Restore the rod to within the limit specified in the COLR, or
- b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be within the insertion limits specified in the COLR:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control Bank A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

**With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as specified in the core operating limits report (COLR).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* **.

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the insertion limits specified in the COLR, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

- a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the insertion limits specified in the COLR, or
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod insertion limit monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

**With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

FOUR LOOPS OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) shall be maintained within the target band (flux difference units) about the target flux difference. The target band is provided in the core operating limits report (COLR).

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the required target band at greater than or equal to 50% but less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in the COLR and the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the required target band at greater than 15% but less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*

ACTION:

- a. With the indicated AFD outside of the required target band and with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 15 minutes either:
 1. Restore the indicated AFD to within the target band limits, or
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. With the indicated AFD outside of the required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours or outside the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in the COLR and with THERMAL POWER less than 90% but equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, reduce:
 1. THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 30 minutes, and
 2. The Power Range Neutron Flux - High** Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

**Surveillance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux Channels may be performed pursuant to Specification 4.3.1.1 provided the indicated AFD is maintained within the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in the COLR. A total of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFD outside of the required target band during testing without penalty deviation.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

- c. With the indicated AFD outside of the required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours and with THERMAL POWER less than 50% but greater than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER shall not be increased equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER until the indicated AFD is within the required target band.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.1.1 The indicated AFD shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel:
 - 1) At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is OPERABLE, and
 - 2) At least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERABLE status.
- b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target band when two or more OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. Penalty deviation outside of the required target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

- a. One minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

4.2.1.1.3 The target flux difference of each OPERABLE excore channel shall be determined by measurement at least once per 92 Effective Full Power Days. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.1.4 The target flux difference shall be updated at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days by either determining the target flux difference pursuant to Specification 4.2.1.1.3 above or by linear interpolation between the most recently measured value and 0% at the end of the cycle life. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

THREE LOOPS OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1.2 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) shall be maintained within the target band (flux difference units) about the target flux difference. The target band is provided in the core operating limits report (COLR).

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the required target band at greater than or equal to 32% but less than 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in the COLR and the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the required target band at greater than 15% but less than 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*

ACTION:

- a. With the indicated AFD outside of the required target band and with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 15 minutes either:
 1. Restore the indicated AFD to within the target band limits, or
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- b. With the indicated AFD outside of the required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours or outside the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in the COLR and with THERMAL POWER less than 65% but equal to or greater than 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER, reduce:
 1. THERMAL POWER to less than 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 30 minutes, and
 2. The Power Range Neutron Flux - High** Setpoints to less than or equal to 37% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

**Surveillance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux Channels may be performed pursuant to Specification 4.3.1.1 provided the indicated AFD is maintained within the Acceptable Operation Limits specified in the COLR. A total of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFD outside of the required target band during testing without penalty deviation.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

- c. With the indicated AFD outside of the required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours and with THERMAL POWER less than 32% but greater than 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER shall not be increased equal to or greater than 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER until the indicated AFD is within the required target band.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.2.1 The indicated AFD shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel:
 - 1) At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is OPERABLE, and
 - 2) At least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERABLE status.
- b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.2.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target band when two or more OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. Penalty deviation outside of the required target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

- a. One minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

4.2.1.2.3 The target flux difference of each OPERABLE excore channel shall be determined by measurement at least once per 92 Effective Full Power Days. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.1.2.4 The target flux difference shall be updated at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days by either determining the target flux difference pursuant to Specification 4.2.1.2.3 above or by linear interpolation between the most recently measured value and 0% at the end of the cycle life. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_Q(Z)$

FOUR LOOPS OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2.1 $F_Q(Z)$ shall be limited by the following relationships:

$$F_Q(Z) \leq \frac{F_Q^{RTP} K(Z)}{P} \text{ for } P > 0.5$$

$$F_Q(Z) \leq \frac{F_Q^{RTP} K(Z)}{0.5} \text{ for } P \leq 0.5$$

F_Q^{RTP} = the F_Q limit at RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) provided in the core operating limits report (COLR).

