

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
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AUTHORITY: <u>H. J. ...</u>	4. COORDINATE WITH:
NAME: <u>Schwartz</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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March 30, 1976

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF EO 12958, DATED 4/17/95
 By Authority of H. Lynn Silvers
 (Declassification Authority Number)
 Date of Declassification 6/11/2001
 Mandatory Rev. Request

The Honorable Robert Ellsworth
 Deputy Secretary
 Department of Defense
 Room 3E854 - Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Ellsworth:

I had intended to follow up on our conversation last month more promptly. However, in discussing with my fellow Commissioners NRC's nuclear export-related information needs we decided to address a letter from Chairman Anders to Secretary Kissinger on the matters you and I had discussed in view of NRC's special relationship with the Department of State under Executive Order 11902, which directs the Department to coordinate Executive Branch views on nuclear export licenses.

This letter, a copy of which I have attached for your information, addresses the principal concerns I voiced during our conversation. I would like, however, to add some observations concerning the significance of the various categories of information noted. The disposition, i.e., the location and composition, of plutonium (and highly enriched uranium) related to prior U.S. nuclear exports can be a crucial factor in assessing the technical nuclear explosives options available to the importing country. Together with data on the recipient country's accumulations of plutonium (and highly enriched uranium) from other sources, this information permits a determination of whether strategic material is being stockpiled in excess of the needs of the recipient's civilian nuclear program, a fact which could well be indicative of the recipient's intentions.

Information related to the application of IAEA safeguards is important because in the case of virtually all U.S. nuclear exports, safeguards are now administered by the IAEA. The essential details of how IAEA safeguards measures are

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Classified by Victor Gilinsky
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 Commissioner

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implemented in specific countries, however, are contained in confidential subsidiary agreements between each such country and the Agency which are not officially available to the United States and, to my knowledge, are largely unknown. More importantly, the results of individual IAEA inspections are not made available to the U.S. government. Clearly more information is desirable to increase our confidence that at any given time recipients of our exports are in compliance with their safeguards undertakings.

As I mentioned to you, so far as I can tell, information of the types I have described has not been previously compiled in useful form by any U.S. agency and where the raw data are obtainable within the government, they can be aggregated in individual cases only with difficulty. In my view, sound decisionmaking throughout the government relating to the important area of nuclear exports would be facilitated if such information were more readily accessible.

I would be pleased to discuss this matter further with you.

Sincerely,

Victor Gilinsky
Commissioner

Enclosure