

July 29, 1997

Mr. Leon R. Eliason  
Chief Nuclear Officer & President-  
Nuclear Business Unit  
Public Service Electric & Gas  
Company  
Post Office Box 236  
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: CHILLED WATER SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, SALEM NUCLEAR  
GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M97995 AND M97996)

Dear Mr. Eliason:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 199 and 182 to Facility  
Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating  
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the  
Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated  
February 11, 1997, as supplemented May 1, June 12, and July 23, 1997.

These amendments add a new TS, 3/4.7.10, "Chilled Water System - Auxiliary  
Building Subsystem," and an associated Bases section to address the support  
function this system provides to other necessary safety systems.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be  
included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Leonard N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-272/311

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 199 to  
License No. DPR-70
- 2. Amendment No. 182 to  
License No. DPR-75
- 3. Safety Evaluation

*JStolz*

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

July 29, 1997

Mr. Leon R. Eliason  
Chief Nuclear Officer & President-  
Nuclear Business Unit  
Public Service Electric & Gas  
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SUBJECT: CHILLED WATER SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, SALEM NUCLEAR  
GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M97995 AND M97996)

Dear Mr. Eliason:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 199 and 182 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated February 11, 1997, as supplemented May 1, June 12, and July 23, 1997.

These amendments add a new TS, 3/4.7.10, "Chilled Water System - Auxiliary Building Subsystem," and an associated Bases section to address the support function this system provides to other necessary safety systems.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Leonard N. Olshan, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-272/311

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 199 to  
License No. DPR-70  
2. Amendment No. 182 to  
License No. DPR-75  
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. Leon R. Eliason  
Public Service Electric & Gas  
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Units 1 and 2

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-272

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 199  
License No. DPR-70


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated February 11, 1997, as supplemented May 1, June 12, and July 23, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 199, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to entering Mode 6 from the current unit outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director  
Project Directorate 1-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 29, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 199

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

DOCKET NO. 50-272

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

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PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION  
=====

3.7.10 The chilled water system loop which services the safety-related loads in the Auxiliary Building shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Three OPERABLE chillers
- b. Two OPERABLE chilled water pumps

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

- a. With one chiller inoperable:
  - 1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
  - 2. Restore the chiller to operable status within 14 days or;
  - 3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two chillers inoperable:
  - 1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
  - 2. Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the Salem Unit 2 train within 4 hours and;
  - 3. Restore at least one chiller to operable status within 72 hours or;
  - 4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to operable status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

PLANT SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

=====

ACTION: MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. \*

a. With one chiller inoperable:

1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
2. Restore the chiller to operable status within 14 days or;
3. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

b. With two chillers inoperable:

1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
2. Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the Salem Unit 2 train within 4 hours and;
3. Restore at least one chiller to operable status within 72 hours or;
4. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

c. With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to operable status within 7 days or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

=====

4.7.10 The chilled water loop which services the safety-related loads in the Auxiliary Building shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each manual valve in the chilled water system flow path servicing safety related components that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months, by verifying that each automatic valve actuates to its correct position on a Safeguards Initiation signal.
- c. At least once per 92 days by verifying that each chiller starts and runs.

\* During Modes 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, chilled water components are not considered to be inoperable solely on the basis that the backup emergency power source, diesel generator, is inoperable.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

=====

3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the chilled water system ensures that the chilled water system will continue to provide the required normal and accident heat removal capability for the control room area, relay rooms, equipment rooms, and other safety related areas. Verification of the actuation of each automatic valve on a Safeguards Initiation signal includes actuation following receipt of a Safety Injection signal.

Removal of non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system in the event one chiller is inoperable ensures the remaining heat loads are within the heat removal capacity of the two operable chillers.

Removal of non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system in the event two chillers are inoperable and aligning the CREACs to the maintenance mode ensures the remaining heat loads are within the heat removal capacity of the operable chiller.

During chiller testing, operator actions can take the place of automatic actions.