Where: $P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$, and

$K(Z)$ = the normalized $F_Q(Z)$ as a function of core height specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With $F_Q(Z)$ exceeding its limit:

- a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower ΔT Trip Setpoints have been reduced at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit, and
- b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided $F_Q(Z)$ is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.1.2 F_{xy} shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limit by:

- a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
- b. Increasing the measured F_{xy} component of the power distribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties,
- c. Comparing the F_{xy} computed (F_{xy}^C) obtained in Specification 4.2.2.1.2b., above to:

- 1) The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) for the appropriate measured core planes given in Specification 4.2.2.1.2e. and f., below, and
- 2) The relationship:

$$F_{xy}^L = F_{xy}^{RTP} [1 + PF_{xy}(1-P)],$$

Where F_{xy}^L is the limit for fractional THERMAL POWER operation expressed as a function of F_{xy}^{RTP} . PF_{xy} is the power factor multiplier for F_{xy} specified in the COLR, and P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy} was measured.

d. Remeasuring F_{xy} according to the following schedule:

- 1) When F_{xy}^C is greater than the F_{xy}^{RTP} limit for the appropriate measured core plane but less than the F_{xy}^L relationship, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to F_{xy}^{RTP} and F_{xy}^L either:
 - a) Within 24 hours after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER or greater, the THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy}^C was last determined, or
 - b) At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), whichever occurs first.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 2) When the F_{xy}^C is less than or equal to the F_{xy}^{RTP} limit for the appropriate measured core plane, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to F_{xy}^{RTP} and F_{xy}^L at least once per 31 EFPD.
- e. The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) shall be provided for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes in the COLR per Specification 6.9.1.6;
 - f. The F_{xy} limits of Specification 4.2.2.1.2e., above, are not applicable in the following core planes regions as measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel:
 - 1) Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,
 - 2) Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,
 - 3) Within $\pm 2\%$ of core height (± 2.88 inches) of grid plane regions. The total core height eliminated from the grid plane regions located between 15% and 85% of core height shall not exceed 20% of total core height (144 inches).
 - 4) Core plane regions within $\pm 2\%$ of core height (± 2.88 inches) about the bank demand position of the Bank "D" control rods.
 - g. With F_{xy}^C exceeding F_{xy}^L the effects of F_{xy} on $F_Q(Z)$ shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limits.

4.2.2.1.3 When $F_Q(Z)$ is measured for other than F_{xy} determinations, an overall measured $F_Q(Z)$ shall be obtained from a power distribution map and increased by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5% to account for measurement uncertainty.

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_Q(Z)$

THREE LOOPS OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2.2 $F_Q(Z)$ shall be limited by the following relationships:

$$F_Q(Z) \leq \frac{F_Q^{RTP}}{P} [K(Z)] \text{ for } P > 0.325$$

$$F_Q(Z) \leq \frac{(F_Q^{RTP})}{0.325} [K(Z)] \text{ for } P \leq 0.325$$

F_Q^{RTP} = The F_Q limit at RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) specified in the core operating limits report (COLR).

Where: $P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$, and

$K(Z)$ = the normalized $F_Q(Z)$ as a function of core height specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With $F_Q(Z)$ exceeding its limit:

- a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower ΔT Trip Setpoints have been reduced at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit. The Overpower ΔT Trip Setpoint reduction shall be performed with the reactor in at least HOT STANDBY.
- b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided $F_Q(Z)$ is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2.2 F_{xy} shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limit by:

- a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
- b. Increasing the measured F_{xy} component of the power distribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties,
- c. Comparing the F_{xy} computed (F_{xy}^C) obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2.2b, above to:
 - 1) The F_{xy} limits for 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER ($F_{xy}^{0.65 RTP}$) for the appropriate measured core planes F_{xy} given in Specification 4.2.2.2.2e. and f., below, and
 - 2) The relationship:

$$F_{xy}^L = F_{xy}^{0.65 RTP} [1 + M_{Fxy} (0.65 - P)],$$

Where F_{xy}^L is the limit for fractional THERMAL POWER operation expressed as a function of $F_{xy}^{0.65 RTP}$, M_{Fxy} is the F_{xy} multiplier, and P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy} was measured.

d. Remeasuring F_{xy} according to the following schedule:

