

April 12, 1995

Mr. John F. Opeka
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M90598)

Dear Mr. Opeka:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.107 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, in response to your application dated September 30, 1994, as supplemented February 13, 1995.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to (1) clarify the definition of core alterations, (2) change the verbiage in the Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) addressing the refueling operations, (3) make changes of surveillance requirements involving source range instrumentation, and (4) change the LCO regarding the Residual Heat Removal and coolant circulation water levels to be consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse plants.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Vernon L. Rooney, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 107 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 12, 1995

Mr. John F. Opeka
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "V. Rooney", written over a horizontal line.

Vernon L. Rooney, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-423

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 107 to NPF-49
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. John F. Opeka
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Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 3

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 107
License No. NPF-49

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated September 30, 1994, as supplemented February 13, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 107, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Phillip F. McKee, Director
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 12, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 107

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

DOCKET NO. 50-423

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

xv
1-2
3/4 9-2
3/4 9-8
3/4 9-9
B 3/4 9-2
B 3/4 9-3

Insert

xv
1-2
3/4 9-2
3/4 9-8
3/4 9-9
B 3/4 9-2 thru 3/4 9-7
B 3/4 9-8

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3/4.7.13 DELETED	
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DEFINITIONS

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves may be opened under administrative control per Specification 4.6.1.1a.
 - 2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions.
- b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,
- c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,
- d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATIONS

1.9 CORE ALTERATIONS shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, reactivity control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microCurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I."

\bar{E} - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.11 \bar{E} shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the sample) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for the radionuclides in the sample.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.2 Two Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors shall be OPERABLE with continuous visual indication in the control room, and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

- a. With one of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
- b. With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.2 Each Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

- a. A CHANNEL CHECK including audible counts at least once per 12 hours,
- b. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and
- c. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

HIGH WATER LEVEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is greater than or equal to 23 feet.

ACTION:

With no RHR loop OPERABLE or in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and suspend loading irradiated fuel assemblies in the core and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to OPERABLE and operating status as soon as possible. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.8.1 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 2800 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

*The RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 8-hour period, provided no operations are permitted that could cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

LOW WATER LEVEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.8.2 Two independent residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is less than 23 feet.

ACTION:

- a. With less than the required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status, or to establish greater than or equal to 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, as soon as possible.
- b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.8.2 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 2800 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

*The RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 8-hour period, provided no operations are permitted that could cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) refueling machines will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

3/4.9.8.1 HIGH WATER LEVEL

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant and to prevent boron stratification. Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s), where the heat is transferred to the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR system for normal cooldown or decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR system.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of coolant in the reactor vessel. Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity. The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant would eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is fission product barrier. One train of the RHR system is required to be operational in MODE 6, with the water level \geq 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange to prevent this challenge. The LCO does permit deenergizing the RHR pump for short durations,

BASES

3/4.9.8.1 HIGH WATER LEVEL (continued)

under the conditions that the boron concentration is not diluted. This conditional deenergizing of the RHR pump does not result in a challenge to the fission product barrier.

APPLICABILITY

One RHR loop must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 6, with the water level \geq 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal. The 23 ft level was selected because it corresponds to the 23 ft requirement established for fuel movement in LCO 3.9.10, "Water Level — Reactor Vessel." Requirements for the RHR system in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level $<$ 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.8.2, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation—Low Water Level."

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

The requirement that at least one RHR loop be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent stratification.

An OPERABLE RHR loop includes an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. An operating RHR flow path should be capable of determining the low-end temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs.

The LCO is modified by a note that allows the required operating RHR loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour per 8-hour period. This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzle and RCS to RHR isolation valve testing. During this 1-hour period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling cavity.

ACTIONS

RHR loop requirements are met by having one RHR loop OPERABLE and in operations, except as permitted in the Note to the LCO.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations. Reduced boron concentrations cannot occur by the addition of water with a lower boron concentration than that contained in the RCS because all of unborated water sources are isolated.

3/4.9.8.1 HIGH WATER LEVEL (continued)

Reduced boron concentrations can occur by the addition of water with lower boron concentration that contained in the RCS. Therefore, actions that result in an unplanned boron dilution shall be suspended immediately.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies in the core. With no forced circulation cooling, decay heat removal from the core occurs by natural convection to the heat sink provided by the water above the core. A minimum refueling water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat sink. Suspending any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be initiated and continued in order to satisfy RHR loop requirements. With the unit in MODE 6 and the refueling water level \geq 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, corrective actions shall be initiated immediately.

