

October 24, 1995

Mr. Leon R. Eliason
Chief Nuclear Officer & President-
Nuclear Business Unit
Public Service Electric & Gas
Company
Post Office Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION (TAC NOS. M91194 AND M92918)

Dear Mr. Eliason:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 85 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your applications dated November 30, 1994 and March 30, 1995. Supplemental information was submitted by letter dated September 5, 1995.

The change to TS Table 3.3.1-2, "Reactor Protection System Response Times," TS Table 3.3.2-3, "Isolation System Instrumentation Response Time," TS Table 3.3.3-3, "Emergency Core Cooling System Response Times," and associated Bases, eliminates the requirement to perform response time testing for certain classes of equipment and transfers the requirements of the above-referenced TS Tables to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/
David H. Jaffe, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-354

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 85 to License No. NPF-57
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 24, 1995

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Public Service Electric & Gas
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David H. Jaffe".

David H. Jaffe, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-354

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 85 to
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2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. Leon R. Eliason
Public Service Electric & Gas
Company

Hope Creek Generating Station

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-354

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 85
License No. NPF-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The applications for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) dated November 30, 1994, and March 30, 1995, as supplemented by letter dated September 5, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.85, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into the license. PSE&G shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 24, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 85

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57

DOCKET NO. 50-354

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
3/4 3-1	3/4 3-1
3/4 3-6	3/4 3-6
3/4 3-9	3/4 3-9
3/4 3-10	3/4 3-10
3/4 3-26	3/4 3-26
3/4 3-27	3/4 3-27
3/4 3-32	3/4 3-32
3/4 3-38	3/4 3-38
B 3/4 3-1	B 3/4 3-1
B 3/4 3-2	B 3/4 3-2

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition* within twelve hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system** in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1.

4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip functional unit shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system.

4.3.1.4 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 or 3 from OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 for the Intermediate Range Monitors.

*An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

**If more channels are inoperable in one trip system than in the other, place the trip system with more inoperable channels in the tripped condition, except when this would cause the Trip Function to occur.

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INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTION:

- a. With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for one trip system, either
 - 1) place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition within
 - a) 1 hour for trip functions without an OPERABLE channel,
 - b) 12 hours for trip functions common to RPS instrumentation, and
 - c) 24 hours for trip functions not common to RPS instrumentation,or
 - 2) take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per trip system requirement for both trip systems,
 - 1) place the inoperable channel(s) in one trip system in the tripped condition within one hour, and
 - 2) a) place the inoperable channel(s) in the remaining trip system in the tripped condition within
 - 1) 1 hour for trip functions without an OPERABLE channel,
 - 2) 12 hours for trip functions common to RPS instrumentation, and
 - 3) 24 hours for trip functions not common to RPS instrumentation,or
 - b) take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1 Each isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

4.3.2.3 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each isolation trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Radiation detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months, where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific isolation trip system.

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INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.3-1.

ACTION:

- a. With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1.

4.3.3.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.

4.3.3.3 The ECCS RESPONSE TIME of each ECCS trip function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ECCS trip system.

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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:

- a. Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding.
- b. Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system.
- c. Minimize the energy which must be adsorbed following a loss-of-coolant accident, and
- d. Prevent inadvertent criticality.

This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of maintenance. When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.

The reactor protection system is made up of two independent trip systems. There are usually four channels to monitor each parameter with two channels in each trip system. The outputs of the channels in a trip system are combined in a logic so that either channel will trip that trip system. The tripping of both trip systems will produce a reactor scram. The system meets the intent of IEEE-279 for nuclear power plant protection systems. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to T. A. Pickens from A. Thadani dated July 15, 1987). The bases for the trip settings of the RPS are discussed in the bases for Specification 2.2.1.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) in-place, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times. Selected sensor response time testing requirements were eliminated based upon NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.A. Pinelli from Bruce A. Boger, dated December 28, 1994).

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," and NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation." The safety evaluation reports documenting NRC approval of NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 2 and NEDC-31677P-A are contained in letters to D.N. Grace from C.E. Rossi dated January 6, 1989 and to S.D. Floyd from C.E. Rossi dated June 18, 1990. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance. Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected. Selected sensor response time testing requirements were eliminated based upon NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.A. Pinelli from Bruce A. Boger, dated December 28, 1994).

