March 12 998

Mr. Harold W. Keiser
Executive Vice President-
Nuclear Business Unit
Public Service Electric & Gas
Company
Post Office Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M98151 AND M98152)

Dear Mr. Keiser:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 208 and 189 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 4, 1997.

These amendments revise the emergency core cooling system surveillance test acceptance criteria in Technical Specification 3/4.5.2 for the centrifugal charging and safety injection pumps.

The NRC found that the quality of the initial submittal and its supporting information were adequate such that no additional information was needed.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
/s/
Patrick D. Milano, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-272/311

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No 208 to License No. DPR-70
2. Amendment No 189 to License No. DPR-75
3. Safety Evaluation

DF01

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 12, 1998

Mr. Harold W. Keiser
Executive Vice President-
Nuclear Business Unit
Public Service Electric & Gas
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Post Office Box 236
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Docket Nos. 50-272/311

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License No. DPR-70
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License No. DPR-75
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. Harold W. Keiser
Public Service Electric & Gas
Company

Salem Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1 and 2

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-272

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 208
License No. DPR-70

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated March 4, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.208, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 12, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 208

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

DOCKET NO. 50-272

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 5-5a	3/4 5-5a
3/4 5-5b	3/4 5-5b
B 3/4 5-2	B 3/4 5-2
B 3/4 5-3	B 3/4 5-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated Total Dynamic Head (TDH) when tested at the test flow point pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1. Centrifugal charging pump ≥ 2338 psi TDH

2. Safety Injection Pump ≥ 1369 psi TDH

3. Residual heat removal pump ≥ 165 psi TDH

g. By verifying the correct position of each of the following ECCS throttle valves:

1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

2. At least once per 18 months.

HPSI SYSTEM VALVE NUMBER	LPSI SYSTEM VALVE NUMBER
11 SJ 16	11 SJ 138
12 SJ 16	12 SJ 138
13 SJ 16	13 SJ 138
14 SJ 16	14 SJ 138
	11 SJ 143
	12 SJ 143
	13 SJ 143
	14 SJ 143

h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1. For Safety Injection pumps, with a single pump running:

a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is ≥ 453 gpm; and

b) The total flow rate through all four injection lines is ≤ 647 gpm, and

c) The difference between any pair of injection line flow rates is ≤ 12.0 gpm, and

d) The total pump flow rate is ≤ 654 gpm in the cold leg alignment, and

e) The total pump flow rate is ≤ 654 gpm in the hot leg alignment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. For Centrifugal Charging pumps, with a single pump running:

   a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is ≥ 306 gpm, and

   b) The total flow rate through all four injection lines is ≤ 444 gpm, and

   c) The difference between any pair of injection line flow rates is ≤ 10.5 gpm, and

   d) The total pump flow rate is ≤ 554 gpm.

i. The automatic interlock function of the RHR System shall be verified within the seven (7) days prior to placing the RHR System in service for cooling of the Reactor Coolant System. This shall be done by verifying with a test signal corresponding to a reactor coolant pressure of 375 psig or greater, that the 1RH1 and 1RH2 valves cannot be opened.

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The surveillance requirements, which are provided to ensure the OPERABILITY of each component, ensure that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analysis are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The safety analyses make assumptions with respect to: 1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance, and 2) both the maximum and minimum branch injection line resistance. These resistances, in conjunction with the ranges of potential pump performance, are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flow assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum and minimum flow surveillance requirements in conjunction with the maximum and minimum pump performance curves ensures that the assumptions of total system resistance and the distribution of that system resistance among the various paths are met.

The maximum total pump flow surveillance requirements ensure the pump runout limits of 560 gpm for the centrifugal charging pumps and 675 gpm for the safety injection pumps are not exceeded. Due to the effect of pump suction boost alignment, the runout limits for the surveillance criteria are $\leq$ 554 gpm for C/SI pumps, $\leq$ 664 gpm for SI pumps in cold leg alignment, and $\leq$ 654 gpm for SI pumps in hot leg alignment.

The surveillance requirement for the maximum difference between the maximum and minimum individual injection line flows ensure that the minimum individual injection line resistance assumed for the spilling line following a LOCA is met.

3/4.5.4 SEAL INJECTION FLOW

The Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection flow restriction limits the amount of ECCS flow that would be diverted from the injection path following an ECCS actuation. This limit is based on safety analysis assumptions, since RCP seal injection flow is not isolated during Safety Injection (SI).