- 1) When F_{xy}^C is greater than the $F_{xy}^{0.65 RTP}$ limit for the appropriate measured core plane but less than the F_{xy}^L relationship, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to $F_{xy}^{0.65 RTP}$ and F_{xy}^L either:
 - a) Within 24 hours after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER or greater, the THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy}^C was last determined, or
 - b) At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), whichever occurs first.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- 2) When the F_{xy}^C is less than or equal to the $F_{xy}^{0.65 \text{ RTP}}$ limit for the appropriate measured core plane, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to $F_{xy}^{0.65 \text{ RTP}}$ and F_{xy}^L at least once per 31 EFPD.
- e. The F_{xy} limits for 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER ($F_{xy}^{0.65 \text{ RTP}}$) and the F_{xy} multiplier ($M_{F_{xy}}$) shall be provided for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes in the COLR .
- f. The F_{xy} limits of Specification 4.2.2.2e., above, are not applicable in the following core planes regions as measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel:
- 1) Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,
 - 2) Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,
 - 3) Within $\pm 2\%$ of core height (± 2.88 inches) of grid plane regions. The total core height eliminated from the grid plane regions located between 15% and 85% of core height shall not exceed 20% of total core height (144 inches).
 - 4) Core plane regions within $\pm 2\%$ of core height (± 2.88 inches) about the bank demand position of the Bank "D" control rods.
- g. With F_{xy}^C exceeding F_{xy}^L , the effects of F_{xy} on $F_Q(Z)$ shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limits.

4.2.2.2.3 When $F_Q(Z)$ is measured for other than F_{xy} determinations, an overall measured $F_Q(Z)$ shall be obtained from a power distribution map and increased by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5% to account for measurement uncertainty.

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.3 RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

FOUR LOOPS OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3.1 The indicated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total flow rate and $F_{\Delta H}^N$ shall be maintained as follows:

- a. RCS total flow rate $\geq 385,210$ gpm, and
- b. $F_{\Delta H}^N \leq F_{\Delta H}^{RTP} [1.0 + PF_{\Delta H} (1.0 - P)]$

Where:

- 1) $P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$,
- 2) $F_{\Delta H}^N$ = Measured values of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ obtained by using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map. The measured value of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ should be used since Specification 3.2.3.1b. takes into consideration a measurement uncertainty of 4% for incore measurement,
- 3) $F_{\Delta H}^{RTP}$ = The $F_{\Delta H}^N$ limit at RATED THERMAL POWER in the core operating limits report (COLR),
- 4) $PF_{\Delta H}$ - The power factor multiplier for $F_{\Delta H}^N$ provided in the COLR, and
- 5) The measured value of RCS total flow rate shall be used since uncertainties of 1.8% for flow measurement have been included in Specification 3.2.3.1a.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With the RCS total flow rate or $F_{\Delta H}^N$ outside the region of acceptable operation:

- a. Within 2 hours either:
 1. Restore the RCS total flow rate and $F_{\Delta H}^N$ to within the above limits, or
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip Setpoint to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

- b. Within 24 hours of initially being outside the above limits, verify through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate that $F_{\Delta H}^N$ and RCS total flow rate are restored to within the above limits, or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours.
- c. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced THERMAL POWER limit required by ACTION a.2. and/or b., above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that $F_{\Delta H}^N$ and indicated RCS total flow rate are demonstrated, through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate comparison, to be within the region of acceptable operation prior to exceeding the following THERMAL POWER levels:
 1. A nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
 2. A nominal 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
 3. Within 24 hours of attaining greater than or equal to 95% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.2.3.1.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
- 4.2.3.1.2 RCS total flow rate and $F_{\Delta H}^N$ shall be determined to be within the acceptable range:
 - a. Prior to operation above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, and
 - b. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.
- 4.2.3.1.3 The indicated RCS total flow rate shall be verified to be within the acceptable range at least once per 12 hours when the most recently obtained value of $F_{\Delta H}^N$, obtained per Specification 4.2.3.1.2, is assumed to exist.
- 4.2.3.1.4 The RCS total flow rate indicators shall be subjected to a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months. The measurement instrumentation shall be calibrated within 7 days prior to the performance of the calorimetric flow measurement.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (Continued)

4.2.3.1.5 The RCS total flow rate shall be determined by precision heat balance measurement at least once per 18 months. Within 7 days prior to performing the precision heat balance, the instrumentation used for determination of steam pressure, feedwater pressure, feedwater temperature, and feedwater venturi ΔP in the calorimetric calculations shall be calibrated.