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection. ECCS actuation instrumentation is eliminated from response time testing requirements based on NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R.A. Pinelli from Bruce A. Boger, dated December 28, 1994). Specified



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 85 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 30, 1995 the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a request for a change to the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS), Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed change to Technical Specification (TS) TS Table 3.3.1-2, "Reactor Protection System Response Times", TS Table 3.3.2-3, "Isolation System Instrumentation Response Time", TS Table 3.3.3-3, "Emergency Core Cooling System Response Times", and associated Bases. The proposed changes to the above-referenced TS Tables would eliminate the requirement to perform response time testing (RTT) for certain classes of equipment. In addition, by letter dated November 30, 1994, the licensee requested that the requirements contained in TS Tables 3.3.1-2, 3.3.2-3 and 3.3.3-3, as referenced above, be transferred to the Hope Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Supplemental information addressing elimination of selected response time testing was submitted by letter dated September 5, 1995. The supplemental letter did not change the original no significant hazards consideration determinations nor the original Federal Register notices.

2.0 DISCUSSION

By letter dated December 28, 1994, the NRC staff informed the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) that the NRC staff had approved Licensing Topical Report NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994. The December 28, 1994 letter, which contained a supporting Safety Evaluation (SE), concluded that, "Based on its review of the information presented by the BWROG, the staff has concluded that significant degradation of instrument response times, i.e., delays greater than 5 seconds, can be detected during the performance of other surveillance tests, principally calibration, if properly performed. Accordingly, the staff concludes that RTT can be eliminated from technical specifications for the selected instrumentation identified in the topical report and accepts NEDO-32291 for reference in license amendment applications for all boiling water reactors with the conditions discussed below." The phrase "...with the conditions discussed below" refers to a plant-specific request for information that the NRC staff requested for those applicants wishing to reference NEDO-32291 as part of an application for license amendment.

The December 28, 1994 NRC staff letter and SE was supplemented by an NRC staff letter dated May 31, 1995 which approves the deletion of TS requirements for RTT of main steam line isolation sensors.

The March 30, 1995 application requested that the following RTT be eliminated from the TS based upon the analyses presented in NEDO-32291: (1) All Emergency Core Cooling System instrument loops as contained in TS Table 3.3.3-3, (2) All Isolation System actuation instrument loops except for Main Steam Line Isolation Valves (MSIVs) as contained in TS 3.3.2-3, (3) Sensors for selected Reactor Protection System actuation as contained in TS Table 3.3.1-2, and (4) Sensors for MSIV closure actuation as contained in a footnote in TS Table 3.3.2-3.

The licensee has also proposed changes to TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 involving removing the references to Tables 3.3.1-2, 3.3.2-3 and 3.3.3-3 and removing these tables from the TS. The licensee has proposed to relocate the tables on response time limits to the UFSAR by including them in the next periodic updates to the UFSAR.

3.0 EVALUATION

The March 30, 1995 application for license amendment responds to the request for information contained in the NRC staff's letter dated December 28, 1994. The NRC staff's questions and the licensee's responses were as follows:

- (Q1) Confirm the applicability of the generic analysis of NEDO-32291.
- (A1) The licensee indicated that they had reviewed NEDO-32291 and verified its applicability to Hope Creek. The NRC staff accepts the licensee's explanation.
- (Q2) (Provide) a request as shown in Appendix I of the topical report.
- (A2) Appendix I of Topical Report NEDO-32291 is a generic model of a license amendment request to delete the RTT from the TS. The licensee's March 30, 1995 application for license amendment generally follows the form and content of the Appendix I model. The NRC finds the form and content of the licensee's application to be acceptable.
- (Q3) (Provide) the TS Markup Tables as shown in Table H.
- (A3) The TS submitted by the licensee as part of the March 30, 1995 application for license amendment conforms to the model TS in NEDO-32291 with one exception. The exception involves the "Refueling Floor Radiation" and "Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation" instruments RTT which were not addressed by the RTT analysis and are, thus, being retained in TS Table 3.3.2-3.
- (Q4) (Provide) a list of affected instrument loop components as shown in Appendix C.1.

