

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

NOVEMBER 28 1980

DOCKET FILE 50-272

Docket No. 50-272

Mr. F. P. Librizzi, General Manager  
Electric Production  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place, Room 7221  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

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Dear Mr. Librizzi:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 27 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your request dated June 29, 1978 and May 16, 1980.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications in Appendix A related to the use of the term "operability" in the application of these Technical Specifications and related to Testing of High and Low Pressure Safety Injection Valves. We have also taken this opportunity to initiate other revisions to both Appendices A and B that (a) remove outdated requirements, and (b) make the requirements for the Fire Protection Program consistent for both Units 1 and 2. These revisions have been discussed with your staff and their approval has been obtained.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:  
S. A. Varga

Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 27 to DPR-70
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures  
See next page

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SURNAME ▶						
DATE ▶						

Docket No. 50-272

Mr. F. P. Librizzi, General Manager  
Electric Production  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place, Room 7221  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

Dear Mr. Librizzi:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your request dated June 29, 1978 and May 16, 1980.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications in Appendix A related to General Limiting Conditions of Operation and Testing of High and Low Pressure Safety Injection Valves. We have also taken this opportunity to make other revisions to both Appendices A and B that have been initiated by the Staff. These revisions are being made to minimize differences in wording and requirements in the Technical Specifications of Salem Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These revisions have been discussed with your staff and their approval has been obtained.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

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See next page

*9/24/80  
per OELD*

OFFICE ▶	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
SURNAME ▶	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Distribution

Docket File 50-272 S. Varga  
 NRC PDR W. Ross  
 Local PDR C. Parrish  
 TERA J. Olshinski  
 NSIC J. Heltemes  
 NRR Reading Attorney, OELD  
 ORB#1 Reading ACRS (16)  
 H. Denton I&E (5)  
 D. Eisenhut B. Scharf (10)  
 R. Purple B. Jones (4)  
 T. Novak C. Miles  
 G. Lainas R. Diggs  
 R. Tedesco C. Stephens

9/25/80  
 WJR

JACS 7228, 8170, 8993, 42069

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 28, 1980

Docket No. 50-272

Mr. F. P. Librizzi, General Manager  
Electric Production  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place, Room 7221  
Newark, New Jersey 07101


Dear Mr. Librizzi:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 27 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your request dated June 29, 1978 and May 16, 1980.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications in Appendix A related to the use of the term "operability" in the application of these Technical Specifications and related to Testing of High and Low Pressure Safety Injection Valves. We have also taken this opportunity to initiate other revisions to both Appendices A and B that (a) remove outdated requirements, and (b) make the requirements for the Fire Protection Program consistent for both Units 1 and 2. These revisions have been discussed with your staff and their approval has been obtained.

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2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures  
See next page

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Mr. F. P. Librizzi  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company - 2 -

November 28, 1980

cc: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire  
Conner, Moore and Corber  
Suite 1050  
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D. C. 20006

Richard Fryling, Jr., Esquire  
Assistant General Solicitor  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

Gene Fisher, Bureau of Chief  
Bureau of Radiation Protection  
380 Scotch Road  
Trenton, New Jersey 08628

Mr. Hank Midura, Manager  
Salem Nuclear Generating Station  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

Salem Free Library  
112 West Broadway  
Salem, New Jersey 08079

Leif J. Norrholm, Resident Inspector  
Salem Nuclear Generating Station  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Drawer I  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Attorney General  
Department of Law and Public Safety  
State House Annex  
Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Samuel E. Donelson, Mayor  
Lower Alloways Creek Township  
Municipal Hall  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Richard B. McGlynn, Commissioner  
Department of Public Utilities  
State of New Jersey  
101 Commerce Street  
Newark, New Jersey 07102

Deputy Attorney General  
State House Annex  
State of New Jersey  
36 West State Street  
Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Director, Criteria and Standards  
Division  
Office of Radiation Programs (ANW-460)  
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency  
Region II Office  
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR  
26 Federal Plaza  
New York, New York 10007

Mr. E. N. Schwalje, Manager  
of Quality Assurance  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