4.2.3.1.6 If the feedwater venturis are not inspected and cleaned at least once per 18 months, an additional 0.1% will be added to the total RCS flow measurement uncertainty.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

THREE LOOPS OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3.2 The indicated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total flow rate and $F_{\Delta H}^N$ shall be maintained as follows:

- a. RCS total flow rate $\geq 304,780$ gpm, and
- b. $F_{\Delta H}^N \leq F_{\Delta H}^{RTP} [1.0 + PF_{\Delta H} (1.0 - P)]$

Where:

1) $P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$,

- 2) $F_{\Delta H}^N$ = Measured values of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ obtained by using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map.

The measured value of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ should be used since Specification 3.2.3.2b. takes into consideration a measurement uncertainty of 4% for incore measurement,

- 3) $F_{\Delta H}^{RTP}$ = The $F_{\Delta H}$ limit at RATED THERMAL POWER in the core operating limits report (COLR),
- 4) $PF_{\Delta H}$ = The power factor multiplier for $F_{\Delta H}$ in the COLR, and
- 5) The measured value of RCS total flow rate shall be used since uncertainties of 2.0% for flow measurement have been included in Specification 3.2.3.2a.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With the RCS total flow rate or $F_{\Delta H}^N$ outside the region of acceptable operation:

- a. Within 2 hours either:
 1. Restore the RCS total flow rate and $F_{\Delta H}^N$ to within the above limits, or
 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip Setpoint to less than or equal to 37% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 Each containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be OPERABLE and each 42-inch containment shutdown purge supply and exhaust isolation valve shall be closed and locked closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With a 42-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve open or not locked closed, close and/or lock close that valve or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be verified to be locked closed and closed at least once per 31 days.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Quench Spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Containment Quench Spray subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each Containment Quench Spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days:
 - 1) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; and
 - 2) Verifying the temperature of the borated water in the refueling water storage tank is between 40°F and 50°F.
- b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 114 psid when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;
- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:
 - 1) Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal, and
 - 2) Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a CDA test signal.
- d. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.2 Two independent Recirculation Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Recirculation Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Recirculation Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.2 Each Recirculation Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 130 psid when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;
- c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a CDA test signal, each recirculation spray pump starts automatically after a 660 ± 20 second delay;
- d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal; and
- e. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.3 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A chemical addition tank containing a volume of between 18000 and 19000 gallons of between 2.41 and 3.10% by weight NaOH solution, and
- b. Two gravity feed paths each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical addition tank to each Containment Quench Spray subsystem pump suction.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.3 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;
- b. At least once per 6 months by:
 - 1) Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
 - 2) Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis is within the above limits.
- c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:

- a. A K_{eff} of 0.95 or less, or
- b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2300 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.*

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6300 ppm boron or its equivalent until K_{eff} is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to 2300 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

- a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and
- b. Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours.

4.9.1.1.3 Valve 3CHS-V305 shall be verified closed and locked at least once per 31 days.

*The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BORON CONCENTRATION

Limiting Condition for Operation

- 3.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Spent Fuel Pool shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the boron concentration is greater than or equal to 800 ppm.

Applicability

During ALL fuel assembly movements within the spent fuel pool.

Action

With the boron concentration less than 800 ppm, suspend the movement of all fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool.

Surveillance Requirements

- 4.9.1.2 Verify that the boron concentration is greater than or equal to 800 ppm prior to any movement of a fuel assembly into or within the spent fuel pool, and every 72 hours thereafter during fuel movement.

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T_{avg} . The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T_{avg} at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.6% $\Delta k/k$ is required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T_{avg} less than 200°F, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steam line break cooldown are minimal. A 1.6% $\Delta k/k$ SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to provide protection against a boron dilution accident.

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison.

