UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

December 4, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-272/311

Mr. Steven E. Miltenberger
Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Post Office Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. Miltenberger:

SUBJECT: DELETION OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTION DEVICES FROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TAC NOS. 73069/73070)

RE: SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 105 and 82 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 23, 1989 and supplemental letters dated April 14, 1989, August 25, 1989, September 22, 1989, and October 26, 1989. The April 14 and October 26, 1989 letters provided revised Technical Specification pages. The August 25 and September 22, 1989 letters withdrew that portion of the original application that was associated with fuses.

These amendments delete Table 3.8-1, Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices from the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and add controls for maintaining the list of protective devices to Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.

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1/1

CP-1

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

James C. Stone, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 105to
   License No. DPR-70
2. Amendment No. 82to
   License No. DPR-75
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

DISTRIBUTION w/enclosures:

Docket File	MO'Brien (2)	Wanda Jones	JDyer
NRC PDR	OGC	JCalvo	JLinville
Local PDR	DHagan	BBoger	
PDI-2 Reading	EJordan	ACRS (10)	
WButler	BGrimes	GPA/PA	
JStone/MThadani	TMeek (8)	Rita Jaques,ARM/LFMB	

[SEM LETTER]

PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/PM	OGC	PDI-2/D	NRR/SELB
MO'Brien	JStone:tr		WButler	FRosa
11/ /89	11/2/89	11/24/89	12/14/89	11/20/89

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 105 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented before startup from the ninth refueling outage, currently scheduled for Fall, 1990.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/s/

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 4, 1989

PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/PM	OGC	PDI-2/D
MO'Brien	JStone		WButler
11/4/89	11/2/89	12/1/89	12/4/89

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 82 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/s/
Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 4, 1989

PDI-2/LA	PDI-2/PM	OGC	PDI-2/D
MO'Brien	JStone		WButler
11/1/89	11/2/89	12/1/89	12/4/89

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

James C. Stone

James C. Stone, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 105 to
   License No. DPR-70
2. Amendment No. 82 to
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3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

cc:

Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire
Conner and Wetterhahn
Suite 1050
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Richard Fryling, Jr., Esquire
Law Department - Tower 5E
80 Park Place
Newark, NJ 07101

Mr. L. K. Miller
General Manager - Salem Operations
Salem Generating Station
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

Mr. S. LaBruna
Vice President - Nuclear Operations
Nuclear Department
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Kathy Halvey Gibson, Resident Inspector
Salem Nuclear Generating Station
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Drawer I
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

Richard F. Engel
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Law and Public Safety
CN-112
State House Annex
Trenton, NJ 08625

Dr. Jill Lipoti, Ph.D
New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection
Division of Environmental Quality
Radiation Protection Programs
State of New Jersey
CN 415
Trenton, NJ 08625

Maryland People's Counsel
American Building, 9th Floor
231 East Baltimore Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21202

Richard B. McGlynn, Commission
Department of Public Utilities
State of New Jersey
101 Commerce Street
Newark, NJ 07102

Regional Administrator, Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Lower Alloways Creek Township
c/o Mary O. Henderson, Clerk
Municipal Building, P.O. Box 157
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

Mr. Bruce A. Preston, Manager
Licensing and Regulation
Nuclear Department
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

Mr. David Wersan
Assistant Consumer Advocate
Office of Consumer Advocate
1425 Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120

Mr. Scott B. Ungerer
MGR. - Joint Generation Projects
Atlantic Electric Company
P.O. Box 1500
1199 Black Horse Pike
Pleasantville, NJ 08232

Mr. Jack Urban
General Manager, Fuels Department
Delmarva Power & Light Company
800 King Street
Wilmington, DE 19899

Public Service Commission of Maryland
Engineering Division
ATTN: Chief Engineer
231 E. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21202-3486

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-272

SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 105
License No. DPR-70

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated March 23, 1989 and supplemental letters dated April 14, 1989, August 25, 1989, September ??, 1989 and October 26, 1989 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 105 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented before startup from the ninth refueling outage, currently scheduled for Fall, 1990.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 4, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 105

