

November 19, 1996

Mr. Donald A. Reid
Vice President, Operations
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
Ferry Road
Brattleboro, VT 05301

SUBJECT: REVISED BASES PAGES ASSOCIATED WITH AMENDMENT NO. 149 FOR VERMONT
YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. M95150)

Dear Mr. Reid:

The Commission issued Amendment No. 149 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee) by letter dated September 30, 1996. By letter dated October 17, 1996, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC) informed the NRC staff that the revised Technical Specification (TS) Bases pages issued with that amendment did not reflect changes previously made to the Bases in Amendment No. 148, which had been issued on September 25, 1996. In its letter, VYNPC submitted the corrected Bases pages. These pages only reconcile Bases changes previously approved by the NRC staff and do not impact the associated changes to the Vermont Yankee TSs approved by the Commission in Amendment Nos. 148 and 149.

Bases pages 89, 89a, and 90 that were issued with Amendment No. 149 should be replaced with the enclosed pages 89, 89a, and 90. Note that because of the addition of page 89a by Amendment No. 148, the changes to pages 89 and 90 by Amendment No. 149 were unnecessary. Thus, for convenience, original pages 89 and 90, as they existed before they were mistakenly revised by Amendment No. 149, are enclosed.

Sincerely,

/s/

C. Craig Harbuck, Acting Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-271

Enclosure: Corrected Bases pages

cc w/encl: See next page

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D. Reid
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

cc:

Regional Administrator, Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

G. Dana Bisbee, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
33 Capitol Street
Concord, NH 03301-6937

R. K. Gad, III
Ropes & Gray
One International Place
Boston, MA 02110-2624

Resident Inspector
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 176
Vernon, VT 05354

Mr. Richard P. Sedano, Commissioner
Vermont Department of Public Service
120 State Street, 3rd Floor
Montpelier, VT 05602

Chief, Safety Unit
Office of the Attorney General
One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor
Boston, MA 02108

Public Service Board
State of Vermont
120 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05602

Mr. David Rodham, Director
ATTN: James Muckerheide
Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency
400 Worcester Rd.
P.O. Box 1496
Framingham, MA 01701-0317

Chairman, Board of Selectmen
Town of Vernon
P.O. Box 116
Vernon, VT 05354-0116

Mr. Raymond N. McCandless
Vermont Division of Occupational
and Radiological Health
Administration Building
Montpelier, VT 05602

Mr. Richard E. McCullough
Operating Experience Coordinator
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
P.O. Box 157
Governor Hunt Road
Vernon, VT 05354

Mr. J. J. Duffy
Licensing Engineer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation
580 Main Street
Bolton, MA 01740-1398

Mr. Robert J. Wanczyk, Plant Manager
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
P.O. Box 157, Governor Hunt Road
Vernon, VT 05354

Mr. Ross B. Barkhurst, President
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
Ferry Road
Brattleboro, VT 05301

BASES:3.3 & 4.3 CONTROL ROD SYSTEMA. Reactivity Limitations1. Reactivity Margin - Core Loading

The specified shutdown margin (SDM) limit accounts for the uncertainty in the demonstration of SDM by testing. Separate SDM limits are provided for testing where the highest worth control rod is determined analytically or by measurement. This is due to the reduced uncertainty in the SDM test when the highest worth control rod is determined by measurement (e.g., SDM may be demonstrated by an in-sequence control rod withdrawal, in which the highest worth control rod is analytically determined, or by local criticals, where the highest worth rod is determined by testing).

Following a refueling, adequate SDM must be demonstrated to ensure that the reactor can be made subcritical at any point during the cycle. Since core reactivity will vary during the cycle as a function of fuel depletion and poison burnup, the beginning of cycle (BOC) test must also account for changes in core reactivity during the cycle. Therefore, to obtain the SDM, the initial measured value must exceed LCO 3.3.A.1 by an adder, "R", which is the difference between the calculated value of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated BOC core reactivity. If the value of "R" is negative (that is, BOC is the most reactive point in the cycle), no correction to the BOC measured value is required. The value of R shall include the potential shutdown margin loss assuming full B₄C settling in all inverted poison tubes present in the core. The frequency of 4 hours after reaching criticality is allowed to provide a reasonable amount of time to perform the required calculations and have appropriate verification.