The most negative MTC, value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

These corrections involved: (1) a conversion of the MDC used in the FSAR safety analyses to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this value the largest differences in MTC observed between EOL, all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and those most adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod insertion, axial power skewing, and xenon concentration that can occur in normal operation and lead to a significantly more negative EOL MTC at RATED THERMAL POWER. These corrections transformed the MDC value used in the FSAR safety analyses into the limiting End of Cycle Life (EOL) MTC value. The 300 ppm surveillance limit MTC value represents a conservative MTC value at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by making corrections for burnup and soluble boron to the limiting EOL MTC value.

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the P-12 interlock is above its setpoint, (4) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (5) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal operation and in short-term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200°F is not exceeded.

The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows:

- $F_Q(Z)$ Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods;
- $F_{\Delta H}^N$ Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power; and
- $F_{xy}(Z)$ Radial Peaking Factor, is defined as the ratio of peak power density to average power density in the horizontal plane at core elevation Z .

3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) assure that the $F_Q(Z)$ upper bound envelope of the F_Q limit specified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes.

Target flux difference is determined at equilibrium xenon conditions. The full-length rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with their respective insertion limits and should be inserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at high power levels. The value of the target flux difference obtained under these conditions divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER is the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL POWER for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER levels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup considerations.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Continued)

Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the AFD within the target band required by Specifications 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.1 about the target flux difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the time duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1-hour penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits specified in the COLR at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER (four loops operating) or between 32% and 65% of RATED THERMAL POWER (three loops operating). For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER (four loops operating) or between 15% and 32% of RATED THERMAL POWER (three loops operating), deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance.

Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer determines the 1-minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for two or more OPERABLE excore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During four loop operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively. During three loop operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 32% and 65% and between 15% and 32% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively.

Figures B 3/4 2-1a and B 3/4 2-1b show typical monthly target bands.

3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

The limits on heat flux hot channel factor, RCS flow rate, and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that: (1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200°F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the limits are maintained provided:

- a. Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than ± 12 steps, indicated, from the group demand position;
- b. Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6;

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR AND RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

- c. The control rod insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are maintained; and
- d. The axial power distribution, expressed in terms of AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE, is maintained within the limits.

$F_{\Delta H}^N$ will be maintained within its limits provided Conditions a. through d. above are maintained. The relaxation of $F_{\Delta H}^N$ as a function of THERMAL POWER allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits.

The $F_{\Delta H}^N$ as calculated in Specifications 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2 are used in the various accident analyses where $F_{\Delta H}^N$ influences parameters other than DNBR, e.g., peak clad temperature, and thus is the maximum "as measured" value allowed. The difference between the three and four-loop $F_{\Delta H}^N$ equations is due to a more restrictive $F_{\Delta H}^N$ used in the safety analyses for three-loop operation. In four-loop operation, the allowable measured $F_{\Delta H}^N$ calculated in Specification 3.2.3.1 at 65% Rated Thermal Power is ≤ 1.65 . In three-loop operation, however, $F_{\Delta H}^N$ is restricted to a measured value ≤ 1.55 to be consistent with the safety analyses for three loop operation. At zero power, both specifications allow the same measured $F_{\Delta H}^N$.

Fuel rod bowing reduces the value of DNBR ratio. Credit is available to offset this reduction in the generic margin. The generic margins, totaling 9.1% DNBR completely offset any rod bow penalties. This margin includes the following:

- a. Design limit DNBR of 1.30 vs 1.28,
- b. Grid Spacing (K_s) of 0.046 vs. 0.059,
- c. Thermal Diffusion Coefficient of 0.038 vs 0.059,
- d. DNBR Multiplier of 0.86 vs. 0.88, and
- e. Pitch reduction.

The applicable values of rod bow penalties are referenced in the FSAR.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

When an F_Q measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be made. An allowance of 5% is appropriate for a full-core map taken with the Incore Detector Flux Mapping System, and a 3% allowance is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.

The Radial Peaking Factor, $F_{xy}(Z)$, is measured periodically to provide assurance that the Hot Channel Factor, $F_Q(Z)$, remains within its limit. The F_{xy} limit for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) as provided in the Core Operating Limits Report Specification 6.9.1.6 was determined from expected power control maneuvers over the full range of burnup conditions in the core.

