

March 15, 1988

Docket No. 50-354

Mr. Corbin A. McNeill, Jr.
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. McNeill:

SUBJECT: CORE RELOAD FOR CYCLE 2 (TAC NO. 66775)

Re: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.15 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 14, 1987.

This amendment would alter the TSs to permit operation during the next operating cycle (Cycle 2) with the new fuel assemblies that were loaded during the first refueling outage. It would also permit use of extended load line limit operations and increased core flow operations.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

/s/

George Rivenbark, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.15 to License No. NPF-57
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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LA:PDI-2:DRPI/II* PM:PDI-2:DRPI/II*
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "George W. Rivenbark", is written over the typed name.

George Rivenbark, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 15 to
License No. NPF-57
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Mr. C. A. McNeill
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

Hope Creek Generating Station

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-354

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 15
License No. NPF-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) dated December 14, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 15, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. PSE&G shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/s/

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 15, 1988

LA: PDI-2: DRPI/II
MUT: ten

3/17/88

PM: PDI-2: DRPI/II
GRivenbark:mr

3/17/88

OGC

3/18/88

D: PDI-2: DRPI/II

WButler

3/15/88

*W. R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation*

WB

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Walter R. Butler".

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 15, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 15

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57

DOCKET NO. 50-354

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages provided to maintain document completeness.*

| <u>Remove</u> | <u>Insert</u> |
|---------------|---------------|
| 2-1 | 2-1 |
| 2-2* | 2-2* |
| B 2-1 | B 2-1 |
| B 2-2* | B 2-2* |
| B 2-3 | B 2-3 |
| B 2-4* | B 2-4* |
| 3/4 2-1* | 3/4 2-1* |
| 3/4 2-2 | 3/4 2-2 |
| 3/4 2-3 | 3/4 2-3 |
| 3/4 2-4* | 3/4 2-4* |
| 3/4 2-7* | 3/4 2-7* |
| 3/4 2-8 | 3/4 2-8 |
| 3/4 2-9 | 3/4 2-9 |
| - | - |
| 3/4 2-10 | 3/4 2-10 |
| - | - |
| 3/4 2-11 | 3/4 2-11 |
| 3/4 2-12 | 3/4 2-12 |
| 3/4 3-59 | 3/4 3-59 |
| 3/4 3-60* | 3/4 3-60* |
| 3/4 4-1 | 3/4 4-1 |
| 3/4 4-2* | 3/4 4-2* |
| 3/4 4-2a | 3/4 4-2a |
| 3/4 4-2b* | 3/4 4-2b* |
| B 3/4 2-3* | B 3/4 2-3* |
| B 3/4 2-4 | B 3/4 2-4 |
| B 3/4 2-5 | B 3/4 2-5 |
| - | - |

2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

THERMAL POWER, Low Pressure or Low Flow

2.1.1 THERMAL POWER shall not exceed 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER with the reactor vessel steam dome pressure less than 785 psig or core flow less than 10% of rated flow.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With THERMAL POWER exceeding 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the reactor vessel steam dome pressure less than 785 psig or core flow less than 10% of rated flow, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 2 hours and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

THERMAL POWER, High Pressure and High Flow

2.1.2 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall not be less than 1.07 with two recirculation loop operation and shall not be less than 1.08 with single recirculation loop operation, in both cases with the reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 785 psig and core flow greater than 10% of rated flow.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With MCPR less than 1.07 with two recirculation loop operation or less than 1.08 with single recirculation loop operation and in both cases with the reactor vessel steam dome pressure greater than 785 psig and core flow greater than 10% of rated flow, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 2 hours and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

2.1.3 The reactor coolant system pressure, as measured in the reactor vessel steam dome, shall not exceed 1325 psig.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the reactor coolant system pressure, as measured in the reactor vessel steam dome, above 1325 psig, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN with reactor coolant system pressure less than or equal to 1325 psig within 2 hours and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

SAFETY LIMITS (Continued)

REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL

2.1.4 The reactor vessel water level shall be above the top of the active irradiated fuel.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 3, 4 and 5

ACTION:

With the reactor vessel water level at or below the top of the active irradiated fuel, manually initiate the ECCS to restore the water level, after depressurizing the reactor vessel, if required. Comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