During Modes 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, chilled water components do not have to be considered inoperable solely on the basis that the backup emergency power source, diesel generator, is inoperable. This is consistent with Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 which only requires two operable diesel generators.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-311

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.182  
License No. DPR-75

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated February 11, 1997, as supplemented May 1, June 12, and July 23, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 182, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 10 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
John F. Stolz, Director  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 29, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 182

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

DOCKET NO. 50-311

Revise Appendix A as follows:

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PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION  
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APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTION: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

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  - 3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two chillers inoperable:
  - 1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
  - 2. Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the Salem Unit 1 train within 4 hours and;
  - 3. Restore at least one chiller to operable status within 72 hours or;
  - 4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to operable status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

=====

ACTION: MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.\*

- a. With one chiller inoperable:
  1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the Chilled Water System within 4 hours and;
  2. Restore the chiller to operable status within 14 days or;
  3. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
  
- b. With two chillers inoperable:
  1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
  2. Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the Salem Unit 1 train within 4 hours and;
  3. Restore at least one chiller to operable status within 72 hours or;
  4. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
  
- c. With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to operable status within 7 days or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.10 The chilled water loop which services the safety-related loads in the Auxiliary Building shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

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- c. At least once per 92 days by verifying that each chillers starts and runs.

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## PLANT SYSTEMS

### BASES

---

#### 3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM - AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the chilled water system ensures that the chilled water system will continue to provide the required normal and accident heat removal capability for the control room area, relay rooms, equipment rooms, and other safety related areas. Verification of the actuation of each automatic valve on a Safeguards Initiation signal includes actuation following receipt of a Safety Injection signal.

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 199 AND 182 TO FACILITY OPERATING  
LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75  
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY  
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 11, 1997, as supplemented May 1, June 12, and July 23, 1997, the Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). These proposed amendments add a new TS, 3/4.7.10, "Chilled Water System - Auxiliary Building Subsystem," and an associated Bases section to address the support function this system provides to other necessary safety systems. The licensee's supplemental letters provided additional information that did not affect the staff's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 Rationale for Requesting New TS

During a recent reevaluation of the auxiliary building chilled water subsystem (ABCW), the licensee determined that ABCW may not be able to withstand a single failure and still perform its design support function if certain components are removed for maintenance. This could result in exceeding the design basis temperatures in the relay rooms, and eventually in the control room and the certain electrical equipment rooms. The excessive temperatures could render redundant trains of safety-related equipment inoperable. The licensee reported this discovery in Licensee Event Report 97-002 on March 12, 1997. As a compensatory action, the licensee developed an operability determination to address the actions to be taken if less than three chillers or two chilled water pumps are operable. The licensee committed to keeping this operability determination in effect until a TS amendment is approved and implemented.

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The licensee determined that the new TS meets Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2). This criterion provides for "A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier." The Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (58 FR 39132) states, in part, "Also captured by this criterion are those support and actuation systems that are necessary for items in the primary success path to successfully function." The licensee determined that the ABCW subsystem removes heat from the control room envelope, relay rooms and electrical equipment rooms. This heat removal is required for the primary success path to successfully function.

The licensee's sample review of the maintenance history showed that in the past, the chillers for the auxiliary building chilled water (ABCW) subsystem were out of service for corrective maintenance approximately once per year. The chilled water pumps were out of service for corrective maintenance approximately once every other year.

## 2.1 System Description

The licensee's June 12, 1997, supplemental submittal provided a detailed ABCW description (including a simplified system diagram) and also provided required operating modes and system interfaces. For clarity, a brief summary of the information provided by the licensee is included in the following paragraphs.

The ABCW is a closed loop subsystem that removes heat from various safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment and rejects the heat to the ultimate heat sink through the service water system. Each Salem unit has its own loop (the systems are cross connected; however, the cross connects are not utilized and not credited for mitigation).

Each unit's ABCW includes three 50% capacity (all three chillers are required for normal operation during maximum summer temperatures) liquid chillers (powered from separate AC vital buses) and two 100% capacity chilled water pumps (also, powered from separate AC vital buses).