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

DOCKET NO. 50-272

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
VIII	VIII
XII	XII
XIV	XIV
-	3/4 8-14
-	3/4 8-15
B 3/4 8-1	B 3/4 8-1
-	B 3/4 8-2

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BASES

BASES

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices required to provide thermal protection of penetrations shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) inoperable:

a. Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping either the primary or backup protective device, or racking out or removing the primary or backup device within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the primary or backup protective device to be tripped, or the primary or backup device racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their primary or backup protective device tripped, or which have the primary or backup device racked out or removed, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 All required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. For at least one 4.16 KV reactor coolant pump circuit, such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 months, by performance of:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and

(b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. By verifying the OPERABILITY of the required molded case and lower voltage circuit breakers, by selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of that type. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during the functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

BASES

3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one of each of the onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The surveillance frequency applicable to molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers provides assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of molded case and lower voltage circuit breakers. Each manufacturer's molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case or lower voltage circuit breakers, it is necessary to further divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

A list of the required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices, with information on location, size and equipment powered by the protective circuit is maintained in the UFSAR. The list is limited to those overcurrent devices installed for the purpose of keeping circuit fault current below the penetration rating. It does not apply to other overcurrent devices which protect penetrations where fault currents are less than the sustained rating of the penetration. This is consistent with the requirements of IEEE 741-1986 which states that no special consideration is required to protect electrical penetrations that can indefinitely withstand the maximum fault current available. Setpoints are controlled by plant procedures and drawings and any additions, deletions or modifications to the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices list is governed by Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-311

SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.82
License No. DPR-75

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated March 23, 1989 and supplemental letters dated April 14, 1989, August 25, 1989, September 22, 1989 and October 26, 1989 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 82 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Walter R. Butler, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 4, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 82

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

DOCKET NO. 50-311

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 8-16	3/4 8-16
3/4 8-17	3/4 8-17
3/4 8-18	3/4 8-18
3/4 8-19	-
3/4 8-20	-
3/4 8-21	-
3/4 8-22	-
3/4 8-23	-
3/4 8-24	-
3/4 8-25	-
3/4 8-26	-
3/4 8-27	-
B 3/4 8-1	B 3/4 8-1
B 3/4 8-2	B 3/4 8-2

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices required to provide thermal protection of penetrations shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) inoperable:

a. Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping either the primary or backup protective device, or racking out or removing the primary or backup device within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the primary or backup protective device to be tripped, or the primary or backup device racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their primary or backup protective device tripped, or which have the primary or backup device racked out or removed, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 All required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. For at least one 4.16 KV reactor coolant pump circuit, such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 months, by performance of:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, and

(b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. By verifying the OPERABILITY of the required molded case and lower voltage circuit breakers, by selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of that type. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during the functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

TABLE 3.8-1

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

DELETED

3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR Part 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators is based upon the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971, and Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testing Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977.

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The surveillance frequency applicable to molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers provides assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of molded case and lower voltage circuit breakers. Each manufacturer's molded case circuit breakers and lower voltage circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of molded case or lower voltage circuit breakers, it is necessary to further divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.

BASES (Continued)