BASES

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The fuel cladding, reactor pressure vessel and primary system piping are the principal barriers to the release of radioactive materials to the environs. Safety Limits are established to protect the integrity of these barriers during normal plant operations and anticipated transients. The fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is set such that no fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not violated. Because fuel damage is not directly observable, a step-back approach is used to establish a Safety Limit such that the MCPR is not less than 1.07 for two recirculation loop operation and 1.08 for single recirculation loop operation. MCPR greater than 1.07 for two recirculation loop operation and 1.08 for single recirculation loop operation represents a conservative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding integrity. The fuel cladding is one of the physical barriers which separate the radioactive materials from the environs. The integrity of this cladding barrier is related to its relative freedom from perforations or cracking. Although some corrosion or use related cracking may occur during the life of the cladding, fission product migration from this source is incrementally cumulative and continuously measurable. Fuel cladding perforations, however, can result from thermal stresses which occur from reactor operation significantly above design conditions and the Limiting Safety System Settings. While fission product migration from cladding perforation is just as measurable as that from use related cracking, the thermally caused cladding perforations signal a threshold beyond which still greater thermal stresses may cause gross rather than incremental cladding deterioration. Therefore, the fuel cladding Safety Limit is defined with a margin to the conditions which would produce onset of transition boiling, MCPR of 1.0. These conditions represent a significant departure from the condition intended by design for planned operation.

2.1.1 THERMAL POWER, Low Pressure or Low Flow

The use of the GEXL correlation is not valid for all critical power calculations at pressures below 785 psig or core flows less than 10% of rated flow. Therefore, the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is established by other means. This is done by establishing a limiting condition on core THERMAL POWER with the following basis. Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low power and flows will always be greater than 4.5 psi. Analyses show that with a bundle flow of 28×10^3 lbs/hr, bundle pressure drop is nearly independent of bundle power and has a value of 3.5 psi. Thus, the bundle flow with a 4.5 psi driving head will be greater than 28×10^3 lbs/hr. Full scale ATLAS test data taken at pressures from 14.7 psia to 800 psia indicate that the fuel assembly critical power at this flow is approximately 3.35 Mwt. With the design peaking factors, this corresponds to a THERMAL POWER of more than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Thus, a THERMAL POWER limit of 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER for reactor pressure below 785 psig is conservative.

SAFETY LIMITS

BASES

2.1.2 THERMAL POWER, High Pressure and High Flow

The fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is set such that no fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not violated. Since the parameters which result in fuel damage are not directly observable during reactor operation, the thermal and hydraulic conditions resulting in a departure from nucleate boiling have been used to mark the beginning of the region where fuel damage could occur. Although it is recognized that a departure from nucleate boiling would not necessarily result in damage to BWR fuel rods, the critical power at which boiling transition is calculated to occur has been adopted as a convenient limit. However, the uncertainties in monitoring the core operating state and in the procedures used to calculate the critical power result in an uncertainty in the value of the critical power. Therefore, the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is defined as the CPR in the limiting fuel assembly for which more than 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core are expected to avoid boiling transition considering the power distribution within the core and all uncertainties.

The Safety Limit MCPR is determined using the General Electric Thermal Analysis Basis, GETAB^a, which is a statistical model that combines all of the uncertainties in operating parameters and the procedures used to calculate critical power. The probability of the occurrence of boiling transition is determined using the General Electric Critical Quality (X) Boiling Length (L), (GEXL), correlation.

The GEXL correlation is valid over the range of conditions used in the tests of the data used to develop the correlation.

The required input to the statistical model are the uncertainties listed in Bases Table B2.1.2-1 and the nominal values of the core parameters listed in Bases Table B2.1.2-2.

The bases for the uncertainties in the core parameters are given in NEDO-20340^b and the basis for the uncertainty in the GEXL correlation is given in NEDO-10958-A^a. The power distribution is based on a typical 764 assembly core in which the rod pattern was arbitrarily chosen to produce a skewed power distribution having the greatest number of assemblies at the highest power levels. The worst distribution during any fuel cycle would not be as severe as the distribution used in the analysis.