When SDM is demonstrated by calculations not associated with a test (e.g., to confirm SDM during the fuel loading sequence), additional margin must be included to account for uncertainties in the calculation. During refueling, adequate SDM is required to ensure that the reactor does not reach criticality during control rod withdrawals. An evaluation of each in-vessel fuel movement during fuel loading (including shuffling fuel within the core) is required to ensure adequate SDM is maintained during refueling. This evaluation ensures that the intermediate loading patterns are bounded by the safety analyses for the final core loading pattern. For example, bounding analyses that demonstrate adequate SDM for the most reactive configurations during the refueling may be performed to demonstrate acceptability of the entire fuel movement sequence. These bounding analyses include additional margins to account for the associated uncertainties in the calculation.

2. Reactivity Margin - Inoperable Control Rods

Specification 3.3.A.2 requires that a rod be taken out of service if it cannot be moved with drive pressure. If a rod is disarmed electrically, its position shall be consistent with the shutdown reactivity limitation stated in Specification 3.3.A.1. This assures that the core can be shutdown at all times with the remaining control rods, assuming the highest worth, operable control rod does rod insert. An allowable pattern for control rods valved out of service will be available to the reactor operator. The number of rods permitted to be inoperable could be

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many more than the six allowed by the Specification, particularly late in the operation cycle; however, the occurrence of more than six could be indicative of a generic control rod drive problem and the reactor will be shutdown. Also if damage within the control rod drive mechanism and in particular, cracks in drive internal housing, cannot be ruled out, then a generic problem affecting a number of drives cannot be ruled out. Circumferential cracks resulting from stress assisted intergranular corrosion have occurred in the collet housing of drives at several BWRs. This type of cracking could occur in a number of drives and if the cracks propagated until severance of the collet housing occurred, scram could be prevented in the affected rods. Limiting the period of operation with a potentially severed collet housing and requiring increased surveillance after detecting one stuck rod will assure that the reactor will not be operated with a large number of rods with failed collet housings.

B. Control Rods

1. Control rod dropout accidents as discussed in the FSAR can lead to significant core damage. If coupling integrity is maintained, the possibility of a rod dropout accident is eliminated. Neutron instrumentation response to rod movement provides a verification that the rod is following its drive. Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The surveillance requires verifying a control rod does not go to the withdrawn over-travel position. The over-travel position feature provides a positive check on the coupling integrity since only an uncoupled CRD can reach the over-travel position. The verification is required to be performed when a control rod is fully withdrawn after each refueling outage (since work on the control rod or CRD System may have affected coupling), and after each uncoupling.

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2. The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the extremely remote event of a housing failure. The amount of reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal, which is less than a normal single withdrawal increment, will not contribute to any damage of the primary coolant system. The design basis is given in Subsection 3.5.2 of the FSAR, and the design evaluation is given in Subsection 3.5.4. This support is not required if the reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure since there would then be no driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing.
3. In the course of performing normal startup and shutdown procedures, a pre-specified sequence for the withdrawal or insertion of control rods is followed. Control rod dropout accidents which might lead to significant core damage, cannot occur if this sequence of rod withdrawals or insertions is followed. The Rod Worth Minimizer restricts withdrawals and insertions to those listed in the pre-specified sequence and provides an additional check that the reactor operator is following prescribed sequence. Although beginning a reactor startup without having the RWM operable would entail unnecessary risk, continuing to withdraw rods if the RWM fails subsequently is acceptable if a second licensed operator verifies the withdrawal sequence. Continuing the startup increases core power, reduces the rod worth and reduces the consequences of dropping any rod. Withdrawal of rods for testing is permitted with the RWM inoperable, if the reactor is subcritical and all other rods are fully inserted. Above 20% power, the RWM is not needed since even with a single error an operator cannot withdraw a rod with sufficient worth, which if dropped, would result in anything but minor consequences.
4. Refer to the Vermont Yankee Core Performance Analysis report.
5. The Source Range Monitor (SRM) system has no scram functions. It does provide the operator with a visual indication of neutron level. The consequences of reactivity accidents are a function of the initial neutron flux. The requirement of at least three counts per second assures that any transient, should it occur, begins at or above the initial value of 10^{-8} of rated power used in the analyses of transients from cold conditions. One operable SRM channel is adequate to monitor the approach to criticality, therefore, two operable SRM's are specified for added conservatism.
6. The Rod Block Monitor (RBM) is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power level operation. During reactor operation with certain limiting control rod patterns, the withdrawal of a designated single control rod could result in one or more fuel rods with MCPR less than the fuel cladding integrity safety limit. During use of such patterns, it is judged that testing of the RBM system prior to withdrawal of such rods will provide added assurance that improper withdrawal does not occur. It is the responsibility of the Nuclear Engineer to identify these limiting patterns and the designated rods either when the patterns are initially established or as they develop due to the occurrence of inoperable control rods.