Mr. R. L. Mittl, General Manager  
Licensing and Environment  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Place  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

Peter A. Moeller  
Nuclear Licensing Engineer  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
80 Park Plaza - 15A  
Newark, New Jersey 07101



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-272

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 27  
License No. DPR-70

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated June 29, 1978 and May 16, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 27, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 28, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 27

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

DOCKET NO. 50-272

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

3/4 0-1

3/4 0-2

3/4 2-1

B3/4 0-1

B3/4 0-2

B3/4 0-3

B3/4 5-2

6-1

Insert Pages

3/4 0-1

3/4 0-2

3/4 0-3

3/4 2-1

3/4 5-5a

B3/4 0-1

B3/4 0-2

B3/4 0-3

B3/4 0-4

B3/4 5-1a

B3/4 5-2

6-1

Revise Appendix B as follows:

Remove Pages

3.1-22

Insert Pages

3.1-22

## 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

### 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.0.1 Compliance with the limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met.

3.0.2 Noncompliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals. If the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time intervals, completion of the ACTION requirements is not required.

3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the ACTION statements requirements. This provision shall not prevent passage through OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

3.0.5 When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system(s), subsystem(s), train(s), component(s) and device(s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied within 2 hours, action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation does not apply, by placing it, as applicable, in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

This specification is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6.

## APPLICABILITY

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.

4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified time interval with:

- a. A maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance interval, and
- b. The combined time interval for any 3 consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval.

4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the specified time interval shall constitute a failure to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.

4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified.

4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:

- a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i).
- b. Surveillance intervals specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for the inservice inspection and testing activities required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda shall be applicable as follows in these Technical Specifications:

APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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- c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities.
- d. Performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements.
- e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

### 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

#### AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) shall be maintained within a  $\pm 5\%$  target band (flux difference units) about the target flux difference.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 ABOVE 50% RATED THERMAL POWER\*

#### ACTION:

- a. With the indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE outside of the above limits and with THERMAL POWER:
  1. Above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 15 minutes:
    - a) Either restore the indicated AFD to within the target band limits, or
    - b) Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
  2. Between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER:
    - a) POWER OPERATION may continue provided:
      - 1) The indicated AFD has not been outside of the above limits for more than 1 hour penalty deviation cumulative during the previous 24 hours, and
      - 2) The indicated AFD is within the limits shown on Figure 3.2-1. Otherwise, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 30 minutes and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to  $\leq 55\%$  of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.
    - b) Surveillance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux Channels may be performed pursuant to Specification 4.3.1.1.1 provided the indicated AFD is maintained within the limits of Figure 3.2-1. A total of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFD outside of the target band during this testing without penalty deviation.

\*See Special Test Exception 3.10.2

## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

- b. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD is within the above limits and ACTION 2.a) 1), above has been satisfied.
- c. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD has not been outside of the above limits for more than 1 hour penalty deviation cumulative during the previous 24 hours.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

- a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel:
  - 1. At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is OPERABLE, and
  - 2. At least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERABLE status.
- b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE for each OPERABLE excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its limits when at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the limits of Specification 3.2.1. Penalty deviation outside of the limits shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

- a. One minute penalty deviation for each one minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the limits at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
- b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each one minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the limits at THERMAL POWER levels below 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
  - 1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
  - 2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
  - 1. Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 580 psig.
  - 2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
  - 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.
  - 2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection test signal:
    - a) Centrifugal charging pump
    - b) Safety injection pump
    - c) Residual heat removal pump

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated discharge pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1. Centrifugal charging pump  $\geq$  2400 psig
2. Safety Injection pump  $\geq$  1425 psig
3. Residual heat removal pump  $\geq$  195 psig

g. By verifying the correct position of each of the following ECCS throttle valves:

1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.
2. At least once per 18 months.