- a. "General Electric BWR Thermal Analysis Bases (GETAB) Data, Correlation and Design Application," NEDO-10958-A.
- b. General Electric "Process Computer Performance Evaluation Accuracy" NEDO-20340 and Amendment 1, NEDO-20340-1 dated June 1974 and December 1974, respectively.

Bases Table B2.1.2-1

UNCERTAINTIES USED IN THE DETERMINATION
OF THE FUEL CLADDING SAFETY LIMIT*

| <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Standard Deviation (% of Point)</u> |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Feedwater Flow | 1.76 |
| Feedwater Temperature | 0.76 |
| Reactor Pressure | 0.5 |
| Core Inlet Temperature | 0.2 |
| Core Total Flow | |
| Two Recirculation Loop Operation | 2.5 |
| Single Recirculation Loop Operation | 6.0 |
| Channel Flow Area | 3.0 |
| Friction Factor Multiplier | 10.0 |
| Channel Friction Factor Multiplier | 5.0 |
| TIP Readings | |
| Two Recirculation Loop Operation | 8.7 |
| Single Recirculation Loop Operation | 9.1 |
| R Factor | 1.6 |
| Critical Power | 3.6 |

*The uncertainty analysis used to establish the core wide Safety Limit MCPR is based on the assumption of quadrant power symmetry for the reactor core. The values herein apply to both two recirculation loop operation and single recirculation loop operation, except as noted.

Bases Table B2.1.2-2

NOMINAL VALUES OF PARAMETERS USED IN
THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY SAFETY LIMIT

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| THERMAL POWER | 3323 MW |
| Core Flow | 108.5 Mlb/hr |
| Dome Pressure | 1010.4 psig |
| Channel Flow Area | 0.1089 ft ² |
| R-Factor | High enrichment - 1.043 Medium enrichment - 1.039 Low enrichment - 1.030 |

3.4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3.4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 All AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATES (APLHGRs) for each type of fuel as a function of AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE shall not exceed the limits shown in Figures 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, and 3.2.1-5. The limits of Figures 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4 and 3.2.1-5 shall be reduced to a value of 0.86 times the two recirculation loop operation limit when in single recirculation loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With an APLHGR exceeding the limits of Figure 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, or 3.2.1-5, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and restore APLHGR to within the required limits within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1 All APLHGRs shall be verified to be equal to or less than the limits determined from Figures 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4 and 3.2.1-5:

- a. At least once per 24 hours,
- b. Within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for APLHGR.
- d. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.




Figure 3.2.1-1





Figure 3.2.1-2

HOPE CREEK

3/4 2-4



MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT
GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS
AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE
INITIAL CORE FUEL TYPE P8CIB163

Figure 3.2.1-3

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 The APRM flow biased simulated thermal power-upscale scram trip setpoint (S) and flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoint (S_{RB}) shall be established according to the following relationships:

| <u>TRIP SETPOINT</u> | <u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u> |
|---|---|
| $S \leq (0.66(w-\Delta w)^{**} + 51\%)T$ | $S \leq (0.66(w-\Delta w)^{**} + 54\%)T$ |
| $S_{RB} \leq (0.66(w-\Delta w)^{**} + 42\%)T$ | $S_{RB} \leq (0.66(w-\Delta w)^{**} + 45\%)T$ |

where: S and S_{RB} are in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER,

w = Loop recirculation flow as a percentage of the loop recirculation flow which produces a rated core flow of 100 million lbs/hr,

T = Lowest value of the ratio of FRACTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER (FRTF) divided by the CORE MAXIMUM FRACTION OF LIMITING POWER DENSITY (CMFLPD). T is applied only if less than or equal to 1.0.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With the APRM flow biased simulated thermal power-upscale scram trip setpoint and/or the flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column for S or S_{RB} , as above determined, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and adjust S and or S_{RB} to be consistent with the Trip Setpoint values* within 6 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2 The FRTF and the CMFLPD shall be determined, the value of T calculated, and the most recent actual APRM flow biased simulated thermal power-upscale scram and flow biased neutron flux-upscale control rod block trip setpoints verified to be within the above limits or adjusted, as required:

- At least once per 24 hours,
- Within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with CMFLPD greater than or equal to FRTF.
- The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

*With CMFLPD greater than the FRTF, rather than adjusting the APRM setpoints, the APRM gain may be adjusted such that the APRM readings are greater than or equal to 100% times CMFLPD provided that the adjusted APRM reading does not exceed 100% of RATED THERMAL POWER and a notice of adjustment is posted on the reactor control panel.