When RCS flow rate and $F_{\Delta H}^N$ are measured, no additional allowances are necessary prior to comparison with the limits of the Limiting Condition for Operation. Measurement errors of 1.8% for four loop flow and 2.0% for three loop flow for RCS total flow rate and 4% for $F_{\Delta H}^N$ have been allowed for in determination of the design DNBR value.

The measurement error for RCS total flow rate is based upon performing a precision heat balance and using the result to calibrate the RCS flow rate indicators. Potential fouling of the feedwater venturi which might not be detected could bias the result from the precision heat balance in a non-conservative manner. Therefore, a penalty of 0.1% for undetected fouling of the feedwater venturi will be added if venturis are inspected and cleaned at least once for 18 months. Any fouling which might bias the RCS flow rate measurement greater than 0.1% can be detected by monitoring and trending various plant performance parameters. If detected, action shall be taken before performing subsequent precision heat balance measurements, i.e., either the effect of the fouling shall be quantified and compensated for in the RCS flow rate measurement or the venturi shall be cleaned to eliminate the fouling.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance of indicated RCS flow is sufficient to detect only flow degradation which could lead to operation outside the acceptable region of operation defined in Specifications 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2.

3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO limit assures that the radial power distribution satisfies the design values used in the power capability analysis. Radial power distribution measurements are made during STARTUP testing and periodically during power operation.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT*

6.9.1.4 Routine Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports covering the operation of the unit during the previous 6 months of operation shall be submitted within 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each year.

A supplemental report containing dose assessments for the previous year shall be submitted annually within 90 days after January 1.

The report shall include that information delineated in the REMODCM.

Any changes to the REMODCM shall be submitted in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS

6.9.1.5 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, one copy to the Regional Administrator Region I, and one copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.6.a Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

1. Moderator Temperature Coefficient BOL and EOL limits and 300 ppm surveillance limit for Specification 3/4.1.1.3,
2. Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit for Specification 3/4.1.1.5,
3. Control Rod Insertion Limits for Specification 3/4.1.1.6,
4. Axial Flux Difference Limits, target band for Specifications 3/4.2.1.1 and 3/4.2.1.2,
5. Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, $K(Z)$, Power Factor Multiplier for Specifications 3/4.2.2.1 and 3/4.2.2.2.
6. RCS Flow Rate and Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor for Specification 3/4.2.3.

* A single submittal may be made for a multiple unit station. The submittal should combine those sections that are common to all units at the station; however, for units with separate radwaste systems, the submittal shall specify the releases of radioactive material from each unit.

6.9.1.6.b The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

1. WCAP-9272-P-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology," July 1985 (W Proprietary).
2. WCAP-8385, "Power Distribution Control and Load Following Procedures - Topical Report," September, 1981 (W Proprietary).
3. T. M. Anderson to K. Kniel (Chief of Core Performance Branch, NRC) January 31, 1980 - Attachment: Operation and Safety-Analysis Aspects of an Improved Load Follow Package.
4. NUREG-800, Standard Review Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Section 4.3, Nuclear Design, July 1981 Branch Technical Position CPB 4.3-1, Westinghouse Constant Axial Offset Control (CAOC), Revision 2, July 1981.
5. WCAP-9220-P-A, Rev. 1, "Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model - 1981 Version," February 1982 (W Proprietary).
6. WCAP-11946, "Safety Evaluation Supporting a More Negative EOL Moderator Temperature Coefficient Technical Specification for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 September 1988, (W Proprietary).

6.9.1.6.c The core operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g. fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

6.9.1.6.d The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

SPECIAL REPORTS

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, one copy to the Regional Administrator Region I, and one copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, within the time period specified for each report.

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 In addition to the applicable record retention requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for at least 5 years:

- a. Records and logs of unit operation covering time interval at each power level;
- b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair, and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety;
- c. ALL REPORTABLE EVENTS;
- d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections, and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications;
- e. Records of changes made to the procedures required by Specification 6.8.1;
- f. Records of radioactive shipments;
- g. Records of sealed source and fission detector leak tests and results; and
- h. Records of annual physical inventory of all sealed source material of record.

6.10.3 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the unit Operating License:

- a. Records and drawing changes reflecting unit design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report;
- b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers, and assembly burnup histories;
- c. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas;



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 50

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

INTRODUCTION

By applications for license amendment dated February 21 and March 15, 1990, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), requested changes to Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specifications (TS).