HPSI SYSTEM  
VALVE NUMBER

11 SJ 16  
12 SJ 16  
13 SJ 16  
14 SJ 16

LPSI SYSTEM  
VALVE NUMBER

11 SJ 138  
12 SJ 138  
13 SJ 138  
14 SJ 138  
11 SJ 143  
12 SJ 143  
13 SJ 143  
14 SJ 143

h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1. For low head safety injection lines, with a single pump running:
  - a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the line with the highest flow rate, is  $\geq$  463 gpm; and
  - b) The total pump flow rate is  $\leq$  650 gpm.
2. For high heat safety injection lines, with a single pump running:
  - a) The sum of the injection line flow rates; excluding the line with the highest flow rate, is  $\geq$  346 gpm, and
  - b) The total pump flow rate is  $\leq$  550 gpm.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -  $T_{avg} < 350^{\circ}\text{F}$

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem<sup>#</sup> comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

- a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,
- b. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger,
- c. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and
- d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

#### ACTION:

- a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
- b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchanger or residual heat removal pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System  $T_{avg}$  less than  $350^{\circ}\text{F}$  by use of alternate heat removal methods.
- c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

<sup>#</sup>A maximum of one safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to  $312^{\circ}\text{F}$ .

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -  $T_{avg} < 350^{\circ}F$

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 All safety injection pumps, except the OPERABLE pump allowed above, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to  $312^{\circ}F$  by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.

## 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

### BASES

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The specifications of this section provide the general requirements applicable to each of the Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements within Section 3/4.

3.0.1 This specification defines the applicability of each specification in terms of defined OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions and is provided to delineate specifically when each specification is applicable.

3.0.2 This specification defines those conditions necessary to constitute compliance with the terms of an individual Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirement.

3.0.3 This specification delineates the ACTION to be taken for circumstances not directly provided for in the ACTION statements and whose occurrence would violate the intent of the specification. For example, Specification 3.5.1 calls for each Reactor Coolant System accumulator to be OPERABLE and provides explicit ACTION requirements if one accumulator is inoperable. Under the terms of Specification 3.0.3, if more than one accumulator is inoperable, the unit is required to be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. As a further example, Specification 3.6.2.1 requires two Containment Spray Systems to be OPERABLE and provides explicit ACTION requirements if one spray system is inoperable: Under the terms of Specification 3.0.3, if both of the required Containment Spray Systems are inoperable, the unit is required to be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour, in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN in the next 30 hours. It is assumed that the unit is brought to the required MODE within the required times by promptly initiating and carrying out the appropriate ACTION statement.

3.0.4 This specification provides that entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition must be made with (a) the full complement of required systems, equipment or components OPERABLE and (b) all other parameters as specified in the Limiting Conditions for Operation being met without regard for allowable deviations and out of service provisions contained in the ACTION statements.

The intent of this provision is to insure that facility operation is not initiated with either required equipment or systems inoperable or other specified limits being exceeded.

Exceptions to this provision have been provided for a limited number of specifications when startup with inoperable equipment would not affect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in the ACTION statements of the appropriate specifications.

## APPLICABILITY

### BASES

3.0.5 This specification delineates what additional conditions must be satisfied to permit operation to continue, consistent with the ACTION statements for power sources, when a normal or emergency power source is not OPERABLE. It specifically prohibits operation when one division is inoperable because its normal or emergency power source is inoperable and a system, subsystem, train, component or device in another division is inoperable for another reason.

The provisions of this specification permit the ACTION statements associated with individual systems, subsystems, trains, components, or devices to be consistent with the ACTION statements of the associated electrical power source. It allows operation to be governed by the time limits of the ACTION statement associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation for the normal or emergency power source, not the individual ACTION statements for each system, subsystem, train, component or device that is determined to be inoperable solely because of the inoperability of its normal or emergency power source.

For example, Specification 3.8.1.1 requires in part that two emergency diesel generators be OPERABLE. The ACTION statement provides for a 72 hour out-of-service time when one emergency diesel generator is not OPERABLE. If the definition of OPERABLE were applied without consideration of Specification 3.0.5, all systems subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable emergency power source would also be inoperable. This would dictate invoking the applicable ACTION statements for each of the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation. However, the provisions of Specification 3.0.5 permit the time limits for continued operation to be consistent with the ACTION statement for the inoperable emergency diesel generator instead, provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. In this case, this would mean that the corresponding normal power source must be OPERABLE, and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices must be OPERABLE, or otherwise satisfy Specification 3.0.5 (i.e., be capable of performing their design function and have at least one normal or one emergency power source OPERABLE). If they are not satisfied, action is required in accordance with this specification.