**The Average Power Range Monitor Scram function varies as a function of recirculation loop drive flow (w). Δw is defined as the difference in indicated drive flow (in percent of drive flow which produces rated core flow) between two loop and single loop operation at the same core flow. $\Delta w = 0$ for two recirculation loop operation. $\Delta w =$ "To be determined at a later date" for single recirculation loop operation.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) shall be equal to or greater than the MCPR limit shown in Figure 3.2.3-1 or Figure 3.2.3-2, as applicable, times the K_f shown in Figure 3.2.3-3, with:

$$\tau = \frac{(\tau_{ave} - \tau_B)}{\tau_A - \tau_B}$$

where:

$\tau_A = 0.86$ seconds, control rod average scram insertion time limit to notch 39 per Specification 3.1.3.3,

$$\tau_B = 0.688 + 1.65 \left[\frac{N_1}{\sum_{i=1}^n N_i} \right]^{1/2} (0.052),$$

$$\tau_{ave} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n N_i \tau_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n N_i},$$

n = number of surveillance tests performed to date in cycle,

N_i = number of active control rods measured in the i^{th} surveillance test,

τ_i = average scram time to notch 39 of all rods measured in the i^{th} surveillance test, and

N_1 = total number of active rods measured in Specification 4.1.3.2.a.

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION:

- a. With the end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system inoperable per Specification 3.3.4.2, operation may continue and the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided that, within 1 hour, MCPR is determined to be greater than or equal to the MCPR limit as a function of the average scram time shown in Figure 3.2.3-1 or Figure 3.2.3-2, as applicable, EOC-RPT inoperable curve, times the K_f shown in Figure 3.2.3-3.
- b. With MCPR less than the applicable MCPR limit shown in Figures 3.2.3-1 and 3.2.3-2, times the K_f shown in Figure 3.2.3-3, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and restore MCPR to within the required limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.


SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.3 MCPR, with:

- a. $\tau = 1.0$ prior to performance of the initial scram time measurements for the cycle in accordance with Specification 4.1.3.2, or
- b. τ as defined in Specification 3.2.3 used to determine the limit within 72 hours of the conclusion of each scram time surveillance test required by Specification 4.1.3.2,


shall be determined to be equal to or greater than the applicable MCPR limit determined from Figure 3.2.3-1 or Figure 3.2.3-2, times the K_f shown in Figure 3.2.3-3:

- a. At least once per 24 hours,
- b. Within 12 hours after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for MCPR.
- d. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.




MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
VERSUS TAU AT RATED FLOW
BOC TO EOC-2000 MWD/ST

Figure 3.2.3-1



MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
 VERSUS TAU AT RATED FLOW
 EOC-2000 MWD/ST TO EOC

