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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Nine Mile Point Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-220  
DPR-63

***Subject: Special Report Regarding Inoperable Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System***

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Action Statement 4.a. of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.6.11-2, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action Statements," Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation is submitting the following Special Report concerning the inoperability of the Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System.

**Description of Event**

On May 29, 2001, at 1150 hours, the Channel #12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System was removed from service for TS required surveillance testing. Prior to removing the Channel #12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System from service, the Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System was verified operable. At 1320 hours, during containment isolation valve testing, the Drywell Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM) isolation valves, Valves 201.7-08, 201.7-09, 201.7-10 and 201.7-11, were declared inoperable due to slow stroke times. These valves were left in the closed position to satisfy TS 3.3.4.b requirements for primary containment isolation valves. With these valves shut, Operations declared the Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System inoperable. The Channel #12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System was returned to service at 1345 hours on May 29, 2001. On June 1, 2001, at 1015 hours, the Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System was returned to service after the Drywell CAM isolation valves were returned to an operable status.

Valves 201.7-08, 201.7-09, 201.7-10, and 201.7-11 are stroke time tested simultaneously via a common control room switch. Valves 201.7-08 and 201.7-09 exceeded stroke time acceptance criteria, which resulted in all four valves being declared inoperable. Investigation revealed that the cause of the slow stroke timing was misalignment of the valves' limit switch actuator plates. The actuator plates for valves 201.7-08 and 201.7-09 had shifted position laterally coming in

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contact with the limit switch mounting plate. Friction caused by the contact between the actuator plates and the mounting plates increased the force required to position the valves, thus increasing the valves' stroke times.

**Cause of Event**

The cause of the slow stroke times was that the limit switch mounting plate and limit switch actuator plate on Valves 201.7-08 and 201.7-09 were not oriented correctly during re-assembly.

**Corrective Actions**

1. The limit switch actuator plates were repositioned for Valves 201.7-08 and 201.7-09.
2. Valves 201.7-08 and 201.7-09 were successfully stroke time tested and returned to service.
3. The limit switch actuator plates on Valves 201.7-10 and 201.7-11 were inspected and found to be correctly positioned.
4. Valves 201.7-10 and 201.7-11 were stroke time tested satisfactorily.
5. The isolation valves associated with the Channel #12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System were inspected with no binding noted and satisfactorily tested.
6. The Channel #11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System was returned to service.
7. Notes were added to work orders to address the inadequate re-assembly and the need to verify the actuator plate's position following any future re-assembly.

Very truly yours,



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RBA/KLE/mlg

cc: Mr. H. J. Miller, NRC Regional Administrator, Region I  
Mr. G. K. Hunegs, NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
Records Management