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Docket No. 50-271

Mr. Robert L. Smith
Licensing Engineer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation
1671 Worcester Road
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701

November 16, 1981



Dear Mr. Smith:

RE: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 68 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated December 1, 1980.

The amendment establishes new vessel level setpoints that are consistent with the installation of a common reference level required by TMI Action Item II.K.3.27 in NUREG-0737.

By this action, we consider Action Item II.K.3.27 to be complete for your facility.

We have not, however, performed a human factors evaluation of your water level instrumentation. That evaluation will be performed as part of the detailed Control Room review (Action Item I.D.1) that you are expected to conduct per NUREG-0737.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Vernon L. Rooney for

Vernon L. Rooney, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 68 to DPR-28
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Amendment + FR Notice

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Mr. Robert L. Smith

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 68
License No. DPR-28

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated December 1, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   2. Technical Specifications

      The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 68 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 16, 1981

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 68

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
7	7
12	12
19	19
21	21
35	35
36	36
38	38
39a	39a
41	41
42	42
62	62
63	63

1.1 SAFETY LIMIT

D. Whenever the reactor is shutdown with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, the water level shall not be less than 12 inches above the top of the enriched fuel when it is seated in the core.

2.1 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING

C. Reactor low water level scram setting shall be at least 127 inches above the top of the enriched fuel.

D. Reactor low low water level emergency core cooling system (ECCS) initiation shall be at least 82.5 inches above the top of the enriched fuel.

E. Turbine stop valve scram shall be less than or equal to 10% valve closure from full open.

F. Turbine control valve fast closure scram shall, when operating at greater than 30% of full power, trip upon actuation of the turbine control valve fast closure relay.

G. Main steamline isolation valve closure scram shall be less than or equal to 10% valve closure from full open.

H. Main steamline low pressure initiation of main steamline isolation valve closure shall be at least 850 psig.

1.1 (cont'd)

to assure the insertion times are adequate. The thermal power transient resulting when a scram is accomplished other than by the expected scram signal (e.g., scram from neutron flux following closure of the main turbine stop valves) does not necessarily cause fuel damage. However, for this specification a Safety Limit violation will be assumed when a scram is only accomplished by means of a backup feature of the plant design. The concept of not approaching a Safety Limit provided scram signals are operable is supported by the extensive plant safety analysis.

The computer provided with Vermont Yankee has a sequence annunciation program which will indicate the sequence in which events such as scram, APRM trip initiation, pressure scram initiation, etc. occur. This program also indicates when the scram setpoint is cleared. This will provide information on how long a scram condition exists and thus provide some measure of the energy added during a transient.

D. Reactor Water Level (Shutdown Condition)

During periods when the reactor is shutdown, consideration must also be given to water level requirements due to the effect of decay heat. If reactor water level should drop below the top of the enriched fuel during this time, the ability to cool the core is reduced. This reduction in core cooling capability could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. The core can be cooled sufficiently should the water level be reduced to two-thirds the core height. Establishment of the safety limit at 12 inches above the top of the enriched fuel provides adequate margin. This level will be continuously monitored.

TABLE 3.1.1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENT REQUIREMENTS

Trip Function	Trip Settings	Modes in Which Functions Must be Operating			Minimum Number Operating Instrument Channels Per Trip System (2)	Required Conditions When Minimum Conditions For Operation Are Not Satisfied (3)
		Refuel(1)	Startup	Run		
1. Mode switch in shutdown		X	X	X	1	A
2. Manual scram		X	X	X	1	A
3. IRM						
High Flux	≤120/125	X	X	X(11)	2	A
Loop		X	X	X(11)	2	A
4. APRM						
High Flux (Flow bias)	≤0.66W+54%(4)			X	2	A or B
High Flux (reduced)	≤15%	X	X		2	A
				X	2(5)	A or B
INOP						
Downscale	≥2/125			X	2	A or B
5. High Reactor Pressure	≤1055 psig	X	X	X	2	A
6. High Drywell Pressure	≤2.5 psig	X	X	X	2	A
7. Reactor Low Water Level	(6)≥127.0 inches	X	X	X	2	A
8. Scram Discharge Volume High Level	≤24 gallons	X	X	X	2	A

TABLE 3.1.1 NOTES

1. When the reactor is subcritical and the reactor water temperature is less than 212°F, only the following trip functions need to be operable:

   a) mode switch in shutdown
   b) manual scram
   c) high fux IBM or high flux SRM in coincidence
   d) scram discharge volume high water level.

2. Whenever an instrument system is found to be inoperable, the instrument system output relay shall be tripped immediately. Except for MSIV & Turbine Stop Valve Position, this action shall result in tripping the trip system.

3. When the requirements in the column "Minimum Number of Operating Instrument Channels Per Trip System" cannot be met for one system, that system shall be tripped. If the requirements cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken:

   A. Initiate insertion of operable rods and complete insertion of all operable rods within four hours.
   B. Reduce power level to IRM range and place mode switch in the "Startup/Hot Standby" position within eight hours.
   C. Reduce turbine lead and close main steamline isolation valves within eight hours.
   D. Reduce reactor power to less than 30% of rated within eight hours.