If RHR loop requirements are not met, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

Surveillance Requirement

This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The frequency of 12 hours is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator in the control room for monitoring the RHR system.

BASES

3/4.9.8.2 LOW WATER LEVEL

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant, and to prevent boron stratification. Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchangers where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR system.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of coolant in the reactor vessel. Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to a reduction in boron concentration in the coolant due to the boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity. The loss of reactor coolant and the reduction of boron concentration in the reactor coolant will eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier. Two trains of the RHR System are required to be OPERABLE, and one train in operation, in order to prevent this challenge.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

In MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, both RHR loops must be OPERABLE. Additionally, one loop of RHR must be in operation in order to provide:

- a. Removal of decay heat;
- b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality;
and
- c. Indication of reactor cooling temperature.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedure to cool the core.

BASES

3/4.9.8.2 LOW WATER LEVEL (continued)

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. An operating RHR flow path should be capable of determining the low end temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs.

APPLICABILITY

Two RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal. Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level \geq 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.8.1, "Residual Removal (RHR) AND Coolant Circulation—High Water Level."

ACTIONS

- a. If less than the required number of RHR loops are OPERABLE, actions shall be immediately initiated and continued until the RHR loop is restored to OPERABLE status and to operation, or until \geq 23 ft of water level is established above the reactor vessel flange. When the water level is \geq 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange, the Applicability changes to that of LCO 3.9.8.1, and only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE and in operation. An immediate Completion Time is necessary for an operator to initiate corrective action.
- b. If no RHR loop is in operation, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations. Reduced boron concentrations cannot occur by the addition of water with a low boron concentration than that contained in the RCS, because all of the unborated water sources are isolated.

If no RHR loop is in operation, actions shall be initiated immediately, and continued, to restore one RHR loop to operation. Since the unit is in Actions 'a' and 'b' concurrently, the restoration of two OPERABLE RHR loops and one operating RHR loop should be accomplished expeditiously.

If no RHR loop is in operation, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures that dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

BASES

Surveillance Requirement

This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. In addition, during operation of the RHR loop with the water level in the vicinity of the reactor vessel nozzles, the RHR pump suction requirements must be met. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR System in the control room.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4.9.12 FUEL BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER SYSTEM

The limitations on the Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY

The limitations described by Figure 3.9-1 ensure that the reactivity of fuel assemblies introduced into Region II are conservatively within the assumptions of the safety analysis.

Administrative controls have been developed and instituted to verify that the enrichment and burn-up limits of Figure 3.9-1 have been maintained for the fuel assembly.

3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL - STORAGE PATTERN

The limitations of this specification ensure that the reactivity conditions of the Region I storage racks and spent fuel pool k_{eff} will remain less than or equal to 0.95.

The Cell Blocking Devices in the 4th location of the Region I storage racks are designed to prevent inadvertent placement and/or storage of fuel assemblies in the blocked locations. The blocked location remains empty to provide the flux trap to maintain reactivity control for fuel assemblies in adjacent and diagonal locations of the STORAGE PATTERN.

STORAGE PATTERN for the Region I storage racks will be established and expanded from the walls of the spent fuel pool per Figure 3.9-2 to ensure definition and control of the Region I/Region II boundary and minimize the number of boundaries where a fuel misplacement incident can occur.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 107

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

DOCKET NO. 50-423

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 30, 1994, as supplemented February 13, 1995, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes revise the TSs to (1) clarify the definition of core alterations, (2) change the verbiage in the Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) addressing the refueling operations, (3) make changes to surveillance requirements involving source range instrumentation, and (4) change the LCO regarding the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and coolant circulation water levels to be consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for Westinghouse plants. The February 13, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Definition Section 1.9 - Core Alterations

The licensee proposed to incorporate the definition for core alterations as specified in the STS. The current definition in the TS 1.9 describes the core alterations as movement or manipulations of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the head removed and the fuel in the vessel. The new definition, which is consistent with the STS, specifies the components as any fuel, sources, reactivity control component or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel.