Figure 3.2.3-2



Kf FACTOR

Figure 3.2.3-3

TABLE 3.3.6-2
CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

| HOPE CREEK | TRIP FUNCTION | TRIP SETPOINT | ALLOWABLE VALUE |
|------------------|---|---|--|
| | | | |
| 3/4 3-59 | 1. <u>ROD BLOCK MONITOR</u> | | |
| | a. Upscale | | |
| | i. Flow Biased | $< 0.66 (w-\Delta w) + 40\%^*$ | $< 0.66 (w-\Delta w) + 43\%^*$ |
| | ii. High Flow Clamped | $\leq 106\%$ | $\leq 109\%$ |
| | b. Inoperative | NA | NA |
| | c. Downscale | $> 5\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | $> 3\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| | 2. <u>APRM</u> | | |
| | a. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - Upscale | $< 0.66(w-\Delta w) + 42\%^*$ | $< 0.66(w-\Delta w) + 45\%^*$ |
| | b. Inoperative | NA | NA |
| | c. Downscale | $> 4\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | $> 3\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| | d. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Startup | $\leq 12\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | $\leq 14\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER |
| | 3. <u>SOURCE RANGE MONITORS</u> | | |
| | a. Detector not full in | NA | NA |
| | b. Upscale | $< 1.0 \times 10^5$ cps | $< 1.6 \times 10^5$ cps |
| | c. Inoperative | NA | NA |
| | d. Downscale | > 3 cps | > 1.8 cps |
| | 4. <u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS</u> | | |
| | a. Detector not full in | NA | NA |
| | b. Upscale | $< 108/125$ divisions of full scale | $< 110/125$ divisions of full scale |
| | c. Inoperative | NA | NA |
| | d. Downscale | $> 5/125$ divisions of full scale | $> 3/125$ divisions of full scale |
| Amendment No. 15 | 5. <u>SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME</u> | | |
| | a. Water Level-High (Float Switch) | 109'1" (North Volume) 108'11.5" (South Volume) | 109'3" (North Volume) 109'1.5" (South Volume) |
| | 6. <u>REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW</u> | | |
| | a. Upscale | $< 108\%$ of rated flow | $< 111\%$ of rated flow |
| | b. Inoperative | NA | NA |
| | c. Comparator | $\leq 10\%$ flow deviation | $\leq 11\%$ flow deviation |
| | 7. <u>REACTOR MODE SWITCH SHUTDOWN POSITION</u> | NA | NA |

*The rod block function is varied as a function of recirculation loop flow (w) and Δw which is defined as the difference in indicated drive flow (in percent of drive flow which produces rated core flow) between two loop and single loop operation at the same core flow. The trip setting of the Average Power Range Monitor Rod Block function must be maintained in accordance with Specification 3.2.2.

HOPE CREEK

3/4 3-60

TABLE 4.3.6-1

CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

| <u>TRIP FUNCTION</u> | <u>CHANNEL CHECK</u> | <u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u> | <u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u> ^(a) | <u>OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u> |
|--|----------------------|--|---|---|
| 1. <u>ROD BLOCK MONITOR</u> | | | | |
| a. Upscale | NA | S/U ^{(b)(c)} , M ^(c) | SA | 1* |
| b. Inoperative | NA | S/U ^{(b)(c)} , M ^(c) | NA | 1* |
| c. Downscale | NA | S/U ^{(b)(c)} , M ^(c) | SA | 1* |
| 2. <u>APRM</u> | | | | |
| a. Flow Biased Neutron Flux - Upscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | SA | 1 |
| b. Inoperative | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | NA | 1, 2, 5 |
| c. Downscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | SA | 1 |
| d. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Startup | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | SA | 2, 5 |
| 3. <u>SOURCE RANGE MONITORS</u> | | | | |
| a. Detector not full in | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | NA | 2, 5 |
| b. Upscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | SA | 2, 5 |
| c. Inoperative | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | NA | 2, 5 |
| d. Downscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | SA | 2, 5 |
| 4. <u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS</u> | | | | |
| a. Detector not full in | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | NA | 2, 5 |
| b. Upscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | SA | 2, 5 |
| c. Inoperative | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | NA | 2, 5 |
| d. Downscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , W | SA | 2, 5 |
| 5. <u>SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME</u> | | | | |
| a. Water Level-High (Float Switch) | NA | M | R | 1, 2, 5** |
| 6. <u>REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW</u> | | | | |
| a. Upscale | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | SA | 1 |
| b. Inoperative | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | NA | 1 |
| c. Comparator | NA | S/U ^(b) , M | SA | 1 |
| 7. <u>REACTOR MODE SWITCH SHUTDOWN POSITION</u> | | | | |
| | NA | R | NA | 3, 4 |

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.1 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

RECIRCULATION LOOPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1 Two reactor coolant system recirculation loops shall be in operation with:

- a. Total core flow greater than or equal to 45% of rated core flow, or
- b. THERMAL POWER less than or equal to the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