As a further example, Specification 3.8.1.1 requires in part that two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution system be OPERABLE. The ACTION statement provides a 24-hour out-of-service time when both required offsite circuits are not OPERABLE. If the definition of OPERABLE were applied without consideration of Specification 3.0.5, all systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable normal power sources, both of the offsite circuits, would also be inoperable. This would dictate invoking the applicable ACTION statement for the inoperable normal power sources instead, provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. In this case, this would mean that for one division the emergency power source must be OPERABLE (as must be the components supplied by the emergency power source) and all redundant systems,

## APPLICABILITY

### BASES

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subsystems, trains, components and devices in the other division must be OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy Specification 3.0.5 (i.e., be capable of performing their design functions and have an emergency power source OPERABLE). In other words, both emergency power sources must be OPERABLE and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in both divisions must also be OPERABLE. If these conditions are not satisfied, action is required in accordance with this specification.

In MODES 5 or 6 Specification 3.0.5 is not applicable, and thus the individual ACTION statements for each applicable Limiting Condition for Operation in these MODES must be adhered to.

4.0.1 This specification provides that surveillance activities necessary to insure the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met and will be performed during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions for which the Limiting Conditions for Operation are applicable. Provisions for additional surveillance activities to be performed without regard to the applicable OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions are provided in the individual Surveillance Requirements. Surveillance Requirements for Special Test Exceptions need only be performed when the Special Test Exception is being utilized as an exception to an individual specification.

4.0.2 The provisions of this specification provide allowable tolerances for performing surveillance activities beyond those specified in the nominal surveillance interval. These tolerances are necessary to provide operational flexibility because of scheduling and performance considerations.

The tolerance values, taken either individually or consecutively over 3 test intervals, are sufficiently restrictive to ensure that the reliability associated with the surveillance activity is not significantly degraded beyond that obtained from the nominal specified interval.

4.0.3 The provisions of this specification set forth the criteria for determination of compliance with the OPERABILITY requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation. Under this criteria, equipment, systems or components are assumed to be OPERABLE if the associated surveillance activities have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. Nothing in this provision is to be construed as defining equipment, systems or components OPERABLE, when such items are found or known to be inoperable although still meeting the Surveillance Requirements.

4.0.4 This specification ensures that the surveillance activities associated with a Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the specified time interval prior to entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other applicable condition. The intent of this provision is to ensure that surveillance activities have been satisfactorily demonstrated on a current basis as required to meet the OPERABILITY requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation.

## APPLICABILITY

### BASES

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Under the terms of this specification, for example, during initial plant startup or following extended plant outages, the applicable surveillance activities must be performed within the stated surveillance interval prior to placing or returning the system or equipment into OPERABLE status.

4.0.5 This specification ensures that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves will be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. Relief from any of the above requirements has been provided in writing by the Commission and is not a part of these technical specifications.

This specification includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout these Technical Specifications and to remove any ambiguities relative to the frequencies for performing the required inservice inspection and testing activities.

Under the terms of this specification, the more restrictive requirements of the Technical Specifications take precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. For example, the requirements of Specification 4.0.4 to perform surveillance activities prior to entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows pumps to be tested up to one week after return to normal operation. And for example, the Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE does not grant a grace period before a device that is not capable of performing its specified function is declared inoperable and takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows a valve to be incapable of performing its specified function for up to 24 hours before being declared inoperable.

## 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each RCS accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

#### 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

The limitation for a maximum of one safety injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all safety injection pumps except the allowed OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 312°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single POPs relief valve.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

## EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The limits on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of the boron solution will be maintained above the solubility limit of 135°F at 21000 ppm boron.