- (A4) The list of applicable components is contained in Table G-6 of NEDO-32291.
- (Q5) Licensees must state that they are following the recommendations from EPRI NP-7243, "Investigation of Response Time Testing Requirements".
- (A5) The licensee stated that they do follow the recommendations from EPRI NP-7243 and provided the required responses concerning commitments to (a) perform a hydraulic RTT following installation or refurbishment of a transmitter/switch and (b) for transmitters/switches that utilize capillary tubes, perform capillary tube testing for initial installations or after maintenance that could damage the lines (found not to be applicable for HCGS). The NRC staff found the licensee commitments to be acceptable.

In addition to providing the above information, the licensee also responded to the following plant-specific questions contained in the NRC staff's December 28, 1994 letter:

- (Q "a") Calibration is being done with equipment designed to provide a step function or fast ramp in the process variable.
- (A "a") Test equipment and procedures provide a step or ramp input. For example, a transmitter can be pressurized with air to 100 percent of the calibrated span and then the air can be quickly removed to simulate the response to a fast ramp input. A trip unit can be subjected to input via a potentiometer until the unit "trips."
- (Q "b") Provisions have been made to ensure that operators and technicians are aware of the consequences of instrument response time degradation, and that applicable procedures have been reviewed and revised as necessary to assure that technicians monitor for response time degradation during the performance of calibrations and functional tests.
- (A "b") Operators will receive training on the consequences of instrument response time degradation during the 1994/1995 training cycle; such training has already been implemented for technicians. Procedures for Channel Calibration and Functional Tests will be revised to include a note to require input signal and output function to be monitored, simultaneously, to ensure that performance has not degraded.
- (Q "c") The surveillance test procedures have been reviewed and revised if necessary to ensure calibrations and functional tests are being performed in a manner that allows simultaneous monitoring of both the input and output response of units under test.

- (A "c") As noted above, procedures for Channel Calibration and Functional Tests will be revised to include a note to require input signal and output function to be monitored, simultaneously, to ensure that performance has not degraded.
- (Q "d") For any request involving the elimination of RTT for Rosemount pressure transmitters, the licensee is in full compliance with the guidelines of Supplement 1 to Bulletin 90-01, "Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount."
- (A "d") The NRC letter and Safety Evaluation dated December 2, 1994 indicates that the licensee has satisfied the requested actions of NRC Bulletin 90-01, Supplement 1 for Hope Creek.
- (Q "e") For those instruments where the manufacturer recommends periodic RTT as well as calibration to ensure correct function, the licensee has ensured that elimination of RTT is nevertheless acceptable for the particular application involved.
- (A "e") There are no instruments at Hope Creek, for which PSE&G is requesting elimination of RTT, where the manufacturer recommends periodic RTT as well as calibration to ensure correct function.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's responses to the information requested in items "a" through "d" of the NRC staff's letter dated December 28, 1994 and finds these responses to be acceptable. The licensee has indicated that all outstanding commitments described above will be implemented prior to implementation of the license amendment.

The licensee has also proposed changes to TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 involving removing the references to Tables 3.3.1-2, 3.3.2-3 and 3.3.3-3 and removing these tables from the TS. The licensee has proposed to relocate the tables on response time limits to the UFSAR by including them in the next periodic updates to the UFSAR. These actions are consistent with the guidance in GL 93-08, "Relocation of Technical Specification Tables of Instrument Response Time Limits." The staff has reviewed this matter and finds that the proposed changes to the TS for Hope Creek Generating Station are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State Official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had comments as follows: "The Hope Creek Technical Specifications define the terms 'ECCS Response Time', 'Reactor Protection System Response Time', and 'Isolation System Response Time'. The tables that are proposed to be deleted from the Technical Specifications contain footnotes that clarify the way that several specific response times are to be measured. These footnotes appear to provide flexibility in certain response time tests that the definition would not allow. It is noted that a portion of one footnote related to radiation monitors was incorporated elsewhere in the Technical Specifications.

However, if PSE&G intends to continue to follow the information in the remainder of the footnotes, then all the footnotes should be incorporated elsewhere into the Technical Specification rather than being deleted." Subsequent to receiving the New Jersey State Official's comments, the licensee provided the following explanation to the State Official. The footnotes in the tables to be deleted from the TS pertain only to the systems dealt with in the tables to be deleted. Further, when these deleted tables are incorporated in the UFSAR, the footnotes are to be included. The State Official was satisfied that the footnotes would be handled satisfactorily and as a consequence had no further comment.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings (60 FR 16198) and (60 FR 42606). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: D. H. Jaffe

Date: October 24, 1995