- a. With one reactor coolant system recirculation loop not in operation:
 1. Within 4 hours:
 - a) Place the recirculation flow control system in the Local Manual mode, and
 - b) Reduce THERMAL POWER to $\leq 70\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
 - c) Increase the MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) Safety Limit by 0.01 to 1.08 per Specification 2.1.2, and
 - d) Reduce the Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR) limit to a value of 0.86 times the two recirculation loop limit per Specification 3.2.1, and
 - e) Reduce the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Scram and Rod Block Monitor Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values to those applicable for single recirculation loop operation per Specifications 2.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3.6, and
 - f) Limit the speed of the operating recirculation pump to less than or equal to 90% of rated pump speed, and
 - g) Perform surveillance requirement 4.4.1.1.2 if THERMAL POWER is $\leq 30\%$ ** of RATED THERMAL POWER or the recirculation loop flow in the operating loop is $\leq 50\%$ ** of rated loop flow.
 2. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
 3. Otherwise be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

**Initial values. Final values to be determined during Startup Testing based upon the threshold THERMAL POWER and recirculation loop flow which will sweep the cold water from the vessel bottom head preventing stratification.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- b. With no reactor coolant system recirculation loops in operation, immediately initiate action to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1 within 2 hours and initiate measures to place the unit in at least STARTUP within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours.
 - c. With one or two reactor coolant system recirculation loops in operation and total core flow less than 45% but greater than 39%# of rated core flow and THERMAL POWER greater than the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1:
 - 1. Determine the APRM and LPRM* noise levels (Surveillance 4.4.1.1.4):
 - a) At least once per 8 hours, and
 - b) Within 30 minutes after the completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
 - 2. With the APRM or LPRM* neutron flux noise levels greater than three times their established baseline noise levels, within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to restore the noise levels to within the required limits within 2 hours by increasing core flow to greater than 45% of rated core flow or by reducing THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1.
 - d. With one or two reactor coolant system recirculation loops in operation and total core flow less than or equal to 39%# and THERMAL POWER greater than the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1, within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1 or increase core flow to greater than 39%# within 4 hours.
- 4.4.1.1.1 With one reactor coolant system recirculation loop not in operation, at least once per 12 hours verify that:
- a. Reactor THERMAL POWER is \leq 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
 - b. The recirculation flow control system is in the Local Manual mode, and
 - c. The speed of the operating recirculation pump is less than or equal to 90% of rated pump speed, and
 - d. Core flow is greater than 39%# when THERMAL POWER is greater than the limit specified in Figure 3.4.1.1-1.

*Detector levels A and C of one LPRM string per core octant plus detectors A and C of one LPRM string in the center of the core should be monitored.

#Initial values. Final values to be determined during Startup Testing (core flow with both recirculation pumps at a minimum pump speed).

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.1.2 With one reactor coolant system recirculation loop not in operation, within no more than 15 minutes prior to either THERMAL POWER increase or recirculation loop flow increase, verify that the following differential temperature requirements are met if THERMAL POWER is $\leq 30\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER or the recirculation loop flow in the operating recirculation loop is $\leq 50\%$ of rated loop flow:

- a. $\leq 145^{\circ}\text{F}$ between reactor vessel steam space coolant and bottom head drain line coolant, and
- b. $\leq 50^{\circ}\text{F}$ between the reactor coolant within the loop not in operation and the coolant in the reactor pressure vessel, and
- c. $\leq 50^{\circ}\text{F}$ between the reactor coolant within the loop not in operation and the operating loop.

The differential temperature requirements of Specifications 4.4.1.1.2b and 4.4.1.1.2c do not apply when the loop not in operation is isolated from the reactor pressure vessel.

4.4.1.1.3 Each pump MG set scoop tube mechanical and electrical stop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with overspeed setpoints less than or equal to 109% and 107%, respectively, of rated core flow, at least once per 18 months.

4.4.1.1.4 Establish a baseline APRM and LPRM* neutron flux noise value within the regions for which monitoring is required (Specification 3.4.1.1, ACTION c) within 2 hours of entering the region for which monitoring is required unless baselining has previously been performed in the region since the last refueling outage.

*Detector levels A and C of one LPRM string per core octant plus detectors A and C of one LPRM string in the center of the core should be monitored.

#Initial values. Final values to be determined during Startup Testing based upon the threshold THERMAL POWER and recirculation loop flow which will sweep the cold water from the vessel bottom head preventing stratification.