#### 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

## 6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

### 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY

6.1.1 The Station Manager shall be responsible for overall facility operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility during his absence.

### 6.2 ORGANIZATION

#### OFFSITE

6.2.1 The offsite organization for facility management and technical support shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-1.

#### FACILITY STAFF

6.2.2 The Facility organization shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-2 and:

- a. Each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.
- b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor.
- c. At least two licensed Operators shall be present in the control room during reactor start-up, scheduled reactor shutdown and during recovery from reactor trips.
- d. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor.
- e. All CORE ALTERATIONS after the initial fuel loading shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
- f. A Fire Brigade of at least 5 members shall be maintained onsite at all times. The Fire Brigade shall not include 4 members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit or any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency.




FIGURE 6.2.1. OFFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

TABLE 3.1-1

WATER QUALITY ANALYSIS PARAMETERS

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>PPM, as</u>	<u>Parameter</u>	<u>PPM, as</u>
Ammonia (NH <sub>3</sub> )	NH <sub>3</sub>	Iron, Total (Fe)	Fe
Biochemical Oxygen Demand	BOD	Kjeldahl Nitrogen	N
Calcium (Ca)	CaCO <sub>3</sub>	Magnesium (Mg)	CaCO <sub>3</sub>
Chemical Oxygen Demand	COD	Nitrate (NO <sub>3</sub> )	NO <sub>3</sub>
Chloride (Cl)	CaCO <sub>3</sub>	pH	--
Chloride (Cl)	NaCl	Phosphate (PO <sub>4</sub> )	PO <sub>4</sub>
Chlorine Demand, 30 Sec.	Cl	Potassium (K)	CaCO <sub>3</sub>
Chlorine Demand, 3 Min.	Cl	Sodium (Na)	CaCO <sub>3</sub>
Conductivity (umhos)	--	Sulfate (SO <sub>4</sub> )	CaCO <sub>3</sub>
Copper, Total (Cu)	Cu	Sulfate (SO <sub>4</sub> )	SO <sub>4</sub>
Dissolved Oxygen	O <sub>2</sub>	Turbidity (JTU)	--



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 27 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY,  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-272

Introduction

Salem Unit No. 1 plans to terminate its second fuel cycle in September 1980. Salem Unit No. 2 received a license to operate up to 5% of rated power in April 1980 and the licensee, the Public Service Electric and Gas Company, has applied for a full-power license. As the result of the Staff's review of the Salem 2 Operating License and the development of Technical Specifications for Unit No. 2 we became aware of many areas where the Technical Specifications for Unit No. 1 differ from those for Unit No. 2. A major effort to rectify these differences is being postponed until Unit No. 2 becomes operational at full power. This amendment, however, is being used to update the Technical Specifications and to revise the Safety Evaluation for the Salem Fire Protection Program where the existing texts for the two Units are not consistent.

I. Administrative Changes

(A) Appendix B - Technical Specification 3.1.1.4

By means of Amendment No. 23, issued on December 13, 1979, the Staff made extensive changes to the non-radiological Environmental Technical Specifications for Salem No. 1. In making these revisions the requirements for sampling station cooling water for "free chlorine residual" and "30-second chlorine demand" were removed from T.S. 3.1.1.4 but were inadvertently retained in Table 3.1-1. This oversight is hereby corrected by issuance of a revised Page 3.1-22 to Appendix B.

(B) Appendix A - Technical Specification 3.2.1

By Amendment No. 20, dated October 30, 1979, we approved the return to power of Salem Unit No. 2 for Fuel Cycle 2. While giving this

approval we placed limitations on the Axial Flux Difference (AFD) during the first 72 effective full power days (EFPD) at 2700 MWD/MTU Operation in Cycle 2. As defined in T.S. 3.2.1, the AFD was to remain less than 7.5% of rated thermal power with the allowed AFD increasing by 1.0% for each 1.0% reduction in thermal power.

Salem Unit No. 1 completed 72 EFPD in Cycle 2 on March 28, 1980; therefore, this limitation is no longer required and has been deleted from T.S. 3.2.1.