4. "W" is percent rated drive flow where 100% rated drive flow is that flow equivalent to 48×10^6 lbs/hr core flow.

5. To be considered operable an APRM must have at least 2 LPRM inputs per level and at least a total of 13 LPRM inputs, except that channels A, C, D, and F may lose all LPRM inputs from the companion APRM Cabinet plus one additional LPRM input and still be considered operable.

6. The top of the enriched fuel has been designated as 0 inches and provides all common reference level for vessel water level instrumentation.

7. Channel shared by the Reactor Protection and Primary Containment Isolation Systems.

8. An alarm setting of 1.5 times normal background at rated power shall be established to alert the operator to abnormal radiation levels in primary coolant.

Amendment No. 21, 22, 68

TABLE 3.2.1

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
	Core Spray - A & B (Note 1)		
2	High Drywell Presure	≤2.5 psig	Note 2
2	Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	≥82.5" above top of enriched fuel	Note 2
1	Low Reactor Pressure #1	≥300 psig	Note 2
2	Low Reactor Pressure #2	≥300 psig	Note 2
1	Time Delay (14A-K16A&B)	≤10 seconds	Note 2
2	Pump 14-1A, Discharge Pressure	≥100 psig	Note 5
1	Auxiliary Power Monitor	--	Note 5
1	Pump Bus Power Monitor	--	Note 5
1	High Sparger Pressure	≤5 psid	Note 5
1	Trip System Logic	--	Note 5

TABLE 3.2.1 (CONT)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

Low Pressure Coolant Injection System A & B (Note 1)

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
1	Low Reactor Pressure #1 (water level permissive	300 $\leq$ p $\leq$ 350 psig	Note 2
2	High Drywell Pressure #1	$\leq$2.5 psig	Note 2
2	Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	$\geq$82.5" above top of enriched fuel	Note 2
1	Time Delay (10A-K51A&B)	0 sec.	Note 5
1	Reactor Vessel Shroud Level	$\geq$ 2/3 core height	Note 5
1	Time Delay (10A-K72A&B)	$\leq$ 60 sec.	Note 5
1	Time Delay (10A-K50A&B)	$\leq$ 5 sec.	Note 5
1	Low Reactor Pressure #2 (shutdown cooling permissive	100 $\leq$ p $\leq$ 150 psig	Note 2
2 per pump	RHR Pump A & C Discharge Pressure	$\geq$100 psig	Note 5
2	High Drywell Pressure #2	$\leq$2.5 psig	Note 2

TABLE 3.2.1 (CONT)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
2 (Note 3)	Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	Same as LPCI	Note 5
2 (Note 4)	Low Condensate Storage Tank Water Level	$\geq$(-)2 inches	Note 5
2 (Note 3)	High Drywell Pressure	Same as LPCI	Note 5
2 (Note 4)	High Suppression Chamber Water Level	$\leq$2 inches	Note 5
1 (Note 3)	Bus Power Monitor	--	Note 5
1 (Note 4)	Trip System Logic	--	Note 5
2 (Note 7)	High Reactor Vessel Water Level	$\leq$177 inches above top of enriched fuel	Note 5

TABLE 3.2.1 (CONT)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
Recirculation Pump Trip - A & B (Note 1)			
2	Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	$\geq$82.5" above top of enriched fuel	Note 2
2	High Reactor Pressure	$\leq$1150 psig	Note 2
2	Time Delays	$\leq$10 sec.	Note 2
1	Trip System Logic	---	Note 2

TABLE 3.2.2

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied (Note 2)
2	Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	≥82.5" above the top of enriched fuel	A
2 of 4 in each of 2 channels	High Main Steam Line Area Temperature	≤212°F	B
2/steamline	High Main Steam Line Flow	≤120% of rated flow	B
2/(Note 1)	Low Main Steam Line Pressure	≥850 psig	B
2/(Note 6)	High Main Steam Line Flow	≤40% of rated flow	B
2	Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	Same as Reactor Protection System	A
2	High Main Steam Line Radiation (7) (8)	≤ 3 X background at rated power (9)	B
2	High Drywell Pressure	Same as Reactor Protection System	A
2/(Note 10)	Condenser Low Vacuum	≥ 12" Hg absolute	A
1	Trip System Logic	--	A

TABLE 3.2.2 (CONT'D)

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
2 (Note 4)	High Reactor Water Level	≤177" above the top of enriched fuel	Note 3
2 per set of 4	High Steam Line Space Temperature	≤212°F	Note 3
1	High Steam Line d/p (Steam Line Break)	≤195 inches of water	Note 3
4 (Note 5)	Low HPCI Steam Supply Pressure	≥70 psig	Note 3
2	Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature	≤212°F	Note 3
1	Time Delay ($^{23A-K48}_{23A-K49}$)	≤35 minutes	Note 3
1	Bus Power Monitor	--	--
1	Trip System Logic	--	--

Bases

3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION

In addition to reactor protection instrumentation which initiates a reactor scram, station protective instrumentation has been provided which initiates action to mitigate the consequences of accidents which are beyond the reactor operator's ability to control, or terminate a single operator error before it results in serious consequences. This set of Specifications provides the limiting conditions of operation for the primary system isolation function and initiation of the core standby cooling and standby gas treatment systems. The objectives of the Specifications are (i) to assure the effectivenes of any component of such systems even during periods when portions of such systems are out of service for maintenance, testing, or calibration, and (ii) to prescribe the trip settings required to assure adequate performance. This set of Specifications also provides the limiting conditions of operation for the control rod block system and surveillance instrumentation.