The LCO is not strictly a flow limit, but rather a flow limit based on a flow line resistance. Line pressure and flow must be known to establish the proper line resistance. Flow line resistance is determined by assuming that the RCS pressure is at normal operating pressure, and that the centrifugal charging pump discharge pressure is greater than or equal to 2430 psig. Charging pump header pressure is used instead of RCS pressure, since it is more representative of flow diversion during an accident. The additional LCO modifier, charging flow control valve full open, is required since the valve is designed to fail open. With the LCO specified discharge pressure and control valve position, a flow limit is established. This flow limit is used in the accident analysis.

A provision has been added to exempt surveillance requirement 4.0.4 for entry into MODE 3, since the surveillance cannot be performed in a lower mode. The exemption is permitted for up to 4 hours after the RCS pressure has stabilized within ± 20 psig of normal operating pressure. The RCS pressure

requirement produces the conditions necessary to correctly set the manual throttle valves. The exemption is limited to 4 hours to ensure timely surveillance completion once the necessary conditions are established.

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a small LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except the most reactive control assembly (ARI-1), and (3) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow area > 3.0 sq. ft.) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, and ECCS water and other sources of water that may eventually reside in the sump following a LOCA with all control rods assumed to be out (ARO).

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-311

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 189
License No. DPR-75

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated March 4, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.189 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 12, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 189

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

DOCKET NO. 50-311

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 5-6	3/4 5-6
3/4 5-6a	3/4 5-6a
B 3/4 5-2	B 3/4 5-2
B 3/4 5-3	B 3/4 5-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated Total Dynamic Head (TDH) when tested at the test flow point pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1.	Centrifugal Charging pump	≥ 2338 psi TDH
2.	Safety Injection pump	≥ 1369 psi TDH
3.	Residual Heat Removal pump	≥ 165 psi TDH

g. By verifying the correct position of each of the following ECCS throttle valves:

1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

2. At least once per 18 months.

HPSI System Valve Number	LPSI System Valve Number
21 SJ 16	21 SJ 138
22 SJ 16	22 SJ 138
23 SJ 16	23 SJ 138
24 SJ 16	24 SJ 138
	21 SJ 143
	22 SJ 143
	23 SJ 143
	24 SJ 143

h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1. For Safety Injection pumps, with a single pump running:

a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is ≥ 453 gpm, and

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d) The total pump flow rate is ≤ 664 gpm in the cold leg alignment, and

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. For centrifugal charging pump, with a single pump running:

   a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is ≥ 306 gpm, and

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i. The automatic interlock function of the RHR System shall be verified within the seven (7) days prior to placing the RHR System in service for cooling of the Reactor Coolant System. This shall be done by verifying with a test signal corresponding to a reactor coolant pressure of 375 psig or greater, that the 2RH1 and 2RH2 valves cannot be opened.

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one safety injection pump or one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance requirement to verify all safety injection pumps except the allowed OPERABLE safety injection pump to be inoperable below 312°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single POPS relief valve.

The surveillance requirements, which are provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component, ensure that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The safety analyses make the assumptions with respect to: 1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance, and 2) both the maximum and minimum branch injection line resistance. These resistances, in conjunction with the ranges of potential pump performance, are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flow assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum and minimum flow surveillance requirements in conjunction with the maximum and minimum pump performance curves ensures that the assumptions of total system resistance and the distribution of that system resistance among the various paths are met.

The maximum total pump flow surveillance requirements ensure the pump runout limits of 560 gpm for the centrifugal charging pumps and 675 gpm for the safety injection pumps are not exceeded. Due to the effect of pump suction boost alignment, the runout limits for the surveillance criteria are $\leq$ 554 gpm for C/SI pumps, $\leq$ 664 gpm for SI pumps in cold leg alignment and $\leq$ 654 gpm for SI pumps in hot leg alignment.

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A provision has been added to exempt surveillance requirement 4.0.4 for entry into MODE 3, since the surveillance cannot be performed in a lower mode. The exemption is permitted for up to 4 hours after the RCS pressure has stabilized within ± 20 psig of normal operating pressure. The RCS pressure requirement produces the conditions necessary to correctly set the manual throttle valves. The exemption is limited to 4 hours to ensure timely surveillance completion once the necessary conditions are established.

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as a part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentrations ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a small LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except the most reactive control assembly (ARI-1), and (3) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow area > 3.0 sq. ft.) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, and ECCS water and other sources of water that may eventually reside in the sump following a LOCA with all control rods assumed to be out (ARO). The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 208 AND 189 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 4, 1997, the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise the emergency core cooling system surveillance test acceptance criteria in TS 3/4.5.2 for the centrifugal charging and safety injection pumps. Specifically, the change would reduce the maximum specified flow rate values for system alignments that affect the suction pressure to the pumps. In the recirculation mode, increased system flow occurs when the charging and safety injection pumps take suction from the discharge of the residual heat removal pumps.