The proposed definition for core alterations was already approved by NRC for the STS. The difference between the two definitions is mainly the general reference to "any components" which is the wording in the existing TS 1.9. However the STS clearly defines the components that impact reactivity. The components are fuel, control elements, sources and any other component which can affect reactivity. The basis of core alterations is to require nuclear instrumentation to monitor neutron flux and changes in core reactivity. Movement of a component which does not affect reactivity does not require

operable nuclear instrumentation. Therefore, the revised definition is acceptable. Also the new definition omits the term "conservative" from the last line of the definition. However, meeting safety has the inherent element of conservatism.

2.2 Technical Specification 3/4.9.2, Limiting Condition for Operation Instrumentation in Refueling Operation

The licensee proposed several changes to TS 3/4.9.2. These changes make TS 3/4.9.2 consistent with the proposed definition of core alterations and the terms specified in the STS. The changes include (a) deleting "As a minimum" in TS 3.9.2, (b) deleting "each" in TS 3.9.2, deleting the comma after OPERABLE, and adding a comma after "in the control room", (c) adding "including audible counts" in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.9.2.a, and (d) changing "8 hours" to "12 hours" in SR 4.9.2.b.

By deleting the phrase "as a minimum" from TS 3.9.2, the modified sentence would continue to require two operable source range neutron flux monitors (SRMs). Clearly, three or four operable SRMs, which is the indirect implication of retaining the phrase "As a minimum", are not required for monitoring core alterations.

Also in TS 3.9.2, deleting the word "each", deleting the comma after OPERABLE, and adding a comma after the phrase "in the control room" would still require two operable SRMs with continuous visual indication of neutron counts in the control room. Further, there will be one SRM with audible counts in the control room and another inside containment. Deletion of "each" and the other punctuation changes clarify the intent of the existing TS 3.9.2.

The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.9.2.a ensures that performance of a channel check includes verification of the detector's audible counts. This is an acceptable change and clarifies the requirement.

To make SR 4.9.2.b consistent with the terms of the STS, the functional test requirement was changed from 8 hours to 12 hours for the analog channels before initial core alterations. The proposed change was evaluated and found to be acceptable because it is consistent with the STS.

2.3 Technical Specification 3/4.9.8.1, Limiting Condition for Operation Refueling, RHR and Coolant Circulation, High Water Level

The licensee proposed changes to the existing TSs that would make TS 3/4.9.8.1 consistent with the new definition of core alterations and STS 3.9.5. The two changes to TS 3/4.9.8.1 affect Action Statement 3.9.8.1, and modifies the footnote pertaining to Action Statement 3.9.8.1. The first change deletes the reference to the decay heat load when a RHR loop is inoperable or not in operation. Instead, it retains the reference to reduction of boron concentration and adds suspension of loading irradiated fuel assembly when RHR is not operational. The second change deletes the reference to core alterations, and instead, adds the requirement for not allowing any operation which could dilute the reactor coolant system (RCS) boron concentration.

The two changes are consistent with the STS. The intent of Action Statement 3.9.8.1 is to prevent loading a fuel assembly or performing any other activity with a likelihood of increasing the decay heat, when the RHR is inoperable. Further, if such activity is in progress, it shall be suspended when an RHR loop becomes inoperable. The specification allows an inoperable RHR for one hour in an 8 hour period. During the 1 hour when the RHR is not operational, no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration. Any activity that dilutes the RCS boron concentration has the potential to cause the reactor to become critical. In this condition, with the reactor being critical, decay heat is generated. Therefore, RHR must be operational. This logic will apply to other activities that can make the reactor critical. By incorporating the STS and replacing the associated Bases 3/4.9.8 with the STS Bases, the proposed change is acceptable. The wording of the new Bases stipulates suspension of any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly. With the Bases, the revised specification is acceptable.

2.4 Technical Specification 3/4.9.8.2, Limiting Condition for Operation Refueling, RHR and Coolant Circulation, Low Water Level

The licensee proposed changes to the existing TSs that would make TS 3/4.9.8.2 consistent with the proposed definition of core alterations and the STS 3.9.6. The change modifies the footnote pertaining to TS 3.9.8.2. The revised footnote deletes the reference to the core alterations and allows the RHR to be inoperable during 1 hour in any 8 hour period. However, it adds that during this hour, no operations are permitted that could cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration.

On the bases that the proposed changes are consistent with the wording and concepts already approved by the NRC, and are contained in STS 3.9.6, the changes are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 55877). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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