Isolation valves (Note 1) are installed in those lines that penetrate the primary containment and must be isolated during a loss-of-coolant accident so that the radiation dose limits are not exceeded during an accident condition. Actuation of these valves is initiated by protective instrumentation shown in Table 3.2.2 which senses the conditions for which isolation is required. Such instrumentation must be available whenever primary containment integrity is required. The objective is to isolate the primary containment so that the limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded during an accident. The objective of the low turbine condenser vacuum trip is to minimize the radioactive effluent releases to as low as practical in case of a main condenser failure. Subsequent releases would continue until operator action was taken to isolate the main condenser unless the main steam line isolation valves were closed automatically on low condenser vacuum. The manual bypass is required to permit initial startup of the reactor during low power operation.

The instrumentaion which initiates primary system isolation is connected in a dual channel arrangement. Thus, the discussion given in the bases for Specification 3.1 is applicable here.

The low reactor water level instrumentation is set to trip when reactor water level is 127" above the top of the enriched fuel. This trip initiates closure of Group 2 and 3 primary containment isolation valves. For a trip setting of 127" above the top of the enriched fuel, the valves will be closed before perforation of the clad occurs even for the maximum break and, therefore, the setting is adequate.

The top of the enriched fuel (351.5" from vessel bottom) is designated as a common reference level for all reactor water level instrumentation. The intent is to minimize the potential for operator confusion which may result from different scale references.

Note 1 - Isolation valves are grouped as listed in Table 3.7.1.

3.2 (cont'd)

The low-low reactor water level instrumentation is set to trip when reactor water level is 82.5" H_2O indicated on the reactor water level instrumentation above the top of the enriched fuel. This trip initiates closure of the Group 1 primary containment isolation valves and also activates the ECCS and starts the standby diesel generator system. This trip setting level was chosen to be low enough to prevent spurius operation but high enough to initiate ECCS operation and primary system isolation so that no melting of the fuel cladding will occur and so that post-accident cooling can be accomplished and the limits of 10 CFR 100 will not be violated. For the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, ECCS initiation and primary system isolation are initiated in time to meet the above criteria. The instrumentation also covers the full range of spectrum of breaks and meets the above criteria.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a backup to the water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating ECCS it causes isolation of Group 2, 3, and 4 isolation valves. For the complete circumferential break discussed above, this instrumentation will initiate ECCS operation at about the same time as the low-low water level instrumentation, thus the results given above are applicable here also. Group 2 isolation valves include the drywell vent, purge, and sump isolation valves. High drywell pressure activates only these valves because high drywell pressure could occur as the result of non-safety related causes such as not purging the drywell air during startup. Total system isolation is not desirable for these conditions and only the valves in Group 2 are required to close. The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes a trip of all primary system isolation valves.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. In addition to monitoring steam flow, instrumentation is provided which causes a trip of Group 1 isolation valves. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line, thus only Group 1 valves are closed. For the worst case accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, this trip setting of 120 percent of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure limit the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel temperatures remain less than 1295°F and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line tunnel to detect leaks in this area. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded cause closure of Group 1 isolation valves. Its setting of ambient plus 95°F is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 5 to 10 gpm; thus, it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks. For large breaks, it is a backup to high steam flow instrumentation discussed above, and for small breaks with the resultant small release of radioactivity, gives isolation before the limits of 10 CFR 100 are exceeded.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 68 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated December 1, 1980 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) forwarded a proposed Technical Specification change that establishes revised vessel level setpoints that are consistent with a new common instrument zero level. The proposed common reference level which is the top of the enriched fuel is 351.5" above the vessel bottom. Establishment of the common zero level for all reactor vessel level instrumentation is called for as TMI Action Item II.K.3.27 in NUREG-0737.

2.0 Evaluation

We have reviewed each of the proposed revised setpoints and find them to be consistent with the previously established safety settings. The required changes to operating and emergency procedures will be entered prior to operating with the new setpoints installed, and operator retraining will be performed.

Since no change in actual water level for any function is involved in the proposed Technical Specification revisions, and since no instrumentation is being changed, we find the proposed Technical Specification revisions acceptable for use.

3.0 Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: November 16, 1981

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATION COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 68 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 issued to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation which revises the Technical Specifications for operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station located in Windham County, Vermont. The amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

The amendment establishes new vessel level setpoints that are consistent with the installation of a common reference level required by TMI Action Item II.K.3.27 in NUREG-0737.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated December 1, 1980, (2) Amendment No.68 to License No. DPR-28, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 16th day of November 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Philip J. Polk, Acting Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing