March 11, 1999

Mr. Gregory A. Maret
Director of Operations
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
185 Old Ferry Road
Brattleboro, VT 05301

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 169 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. MA1661)

Dear Mr. Maret:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 169 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28, for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in response to your application dated April 23, 1998, as supplemented on January 25, 1999. In your submittal, you proposed changes to the Technical Specifications involving the Station Service Water and Residual Heat Removal Service Water systems. The January 25, 1999, supplement did not affect the conclusions of the original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

original signed by:
Richard P. Croteau, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-271

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 169 to License No. DPR-28
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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DATED: March 11, 1999

AMENDMENT NO. 169 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 169
License No. DPR-28

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated April 23, 1998, as supplemented on January 25, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (B) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 169 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

   In addition, requirements associated with certain Station Service Water and Residual Heat Removal Service Water testing details shall be relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and the TRM shall be incorporated by reference into the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and is to be implemented, including relocations to the TRM and incorporation by reference of the TRM into the FSAR, within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Elinor G. Adensam

Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 11, 1999

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 169 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station is a boiling water reactor (BWR), model BWR-4, with a Mark I containment. By letter dated April 23, 1998, as supplemented on January 25, 1999, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, the licensee for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, submitted for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review a proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TSs). The licensee requested an amendment to change the existing requirements in TSs 4.5.C and 3/4.5.D for the Station Service Water (SSW), the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW), and the Alternate Cooling Tower Systems (ACS). The changes include replacing the allowance for continued operation with two inoperable SSW subsystems with a more conservative requirement to shut down the unit within 24 hours, relocating certain SSW and RHRSW testing details to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), and revising the wording in the SSW TSs to more accurately reflect the Vermont Yankee design and operation. Also, the Bases for the SSW and ACS Systems would be revised to omit statements that imply that the ACS could provide adequate heat removal following a postulated accident. The January 25, 1999, supplement affirmed that the information had been duplicated in the TRM and the TRM had been incorporated by reference into the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The January 25, 1999, supplement did not affect the conclusions of the original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The SSW system at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station is designed to provide water for turbine and reactor auxiliary equipment cooling during normal operation and to provide cooling water in conjunction with the RHRSW pumps for reactor shutdown cooling. Also, the SSW system provides cooling water to systems and equipment required to operate under accident conditions. The SSW system consists of a dual header system with two SSW pumps on each header. Each header supplies cooling water to a reactor building closed cooling water system heat exchanger, emergency core cooling system room ventilation coolers, a diesel generator cooler, and a set of RHRSW pumps, which supply water to the RHR heat exchangers.

The RHRSW system is designed to provide a source of cooling water for the RHR system during normal shutdown conditions and for the RHR system during a loss of off-site power. The RHRSW pumps are supplied from the SSW system, and the cooling water is then pumped through the RHR heat exchangers and is returned to the SSW system.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 169

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Replace the following pages of Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. These revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
103	103
104	104
105	105
111	111
	111a

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
C. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System	C. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System
	Surveillance of the RHR Service Water System shall be performed as follows:
1. Except as specified in Specifications 3.5.C.2, and 3.5.C.3 below, both RHR Service Water Subsystem loops shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.	1. RHR Service Water Subsystem testing: Operability testing of pumps and valves shall be in accordance with Specification 4.6.E.
2. From and after the date that one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding thirty days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such thirty days all other active components of the RHR Service Water Subsystem are operable.	2. When one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable, the operable RHR service water pumps shall have been or shall be demonstrated to be operable within 24 hours.
3. From and after the date that one RHR Service Water Subsystem is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such subsystem is sooner made operable, provided that all active components of the other RHR Service Water	3. When one RHR Service Water Subsystem is made or found to be inoperable, the active components of the redundant RHR Service Water Subsystem shall have been or shall be demonstrated to be operable within 24 hours.

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
Subsystem, both Core Spray Subsystems, and both diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available, shall be operable.	
4. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.C cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.	
D. Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems	D. Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems
	Surveillance of the Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems shall be performed as follows:
1. Except as specified in Specifications 3.5.D.2 and 3.5.D.3, the Station Service Water System and both essential equipment cooling loops and the alternate cooling tower shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F.	1. Operability testing of pumps and valves shall be in accordance with Specification 4.6.E.
2. From and after the date that the Station Service Water System is made or found to be unable to provide adequate cooling to one of the two essential equipment cooling loops, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 15 days unless adequate cooling capability to both essential equipment cooling loops is restored sooner, provided that during such 15 days all other active components of the remaining essential equipment cooling loop and the Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems are operable.	2. When the Station Service Water System is made or found to be unable to provide adequate cooling to one of the two essential equipment cooling loops, the remaining active components of the Station Service Water System, both essential equipment cooling loops, and the alternate cooling tower fan, shall have been or shall be demonstrated to be operable within 24 hours.