2.0 EVALUATION

In its letter of March 4, 1997, the licensee proposed to modify the TSs surveillance test acceptance criteria in TS 4.5.2.h. In TS 4.5.2.h, the performance of a flow balance test, during shutdown, is required following the completion of modifications to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics. Specifically, the licensee proposed to modify the total pump flow rate acceptance criteria, with a single pump running, for both the safety injection (SI) and the centrifugal charging (CCH) pumps. The proposed amendment would change the total pump flow rate for an SI pump from the current acceptance criteria of $\leq$ 675 gallons per minute (gpm) to $\leq$ 664 gpm when in the cold leg alignment and $\leq$ 654 gpm when in the hot leg alignment. For the CCH pumps, the total pump flow acceptance criteria would be reduced from 560 gpm to the proposed 554 gpm. The maximum flow rates for the CCH and SI pumps are 560 gpm and 675 gpm, respectively. The applicable Bases section would also be revised to reflect these changes.

The discharge head of a centrifugal pump is a combination of the suction head, the dynamic head, and other velocity factors. The dynamic head is the energy imparted to the process liquid by the pump impeller between the points where suction and discharge heads are measured.

Thus, during series operation of the residual heat removal (RHR) and the SI or CCH pumps in which the RHR pumps provide suction to the SI and CCH pumps, the heads are added. The series operation raises the pump characteristic curve above that for single pump operation. When the pump characteristic curve is superimposed on the system head curve, the intersection of the two curves represents the capacity that the specific pump can deliver. Thus, the series operation at higher total discharge head will create an increase in capacity flow rate. The motor (driver) loading will increase since the pump brake horsepower increases with capacity. Further, as the capacity increases, the pump may be operating away from the best efficiency point and the wire-to-water efficiency will decrease causing additional motor loading. Throttling of the discharge valve may be necessary to protect the motor from overloading.

The ECCS automatically injects cooling water to the reactor core in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This action limits the peak fuel cladding temperature and ensures that the core will remain substantially intact and in a geometry to preserve heat transfer. Depending on the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure, water can be injected by the CCH pumps, SI pumps, residual heat removal pumps, or the accumulators. The operation of the ECCS, following a LOCA, is divided into two phases, injection and recirculation. During safety injection, the CCH pumps deliver borated water at the prevailing RCS pressure to the four cold legs via the boron injection tank. The SI signal also shifts the CCH pump suction from the volume control tank to the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The SI pumps take suction from the RWST and inject into the four cold legs via the accumulator discharge lines once RCS pressure is reduced below about 1500 psig.

When the RWST reaches the low-low level alarm point, ECCS suction is shifted from the RWST to the containment sump for the recirculation phase. During recirculation, sump water is cooled and returned to the RCS by the recirculation flow path. The RCS can be supplied simultaneously from the RHR pumps, and from a portion of the discharge from the RHR heat exchangers that is directed to the CCH and SI pumps (suction boost). The suction boost mode assures flow in the event of a small RCS rupture where the depressurization proceeds slowly such that the RCS pressure stays above the discharge pressure of the RHR pumps at the onset of recirculation. For cold leg recirculation, the CCH and SI pumps deliver to all four cold legs by separate flow paths. For hot leg recirculation, each SI pump delivers through separate paths to two RCS loops.

In its March 4, 1997, letter, the licensee stated that Westinghouse Electric Company had identified a generic concern with increased CCH and SI flows during the suction boost mode. For Salem, calculated CCH and SI pump flows were found to be greater than the current pump maximum flow limits under certain worst case conditions. In order to account for the effects of suction boost, the licensee proposed to decrease the CCH and SI pump flows when testing to the surveillance requirements in TS 4.5.2.h to prevent pump runout during suction boost. The licensee indicated that the reduced flow rates remain adequate to maintain flows to the core and have been determined to be bounded by safety analyses in the current licensing basis.

Finally, the licensee stated that the current testing configuration will be retained because RHR cooling is needed during the operational mode in which the ECCS flow surveillance test is performed.

The NRC staff finds that the proposed reduction in the acceptance values for total flow during surveillance requirement TS 3/4.5.2 maintains the flows below the maximum specified flow rates for each pump. Also, the addition of SI pump flow rate acceptance limits that differentiate between the cold leg and hot leg injection paths are acceptable since the system head curves vary for each flow path. Based on these aspects and the fact that the proposed changes are small and bounded by the ECCS flow requirements used in the current safety analyses, the staff finds the proposed change to TS 3/4.5.2 to be acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 19834). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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