

March 19, 1986

Docket Nos. 50-272  
and 50-311

Mr. C. A. McNeill, Jr.  
Vice President - Nuclear  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
Post Office Box 236  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Dear Mr. McNeill:

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The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 73 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 and Amendment No. 48 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated October 16, 1985.

These amendments revise calibration methods for the Analog Rod Position Indication System.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/DFischer

Donald C. Fischer, Senior Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate #3  
Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 73 to DPR-70
2. Amendment No. 48 to DPR-75
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures  
See next page

PAD-3  
CVogan *CV*  
03/14/86

PAD-3  
DFischer/pws  
03/14/86

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PDR ADOCK 05000272  
PDR

Mr. C. A. McNeill  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company      Salem Nuclear Generating Station

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-272

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 73  
License No. DPR-70

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated October 16, 1985, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:


8604040522 860319  
PDR ADOCK 05000272  
P PDR

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 73, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steven A. Varga, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #3  
Division of PWR Licensing-A

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 19, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 73

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

DOCKET NO. 50-272

Revise Appendix A as follows:

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3/4 1-18	3/4 1-18
_____	3/4 1-18a
_____	3/4 1-18b
3/4 1-19	3/4 1-19
_____	3/4 1-19a
3/4 1-20	3/4 1-20
3/4 1-22	3/4 1-22
3/4 1-23	3/4 1-23
B 3/4 1-4	B 3/4 1-4

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS  
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES  
GROUP HEIGHT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All full length (shutdown and control) rods, shall be OPERABLE and positioned within  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position within one hour after rod motion.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*

ACTION:

- a. With one or more full length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full length rod inoperable or mis-aligned from the group step counter demand position by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one full length rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or mis-aligned from its group step counter demand position by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hour either:
  1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
  2. The remainder of the rods in the bank with the inoperable rod are aligned to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.5 during subsequent operation, or
  3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

- a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions.
- b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours.
- c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors and  $F_0(Z)$  and  $F_{\Delta H}^N$  are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours.
- d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within one hour and within the next 4 hours the high neutron flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER. THERMAL POWER shall be maintained less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER until compliance with ACTIONS 3.1.3.1.c.3.a and 3.1.3.1.c.3.c above are demonstrated.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full length rod shall be determined to be within  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position of the group demand position at least once per 12 hours (allowing for one hour thermal soak after rod motion) except during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION  
IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL LENGTH ROD

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Mis-alignment

Loss Of Reactor Coolant From Ruptured Pipes Or From Cracks In Large Pipes  
Which Actuates The Emergency Core Cooling System

Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal At Full Power

Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss Of Coolant Accident)

Major Secondary System Pipe Rupture

Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control  
Assembly Ejection)



REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.2.1 The shutdown and control rod position indication systems shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the actual and demanded rod positions as follows:

- a. Analog rod position indicators, within one hour after rod motion (allowance for thermal soak);

All Shutdown Banks: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal ranges of 0-30 steps and 200-228 steps.

Control Bank A: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal ranges of 0-30 steps and 200-228 steps.

Control Bank B: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal ranges of 0-30 steps and 160-228 steps.

Control Banks C and D: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal range of 0-228 steps.

- b. Group demand counters; + 2 steps of the pulsed output of the Slave Cyclor Circuit over the withdrawal range of 0-228 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With a maximum of one analog rod position indicator per bank inoperable either:
1. Determine the position of the non-indicating rod(s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours and within one hour after any motion of the non-indicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.
- b. With a maximum of one group demand position indicator per bank inoperable either:

1. Verify that all analog rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.2.1.1 Each analog rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the demand position indication system and the rod position indication system agree within 12 steps (allowing for one hour thermal soak after rod motion) at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then compare the demand position indication system and the rod position indication system at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.2.1.2 Each of the above required rod position indicator(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL calibration at least once per 18 months.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2.2 The group demand position indicator shall be OPERABLE for each shutdown and control rod not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*#, 4\*#, and 5\*#

ACTION:

With less than the above required group demand position indicator(s) OPERABLE, open the reactor trip system breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.3.2.2 Each of the above required group demand position indicator(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of the associated control rod at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

\*With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.5

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.4 All shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\*, and 2\*#

#### ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod not fully withdrawn, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within one hour either:

- a. Fully withdraw the rod,, or
- b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.4 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawn by use of the group demand counters, and verified by the analog rod position indicators within one hour after rod motion:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in control banks A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor critically, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.5 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\*, and 2\*#

#### ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, either:

- a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within two hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within two hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figures, or
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.3.5 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours by use of the group demand counters and verified by the analog rod position indicators within one hour of rod motion, except during time intervals when the Rod Insertion Limit Monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod mis-alignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. OPERABLE condition for the analog rod position indicators is defined as being capable of indicating rod position to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the bank demand position for a range of positions. For the Shutdown Banks, and Control Bank A this range is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive, and between 200 and 228 steps withdrawn inclusive. This permits the operator to verify that the control rods in these banks are either fully withdrawn or fully inserted, the normal operating modes for these banks. Knowledge of these banks positions in these ranges satisfies all accident analysis assumptions concerning their position. The range for control Bank B is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive, and between 160 and 228 steps withdrawn inclusive. For Control Banks C and D the range is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 228 steps withdrawn. Comparison of the group demand counters to the bank insertion limits with verification of rod position with the analog rod position indicators (after thermal soak after rod motion) is sufficient verification that the control rods are above the insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variation from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. Mis-alignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. The reactivity worth of a mis-aligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumption used in the accident analysis.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the accident analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg} > 541^{\circ}\text{F}$  and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-311

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 48  
License No. DPR-75


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated October 16, 1985, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 48, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
Steven A. Varga, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #3  
Division of PWR Licensing-A

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 19, 1986



ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 48

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

DOCKET NO. 50-311

Revise Appendix A as follows:

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3/4 1-13	3/4 1-13
3/4 1-14	3/4 1-14
3/4 1-15	3/4 1-15
3/4 1-16	3/4 1-16
	3/4 1-16a
<hr/> 3/4 1-17	3/4 1-17
3/4 1-19	3/4 1-19
3/4 1-20	3/4 1-20
B 3/4 1-4	B 3/4 1-4

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS  
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES  
GROUP HEIGHT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.1.3.1 All full length (shutdown and control) rods, shall be OPERABLE and positioned within  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position within one hour after rod motion.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*

ACTION:

- a. With one or more full length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HUT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full length rod inoperable or mis-aligned from the group step counter demand position by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position), be in HUT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one full length rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or mis-aligned from its group step counter demand position by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hour either:
  1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
  2. The remainder of the rods in the bank with the inoperable rod are aligned to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.5 during subsequent operation, or
  3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

- a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions.
- b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours.
- c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors and  $F_0(Z)$  and  $F_{24}$  are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours.
- d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within one hour and within the next 4 hours the high neutron flux trip setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER. THERMAL POWER shall be maintained less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER until compliance with ACTIONS 3.1.3.1.c.3.a and 3.1.3.1.c.3.c above are demonstrated.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full length rod shall be determined to be within  $\pm 12$  steps (indicated position of the group demand position at least once per 12 hours (allowing for one hour thermal soak after rod motion) except during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

TABLE 3.1-1

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION  
IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL LENGTH ROD

- Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics
- Rod Cluster Control Assembly Mis-alignment
- Loss Of Reactor Coolant From Ruptured Pipes Or From Cracks In Large Pipes Which Actuates The Emergency Core Cooling System
- Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal At Full Power
- Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss Of Coolant Accident)
- Major Secondary System Pipe Rupture
- Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - OPERATING

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2.1 The shutdown and control rod position indication systems shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the actual and demanded rod positions as follows:

- a. Analog rod position indicators, within one hour after rod motion (allowance for thermal soak);

All Shutdown Banks: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal ranges of 0-30 steps and 200-228 steps.

Control Bank A: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal ranges of 0-30 steps and 200-228 steps.

Control Bank B: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal ranges of 0-30 steps and 160-228 steps.

Control Banks C and D: + 12 steps of the group demand counters for withdrawal range of 0-228 steps.

- b. Group demand counters; + 2 steps of the pulsed output of the Slave Cyclor Circuit over the withdrawal range of 0-228 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

#### ACTION:

- a. With a maximum of one analog rod position indicator per bank inoperable either:
1. Determine the position of the non-indicating rod(s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours and within one hour after any motion of the non-indicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or
  2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.
- b. With a maximum of one group demand position indicator per bank inoperable either:

1. Verify that all analog rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.2.1.1 Each analog rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the demand position indication system and the rod position indication system agree within 12 steps (allowing for one hour thermal soak after rod motion) at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then compare the demand position indication system and the rod position indication system at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.2.1.2 Each of the above required rod position indicator(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL calibration at least once per 18 months.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.2.2 The group demand position indicator shall be OPERABLE for each shutdown and control rod not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3\*#, 4\*#, and 5\*#

ACTION:

With less than the above required group demand position indicator(s) OPERABLE, open the reactor trip system breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.3.2.2 Each of the above required group demand position indicator(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of the associated control rod at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

\*With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.5

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.1.3.4 All shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\*, and 2\*#

#### ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod not fully withdrawn, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within one hour either:

- a. Fully withdraw the rod,, or
- b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.1.3.4 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawn by use of the group demand counters, and verified by the analog rod position indicators within one hour after rod motion:

- a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in control banks A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor critically, and
- b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

\*See Special\_Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0



## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.1.3.5 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\*, and 2\*#

#### ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, either:

- a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within two hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within two hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using the above figures, or
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.3.5 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours by use of the group demand counters and verified by the analog rod position indicators within one hour of rod motion, except during time intervals when the Rod Insertion Limit Monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3

#With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod mis-alignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. OPERABLE condition for the analog rod position indicators is defined as being capable of indicating rod position to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the bank demand position for a range of positions. For the Shutdown Banks, and Control Bank A this range is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive, and between 200 and 228 steps withdrawn inclusive. This permits the operator to verify that the control rods in these banks are either fully withdrawn or fully inserted, the normal operating modes for these banks. Knowledge of these banks positions in these ranges satisfies all accident analysis assumptions concerning their position. The range for control Bank B is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive, and between 160 and 228 steps withdrawn inclusive. For Control Banks C and D the range is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 228 steps withdrawn. Comparison of the group demand counters to the bank insertion limits with verification of rod position with the analog rod position indicators (after thermal soak after rod motion) is sufficient verification that the control rods are above the insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variation from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. Mis-alignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. The reactivity worth of a mis-aligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumption used in the accident analysis.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the accident analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg} > 541^\circ\text{F}$  and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 48 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY  
DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND  
ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

Introduction

By letter from C.A. McNeill, Jr., to the NRC (ATTN: S. Varga) dated October 16, 1985, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG) requested changes to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-70 and DPR-75 for Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendment request consists of changes to the Technical Specifications regarding the Analog Rod Position System.

Evaluation and Summary

The Technical Specifications for Westinghouse reactors typically require the position of all control rods as indicated by position indicators (actual position) to be in agreement with group step counter demand positions within  $\pm 12$  steps. The  $\pm 12$  step requirement reflects the accident analysis assumption that the rods can be misaligned by 24 steps, which consists of an indicated 12 step misalignment with a 12 step uncertainty. A step is  $5/8$ ". Almost all of the Westinghouse reactors in operation use an analog system based on linear variable transformer detectors for the actual position indication. There has been a long history of Licensee Event Reports concerning violation of the  $\pm 12$  step requirement, particularly in the shutdown modes and during power ascension. The difficulty lies in the characteristics of the analog system, which has a non-linear steady state response, a time-dependent response which is the result of temperature dependence, and a response dependence on whether the last rod motion was a withdrawal or an insertion.

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The Technical Specification changes proposed by PSEG incorporate most of the features of a solution to the problem proposed by Westinghouse in a July 23, 1981 letter to PSEG. This letter was included in the present change request. Basically, the change does three things: (1) it removes the requirement to maintain alignment in the central region of the core for the control rods which are either fully inserted or fully withdrawn in normal operation, (2) it allows an hour (to reach temperature equilibrium) after rod motion before any  $\pm 12$  step alignment is required and (3) it allows use of the demand counter position to indicate where the rods are in the shutdown modes. These are acceptable for the following reasons, respectively.

1. The changed Specifications require operability of the analog position system and  $\pm 12$  step alignment for the shutdown banks and control bank A between 0-30 steps and 200-228 steps, control bank B between 0-30 steps and 160-228 steps and control banks C&D over the 0-228 step range. Since all the control rods except banks C&D are either fully withdrawn or fully inserted in the normal operating modes, removal of position indication requirements in the mid range of their withdrawal only represents a transitory condition. The operator can verify the fully withdrawn or inserted position as before. In addition, accident concerns for misaligned control rods are greatest in the power range, for which the above banks are not in the core. Therefore, no significant increase in accident consequences will arise from removal of position indication requirements in the midrange of the shutdown and A and B banks. Needless reporting and operational delays should therefore be eliminated by this change.
2. As indicated above, there are thermal effects which cause the analog position indicators to drift following rod motion. Allowing an hour of thermal soak following rod motion before  $\pm 12$  step alignment is required is acceptable because the probability of an accident occurring during this time is small. Besides, in general, the rods will not be misaligned. Furthermore, requiring  $\pm 12$  step alignment when the thermal transient is in progress might result in greater inaccuracy in knowledge of the rod position than after the transient because the instrument is known to be decalibrated while its temperature is changing. Other action statements regarding position indication and operability of the control rods also allow time for compliance of at least an hour.

3. Unless separate calibrations of the analog position indicators were required, imposition of strict alignment requirements in modes 3,4, and 5 is unnecessarily stringent. Because the demand step counters have had excellent performance records in our experience to date, we therefore judge the demand position indicators to provide adequate indication of the location of the control rods in these modes.

We reviewed the detailed Technical Specification changes submitted for Salem Units 1 and 2 and find they properly implement the modifications discussed above with one exception: we did not agree with proposed Action A in Technical Specification 3.1.3.2.2 as submitted. At our request, the licensee agreed to delete this option. With this modification, and for the reasons discussed above, we find the proposed Technical Specification changes acceptable.

#### Environmental Consideration

These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:  
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 19, 1986

Principal Contributor:

M. Dunenfeld