The proposed amendment would modify the TS as follows: (1) The cycle-specific operating limits would be removed from a number of TS and incorporated in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) as defined in TS 1.42 and the reporting requirements associated with the COLR would also be established; (2) an editorial change to TS 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.2 would be made to improve readability, and (3) a change to TS 3/4.9.1 would correctly describe a method for immobilizing a manual valve.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

With regard to the removal of the cycle-specific operating limits from the TS, the proposed revision to the TS is in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 88-16 as follows:

- (1) The Definitions section of the TS would be modified to include a definition of the COLR that requires cycle/reload-specific parameter limits to be established on a unit-specific basis in accordance with an NRC-approved methodology that maintains the limits of the safety analysis. The definition notes that plant operation within these limits is addressed by individual specifications.
- (2) The following TS would be revised to replace the values of cycle-specific parameter limits with a reference to the COLR that provides these limits:

3/4.1.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient

3/4.1.3.5 Shutdown Rod Insertion Limits

3/4.1.3.6 Control Rod Insertion Limits
(Four Loop and Three Loop)

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PDR ADOCK 05000423
P FDC

- 3/4.2.1.1 Axial Flux Difference - Four Loop
- 3/4.2.1.2 Axial Flux Difference - Three Loop
- 3/4.2.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor - Four Loop
- 3/4.2.2.2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor - Three Loop
- 3/4.2.3.1 RCS Flow Rate and Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor - Four Loop
- 3/4.2.3.2 RCS Flow Rate and Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor - Three Loop

Changes would also be made to the associated bases.

- (3) Technical Specification 6.9.1.6.a, "Core Operating Limit Report", would be added to the reporting requirements of the Administrative Controls section of the TS. This TS requires that the COLR be submitted, upon issuance, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and Resident Inspector. The report provides the values of cycle-specific parameter limits that are applicable for the current fuel cycle. Furthermore, this TS requires that the values of these limits be established using the NRC-approved methodology as specified in proposed TS 6.9.1.6.a and consistent with all applicable limits of the safety analysis. Finally, the TS requires that all changes in cycle-specific parameter limits be documented in the COLR before each reload cycle or remaining part of a reload cycle and submitted upon issuance to NRC, prior to operation with the new parameter limits.

As part of the implementation of Generic Letter 88-16, the staff has reviewed a sample COLR that was provided by the licensee in its February 21, 1990 application. On the basis of this review, the staff concludes that the format and content of the sample COLR are acceptable.

On the basis of the review of the above items, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee provided an acceptable response to those items as addressed in the NRC guidance in Generic Letter 88-16 on modifying cycle-specific parameter limits in TS. Because plant operation continues to be limited in accordance with the values of cycle-specific parameter limits that are established using an NRC-approved methodology, the NRC staff concludes that this change is acceptable.

The licensee has also proposed a change to TS 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.2. The proposed change would incorporate the word "that" after "flow path" to clarify the existing specification. This addition is intended to clarify the surveillance requirement by making it easier to read. This change is considered editorial in nature. There is no change in the technical content of the surveillance requirement. In addition, the proposed change makes TS 4.6.2.1 and 4.6.2.2 consistent with existing TS 4.6.2.3. Accordingly, the proposed changes to the TS are acceptable.

Finally, the licensee has proposed a change to TS 3/4.9.1. The proposed change to TS 3/4.9.1 would revise the surveillance requirement for valve

3CHS-V305 to require verification that the valve is closed and locked rather than secured in position. Valve 3CHS-V305 is a manual valve which provides primary grade flushing water to the emergency boration line. This valve is normally locked closed with a typical lock and chain device. The proposed change does not alter the position of valve 3CHS-V305 or the surveillance requirement frequency for the valve, it simply clarifies that removal of air or electrical power and installation of mechanical stops are not necessary on a manually operated valve. The proposed change would correct an inconsistency between as built conditions and TS 3/4.9.1 and would not otherwise change the requirements in the TS or the safety analysis. Accordingly, the proposed change to this TS is acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The amendment also relates to changes in recordkeeping, reporting or administrative procedures or requirements. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The staff has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and (10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: June 13, 1990

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