(C) Appendix A - Technical Specification 6.2.2(f)

As the result of the licensing review for Salem Unit No. 2, the licensee committed to an onsite Fire Brigade of at least five members at all times. This commitment has been documented in T. S. 6.2.2(f) for Unit No. 2 (License DPR-75). We are taking this opportunity to revise T. S. 6.2.2(f) for Unit 1 to also reflect this change from a previous commitment of three members.

(D) Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report

By means of Amendment No. 21, dated November 20, 1979, we added conditions to License No. DPR-70 for Salem Unit 1. These conditions related to the completion of facility modifications for fire protection. The basis for this amendment was the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report (Fire Protection Review), by means of which we approved the fire protection program at Unit 1.

As the result of continued review by the Staff and PSE&G during the licensing of Unit No. 2, two sections of the Salem 2 SER (Appendix E of Supplement No. 4, April 1980) differ in text from the same sections at the Salem 1 SER. We believe that the revised sections more accurately describe systems that have been approved as providing acceptable protection against fire. Consequently, we take this opportunity to revise Section IV.B and IV.D(2) in the Salem 1 SER:

(1) Page 20, Section IV.B

Replace the fourth and fifth sentences of the first paragraph with the following sentence: "In lieu of the two options proposed by the staff (i.e., a one-hour rated fire barrier or a one-half hour barrier and sprinkler system), we have accepted an equivalent system that consists of a water sprinkler system with redundant valves operated by separate actuators which, in turn, are actuated by redundant fire detectors."

(3) Page 21, Section IV.D(2)

In the Licensee's Commitment No. 2, the first line should be changed to read "provide a one-half hour fire rated barrier..."

(4) Page 29, Action Item 21

As the result of its experience since implementation of its fire protection program, the licensee contacted the Staff (by letter on September 26, 1980) to request a minor modification in this Action Item. The original Action Item called for storing two self-contained air breathing units in the mechanical penetration at the Reactor Containment entrance. Because of the hot and humid environment, the breathing units were undergoing serious deterioration. Consequently, the licensee requested that the breathing units be stored at the radiological control point approximately 100 feet from the Containment Entrance since this area is air conditioned. We find this change in location to be acceptable since any person who plans to enter Containment must pass through this control point. Also, the distance from control point to the Containment entrance is not significantly increased from the former storage location. This Action Item is revised to read, "Ten (2) dedicated air breathing units (Scott) will be stored at the Radiological Control Point for entry into the Reactor Containment Areas."

(E) Redefining the Term "Operable"

In response to the Staff's request dated April 10, 1980, the licensee, by letter of May 16, 1980, proposed changes to Appendix A, Safety Technical Specification 3/4.0. These changes reflect the Staff's current definition of the term "operable" as it applies to the single failure criterion for safety systems in power reactors.

The NRC's Standard Technical Specifications (STS) were formulated to preserve the single failure criterion for systems that are relied upon in the safety analysis report. By and large, the single failure criterion is preserved by specifying Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) that require all redundant components of safety related systems to be OPERABLE. When the required redundancy is not maintained, either due to equipment failure or maintenance outage, action is

required, within a specified time, to change the operating mode of the plant to place it in a safe condition. The specified time to take action, usually called the equipment out-of-service time, is a temporary relaxation of the single failure criterion, which consistent with overall system reliability considerations, provides a limited time to fix equipment or otherwise make it OPERABLE. If equipment can be returned to OPERABLE status within the specified time, plant shutdown is not required.

LCOs are specified for each safety related system in the plant, and with few exceptions, the ACTION statements address single outages of components, trains or subsystems. For any particular system, the LCO does not address multiple outages of redundant components, nor does it address the effects of outages of any support systems - such as electrical power or cooling water - that are relied upon to maintain the OPERABILITY of the particular system. This is because of the large number of combinations of these types of outages that are possible. Instead, the STS employ general specifications and an explicit definition of the term OPERABLE to encompass all such cases. These provisions have been formulated to assure that no set of equipment outages would be allowed to persist that would result in the facility being in an unprotected condition.