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HOPE CREEK

3/4 4-2b

Amendment No. 3

APR 1987

Bases Table B 3.2.1-1
SIGNIFICANT INPUT PARAMETERS TO THE
LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

Plant Parameters:

Core THERMAL POWER 3430 Mwt* which corresponds
to 105% of rated steam flow

Vessel Steam Output 14.87×10^6 lbm/hr which
corresponds to 105% of rated
steam flow

Vessel Steam Dome Pressure..... 1055 psia

Design Basis Recirculation Line
Break Area for:
a. Large Breaks 4.1 ft²
b. Small Breaks 0.09 ft²,

Fuel Parameters:

| FUEL TYPE | FUEL BUNDLE GEOMETRY | PEAK TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (kw/ft) | DESIGN AXIAL PEAKING FACTOR | INITIAL MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO |
|--------------|-------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| Initial Core | 8 x 8 | 13.4 | 1.4 | 1.20** |

A more detailed listing of input of each model and its source is presented in Section II of Reference 1 and subsection 6.3.3 of the FSAR.

*This power level meets the Appendix K requirement of 102%. The core heatup calculation assumes a bundle power consistent with operation of the highest powered rod at 102% of its Technical Specification LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE limit.

**For single recirculation loop operation, loss of nucleate boiling is assumed at 0.1 seconds after LOCA regardless of initial MCPR.

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

The required operating limit MCPRs at steady state operating conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady state operating limit, it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Specification 2.2.

To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting transients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR). The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow, increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease. The limiting transient yields the largest delta MCPR. When added to the Safety Limit MCPR, the required minimum operating limit MCPR of Specification 3.2.3 is obtained.

The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system initial parameters shown in FSAR Table 15.0-3 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer program. The code used to evaluate pressurization events is described in NEDO-24154⁽³⁾ and the program used in non-pressurization events is described in NEDO-10802⁽²⁾. The outputs of this program along with the initial MCPR form the input for further analyses of the thermally limiting bundle with the single channel transient thermal hydraulic TASC code described in NEDE-25149⁽⁴⁾. The principal result of this evaluation is the reduction in MCPR caused by the transient.

The purpose of the K_f factor of Figure 3.2.3-3 is to define operating limits at other than rated core flow conditions. At less than 100% of rated flow the required MCPR is the product of the MCPR and the K_f factor. The K_f factors assure that the Safety Limit MCPR will not be violated during a flow increase transient resulting from a motor-generator speed control failure. The K_f factors may be applied to both manual and automatic flow control modes.

The K_f factors values shown in Figure 3.2.3-3 were developed generically and are applicable to all BWR/2, BWR/3 and BWR/4 reactors. The K_f factors were derived using the flow control line corresponding to RATED THERMAL POWER at rated core flow.

For the manual flow control mode, the K_f factors were calculated such that for the maximum flow rate, as limited by the pump scoop tube set point and the corresponding THERMAL POWER along the rated flow control line, the limiting bundle's relative power was adjusted until the MCPR changes with different core flows. The ratio of the MCPR calculated at a given point of core flow, divided by the operating limit MCPR, determines the K_f .

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (Continued)

For operation in the automatic flow control mode, the same procedure was employed except the initial power distribution was established such that the MCPR was equal to the operating limit MCPR at RATED THERMAL POWER and rated thermal flow.

The K_f factors shown in Figure 3.2.3-3 are conservative for the General Electric plant operation because the operating limit MCPRs of Specification 3.2.3 is the same as the original 1.20 operating limit MCPR used for the generic derivation of K_f .

At THERMAL POWER levels less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience indicates that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. During initial start-up testing of the plant, a MCPR evaluation will be made at 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER level with minimum recirculation pump speed. The MCPR margin will thus be demonstrated such that future MCPR evaluation below this power level will be shown to be unnecessary. The daily requirement for calculating MCPR when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER is sufficient since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes. The requirement for calculating MCPR when a limiting control rod pattern is approached ensures that MCPR will be known following a change in THERMAL POWER or power shape, regardless of magnitude, that could place operation at a thermal limit.

3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

This specification assures that the Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) in any rod is less than the design linear heat generation even if fuel pellet densification is postulated.