A list of the required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices, with information on location, size and equipment powered by the protective circuit is maintained in the UFSAR. The list is limited to those overcurrent devices installed for the purpose of keeping circuit fault current below the penetration rating. It does not apply to other overcurrent devices which protect penetrations where fault currents are less than the sustained rating of the penetration. This is consistent with the requirements of IEEE 741-1986 which states that no special consideration is required to protect electrical penetrations that can indefinitely withstand the maximum fault current available. Setpoints are controlled by plant procedures and drawings and any additions, deletions or modifications to the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices list is governed by Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 105 AND 82 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 23, 1989 and supplemental letters dated April 14, 1989, August 25, 1989, September 22, 1989 and October 26, 1989, Public Service Electric & Gas Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The supplemental letter dated April 14, 1989, provided the revised Technical Specification pages that had been inadvertently omitted from the March 23, 1989 submittal. The supplemental letter dated August 25, 1989 requested withdrawal of that portion of the March 23, 1989 application associated with adding surveillance requirements for fuses. The supplemental letter dated September 22, 1989 provided revised Bases pages that eliminated mention of fuses. The pages had been inadvertently omitted from the August 25, 1989 supplemental letter. The October 26, 1989 letter provided corrected technical specification pages B 3/4 8-1 for Unit 1 and 2 and page 3/4 8-16 for Unit 2. The supplemental letters did not increase the scope of the original amendment request and did not affect the staff's original no significant hazards determination. The proposed amendments would modify the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications by deleting Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.8-1, "Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices," and modify Bases 3/4.8.3 to require controls for maintaining the list of protective devices similar to those required for snubbers as described in Generic Letter 84-13, dated May 3, 1984. Additionally, an identical specification would be added to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications for consistency between units.

2.0 EVALUATION

Currently the list of containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices and their setpoints are controlled by Table 3.8-1 in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Changes to these breakers and their setpoints require a license amendment, even if the change is in the conservative direction.

Deleting Table 3.8-1 from the Technical Specifications and requiring administrative controls for the protective devices is similar to the requirements for snubbers as described in Generic Letter 84-13 and does not degrade compliance with TS 3.8.3.1. Technical Specification 3.8.3.1 will continue to require that the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices be operable. The currently required surveillance will continue to be performed and the required corrective actions will be taken if the devices are found to be inoperable.

The licensee has committed to incorporating the list of containment penetration overcurrent protective devices and setpoints into the next revision to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Additionally, the setpoints for the subject devices will be incorporated into plant maintenance procedures and plant drawings which are controlled plant documents. Changes to the setpoints and devices are made through this controlled system in accordance with the licensee's Quality Assurance Program and within the guidance of 10 CFR 50.59.

Changes under 10 CFR 50.59 can be made without a license amendment only after the licensee completes a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change, test or experiment does not involve an unreviewed safety question. Thus, there is no reduction in the requirements for the licensee to establish that there is no unreviewed safety question prior to making changes to the list of containment penetration overcurrent protection devices. Those safety evaluations are available for staff review at the plant site. Although this proposed change would delete the table of protective devices from the technical specifications and thereby allow the licensee some flexibility for changes as discussed earlier, the basis for the protective devices is discussed in the "Bases" section of the technical specifications. There, the safety reason for these devices is clearly stated. Their purpose is to limit circuit fault current to a value below the electrical penetration rating. Eliminating any protective device from the UFSAR list would require a 10 CFR 50.59 review. Because deleting a required protective device would constitute a reduction in a margin of safety as defined in the basis for a technical specification, the licensee could not make such a change without prior NRC approval. Therefore, the staff is satisfied that the essential overcurrent devices would remain (or an application for amendment would be tendered) and it is acceptable to delete the table.

Addition of an identical requirement to the Unit 1 technical Specifications is included as part of the licensee's ongoing program to achieve consistency between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

In the initial submittal, the licensee had included a section on surveillance requirements for fuses. After discussions with the project manager and reviewing the Calloway submittal that deleted the surveillance requirements for fuses, the licensee, by letters dated August 25, 1989 and September 22, 1989, withdrew that portion of the request.

The October 26, 1989 letter provided pages that corrected administrative errors in the previous submittals. It also requested delaying implementation on Unit 1 until startup from the ninth refueling outage, scheduled for the Fall, 1990. This was to allow the utility time to prepare procedures and perform the surveillances that are being added to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. The staff finds this acceptable.

At the request of the licensee, administrative changes were made to the INDEX to more accurately reflect the contents of the Technical Specifications.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 23323) on May 31, 1989 and consulted with the State of New Jersey. No public comments were received and the State of New Jersey did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Jim Stone

Dated: December 4, 1989