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
3. From and after the date that the Alternate Cooling Tower System is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, unless the Alternate Cooling Tower System is made operable, provided that during such seven days all active components of the Station Service Water System and both essential equipment cooling loops are operable.	3. When the Alternate Cooling Tower System is made or found to be inoperable, all active components of the Station Service Water System and both essential equipment cooling loops shall have been or shall be demonstrated to be operable within 24 hours.
4. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.D cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.	
E. High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) System	E. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System
1. Except as specified in Specification 3.5.E.2, whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor pressure is greater than 150 psig and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition:	Surveillance of HPCI System shall be performed as follows:
a. The HPCI System shall be operable.	1. Testing
b. The condensate storage tank shall contain at least 75,000 gallons of condensate water.	Item: Simulated Automatic Actuation Test — Frequency: Each refueling outage
	Operability testing of the pump and valves shall be in accordance with Specification 4.6.E. The HPCI System shall deliver at least 4250 gpm at normal reactor operating pressure when recirculating to the Condensate Storage Tank.

BASES: 3.5 (Cont'd)

D. Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems

The Station Service Water System consists of pumps, valves and associated piping necessary to supply water to two essential equipment cooling loops and additional essential and nonessential equipment cooling loads. Each of the two Station Service Water essential equipment cooling loops includes valves, piping and associated instrumentation necessary to provide a flowpath to essential equipment. The Station Service Water essential equipment cooling loops provide redundant heat sinks to dissipate residual heat after a shutdown or accident. Each Station Service Water essential equipment cooling loop provides sufficient heat sink capacity to perform the required heat dissipation. Analyses have shown that any two service water pumps are capable of providing adequate cooling capability to the essential equipment cooling loops. To ensure this capability, four Service Water pumps and two Service Water essential equipment cooling loops must be operable. This ensures that at least two operable Service Water Pumps and one operable essential equipment cooling loop will be available in the event of the worst single active failure occurring coincident with a loss of off-site power. A Service Water pump is considered operable when it is capable of taking suction from an intake bay and transferring water to a Service Water essential equipment cooling loop at the specified pressures and flow rates. An essential equipment cooling loop is considered operable when it has a flow path capable of transferring water to the essential equipment, when required. The Alternate Cooling Tower System will provide the necessary heat sink for normal post-shutdown conditions in the event that the Station Service Water System becomes incapacitated due to a loss of the Vernon Dam with subsequent loss of the Vernon Pond, flooding of the Service Water intake structure (due to probable maximum flood in the river or an upstream dam failure) or fire in the Service Water intake structure which disables all four Service Water pumps.

If one or more Station Service Water component(s) are inoperable such that the Station Service Water System would not be capable of performing its safety function, assuming a single active failure (e.g., a pump, valve or diesel generator), then at least one essential equipment cooling loop is inoperable. If one or more component (s) are inoperable such that the Station Service Water System would not be capable of performing its safety function, even without assuming a single active failure, then both essential equipment cooling loops are inoperable.

Although the Station Service Water (SSW) System can perform its safety function with only two operable SSW pumps, the SSW System may not be capable of performing its safety function assuming one or two inoperable SSW pumps and assuming a worst case single active failure (e.g., failure of a diesel generator, SSW pump, SSW valve, etc.). Therefore, reactor operation with one or two inoperable SSW pumps is limited to 15 days provided that during this time both the normal and emergency power supplies for the remaining operable SSW pumps are also operable, in addition to demonstrating the operability of all remaining active components of the SSW system which perform a safety function and the alternate cooling tower fan.

If the SSW System would not be capable of performing its safety function for a reason other than one or two SSW pumps being inoperable, assuming a worst case single active failure (e.g., failure of a diesel generator,

BASES: 3.5 (Cont'd)

SSW pump, SSW valve, etc.), then reactor operation is limited to 15 days provided that during this time both the normal and emergency power supplies for the remaining operable equipment are also operable, in addition to demonstrating the operability of all remaining active components of the SSW system which perform a safety function and the alternate cooling tower fan.

If the SSW System would not be capable of performing its safety function for any reason, even without assuming a worst case single active failure, then the reactor must be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

E. High Pressure Coolant Injection System

The High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIs) is provided to adequately cool the core for all pipe breaks smaller than those for which the LPCI or Core Spray Cooling Subsystems can protect the core.

The HPCIs meets this requirement without the use of outside power. For the pipe breaks for which the HPCIs is intended to function the core never uncovers and is continuously cooled; thus, no clad damage occurs and clad temperatures remain near normal throughout the transient. Reference: Subsection 6.5.2.2 of the FSAR.

F. Automatic Depressurization System

The relief valves of the Automatic Depressurization System are a backup to the HPCIs. They enable the Core Spray Cooling System or LPCI Subsystem to provide protection against the small pipe break in the event of HPCI failure by depressurizing the reactor vessel rapidly enough to actuate the Core Sprays or LPCI Subsystem. Either of the two Core Spray Cooling Systems or LPCIs provides sufficient flow of coolant to prevent clad melting. All four relief valves are included in the Automatic Pressure Relief System. (See VYNPS, FSAR Vol. 4, Appendix B.)

G. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) is provided to maintain the water inventory of the reactor vessel in the event of a main steam line isolation and complete loss of outside power without the use of the emergency core cooling systems. The RCIC meets this requirement. Reference Section 14.5.4.4 FSAR. The HPCIS provides an incidental backup to the RCIC system such that in the event the RCIC should be inoperable no loss of function would occur if the HPCIS is operable.

H. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability

The core cooling and the containment cooling subsystems provide a method of transferring the residual heat following a shutdown or accident to a heat sink. Based on analyses, this specification assures that adequate cooling capacity is available by precluding any combination of inoperable components from fulfilling the core and containment cooling function. It is permissible, based upon the low heat load and other methods available to remove the residual heat, to disable all core and containment cooling systems for maintenance if the reactor is cold and shutdown and there is no potential for draining the reactor vessel. However, if refueling operations are in progress, one coolant injection system, one diesel and a residual of at least 300,000 gallons is required to assure core flooding capability.

The ACS is designed to provide the necessary heat sink for normal post-shutdown conditions in the event that the SSW becomes incapacitated due to a loss of the Vernon Dam with a subsequent loss of the Vernon Pond, flooding of the SSW intake structure or a fire in the SSW intake structure, which disables all four SSW pumps.

FSAR Section 10.8.2 states that the ACS is not classified as an Engineered Safeguard System and is not designed to accept the consequences of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. The licensee discovered that the Bases for the SSW system TS contradicted the FSAR by incorrectly assuming that the ACS was capable of removing post-accident heat loads. Regulatory guidance in SECY 97-035 dated February 1, 1997, states in part, that upon discovering that the TSs are not consistent with the respective safety analysis, the licensee should take the appropriate action to put the plant in a safe condition (such as imposing more conservative administrative limits) and also take action (such as requesting a license amendment) so the TS represents the minimum requirements. As a result, the licensee implemented administrative controls to require a shutdown if both SSW subsystems are made or found to be inoperable. Additionally, the licensee submitted the license amendment as discussed below.

3.0 EVALUATION

Currently, TS 3.5.D.3 includes an allowance for 7 days of operation after both SSW subsystems are made or found to be inoperable. This allowance was incorrectly based on the assumption that the ACS is able to fulfill the post-accident heat removal requirements when both SSW subsystems are made or found to be inoperable. However, the licensee stated that since the ACS is designed to be aligned and operated in a controlled manner, which takes approximately 2 hours, it is not designed to accept the consequences of a design basis loss-of-coolant accident. Therefore, the licensee has proposed to remove the existing allowance for 7 days of operation with both SSW subsystems inoperable in TS 3.5.D.3 and TS Surveillance 4.5.D.3, and replace it with a requirement to shut down the unit within 24 hours. The staff finds this change to be acceptable since it removes the allowance to operate in excess of 24 hours with both SSW subsystems inoperable.

The remaining portion of TS 3.5.D.3 allows for continued operation for 7 days with an inoperable ACS and is not affected by this change. The low probability of either a dam failure, a fire in the SSW pump room, or flooding in the SSW pump room, which would require the use of the ACS for shutdown of the unit, provides the basis for this allowed outage time. Since this basis is not affected, there are no changes necessary to the ACS requirements.

In proposed TS 4.5.C.1 and TS 4.5.D.1, the licensee has relocated the testing details for the RHRSW and SSW systems to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). Any changes to these relocated requirements in the TRM would be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 since the TRM will be incorporated into the FSAR by reference. The staff finds this change to be acceptable since these details are not required by 10 CFR 50.36 to be contained in the TSs and control of these changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 is adequate. This change is also in conformance with NUREG-1433, Revision 1, "Improved Standard Technical Specifications."

In proposed TSs 3.5.D.1, 3.5.D.2, 3.5.D.3, 4.5.D.2, 4.5.D.3, and the associated Bases, the licensee has replaced the word "subsystem" with "essential equipment cooling loop." The SSW

system at Vermont Yankee consists of four SSW pumps, associated valves and piping, one nonessential equipment cooling loop, and two essential equipment cooling loops and additional essential and nonessential equipment cooling loads. The essential equipment cooling loops provide redundant capability for analyzed accidents or transients. Two operable SSW pumps with one or both essential equipment cooling loops in operation will provide adequate cooling for analyzed accidents or transients. The staff finds this change to be acceptable since the licensee's proposed change to "essential equipment cooling loop" would more accurately reflect the Vermont Yankee design and operation.

In the Bases for TS 3.5.D, the licensee has removed the statements that imply that the ACS could provide adequate heat removal following a postulated accident and replaced them with a discussion on the actual capabilities of the ACS. The staff has no objection to the proposed Bases change.

Based on its review, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed TS changes to replace the allowance for continued operation with two inoperable SSW subsystems with a more conservative requirement to shut down the unit within 24 hours, to relocate certain SSW and RHRSW testing details to the TRM, and to replace the references to SSW "subsystem" with "essential equipment cooling loop" to more accurately reflect the Vermont Yankee design, are acceptable for the reasons previously stated.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Vermont State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 6713). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Vonna Ordaz

Date: March 11, 1999