To achieve the necessary clarification, the Staff provided the licensee with model Technical Specifications that have been accepted and re-submitted without change. We, therefore, find these changes to be acceptable. The licensee shall implement appropriate procedures to assure that the necessary records, such as plant logs or similar documents, are reviewed to determine compliance with these specifications.

## II. Safety Evaluation

### Surveillance Requirements for Emergency Core Cooling Systems

#### Introduction

By letter of June 30, 1977, the Staff requested the licensee to propose Technical Specification changes to incorporate surveillance requirements for HPSI/LPSI throttle valves. The purpose of these surveillance requirements is to assure that proper flow resistances in HPSI/LPSI systems are maintained throughout plant life. The licensee responded by submittal dated June 29, 1979. This submittal contained proposed

changes to the Technical Specifications that were not in complete conformance with the Staff's requirements. Through subsequent discussions between the Staff and licensee acceptable Technical Specifications were developed and were included in Appendix A of License DPR-75 for Salem Unit No. 2. Inasmuch as the ECCS systems for Salem Units 1 and 2 are identical, the licensee proposed that the surveillance requirements for HPSI/LPSI flow balancing in the Salem 2 Technical Specifications (4.5.2(g) and (h)) be substituted for those proposed in the June 29, 1978 letter. The Staff agrees that not only is the substitution valid and acceptable, but also requirement 4.5.2(f) in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications should be included as an identical requirement for Unit 1 so that the surveillance requirements for both units will be the same. The licensee has agreed.

#### Discussion and Evaluation

The High and Low Pressure Safety Injection system (HPSI and LPSI) designs of many Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) utilize a common low pressure and a common high pressure header to feed the several cold (and in some cases hot) leg injection points. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration; (2) provide a proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. On many plants, there are motor-operated valve(s) in the lines to each injection point that have stops which are set during pre-operational flow testing of the plant to insure that these flow requirements are satisfied. On other plants, electrical or mechanical stops on the Safety Injection System's isolation valve(s) are used for this purpose. Salem 1 utilizes hand-set throttle valves to satisfy these ECCS flow requirements.

While pre-operational HPSI/LPSI flow testing is utilized to assure that the valves used to throttle flow have been properly set, the NRC Staff has concluded that periodic surveillance requirements are needed to assure that these settings are maintained throughout the life of the plant. Consequently, we requested all PWR licensees to propose changes to their Technical Specifications, as appropriate, to incorporate periodic surveillance

requirements for these valves. Sample surveillance requirements, developed by the NRC Staff, were provided to the licensees for guidance in developing proposed changes. The sample requirements include periodic verification of throttle valve position stop settings and verification of proper ECCS flow rates whenever system modifications are made that could alter flow characteristics.

Based on our review, we have concluded that the licensee's proposed increased surveillance requirements would provide sufficient additional assurance that proper valve settings for ECCS flows and flow distributions will be maintained throughout plant life; and thus, the proposed changes are acceptable.

#### Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: November 28, 1980

References

1. Letter, NRC (Schwencer) to PSE&G (Librizzi), November 28, 1978.
2. Letter, PSE&G (Librizzi) to NRC (Schwencer), January 30, 1979.
3. Letter, PSE&G (Midura) to NRC (Grier), August 30, 1979.
4. Letter, PSE&G (Martin) to NRC (Grier), October 5, 1979.
5. Letter, NRC (Schwencer) to PSE&G (Librizzi), October 30, 1979.
6. Letter, PSE&G (Librizzi) to NRC (Schwencer), November 21, 1979.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-272  
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY,  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 27 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70, issued to Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in Salem County, New Jersey. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment revises Technical Specifications in Appendix A related to the use of the term "operability" in the application of these Technical Specifications and related to Testing of High and Low Pressure Safety Injection Valves. We have also taken this opportunity to initiate other revisions to both Appendices A and B that (a) remove outdated requirements, and (b) make the requirements for the Fire Protection Program consistent for both Units 1 and 2.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has

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
made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated June 29, 1978 and May 16, 1980, (2) Amendment No. 27 to License No. DPR-70, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 28th day of November, 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Steven A. Varga, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #1  
Division of Licensing