The safety-related heat loads are:

- control area air conditioning (CAAC) cooling coils (the control room envelope is common for Salem Units 1 and 2)
- emergency air conditioning (EAC) cooling coils
- emergency control air compressor (ECAC) coolers

The nonsafety heat loads are:

- penetration area cooler units (PACUs)
- main steam radiation monitors (R46s)
- miscellaneous room coolers (Salem Unit 2's ABCW only)

The ABCW subsystem is required to operate in the following modes (1) normal, (2) abnormal, (3) accident safety injection, (4) accident high radiation, (5) loss of offsite power, and (6) fire outside control room area.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee is proposing the following new ABCW TS limiting condition for operation (LCO):

3.7.10 The chilled water system loop which services the safety-related loads in the Auxiliary Building shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Three OPERABLE chillers
- b. Two OPERABLE chilled water pumps

The above equipment is required to be operable to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post-accident heat loads, assuming a single failure. The licensee is proposing to have the above LCO applicable in all modes and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

The licensee is proposing the following action statements in the event an LCO cannot be met:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4

- a. With one chiller inoperable:
  1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
  2. Restore the chiller to operable status within 14 days or;
  3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With two chillers inoperable:
  1. Remove the appropriate non-essential heat loads from the chilled water system within 4 hours and;
  2. Align the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACs) for single filtration operation using the [other Salem unit's] train within 4 hours and;

3. Restore at least one chiller to operable status within 72 hours or;
  4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one chilled water pump inoperable, restore the chilled water pump to operable status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

If one ABCW chiller is inoperable, actions must be taken to transfer heat loads to other systems and the inoperable chiller must be restored to operable status within 14 days. In this condition, two operable ABCW chillers are adequate to perform the accident cooling function (three chillers are required to perform the normal cooling function during certain summer conditions). The 14-day completion time is reasonable, based on the low probability of an initiating event occurring during this time, the 100% capacity of the remaining ABCW chillers, the ability to transfer additional heat loads to the other Salem unit's ABCW chillers if necessary, and the licensee's probabilistic safety assessment which shows an acceptable conditional core damage probability.

If two ABCW chillers are inoperable, action must be taken to transfer heat loads to other systems and restore one of the inoperable chillers to operable status within 72 hours. The 72-hour completion time is reasonable, based on the low probability of an initiating event occurring during this time, the requirement to transfer heat loads to other systems within 4 hours, and the licensee's probabilistic safety assessment which shows an acceptable conditional core damage probability.

If the actions discussed above cannot be met, the unit must be in hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

With one chilled water pump inoperable, action must be taken to restore the pump to operable status within 7 days. In this condition, one operable ABCW pump is adequate to perform the accident cooling function. The 7-day completion time is reasonable, based on the low probability of an initiating event occurring during this time, the 100% capacity of the remaining ABCW pump, the ability to transfer some heat loads to the other Salem unit's ABCW subsystem, and the licensee's probabilistic safety assessment which shows an acceptable conditional core damage probability. If these actions cannot be met, the unit must be in hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

For Modes 5 and 6 or during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the licensee proposed similar action statements. However, the requirement to place the unit in hot standby followed by cold shutdown is replaced by the requirement to suspend core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This is an appropriate change to the action statements considering the plant conditions.

The licensee is proposing the following surveillance requirements (SRs) to verify ABCW operability:

4.7.10 The chilled water loop which services the safety-related loads in the Auxiliary Building shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each manual valve in the chilled water system flow path servicing safety related components that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months, by verifying that each automatic valve actuates to its correct position on a Safeguards Initiation signal.
- c. At least once per 92 days by verifying that each chiller starts and runs.

Regarding the first SR above, verifying the correct alignment for manual valves in the ABCW flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for ABCW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31-day frequency is acceptable based on engineering judgment.

Regarding the second SR above, this SR verifies that each ABCW valve will actuate to its correct position on an actual or simulated safeguards initiation signal. The 18-month frequency allows for performing this surveillance during unit outages.

Regarding the final SR above, the verification of chiller operation ensures that a chiller previously in a standby condition will start, run and pick up the available heat load when required. The 92-day frequency is appropriate based on the operating history of the chillers.

Additionally, the licensee proposed TS bases to provide the rationale for the new TS. The staff found that the licensee's proposed bases provide an acceptable level of basis information for the operators' use.

Based on the above discussion, the staff finds the licensee's proposed TS revisions acceptable. However, the staff notes that the licensee's TS change request is not required to ensure public health and safety (the licensee's former method of performing operability determinations already ensured adequate protection of public health and safety). However, the licensee's proposal is a TS enhancement that will allow for a more operator-oriented TS and a reduced chance for action statement induced plant transients (i.e., entry into TS 3.0.3 and forced plant shutdowns will be minimized).

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 11497). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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