References:

1. General Electric Company Analytical Model for Loss-of-Coolant Analysis in Accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K, NEDE-20566, November 1975.
2. R. B. Linford, Analytical Methods of Plant Transient Evaluations for the GE BWR, NEDO-10802, February 1973.
3. Qualification of the One Dimensional Core Transient Model for Boiling Water Reactors, NEDO-24154, October 1978.
4. TASC 01-A Computer Program for the Transient Analysis of a Single Channel, Technical Description, NEDE-25149, January 1980.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.15 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-354

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 14, 1987, Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS). The proposed amendment would alter the plant Technical Specifications to permit operation for Cycle 2, provide for use of Extended Load Line Limit operations and increased core flow operation.

2.0 EVALUATION

The Cycle 2 design discharges two fuel types used in the initial core and replaces them with two new fuel types. A total of 232 new fuel assemblies are introduced into the core. The reload analysis for Cycle 2 was performed by General Electric who prepared a reload report that was submitted in support of the license amendment. The methods used for the analysis are those which are described in NEDE-24011-P-A-8, GESTAR, which has been reviewed and approved by the staff. The results are presented in the Supplemental Reload Licensing submittal for HCGS Unit 1 Cycle 2 (23A5854, Revision 1). The staff has reviewed the submittal and concludes that the results are consistent with values usually obtained and are acceptable. The licensee has selected the following margin improvement options: Recirculation Pump Trip, Thermal Power Monitor, ODYN Option B, and Exposure Dependent Limits. Single-loop operation is the only operating flexibility option described in the submittal. Appropriate analyses are presented in the licensing submittal to justify use of these options and the staff concludes that use of these options is acceptable.

Only one of the two new fuel types is included in GESTAR. By Supplement 1 to the licensing submittal, the licensee provided a description of the fuel assembly type for which information is not yet included in GESTAR. This is common practice for such assemblies and is acceptable.

The licensee also submitted a report, NEDC-31487, "Final Report, Increased Core Flow and Extended Load Line Limit Analysis for Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 Cycle 2," in support of a request to include these features among the operating flexibility options. These options

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are among those that have been employed by several plants. The report provides analyses to support operation in these modes and to identify necessary changes to the Technical Specifications. The analyses were performed with approved techniques and methods and the staff finds their use for HCGS acceptable.

A number of Technical Specification changes were proposed for Cycle 2 of HCGS. The following comments address the changes.

Specification 2.1.2 Safety Limits: The value of the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limit was increased from 1.06 to 1.07 for two-loop operation and from 1.07 to 1.08 for single loop operation. These changes are required when going from the initial cycle to succeeding cycles for all BWRs and is acceptable for HCGS. The increase is required because the uncertainty in TIP readings increases for exposed fuel. The Bases Table B2.1.2-1 is changed to reflect the increased uncertainties.

Figures 3.2.1-1 and 3.2.1-2: These figures have been changed to contain the Maximum Average Planar Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR) curves for the two new fuel types instead of the two types that were discharged. The new MAPLHGR curves are consistent with the results of the LOCA analyses and are acceptable.

Specification 3/4.2.3 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR): A number of changes have been made to this specification. The single figure (3.2.3-1) of operating MCPR as a function of normalized scram time has been replaced by two such figures. This change was necessitated by the choice of the exposure dependent limits option. Two exposure bands were chosen-hence two figures. This is a widely used option and is acceptable for HCGS. The original figure 3.2.3-2 has been renumbered 3.2.3-3.

The option of operating with reduced feedwater temperature has been deleted along with Table 3.2.3-1. This is in compliance with license condition 2.c(11) and is acceptable.

Specification 3/4.4.1.1 Recirculation Loops: This specification presents the action requirements in the event that a recirculation loop becomes inoperable. In this specification, the value of the safety limit MCPR is increased from 1.07 to 1.08. This is acceptable (see discussion under Specification 2.1.2 above).

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, an environmental assessment has been published (53 FR 8289) in the Federal Register on March 14, 1988. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any environmental impacts other than those evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Prior Hearing which was published in the Federal Register (53 FR 972) on January 14, 1988. No petition to intervene or request for hearing has been filed on this action.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. Brooks

Dated: March 15, 1988